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FOREWORD
The development of democratic institutions in the 
Latin American Republics has been retarded by the continuous 
appearance of "the man on horseback," or the caudillo. This 
type of an illiterate or semi-literate leader usually comes 
from the military class and possesses a magnetic and forceful 
personality. The caudillos rule with dictatorial powers, 
sometimes under the guise of a more or less democratic con­
stitution. In most instances, the majority of the people 
they govern are either partially or totally illiterate and 
follow the dictates of their leader without pondering the 
violation of the principles he professes to uphold. The 
pattern for this type of government was initiated throughout 
most of Latin America after the end of the wars for inde­
pendence from Spain. In Venezuela, the government of the 
"man on horseback" began the very day that nation became an 
independent Republic, and it was embodied in the person of 
JosA Antonio PAez.
The translating and editing of the Autobiografla del 
General JosA Antonio PAez. Volume I, and a study of General 
PAez's life, reveal the many facets involved in the develop­
ment of caudillo government. To begin with, it clearly 
pictures masses of ignorant men of mixed blood who do not
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understand, or even seem to need to understand, the principles 
involved in democratic government. It delineates the 
economic conditions which force these men to be so involved 
in the process of eking out a meager existence, that they 
have no time to formulate thoughts on government. Finally, 
it portrays PAez himself as the resolute, strong, and likable 
caudillo who assumed the reins of the Venezuelan government.
He was a simple man who, although very much aware of his 
intellectual limitations, accepted his country's mandate to 
rule not only because of his personal ambition, but also out 
of a sincere belief that he best suited his country's needs. 
PAez ruled his country like an autocratic father would rule 
his family. The progress and development of all institutions, 
including the Church to a certain extent, depended on his 
personal wishes and whim rather them on the intellectual and 
social growth of the populace. Thus General PAez set the 
stage for the dictators who were to govern Venezuela in the 
future. Unfortunately, few if any of these men had the 
interest in their country and fellow citizens that PAez had; 
consequently, none ruled so benevolently as he did.
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TRANSLATOR-EDITOR1S NOTE
Translating and editing the Autobiografia del General 
Jos& Antonio PAez, Volume I, posed several questions. The 
first of these concerned the whereabouts of the original 
manuscript, for perhaps it could offer clues as to whether 
General Jose Antonio P&ez wrote the manuscript himself, with­
out editorial supervision; whether he wrote the manuscript 
and later submitted it for editorial corrections; or whether 
he dictated the material to a secretary who edited it. 
Unfortunately, no information can be found regarding the 
whereabouts of this original manuscript, and it can only be 
assumed that it was either destroyed or lost after publica­
tion. Therefore, any answers to the queries about the 
original manuscript necessarily have to be conjecture to a 
certain extent. It is known that P&ez had limited funds on 
which to live in New York, so limited in fact that he was 
forced to leave for Argentina the year after he wrote his 
manuscript in order to work as a commission agent for a 
cattle company. This suggests that he could not afford a 
secretary or editorial supervision for any extended period 
of time. Furthermore, judging from the style of writing, 
and the length of some sentences and paragraphs, it is safe 
to venture that General P&ez wrote his autobiography himself 
with limited assistance.
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The second problem concerned the type of translation 
to be made, either literal or free. After much considera­
tion, the translator decided on a literal translation in so 
far as grammar and readability permitted. Perhaps in this 
manner, PAez's charm and candor could more readily be seen. 
However, when the sentences or paragraphs were too long and 
involved, the editor divided them, always trying to keep the 
meaning and spirit of the original. Necessarily, the 
capitalization varies somewhat from that used by PAez.
The matter of handling footnotes posed still another 
difficulty, for PAez had footnotes in his manuscript, and the 
translator-editor had many footnotes to interject. This 
raised the question of how to distinguish between the two.
It was solved by stating first, before giving the citation, 
when it was PAez's footnote. All the other footnotes are 
those written by the translator-editor.
Toward the middle of the first volume. General PAez 
began to add material and documents that either did not add 
substantially to the text, or were already reproduced else­
where. The translator-editor deleted these which include 
the following! in Chapter XI the long list of names of the 
men in the patriot army who fought at Queseras del Medio in 
1819; in Chapter XIII the lengthy official decree issued by 
the Colombian Constituent Congress expressing thanks to the 
victors of the Battle of Carabobo; in chapter XV the articles 
of capitulation whereby the Spanish Colonel Manuel de Carrera
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y Colina surrendered Puerto Cabello to General PAez; in 
Chapter XVIII PAez's official letter to the Liberator 
explaining his conduct in 1826, printed in many collections 
of documents and letters; in Chapter XXI PAez's official 
letter to the Liberator in 1827, also reproduced in many 
collections; and in chapter JOCIV a varied assortment of 
letters which General PAez inserted. Other deletions made by 
the translator-editor are indicated in the text by the use 
of a footnote.
There are two editions of the Autobiografla del 
General JosA Antonio PAez. The first edition was published 
in New York by Hellet and Breen in 1869. A copy of this 
edition is in the United States Library of Congress in 
Washington, D. C. The second edition was published by H. R. 
Elliot & Co., Inc., with printings in Caracas and in New 
York in 1946. These printings are exact reproductions of the 
first edition except for the fact that the following items 
were added; two pictures of General JosA Antonio PAez; a 
copy of a painting of Queseras del Medio; the Liberator’s 
proclamation to the Bravos de Apure; and the Prologues. The 
Prologue of the Caracas printing was written by Doctor Juan 
Oropesa, Rector of the universidad Central de Venezuela; 
the Prologue of the New York printing, by JosA Marti, the 
precursor of the Cuban independence movement. Since copies 
of the first edition are almost extinct, the translator- 
editor used the Caracas printing of the second edition.
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ABSTRACT
The wars for South American independence have pre­
sented a panoramic, but often neglected, view of man's 
willingness to endure any and every type of hardship in pur­
suit of that most elusive ideal— freedom. The leaders of 
this movement range from the intellectuals of Simdn Bolivar's 
stature to the almost illiterate. JosA Antonio PAez, a 
native of Venezuela, is illustrative of the latter category. 
In his later years while he was in exile in New York, after 
he had acquired an education, he wrote a two-volume auto­
biography, which gives a vivid picture not only of his life, 
but also of the wars for independence in Northern South 
America. This dissertation is a tramslation and editing of 
the first volume of Autobioqrafla del General JosA Antonio 
PAez. It covers the years 1790 to 1829. The author included 
innumerable letters and documents relative to this period in 
his life. Some of these have been deleted because they do 
not add substantially to the material in the text or because 
they may be found elsewhere in their original form. My 
introduction to the Autobioqrafla is a review of PAez's life 
from the beginning until his death in 1873. It depicts his 
role as a military leader in the wars for independence; his 
political career as President of Venezuela (1831-35; 1638-42),
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as the power behind President Vargas (1835-38) and President 
Soublette (1843-47), and as dictator (1861-62); and some 
aspects of his personal life.
This volume reveals JosA Antonio PAez's inauspicious 
beginnings as an ignorant llanero. or cowboy, on the Vene­
zuelan llanos. or plains. It tells how when the war for 
independence from Spain broke out in 1810, he enlisted in 
the patriot army. After enduring indescribable hardships, 
he became the undisputed leader of the llanero army that was 
the scourge of the seasoned Spanish troops. His military 
prestige now made his friendship indispensable to the Libera­
tor, Simbn Bolivar. PAez not only led his fellow Venezuelans 
to victory over Spain, but also eventually to a rejection of 
Bolivar's ideal of a unified Latin America. When Venezuela 
could no longer tolerate domination from BogotA in 1829,
PAez was on hand to take over the reins of an independent 
Venezuelan government. Thus he became Venezuela's first 
constitutionally elected President.
There are two main interrelated questions that arise 
concerning PAez's career. The first is his personal loyalty 
or disloyalty to his Commander-in-Chief, Bolivar. The 
second concerns his attitude toward Venezuelan nationalism. 
Did he ever give anything but a token fealty to Bolivar's 
Republic of Graun Colombia? This volume attempts to answer 
both questions. It reveals PAez as being loyal to Bolivar 
to the point where it would have been foolhardy for PAez to
xii
ignore his country's requests. PAez’s fealty to Gran 
Colombia in the beginning was as sincere as his loyalty to 
Bolivar. Although his mental horizons were circumscribed to 
a great extent by the llanos more than by Venezuela itself, 
he seems to have respected Bolivar's opinions. It was only 
when public opinion showed itself markedly opposed to union 
with Colombia, that PAez yielded to Venezuela's request for 
independence.
The translation and editing of this first volume mani­
fest General PAez to be not only the dominant figure in 
Venezuela both prior to independence and the period immedi­
ately succeeding it, but also one of Bolivar's most important 
Generals. Without PAez and his llanero army, the war for 
independence in Northern South America might have presented 
a different picture and seen Spain victorious for an 
indefinite period of time.
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INTRODUCTION
Some men are born, live, and die and barely ruffle 
the waters of existence: others plunge in and alter the cur­
rents. Such a man was JosA Antonio PAez. Born of humble 
parentage in the western Venezuelan province of Barinas, 
without the benefit of a formal education, this man became 
the scourge of seasoned Spanish troops in the battles for 
South American independence and eventually became president 
of the country he helped to liberate and create. The stories 
about how PAez attained these achievements are abundant and 
much intermingled with myth and legend. The cold, bare facts 
about his life, however, are even more interesting than any­
thing legend could create. PAez was an exceptional man in 
every sense of the word. Physical and mental feats that 
would have daunted a lesser man merely served as a challenge 
to him. And yet, very much aware of the limits placed on 
him by his lack of schooling, he could be as humble and 
trusting as a child. True to his Hispanic background, he was 
a victim of flamboyance and grand gestures. There is one 
main fact that shines throughout all the actions of his life 
and compensates for his shortcomings and mistakes. This was 
his zest for living and his sincere love for and belief in 
his fellow man. It must have been very difficult to know 
him and not like him.
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2JosA Antonio PAez was born June 13, 1790 on a farm 
near the Curpa River bank, close to the town of Acarigua in 
the Araure District of Barinas. He was the seventh son of 
Juan victorio PAez and Marla violante Herrera. He had reddish 
hair and a fair complexion, for he was "white on all four 
sides." Since his father was employed in a government tobacco 
store in the town of Guanare and his mother, for some unex­
plained reason, did not live with him, young PAez had an 
unusual childhood. Sefiora PAez and her sons never had a 
fixed abode. Despite this when he was eight years old his 
mother sent him to a school which was operated by Seftora 
Gregoria Diaz. Here he learned the rudiments of Christian 
doctrine and how to read and write.^ He was delivered from
There is considerable divergence of opinion relative 
to PAez1s literacy (or illiteracy). R. B. Cunninghame Graham, 
JosA Antonio PAez (London, 1929), 2, states that at the age 
of eight PAez attended a "hedge school" and probably learned 
the basics of an elementary education. Later, on page 114, 
Cunninghame Graham propounds that PAez "must have been over 
twenty years of age before he learned to read and write." 
General Daniel F. O ’Leary describes PAez as "completely 
illiterate," Memoriae del General Daniel Florencio 0 1Learv.
3 vols. (Caracas, 1952), 1, 451. Jesus Marla Henao and 
Gerardo Arrubla (Fred Rippy, trans. and ed.), History of 
Colombia (Chapel Hill, 1938), 310, state that "he received 
but little education." Sir Robert Ker Porter, first British 
consul and charge d'affairs to Venezuela (Walter Dupuoy, ed.), 
Caracas Diary. 1825-42 (Caracas, 1966), 119, describes PAez 
as "being totally uneducated. . . . Feeling this inferiority,
and anxious to improve, he has within these very few years, 
applied himself to reading and writing; which acquirement 
until then, he was totally ignorant of."
What may be deduced from all this is that JosA Antonio 
PAez could probably barely read and write when he became 
President of Venezuela in 1830. At this time he seems to 
have started a campaign to improve himself culturally because 
he was soon able to read and write French, English, and a 
little Italian, in addition to his native Spanish.
3Senora Diaz's rather harsh teaching methods by his brother-in- 
law, Bernardo FernAndez, who employed him as a sales clerk in 
his mercantile store. PAez proved fairly proficient at his 
tasks; consequently, an uncle, Domingo PAez, hired him and 
one of his brothers to come to the town of San Felipe to 
assist him in the management of his varied business interests.
Shortly after this, when PAez was barely seventeen 
years old, his mother sent for him to come to Guanare to run 
an important family errand in the neighboring province of 
Barquisimeto. This errand proved to be the event that was to 
alter drastically the pattern of PAez1s life and subsequently, 
the pattern of Venezuelan and Gran Colombian history. All 
the details of this mission are not known. What is known is 
that in June of 1807 PAez set off with certain documents and 
a sum of money to present to a lawyer who lived in Patio 
Grande, and that he did accomplish his mission successfully.
On his return trip home, PAez stopped at one of the small 
local stores. Obviously impressed with his attainment, he 
brandished his money purse. This act caused him to be 
accosted later on the road by several of the local ruffians.
In the affray which ensued, he shot and killed one of the men. 
Panic seized PAez when he thought of the consequences which 
might result from this act, but he managed to reach home and 
said nothing except to one of his sisters, about what had 
transpired. Tormented by the fear of being accused of murder, 
and without saying a word to his family, he headed toward the
4llanos, where then as now, a man may hide himself from the 
whole world.
Henceforth the llanos (the great Venezuelan plains 
that stretch north from the Guiana Highlands and the Orinoco 
to where the Andes skirt the Caribbean Coast, and west through 
the Apure in Venezuela and Casanare in New Granada, to the 
Andes in New Granada) were destined to dominate JosA Antonio 
Piez1s existence. They represented a great inland sea of 
grass, broken only by small islands of slender palms, which 
were inundated six months out of the year when they became a 
huge lake. "The climate of the Llanos with its temperature 
of ninety-two, the snakes, the boas, the crocodiles, the 
electric eels, the stinging rays, caribes, the tigers in the 
woods, the inundations and the droughts, the ever present 
insect plague, made life in the great plains a constant 
battle to the i n h a b i t a n t s ^ Consequently, the inhabitants 
of this vast, wild region were a distinctly separate breed 
of men. Mostly Indians or men of mixed blood, the inhabi­
tants that survived in this environment were exceptionally 
hardy— immune to heat, cold, and hunger, and able to face 
daily dangers with equanimity. This was the world and the 
men with whom PAez was thrown when the Venezuelan independence 
movement began thus making Venezuela the bloodiest battle­
ground in Spanish America.
When PAez had penetrated deep into the llanos, he went
^cunninghame Graham, PAez, 17.
5to the cattle ranch of La Calzada. It was owned by a Don 
Leon Manuel Pulido, and here PAez worked as a cattle peon at 
th3 salary of three dollars a month. The adjustment he was 
forced to make was tremendous. He had nothing in common, 
either in blood or upbringing, with the swarthy llaneros who 
nicknamed him "El_ Catire.” meaning fair in their dialect.
To add insult to injury, Piez immediately incurred the dis­
like of Manuelote, the big Negro overseer of the ranch. He 
gave young PAez every impossible task to perform and then at 
night would force him to come wash his feet. It was these 
experiences that tempered the steel of P&ez's character and 
body and were destined to make him the undisputed leader of 
the llanero hordes.
As fortune would have it, the foreman Manuelote 
decided to take PAez to El Paguey to assist him with the 
branding of some cattle. While he was there, PAez met Don 
Pulido, owner of the ranch. The latter was immediately taken 
with young PAez and sent him to sell cattle at the nearest 
town. PAez discharged this task so well that Pulido decided 
to keep him close by. He gradually taught PAez the cattle 
business, and PAez started buying some cattle on his own and 
prospered a little. In 1809 he married Dominga Ortiz. Other 
than being the mother of his only legitimate son, Manuel 
Antonio, Dominga must have had very little, if any, influence
6on PAez, for he seldom mentions her in his autobiography.
This seems particularly unusual considering that she accom­
panied him on all his campaigns until 1821, when he deserted 
her.4 However, PAez does not mention Barbara Nieves in his 
autobiography, and she was his reason for abandoning Dominga. 
According to John G. A. Williamson, the first diplomatic 
representative of the United States to Venezuela, PAez lived 
with Barbarita after he deserted Dominga "with all the 
apparent care prudence & circumspection of a married man."5 
RamOn Diaz SAnchez later wrote that in PAez's love for his 
lovely and spirited mistress, "there was not only voluptous- 
ness and carnal jealousy, but superstition, mysterious magic. 
'She was my good star,1 he sobbingly said when death snatched 
her away from him in 1845."®
When PAez was eighteen, Napoleon Bonaparte was near 
the zenith of his power. In 1808 he invaded Spain and after 
the abdication of Charles IV and Ferdinand VII, proclaimed 
his brother Joseph Bonaparte King of Spain. Spain's American 
possessions refused to recognize Joseph. They established
3A1 though PAez had several illegitimate children later, 
Manuel Antonio remained his only legitimate heir. John G. A. 
Williamson (Jane Lucas de Grummond, ed.), Caracas Diarv. 
1835-1840 (Baton Rouge, 1954), 268.
Vicente DAvila, Diccionario BioarAfico de Ilustres 
Prbceres de la Independenc ia Suramericana. 2 vols. (Caracas, 
1926), II, 52.
^Williamson, Caracas Diarv. 241.
®Ram6n Diaz SAnchez, QuzmAn, Elipse de una Ambicidn de 
Poder (Caracas, 1950), 173-74.
7juntas to govern themselves in Ferdinand's name. P&ez's 
province of Barinas and six others (Caracas, Cumana, Mar­
garita, Barcelona, Mftrida, and Trujillo} called themselves 
the American Confederation of Venezuela. It was not until 
July 5, 1811, however, that this new nation declared its 
independence from Spain. It promulgated a constitution which 
changed a monarchical form of government to a republican, and 
created a new federal state known as the Confederation of the 
States of Venezuela. This early independence movement was 
not a popular movement. The masses had little or no interest 
in securing their independence. They remained loyal to the 
monarchy and the church. The Venezuelan historial Guillermo 
MorOn states: "The people, the Venezuelans, did not under­
stand or desire Independence. It had to be imposed on them."7 
Keeping these facts in mind makes it easier to understand the 
wars for independence in Venezuela during which men and 
armies changed sides and loyalties with amazing rapidity.
This was the way to survive; and after all, they were merely 
changing their leaders, not their principles.
P&ez was twenty years old in 1810 when he enlisted in 
the revolutionary cavalry and served under his old master Don 
Manuel Pulido in the province of Barinas. There is no record 
to show that he saw much service in this first enlistment.
When the First Republic came to an end in 1812 with Francisco
7Guillermo Mordn (John street, trans. and ed.). 
History of Venezuela (London, 1964), 91.
8Miranda's capitulation to Domingo Monteverde, PAez retired 
from the revolutionary army with the rank of sergeant and an 
indefinite leave.® He must have been living quietly at his 
small cattle ranch when he received an order from the Spanish 
General, Don Antonio Tiscar, to round up cattle and deliver 
them to Barinas. Although PAez claims to have always been a 
patriot at heart, he was wary of openly defying the Spanish 
General. It was only when the Spaniards issued him a Cap­
tain's commission and command of a cavalry troop, that PAez 
seized the opportunity to flee to Santa Barbara. There he 
rejoined Don Pulido who had been commissioned a Lieutenant 
Colonel by the Republicans. It was then that the temporary 
patriot government of the Second Republic offered PAez the 
rank of Captain as compensation for the rank he had refused 
to accept from the Spanish.
On June 15, 1813 in Trujillo, Simdn Bolivar issued 
his Decree of War to the Death. Within two months he had 
swept east to Caracas and reestablished the Republic of 
Venezuela. It was during this time that PAez had his first 
success as a military leader. He surprised and defeated a 
Spanish detachment of four hundred men led by Commander 
Miguel Marcelino at Las Matas (kierrerefia, parish of canagua,
®One of the major factors leading to Miranda1s capitu­
lation was the earthquake which occurred on Good Friday,
March 26, 1812, along the Venezuelan coast. Caracas was 
almost completely destroyed, and the clergy used this natural 
phenomenon as antipatriot propaganda, claiming that it was 
God's punishment for the Venezuelan declaration of inde­
pendence .
in the Apure Department. When PAez was returning with the 
prisoners he took to Barinas, he met a soldier who informed 
him that the Spanish had taken the town of Barinas. On 
learning this, PAez's men deserted him. Hence, he was forced 
to wander for days, hiding from the Spanish and enduring all 
sorts of privations, until finally he was able to communi­
cate with Don Manuel Pacheco, an old friend who was the 
Spanish military commander of Canagua. PAez conceived the 
plan of joining the patriots in Sam Carlos by securing a pass 
port to Barinas from Commandant Pacheco, and getting amother 
passport there from another friend, Don JosA Maria Luzardo, 
the Spanish governor of Barinas, under the pretext of going 
to present himself to Colonel JosA YafSez y Tiscar at his 
headquarters in Guanare. While attempting to carry out this 
plan, PAez was seized and imprisoned by the Spamish.
Following almost unbelievable escapee from two executions, 
he was freed and rejoined the patriots. However, the Second 
Republic had now disappeared, for in 1814 a new Royalist 
caudillo, JosA TomAs Boves, had risen to lead the formidable 
llaneros. Together they had defeated the patriot leader 
Vicente Campo Elias in February of 1814; amd in June, Bolivar 
and Samtiago Marino's combined forces at the Second Battle of 
La Puerta. Boves swept into Caracas amd then to the east, 
but Bolivar and Marifto managed to escape him and flee to 
Cartagena.
When PAez rejoined the patriots. Commander Ramdn 
Garcia de Sena made him commander of his cavalry. In time.
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PAez, disgusted with Garcia do Sena's treacherous actions, 
transferred his loyalty first to Governor Juan Antonio 
Paredes and later to Captain Antonio Rangel. Still later in 
1814, he joined General Rafael Urdaneta in MArida in western 
Venezuela.
In the summer of 1814 Urdaneta with the Venezuelan 
Army of the West and many patriot families fled by the 
MArida-CAcuta route into New Granada and established his 
headquarters at CAcuta. PAez refused to follow him because 
of a disagreement with one of Urdaneta's officers, commander 
Rafael Chavez. Then PAez decided to carry out a scheme he 
had been pondering for a long time, especially after he heard 
of Boves1s death in December of 1814. This was to take pos­
session of the Apure region and win its fierce inhabitants, 
the llaneros, over to the patriot cause. PAez knew from 
experience that these men would fight only if they found a 
leader whose personal courage and qualities they could 
respect. He also was aware that his zest for fighting and 
total disregard for personal safety had already made him 
famous among them. With his wife and child, he now made the 
dangerous crossing of the Andes from MArida to the plains of 
Casanare. PAez finally arrived at Pore, the capital of 
Casanare. There the Venezuelan Commander who had been 
appointed Commander-in-chief by the Casanare government, 
General Francisco Olmedilla, welcomed him amd immediately 
gave him command of a cavalry regiment. With their guerilla 
forces they carried the war east into the Apure where PAez
11
and Olmedilla won the Battle of Guasdualito in 1814.
Except for the guerrilla pockets of resistance in the 
llanos defended by men like Olmedilla and PAez, most of 
Venezuela was back under Spanish control at the beginning of 
1815. Bolivar was in Cartagena where he explained to the 
Congress of New Granada why his campaign in Venezuela had 
failed, and why once again Colombia must help liberate his 
native state. The Granadan Congress promoted Bolivar and 
sent him to subject the rebellious state of Cundinamarca. 
Having accomplished this mission, he was made Captain General 
of the Armies of the Confederation. His next assignment was 
to free Santa Marta from the Royalists, which would enable 
him to invade Maracaibo and thus reenter Venezuela. Unfor­
tunately, Bolivar fell afoul of the governor of Cartagena, 
General Manuel del Castillo. The latter refused to supply 
arms and munitions for the Santa Marta campaign; and after 
failing to force Castillo to conform, Bolivar resigned his 
command on May 8, 1815 to prevent further bloodshed of 
patriots. The next day he sailed to Jamaica; and on May 14, 
he reached Kingston where his host. Maxwell Hyslop, was most 
gracious but unable to secure any help from England for 
Bolivar's cause since England and Spain were allies at this 
time.
Meanwhile, the Cortes had restored Ferdinand VII to 
the throne of Spain. He quickly nullified the Liberal Constitu­
tion of 1812 and the decrees of the Cortes. He then organized 
an expedition of more than ten thousand veterans from the
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Napoleonic Wars for the purpose of subduing his rebellious 
colonies. He put General Pablo Morillo in command, and the 
esqpedition landed on the eastern coast of Venezuela on April 
3, 1815. Morillo swept west through Venezuela and then began 
a two-pronged attack against New Granadat one by sea to 
Cartagena and south to Bogota; the other over the Andes to 
Bogota.
Bolivar left Jamaica on December 10, 1815 and set sail 
for Haiti.9 He landed first at Aux Caves [Los Cavos) and 
then went to Port-au-Prince on December 31, 1815. Here he 
was welcomed by President Alexandre Petidn and destined to 
get invaluable help. With Petidn's assistance, Bolivar 
organized an expedition of two hundred and forty men which 
sailed in seven small vessels to the island of Margarita, 
still partly under the guerrilla control of the patriot Juan 
Bautista Arismendi. Together Bolivar and Arismendi subdued 
the island and went on to the mainland, only to be defeated 
by Francisco Tom&s Morales, one of Morillo's lieutenants.
Once again Bolivar was forced to return to Haiti.
During this time P&ez and other guerrilla chiefs con­
tinued to operate in the llanos against the Royalists.
^Writers such as Madariaga state that Bolivar at this 
point had set sail for Cartagena and decided to go to Haiti 
only when he learned that Cartagena had been captured by 
Morillo. The latest scholarship, however, affirms that when 
Bolivar left Kingston he had no intention of going to Carta­
gena, but rather was headed for Haiti. This is revealed in 
a newly-discovered letter Bolivar had written to President 
Petidn. Alfredo Boulton, Miranda, Bolivar y  Sucre. Tres 
Estudios Iconogr&ficos (Caracas, 1959), 51.
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Unfortunately, Olmedilla became too hard-pressed by the early 
patriot reverses and decided to move his family and all the 
men who would follow him to San Juan de los Llanos, a frontier 
town in what is now Colombian territory. P&ez considered 
this tantamount to a desertion of the patriot cause and 
refused to follow him. Instead he joined N. Solano, the new 
patriot governor of Casanare. Under the latter's orders, it 
became P&ez's painful duty later to arrest Olmedilla for his 
desertion. Shortly afterwards, P&ez joined General Joaquin 
Ricaurte's forces.
At the end of 1815 the province of Casanare, which was 
the only part of New Granada that Morillo had not conquered, 
was invaded by the Spanish General Sebastian de Calzada.
With an army of three thousand infantrymen, five hundred 
cavalrymen, and two pieces of artillery, he penetrated to 
the region of chire. There the llanero troops were waiting 
under Ricaurte's command; and on December 31, 1815 at the 
Battle of Chire P&ez as cavalry commander helped Ricaurte 
and Ramdn Nonato P6rez, the most powerful caudillo from 
Casanare, to defeat General Calzada and to completely rout 
the Spanish troops. It was on this occasion that P&ez had 
the first of the curious nervous attacks which were destined 
to plague him in the future before a battle. Several con­
temporary writers noted these strange seizures and credited 
them either to epilepsy or violent nervous excitement. In 
describing these fits, Cunninghame Graham statesi "One thing 
is certain, that for the time being, he used to behave like
14
a man possessed, brandishing his lance, and foaming at the 
mouth, till he fell off his horse."
It was shortly after this fit or attack, on February 
16, 1816, that the Battle of Mata de la Miel, which looms so 
prominently in Venezuelan history, took place. P&ez had 
been left in command of the small army defending Guasdualito 
after its commander. General Francisco Guerrero, fled with 
his staff and several companies of soldiers on hearing that 
the Spanish were advancing with superior forces and artillery. 
P&ez left Guasdualito with only five hundred cavalrymen to 
find the enemy forces led by colonel Francisco L6pez, the 
Spanish governor of Barinas. Encountering them at Mata de 
la Miel, he ordered a charge at dusk. This was good strategy 
since night rendered their powerful artillery fire harmless. 
The Royalists fled before P&ez's inspired attack, which 
killed or wounded four hundred of their m e n . ^  This was a 
total defeat of the Royalists and was the first time that 
the llaneros routed regular soldiers armed with artillery.
It was also the occasion when P&ez emerged from obscurity to 
display his skillful leadership and for which he was promoted 
to Lieutenant colonel. Henceforth, his name became known 
throughout the country.
Now immigrants from New Granada fleeing Morillo's
lOCunninghame Graham, Piez. 92.
11Vicente Lecuna, Crdnica Razonada de las Guerras de 
Bolivar. 3 vols. (New York, 1950), I, 484.
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oppression begeun pouring into the Apure. Generals P&ez, 
Urdaneta, and Santander had already moved east to escape the 
Spanish General Miguel de la Torre. In Arauca, the Commandant 
General Miguel Valdez called a meeting of officials and 
notable persons to constitute a government and name the chief 
of arms. This junta named Fernando Serrano, President; 
Francisco Javier Yanes, Secretary; and Francisco de Paula 
Santander, General in Chief. Santander immediately sent 
P£ez on an expedition to round up horses. However, the 
llaneros refused to acknowledge Semtander as their commander: 
so when P&ez returned from carrying out Santander's order, he 
discovered that his army had “mutinied," demanding that he 
dissolve this government and assume control of both civil 
and military command. P&ez yielded to the entreaty of his 
troops in September of 1816. Vicente Lecuna states that:
"In reality his election, in that environment of practical 
and primitive customs, without any further law than that of 
force, was inevitable.
After the Spanish reestablished the Sarinas division 
in 1816, Colonel Francisco Ldpez, who was La Torre's second 
in command, invaded the Apure region again as far as Mantecal. 
Ldpez's troops occupied and won command of the Lower Apure, 
but fearful of attacking P&ez in the Upper Apure, he retired 
toward Nutrias. P&ez, having just been elected Commander- 
in-Chief of this area, decided to invade the Lower Apure,
12ibid., 485.
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which had greater available resources than the Upper Apure.
He divided his troops into three columns under the orders of 
Generals Urdaneta, Santander, and Manuel de Serviez. On 
October 8, 1816 they attacked and defeated Ldpez's more 
numerous troops at the Battle of Yagual. PAez and his 
generals then pursued a fleeing L6pez to Achaguas.
After L6pez had finally set up his headquarters on 
the shores of the Apure, he carelessly fell prisoner to 
PAez's troops. PAez ordered Ldpez beheaded, and "with this 
political blow he affirmed his power in those immense 
llanuras. The llanero chieftain now determined to send 
General Urdaneta to Barinas while he himself led the siege 
on San Fernando, the control point on the Apure. (It was at 
this time that Nonato PArez evacuated Casanare and left it 
to the Spanish General La Torre while he proceeded to set up 
his headquarters in the Upper Apure.) When PAez discovered 
that General Salvador Gorrin was marching to relieve San 
Fernando, he set out to encounter him. The rival forces met 
in battle at El Palital on December 18. PAez was unable to 
defeat Gorrin, and the latter entered San Fernando peacefully 
while PAez returned to Achaguas in the Apure to concentrate 
and train his cavalry to meet Morillo, who was also marching 
to the Apure. Meanwhile Calzada was approaching MArida from 
New Granada with three times as many troops as the patriots 
had.
13Ibid., 486.
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On December 31 of 1816 Bolivar's second expedition, 
organized in Haiti, landed at Barcelona. Urdaneta, who had 
fled Barinas ahead of calzada, first returned to PAez's 
headquarters and then went to join the Liberator early in 
1817. On his way to Barcelona (along the Guayana Province 
and the llanos of San Diego de Cabrutica) many patriot men 
and officers who could not tahe the hardships of life in the 
Apure joined Urdaneta. This necessarily reduced the size of 
PAez's forces.
In January of 1817, with the Liberator still ignorant 
of PAez's contributions to the patriot cause in the Apure, 
the llanero chieftain ordered Nonato PArez to attach La 
Torre. Unfortunately, PArez insisted on first fighting 
Calzada*s troops, stationed in Guasdualito. The battle that 
ensued on January 4, was a total defeat for the patriots.
In fact, PArez lost so many men that he could not challenge 
La Torre as scheduled. Consequently, PAez was not able to 
prevent Morillo and La Torre from marching across the plains 
of Mucuritas and joining forces. Then PAez immediately 
joined Nonato PArez's forces and they confronted the Royalists 
at Mucuritas on January 28. In several brilliant tactical 
cavalry maneuvers PAez outwitted La Torre, who had to with­
draw from the battle zone that night. Lecuna asserts that 
"this brilliant victory confirmed PAez's titles as lord of 
the Apure . " 1 4
14Ibid., II, 5.
18
After their defeat, the Royalists marched in the 
direction of San Fernando, by way of Banco Largo and Achaguas, 
clinging to the edge of the forests. PAez inarched parallel 
to them on the open plain and tried to draw them into battle 
at Achaguas. The Royalists refused to give battle and pro­
ceeded to San Fernando. From here Morillo sent La Torre with 
troops and supplies down the Orinoco to reinforce Angostura, 
which had been beseiged by General Manuel Carlos Piar since 
January 18. Morillo left a force at San Fernando and moved 
east to the valleys of Aragua. As for PAez, he began 
detailed preparations to enable his refugee families and 
troops to survive the rainy season which was about to begin. 
PAez also divided his forces and spread them to occupy almost 
all of the Apure and part of the territory of Barinas. He 
set up his headquarters first at El Yagual and later in 
Achaguas. When his line of communication was interrupted by 
a Spanish regiment of three hundred men commanded by Jacinto 
Perera at San Antonio, on the bank of the Apure, he sent 
Vicente Pena to rout it. Commandant Peffa was repelled, with 
heavy lossest so PAez personally led another attack on 
Perera; but he, too, was defeated.
It was while PAez was at his headquarters in El Yagual 
in July of this year that he received commissioners from 
Mariffo and Bolivar, both asking to be recognized as the 
supreme authority. Cognizant of Bolivar's superior abilities 
and attributes, PAez chose to recognize him as supreme chief. 
With all the troops he could muster, he swore his allegiance
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to Bolivar before Father Ramfln Mendez, later Archbishop of 
Caracas.
By this time Morillo had abandoned Angostura, and a 
few of the Royalists had escaped down the Orinoco and north 
to Caracas. Bolivar set up his headquarters at Angostura.
It was not until the end of the year 1817 that Bolivar had 
enough supplies to move up the Orinoco and join forces with 
PAez. Finally, on January 30, 1818 Bolivar and PAez met for 
the first time at Cafiafistola. It was a warm and long- 
awaited meeting, but PAez could not help but express his 
amazement later "that Bolivar's outward appearance, his weak 
frame, accustomed from infancy to the comforts of a home, 
provided quite a contrast to that of the inhabitants of the 
llanos. On the sixth of the following month Bolivar 
expressed his amazement at the llaneros when they captured 
the enemy launches he needed at the mouth of the Cople River. 
Knowing that Bolivar wanted these vessels to move his army 
across the Apure River, PAez had ordered two parties of his 
llaneros. with twenty-five men each, to swim alongside their 
horses and capture them. When this "water cavalry" accom­
plished its mission, Bolivar was pleasantly surprised. He 
immediately ordered the first squadron to cross the river 
and attack the Royalist detachment at Guayabal. The patriots 
did this successfully and were able to keep anyone from
^Sjosfi Antonio PAez, Autobioqrafla del General JosA 
Antonio PAez. 2 vols. (New York, 1869), I, 140.
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escaping and informing General Morillo in Calabozo about what 
had transpired.
With his army safely across the Apure, Bolivar ordered 
the march to Calabozo. By February 12 of 1818 his forces had 
obliged Morillo to evacuate Calabozo and move north. Pur­
suing the Spanish General, Bolivar made a thrust at Caracas 
which was unsuccessful, partly because PAez, General Manuel 
Cedefto, and Colonel Antonio Ranjel had outvoted Bolivar in 
favor of remaining in Calabozo and using it as a base to take 
San Fernando, a besieged city they believed was bound to fall. 
Bolivar returned to Calabozo and on February 22 named PAez 
Governor and Commandant General of the Barinas Province.
PAez still seemed to be obsessed by San Fernando,
which according to Salvador de Madariaga was an obsession
lfi"due to the lure of booty to be won t h e r e . W h a t e v e r  his 
ulterior reason, PAez did leave Calabozo and besiege San 
Fernando. The siege was successful, for on March 6 the 
Spanish troops evacuated it, and PAez personally led his 
forces in their pursuit. After this victory, PAez retired 
to Achaguas, where he received news this same month of 
Bolivar's defeat at La Puerta by Morales.1 7 The llanero
^ Bolivar (New York, 1952), 306.
17General Morales, who was seriously wounded in this 
battle, was made Marques de La Puerta as a result of the 
victory. With Morales wounded, General La Torre assumed 
command of the Spanish forces here, and General Francisco 
LOpez became second in command.
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chieftain then, in answer to Bolivar's entreaties, went on 
to meet the Liberator at Ortiz. On May 21, 1818 the Royalists 
recaptured Calabozo, with PAez himself suffering a defeat by 
La Torre's troops at Cojedes. Bolivar now returned to 
Angostura, leaving PAez in the Apure.
Although the year 1818 had been a sad year indeed for 
the patriot cause, it had one redeeming feature with respect 
to morale. This was the arrival of English officers and 
troops who, out of work after the Napoleonic Wars, came to 
seek their fortunes by aiding the patriots. In August of 
1818, Colonel Gustavus Hippisley, with a regiment known as 
"The First Venezuelian Hussars," joined PAez's forces. The 
English officers and men took an immediate liking to the 
llanero chieftain. So much so, in fact, that on the same 
month they had joined him, one of the Englishmen, Colonel 
Belford H. Wilson, led a movement in San Fernando de Apure 
to promote PAez to be the Commander-in-Chief. Although 
there were insinuations that PAez had instigated the move­
ment himself, he denies it fervently in his autobiography.
At any rate, PAez states that he refused to accept the 
"commission" of government given him and sent Wilson to 
Bolivar in Angostura.1 8
Bolivar remained in Angostura until December of 1818, 
busy with the operations of his Army of the East. He had
lsBolivar arrested Colonel Wilson and later expelled 
him from the territory of Venezuela. Madariaga, Bolivar.
315.
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sent Santander to prepare forces and supplies in Casanare, 
for the Liberator was planning to invade New Granada. When 
the military details of this invasion had been worked out to 
his satisfaction, he turned his attention once again to the 
organization of a government for Venezuela and issued regu­
lations for convoking a congress. On December 21 Bolivar's 
expedition sailed up the Orinoco to meet PAez again to win 
his support for an attack on Morillo. PAez's support was 
vitally necessary for Bolivar, for in this San Fernando area 
it was Piez, and not Bolivar, who was in command of the 
troops. On January 17, 1819 he reviewed PAez's troops at 
San Juan de Payara, but failed to get PAez's support for an 
immediate attack on Morillo. Then Bolivar received news on 
January 21 of the arrival of numerous English volunteers in 
Angostura whom he was most desirous of incorporating in his 
army. He also wanted officially to install the delegates 
from Venezuela and New Granada meeting in Angostura; conse­
quently, he left General PAez in command of the troops in 
the Apure and returned to Angostura. The Congress of 
Angostura met on February 15, and on the following day 
Bolivar was elected President and Francisco Antonio Zea, 
Vice-President. This Congress also organized New Granada and 
Venezuela as the Republic of Gram Colombia.
Me am while General Morillo had decided to invade the 
Apure and end the patriot resistance there once and for all. 
He started his march into this area on January 1, 1819. 
Fortunately for the patriot cause, PAez had foreseen this
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invasion as early as December of the previous year. He 
determined to defend the Apure by using his cavalry to wear 
out the enemy cavalry with continuous attacks and to save 
his infantry by moving it to the island of Urbana. He put 
this scheme into operation and drew Morillo's troops deeper 
into the llanos. Morillo soon divined PAez's plan. The 
Spanish General knew that his cavalry could not defeat the 
llanero chieftain's cavalry in the plains. When Morillo 
realized that he could not overtake PAez with his infantry, 
he decided to suspend his pursuit of the llaneros and retire 
north of the Arauca .1 9  Morillo thus divided his forces in 
order to cover distant points and thus maintain himself in 
the Apure on the defensive. Thus the Spanish General 
established his headquarters on the north side of the Arauca, 
while PAez was on the south side. Such was the military 
situation in this area when Bolivar arrived unexpectedly on 
March 10 with a force numbering three thousand infantrymen 
and fifteen hundred c a v a l r y . B o l i v a r  felt that now was 
the most opportune time to attack and destroy Morillo com­
pletely; consequently, the Liberator's forces provoked 
Morillo, who had closeted his forces in Achaguas, for thirty- 
six consecutive hours. But Morillo refused to be baited, 
and Bolivar had to retire south along the Arauca and set up 
his headquarters at Potreritos Marrerenos.
1 9 Lecuna, Crdnica Razonada. II, 263.
2 0 Ibid.. 269.
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Morillo was soon joined in Achaguas by the fifth 
Spanish division under the command of La Torre and Calzada. 
Then he left this town and crossed the Apure Seco River, 
determined to give the patriots battle. By April 2 the 
Royalist forces were camped across from Bolivar's at Queseras 
del Medio, separated only by the Arauca River. PAez asked 
Bolivar's permission to cross the Arauca and attack Morillo. 
Gaining the Liberator's approval, PAez and his one hundred 
and fifty cavalrymen on April 3, 1819 defeated Morillo by 
brilliant guerrilla tactics. The defeat proved fatal for 
Spanish morale, and Morillo withdrew first to Achaguas, and 
then crossed the Apure and returned to Calabozo on May 12.
Bolivar appears to have been undecided at this point 
over what course of action to follow. It seemed that at 
first he wanted to pursue Morillo across the Apure, and then 
thought it more prudent to gather cattle for wintering in 
Barinas. PAez states in his autobiography that he was 
against going to Barinas, and that he thought the Liberator 
should march on to Mew Granada through the plains to Caaa- 
n a r e . ^  Bolivar's decision was made easier when Colonel 
Jacinto Lara arrived to inform Bolivar that Santander had 
everything in readiness for a revolt in Mew Granada.
21PAez, Autobioqrafla. I, 191. Madariaga states that 
"this may be an after-the-event attempt by PAez to deprive 
others of the glory of having thought first of the Andes 
expedition; but it sounds true to life. PAez always thought 
of operations that would send Bolivar as far away as 
possible." Bolivar, 341.
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Thereupon Bolivar called a general council of war which 
unanimously approved the plan to transfer operations to New 
Granada. Bolivar left the Apure to direct these operations, 
while PAez was both selected and elected to remain in the 
Apure and hold this area at all costs. During the period of 
reorganization which followed, Bolivar got his Army of the 
West ready, and it left the Mantecal area headed for New 
Granada on May 27. By June 22, 1819 this army had reached 
Pore where it joined Santander's division. The combined 
forces started the hazardous ascent of the Andes along the 
Pisba Moor early in July. After the descent and several 
skirmishes, Bolivar defeated the Spanish forces under JosA 
Maria Barreiro in the famous Battle of BoyacA on August 7, 
1819; and so "exactly six months from the opening of the 
campaign in Apure, and within seventy-five days of marching 
from El Mantecal, enduring all types of hardships and suf­
ferings, the victory delivered to the hero the main part of 
the viceroyalty of New G r a n a d a . O n  August 10 Bolivar 
triumphantly entered Santa FA and spent the next few weeks 
establishing control in the heart of New Granada. The 
Royalists had been pushed north to Cartagena and south to 
PopayAn.
Except for the battalion of llaneros he had given 
Bolivar, PAez had refused to collaborate in the New Granadan
^Lecuna, CrOnica Razonada. II, 349.
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venture.^3 Not only had he failed to occupy the valleys of 
Cdcuta as Bolivar had asked him to do, but he also refused 
to even deliver horses to Bolivar. At this point, he would 
neither leave the llanos nor deplete any of its resources. 
PAez spent most of his time late in 1819 and early in 1820 
either at Achaguas or at his Yagual ranch training an infan­
try corps destined to be known as "'Los Bravos de Apure."
Having found a good Vice-President for New Granada in 
Santander, Bolivar left the capital to return to Venezuela on 
September 20, 1819, and arrived in Angostura December 11. 
Almost immediately, he called a meeting of the Congress of 
Angostura to verify a plan he had brought all the way from 
Santa FA: the union of Venezuela, Colombia, and Quito under
one single constitution, congress obliged Bolivar, and on 
December 17 passed the bill which founded the Republic of 
Colombia. In this way, the Liberator hoped to impress 
foreign powers and secure recognition of the nascent state.
Fourteen days after his arrival in Angostura, Bolivar 
left for the Apure and arrived in Sam Juan de Payara on 
January 10, 1820, hoping to head P&ez'a fresh army against 
Morillo's main force. This hope was thwarted by the fact 
that PAez's cavalry had been rendered unfit for warfare due 
to an epidemic among the horses, while his infantry had been
^ T h i s  battalion was known as the "Bravos de PAez.” 
Madariaga states that "when the llaneros beheld the Andes, 
they looked on such stupendous heights with awe and wonder, 
and marvelled at the very existence of lands so different 
from theirs." As a result many of them deserted. Bolivar. 
344.
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weakened by desertion. Furthermore, PAez thought that 
Morillo wanted to draw Bolivar into a fight in the mountains, 
where the Spanish General felt stronger; so he would not yield 
to Bolivar's request to move his army. Bolivar, on the other 
hand, did not want to delay attacking Morillo for fear that 
it would give him time to receive the reinforcements he had 
asked for from Spain. The irreconcilable temperaments of 
the two strongest men in Venezuela clashed in this argument. 
"Bolivar knew only too well that he could not master the 
indomitable Llanero. What was he to do? Exactly what he 
had done a year earlier in the same situationi seek another 
city, another army, another mem he would be able to control.
He decided to give up his Venezuelem campaign and go to rule 
New Granada over the head of Santander. " 2 4
Meanwhile in Spain, the troops that were destined to 
reinforce Morillo and permanently subjugate the colonies 
rebelled against the power of the King on January 1, 1820.25 
With all hopes of receiving aid from the Peninsula dashed, 
the Royalist cause in America was dealt a tremendous blow. 
Bolivar was freed of the necessity of attacking Morillo 
immediately, and instead concentrated his efforts on making 
the patriots more secure in the interior by pushing the
2 4 Ibid.. 366.
2 5Lecuna, Crdnica Razonada, II, 377. Lecuna states 
that this revolt, part of a general liberal movement was 
brought about in part by the effect which the patriot victory 
at BoyacA, which had quickly liberated the rich provinces of 
New Granada, had had on the Spanish populace.
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Royalists closer to the Caribbean coast. The Liberator also 
took advantage of the order issued General Morillo by the 
Spanish Cortes to arrange an armistice with the patriots, to 
meet and confer with the latter and sign the Treaty of 
Trujillo on November 26, 1820. This famous Treaty declared 
a six months* armistice and regularized the conduct of war, 
ending the "war to the death" which had been mercilessly 
practiced by both sides. The armistice proved to be a moral 
victory for the patriots and gave them the time needed to 
effectively reorganize their forces. It also gave the 
patriots an added advantage in that it helped General Morillo 
come to the decision to return to Spain. Spurred on by the 
belief that the war in the colonies was lost unless over­
whelming reinforcements were received, the Spanish General 
sailed for Spain on December 16, 1820. He left General La 
Torre, a much less capable man, in his place. This in itself 
represented a victory for the patriots.
Before the end of the six months' interval, Bolivar 
had felt the need to end the armistice. His troops were 
being decimated everywhere by disease and want, for the 
cattle of the Apure were being diverted, under the protection 
of the armistice, from military use to peaceful trade. 
Following the attack on Maracaibo by Urdaneta's men, the truce 
ended April 21, 1821. Bolivar set his forces in motion* he 
had P&ez in the Apure; Urdaneta, in Maracaibo; and he himself, 
in Barinas. General Jos6 Francisco Bermddez was ordered to 
attack and take Caracas before the end of May. Bermtidez
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fulfilled these orders on May 14, with the Spaniards taking 
refuge in Puerto Cabello.
By June all parties, both patriot and Royalist, were 
converging on the plains of Carabobo. Both sides realized 
that this next campaign would seal the fate of Venezuela, 
and consequently employed their most experienced troops.
The rival forces led by Bolivar and La Torre met on June 24 
at Carabobo. Since the Spanish artillery commanded the 
valley through which Bolivar had to pass in order to reach 
the plain, he sent P&ez and his cavalry to use an unfrequented 
path through the hills to the west and enter the plain to 
the rear of the Spaniards. P&ez accomplished his mission, 
reaching a hilltop from where he could see the Spanish army 
two miles away. In his autobiography, the llanero chieftain 
states that from this hilltop, "The Apure Battalion vigor­
ously resisted the enemy infantry fire while descending into 
the woods and crossing a riverlet. It maintained its fire 
until the British Legion arrived under the command of its 
gallant Colonel (Thomas) Farriar. " 2 6 Later P&ez sent his men 
back farther north. Here, under the cover of brush and 
trees, he and his llaneros were able to reach the plain and 
attack the Spaniards from the rear just as Bollver's main 
force arrived by the direct road. La Torre lost control of 
his troops and soon the Royalist army was routed. P&ez, 
commanding the llanero cavalry, the infantry division known
2 6 P4ez, Autobiografia. I, 206.
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as 11 Los Bravos de Apure." and the British Legion, had ren­
dered such an important contribution to this victory, that 
Bolivar promoted him on the spot to General in Chief.
"However correct, the Liberals chiefly attributed the victory 
at Carabobo to the valor and military skill of General 
PAez."27 Though the victor, PAez had a miraculous escape 
during the battle.
General Morales, La Torre's second in command, now 
retreated with what was left of the Royalist army and shut 
himself up in Puerto Cabello. Bolivar and PAez entered 
Caracas on June 29. Here Bolivar organized the Venezuelan 
government under republican forms but on a military basis.
"He knew full well that the actual boss would be PAez; but 
this leader of cowboys was not yet presentable, nor reliable 
either. So Bolivar put at the head of the State as Vice- 
President his henchman Soublette, an urban and even urbane 
general; while PAez, promoted to the rank of general in 
chief, was given the military and civil command of the 
Province."2® This action was taken at a time when JosA 
Antonio PAez represented "almost the only permanent fixture
in the regional g o v e r n m e n t 29
27Henry R. Lemly, Bolivar. Liberator of Venezuela. 
Colombia. Ecuador, Perfl, and Bolivia (Boston, 1923), 248.
28Madariaga, Bolivar. 398.
29oavid Bushnell, The Santander Regime in Gran Colom­
bia (Newark, 1954), 294. PAez and Soublette disagreed so 
markedly during this period about general policies, par­
ticularly the expulsion of Spaniards from the territory, to
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Bolivar left Caracas for Bogota on August 1, 1821.
He was invited by the Congress which had been meeting in 
Cucuta since May 6 of this year to join it. 3 0 The purpose 
of the invitation was to offer him the Presidency of the 
Republic of Colombia. Bolivar finally accepted this post on 
October 3, and Santander was made Vice-President. The 
Liberator almost immediately turned his gaze to the war in 
the south, and on December 14 left to direct operations in 
Quito. He would not return to Colombia until the end of 1826.
General Morales, except for occasional forays, was 
still holed up in Puerto Cabello. In May of 1822, PAez 
decided to besiege the fortress. At times he was forced to 
lift the siege either by the need to go quell a revolt, or 
because of malignant fevers that played havoc with his men.
It was during these withdrawals that General Morales, in 
command of the Spanish troops since General La Torre had
which PAez was strongly opposed, that Soublette handed over 
the departmental intendancy to the MarquAs Francisco Rod­
riguez del Toro, an old-line aristocrat. He and PAez got along 
somewhat better, chiefly because he, too, was anxious to sus­
pend the expulsion of Spaniards. When the MarquAs retired to 
private life, he was succeeded by General Juan Escalona.
The disagreements between PAez and Soublette seemed to 
disappear after PAez became President in 1831. From this 
year until 1847 they alternated in the presidency, with 
Soublette riding PAez's coattail. Williamson, Caracas Diarv. 
234.
30The Congress of Angostura had dissolved on January 
15, 1820. The new congress ratified the Fundamental Law of 
the Republic which formally adopted the union of Venezuela 
and New Granada to constitute the Republic of Colombia. The 
constitution it promulgated differed but little from that of 
Angostura and proclaimed a centralized, popular, and repre­
sentative government.
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been named Captain General of Puerto Rico, sallied forth and 
forced P&ez to fight several skirmishes. Although nearly 
always victorious, Piez suffered serious losses. On one of 
these occasions, reinforced by the Anzo&tegui Battalion, he 
pushed Morales further into the hills. But the latter 
returned to Puerto Cabello then, left it under the command 
of General Sebasti&n de la Calzada, and embarked with a con­
siderable force for Maracaibo. Morales seized the San Carlos 
Fortress and the city of Maracaibo.
In the meantime, P&ez had been raising a considerable 
force to attack Morales. When he arrived in Trujillo he 
learned that the San Carlos Fortress had been given up with­
out a blow by its cowardly commander, Colonel Natividad 
Villasmil, and that the Spanish squadron had crossed the 
sandbar into the inland sea. P&ez then countermarched to 
Valencia and sent word to General Soublette that the patriot 
fleet was needed at Lake Maracaibo. Soublette sent General 
Jos6 Padilla with his small patriot fleet which outmaneuvered 
and defeated the superior Spanish fleet on July 24, 1823. 
Morales, attacked on every side, capitulated to Padilla and 
surrendered the fortress at San Carlos, Puerto Cabello, and 
the remainder of the Spanish fleet.
On August 15, 1823 General Morales set sail forHabana. 
Thus, after a thirteen-year struggle, the last high-ranking 
official representative of Spain left the country. Unfor­
tunately, General Calzada, whom Morales had left in charge 
at Puerto Cabello, refused to recognize the capitulation.
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PAez was forced to lay siege of Puerto Cabello once again in 
September. After resisting some of PAez's most memorable 
exploits, Calzada finally surrendered. The Spaniards had 
lost their last inch of Venezuelan territory, and the war of 
independence was at am end. Venezuela was completely incor­
porated into the Republic of Colombia.
After the fall of Puerto Cabello, PAez set out with 
Generals Marifio and Bermudez for Caracas. This turned out 
to be a long, triumphal march for the llanero chieftain.
After all, Puerto Cabello had resisted all patriot attacks 
since 1812: “Thus the joy at its fall was quite legitimate,
and all his countrymen naturally saw in PAez the incarnation 
of their independence. . . .  So for the moment he occupied a 
position that he enjoyed for a brief period and to which he 
never rose again throughout his long career,"3^
The following year, 1624, saw General PAez's rap­
prochement with the ultra-liberal group in Caracas. Even 
though the latter was violently opposed to everything mili­
tary which PAez embodied, they looked on him as their only 
support against Santander's tyranny. PAez, on his own part, 
had very little in common with the liberal faction, but he 
did have a concrete rivalry with the existing central regime 
and its agents. Later in the year two minor crises occurred 
which hastened his alignment with the extreme liberal faction. 
The first of these occurred when PAez issued a decree, late
33-Cunninghame Graham, PAez. 211.
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in November, declaring the Departments of Venezuela and Apure 
in a state of siege because of the appearance of a French 
squadron in the Caribbean. When it became apparent that the 
French were not hostile, Vice-President Santander ordered 
PAez to lift the state of siege. The llanero General per­
sonally felt it necessary to continue the siege a little 
longer because of new outbreaks of disorder within the 
Department of Venezuela. He was chagrined by Santander's 
order and by Father JosA Antonio PArez1s subsequent motion 
to impeach PAez for declaring martial law without due cause. 
Although this latter motion was rejected by an overwhelming 
vote, and Santander later reversed himself on this issue, it 
all served to foment PAez's disillusionment with legislative 
procedures and civilian politicians in general, particularly 
those in BogotA.
The second crisis was actually one of the reasons why 
PAez's continuation of the state of siege was not unwarranted. 
On December 9, 1824, the town of Petare, on the outskirts of 
Caracas, was raided by a band of men armed with machetes 
yelling, "Long live the King and death to the whites 1" These 
raiders seem to have been slaves from nearby plantations, who 
had no association with any preexisting guerrilla band. The 
raid produced very little damage; however, the incident came 
to be known as the Petare conspiracy and caused nation-wide 
wrangling and dissension. General PAez regarded the incident 
simply as a small disturbance, but General Escalona, the 
intendant, considered the incident as having been fomented
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by the Caracas liberals and consequently of a very serious 
nature. The Bogota government, led by Vice-President 
Santander, chose to believe Escalona's version rather than 
PAez'si so Congress granted the Vice-President "extra­
ordinary faculties" for dealing with similar situations in 
the future. According to David Busnell, "The Petare affair 
together with its aftermath was thus one more reason for the 
growing rift between P&ez and the Santander regime that 
marked the year 1825."32 The Caracas liberals, led by 
Antonio L. Guzman and General Francisco Carabafio, took advan­
tage of this opportunity to further win P&ez's favor. Some­
how, the llanero General failed to see that the ideals of 
this liberal group were similar to those of the Santanderean 
liberals whom he considered his enemies.
General P&ez was severely chastized again by the 
Bogota government in 1926. The Congress at Bogota, alarmed 
by the rumors of a Spanish expedition sent to recover the 
lost territory and needing to provide troops for Bolivar's 
war elsewhere against the Spaniards, had passed a decree to 
raise a force of fifty thousand men. The Caraquefios had 
generally continued to resist the enlistment decree. Conse­
quently, P&ez, unfortunately for his popularity, was given 
the task of enforcing the decree. As General Military Com­
mander, he called a meeting of the citizens of Caracas to 
enlist them in his army. When only a few responded, he
32The Santander Regime in Gran Colombia. 302.
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ordered his troops to arrest every man seen on the streets. 
The Municipality of Caracas, backed by General Escalona, pro­
tested this action and instituted formal accusations against 
Piez before the Colombian Senate. The Senate accepted the 
accusations, instituted impeachment proceedings against the 
llanero chieftain, and suspended him as Military Commander 
of the Department. To add insult to injury, General San­
tander then appointed Escalona to replace PAez while the 
latter was ordered to BogotA to stand trial.
It is surprising that PAez even considered going 
before Congress and commanded his troops to obey Escalona, 
for the masses openly and enthusiastically supported him.
He pathetically asked Santander to use his great influence 
in the Senate to win an acquittal. PAez also contacted 
Bolivar who begged him to be patient until 1831 at which 
time the Constitution would be changed. However, the picture 
changed abruptly on April 30, 1862, when the Municipality of 
Valencia, reportedly led by Dr. Miguel Pefia, ignored the 
orders of the BogotA government and reappointed PAez its 
Military Commander. Other municipalities throughout the 
Department, including Caracas, resentful of having to take 
orders from General Santander, a native of BogotA, and per­
haps ’'urged" to do so by the presence of PAez's troops, 
followed Valencia's example. They all voted to keep PAez in 
command until Bolivar returned to preside over the Convention 
that was to be convoked in 1831 to deal with national prob­
lems. PAez was invested with the supreme authority, in
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civil and military affairs, and once more was President of 
Venezuela in all but name. In his autobiography P&ez states 
apologetically, "In a fatal moment for me, I reassumed the 
command that had been suspended so unjustly."33 when he was 
sworn in at Valencia on May 14, 1826 it was understood that 
he would not follow orders issued by the Bogota government. 
Immediately P&ez restored the mint at Caracas and perhaps 
foolishly prohibited the circulation of letters and papers 
from neighboring departments. He was really governing 
Venezuela like a dictator.3 4
3 3 Autobioarafla. I, 294.
34Following is an account of these events as reported 
in the Philadelphia National Gazette and Literary Register, 
June 20, 1826, reprinted from the Baltimore Gazette, June 17, 
1826. "From the beginning of the month of May the inhabi­
tants of this country, who have more or less property, have 
been put under some dread, by a commotion which might have 
been injurious to foreign traders in La Guayra, Puerto 
Cabello and Caracas, if the genius of P&ez had not arrested 
the fire of rebellion even from the commencement. . . .
" . . .  The Cabildo of Caracas is against the General. 
Santander, the Vice President, ordered with great promptitude 
that P&ez should be deprived of his military command. P&ez 
conformed to the order and transferred the command over to 
Escalona, who, previously was Intendant of Venezuela. When 
this became public, the inhabitants perceived that there was 
a great discontent among the population, but this discontent 
sprang more from the desire which men without property have, 
to draw some advantage from public disorders, than from 
patriotic motives. . . . When it was known that the govern­
ment of BogotA had deprived Piez of his command and trans­
ferred it to Escalona, the troops of Valencia mutinied and 
ransacked the Tobacco monopoly warehouse— a few murders were 
committed, and in other places the signs of seditions of 
armed people appeared. For fear that things would grow worse, 
the Cabildo of Valencia assembled and requested P&ez to re­
sume the military command. The cabildo of Caracas, more 
afraid than the other, they being the accusers of P&ez, sent 
a deputation also requesting him to resume the command.
From the moment in which he took the command tranquility was
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Meanwhile, in Bogota and New Granada public opinion 
as a whole was generally hostile to P&ez's "rebellion," 
known as the Cosiata. Vice-President Santander condemned 
the movement as wholly illegal and declared all its acts to 
be null and void. He immediately assumed his "extraordinary 
powers" to deal with the Venezuelan situation, but he did 
not take any immediate action against the revolutionists. 
Santander unleashed a bitter propaganda campaign against 
P&ez. However, he believed that this revolt could be over­
come by Bolivar's mere presence in Caracas and accordingly 
wrote to him urging his immediate return. Santander was 
more than ever convinced that Bolivar should return when he 
received reports that P&ez's strength was declining as a 
result of the active opposition of Fernando Pefialver, Jos& 
Francisco Bermddez, and General Rafael Urdaneta.
Sim6 n Bolivar when he first heard about the Congres­
sional impeachment proceedings against P&ez, expressed strong 
sympathy for the accused. He appears to have regarded 
Santander1s appointment of Escalona as a major cause of the 
revolt, and had expressed only a perfunctory disapproval cf 
P&ez's course of action. It appears Bolivar was impressed 
with P&ez's pledge not to introduce any reforms before his
restored and things went on as usual. If you have heard 
that P&ez has become Dictator or King, or wishes to separate 
Venezuela from the general government and things like these, 
do not believe them. P&ez is a man of great natural genius, 
and he could not commit the great faults which the timorous 
and ignorant of this country would represent."
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own return to Venezuela. In compliance with both P&ez's and 
Santander's requests, Bolivar left Peru in the latter part 
of 1826 for Venezuela, leaving Santander in charge at 
Cundinamarca. He maintained a conciliatory attitude toward 
P&ez. However, when P&ez announced to the Venezuelans that 
the Liberator was coming as a mere citizen and not as Presi­
dent, Bolivar became enraged. He had also heard reports that 
P&ez was going ahead with his reorganization of Venezuela 
without waiting for the Liberator.
The llanero chieftain sent Dr. Miguel Pena to inform 
Bolivar that he must either accept Venezuela's demands or 
halt his march. Unfortunately, Colonel William Fergusson, 
who was Bolivar's aide de camp at the time, arrested Dr. Pefla 
and sent him to Trujillo as a prisoner. P&ez retaliated by 
arresting Bolivar's emissary, Laurencio Silva. On January 1, 
1827, P&ez sent Silva with a message to Puerto Cabello.
Bolivar used this gesture to effect a reconciliation. He 
issued a decree confirming P&ez as chief civil and military 
authority in Venezuela; and in return for a general amnesty 
(a guarantee that P&ez and his followers would retain their 
property, rank, and public offices), and the promise of a 
Great Convention for constitutional reform, P&ez recognized 
the Liberator's supreme authority. On January 4, 1827 Bolivar 
and P&ez met and embraced, for Bolivar had decided to win 
over P&ez in his struggle against the "republic of lawyers" 
led by Santander. Together, they entered Caracas trium­
phantly on January 10.
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Then Bolivar left P&ez in command in Venezuela and 
went to Bogotd where he reassumed the Presidency. Bolivar 
adopted a set of policies that made his open breach with 
Santander inevitable. Not content with the recent amnesty 
he had given P&ez relieving him of any responsibility to 
answer the charges made against him in Congress, he went on 
to proclaim that the Venezuelan chieftain had "saved the 
republic." Bolivar heaped fire on the coals by rewarding 
P&ez's leading supporters with jobs and favors.3 5
The year 1828 which followed was a most unfortunate 
year for P&ez. The treasury was empty. The soldiers were 
unpaid and roamed the streets and countryside begging or 
stealing. Bolivar was ill and unable to dominate the Con­
vention of Ocana which had been called in response to a 
general demand for reform of the constitution. In fact, 
because of Santander's powerful opposition, Bolivar dismissed 
the Convention. It was now evident that there were two 
strong parties in Colombiat the Santanderistas. or federal­
ists, and the Bolivianos, or centralized republicans. By 
1829 P&ez was so disillusioned that he wanted to retire from 
public life; however, his sense of duty to his native land 
prevented him from doing so.
35During this period of rapproachment between Bolivar 
and P&ez, despite the burden placed on them by governmental 
policy decisions and problems in Bogot& and the Apure, the 
two men spent many hours planning the liberation of Cuba and 
Puerto Rico. In fact, P&ez devoted all of Chapter XX in the 
first volume of his autobiography to discussing these plans.
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P&ez's love of music and drama, which had long been 
semidormant, came to the fore in the year 1929 when, despite 
all his other preoccupations, he sponsored the presentation 
of Othello in his own home. P&ez himself took the role of 
Othello; General Carlos Soublette, Brabancio; and Dr. Miguel 
Pena, Iago. According to Francisco Gonz&lez Guinan, P&ez 
accurately and vividly interpreted O t h e l l o . 3 6  Later his 
interest in the fine arts led him to support and encourage 
the first theatre in Valencia which was built by 1832 and 
called El. Teatro del Coronel Celia. ’
In November of 1829 P&ez presided over a convention 
in Caracas that explicitly called for a separation of Vene­
zuela from the Republic of Colombia. P&ez was temporarily 
caught on the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, his 
admiration for and long obedience to Bolivar prompted him to 
oppose this project. Yet on the other hand, urged by his 
local patriotism, staunch Republicanism, and his own personal 
ambition, he was encouraged to accept the measure for separa­
tion. A conference was held at Cticuta to settle the differ­
ences between these two "countries." It resolved nothing, 
for it met mainly to please a dying Bolivar.
On January 13, 1630 General P&ez officially proclaimed 
Venezuela an independent nation and set up a provisional 
government with himself as head. He appointed a Cabinet 
with three Secretaries; of Home, Justice and Police; of
36Tradiciones de Mi Pueblo (Caracas, 1954), 38.
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Finances; and of Foreign Affairs, War and Navy. He named to 
these posts respectively Pefia, Urbaneja, and soublette. On 
April 29 word came that Bolivar had resigned the presidency 
in his last message to the Congress at Bogota. P&ez had 
already called a constituent congress to meet on April 30 in 
Valencia, which now became the capital. This congress, 
ignoring Bolivar's constitution, wrote a new one which pro­
claimed a republican, popular, representative, and respon­
sible government. The legislature was divided into a Senate 
and a House of Representatives, with each province electing 
two Senators and a number of Representatives proportionate 
to its population. The Executive power was to be embodied 
in a President elected for four years and not eligible for 
reelection. Both the electors and the elected had to be 
males, over twenty-one years of age, literate, with a small 
annual income from property, or exercising some trade or 
profession. In 1831 P&ez began his first term as constitu­
tionally elected president. Cunninghame Graham says of him 
at this timei37
P&ez, from the humblest origin, had now risen to be 
the first citizen of the republic. The wheel of for­
tune had indeed come round full centre, and he who 
once had washed the negro [sicl Manuelote's feet was 
seated in the presidential chair. Until the year 1647, 
he dominated the public life of the republic, making 
and unmaking generals at his will and ruling like a 
patriarch.
The llanero President, accompanied by Barbarita and
37Cunninghame Graham, P&ez. 249.
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his new government, moved to Caracas. His home was known as 
La Vifieta. and Barbarita was its mistress. Fair-complexioned, 
slim, with dark brown hair cascading down to her hips, this 
woman is said to have inspired P&ez with "a passion in which 
the flesh is set on fire by the vibrations of pride," and 
that he regarded her as a "living trophy which his prestige 
has wrested from the prejudices of a society which still 
shows itself scornful and stubborn," and liked "to exhibit 
her as if she were a medal won in the great war maneuvers. " 38 
She helped him immeasurably now with his campaign for self- 
improvement. Some evenings she would read Kousseau, Lamar­
tine, or Cervantes to him. On other evenings she would hire 
professional singers, preferably Italians, to come sing at 
La Vifieta. There were times when Barbarita would play the 
piano and sing in her soprano voice while P&ez accompanied 
her with his robust baritone, their spirits joined "by a tie 
which is deeper than that of the flesh— by the love of art 
and particularly music . " 3 8
General P&ez's first term as constitutional President 
of Venezuela, 1831 until 1835, was relatively peaceful.
With Urbaneja as his Vice-President, he was able to put down 
General Josd Tadeo Monagas's revolt for the reestablishment 
of the Republic of Colombia without bloodshed. P&ez managed
3 8 S&nchez, Quzm&n. 43-44.
3 9 Ibid.. 175.
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to avert a threatened war with Colombia and removed any final 
danger of a Spanish attempt to regain power. It is also to 
P&ez’s credit that he allowed freedom of the press and per­
mitted Congress to act independently.
During this first presidency, P&ez continued to agi­
tate for the abolition of slavery, a passion which had 
consumed him since the early days of the wars for independence. 
He failed to win this battle, but he was successful in secur­
ing legislation which forbade the selling of slaves out of 
their district and the importation of new slaves. He also 
promoted education for Negroes.
P&ez's relations with the Catholic Church during this 
period may be summed up by relating his difficulties with 
the Archbishop of Caracas. The Archbishop refused to take 
the oath of fealty prescribed by the Venezuelan constitution. 
P&ez tendered the oath to him several times unsuccessfully; 
but finally, at the end of the year 1831, the archpriest 
accepted the oath. This did much to enhance P&ez's prestige.
Perhaps P&ez's greatest achievement in this first 
term was in the field of public education. Having been 
denied the benefits of proper schooling in his youth, he was 
moved by a desire to provide an adequate system of education 
for his people. Consequently, he supported and protected 
Feliciano Montenegro in his efforts to establish primary 
schools. The pioneer of Venezuelan education, Montenegro 
founded El. Coleaio de la Indeoendencia in Caracas.
By 1835, Venezuela was fairly prosperous and national
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finances were improving slowly. The two political parties 
that were destined to rule Venezuela's future had also 
emerged--the Mantuanos and the Democrats. The former was 
the party of the aristocrats, and by a strange freak of for­
tune, P&ez had become their leader while Monagas, a wealthy 
and well-educated man, was the champion of the Democrats.
The presidential election of 1835 was contested by 
such strong candidates as General Carlos Soublette, Dr. Jos& 
Marla Vargas, and General Santiago MarifSo. Consequently, no 
candidate gained the two-thirds majority of the Electoral 
College necessary for a victoryx so Congress had to elect 
the president. Although it was well known that P&ez favored 
Soublette, Congress chose Dr. Vargas, a civilian who had not 
fought in the wars for independence, and who did not really 
want the office, but was coaxed into accepting it by the 
anti-military politicians. MarifSo, dissatisfied with the 
results of the election, started a so-called party of reform 
which was responsible for a military revolt led by a Major 
Pedro Carujo which forced President Vargas to abdicate and 
go into exile on June 10, 1835. Marino then assumed military 
control of the country, called a Popular Assembly which con­
firmed what had just taken place, and recommended the calling 
of a National Convention. The Reformists, e j e c t i n g  P&ez to 
join them, named him provisional President and MarifSo mili­
tary Commander in Chief.
unfortunately, in the east Jos& Tadeo Monagas pro­
claimed a federation, as he had done in 1831, in an additional
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attempt to gain autonomy for his region. At this point some 
of the old independence warriors, such as Generals Urdaneta 
and Arismendi, declared for the Constitution, and in July an 
exiled Vargas appointed P&ez his own Chief of Operations.
When the General accepted this commission, it represented an 
end for the "reformers." Within fourteen days P&ez brought 
about the submission of all the revolutionary leaders, 
including Monagas. Even though P&ez had not originally sup­
ported Vargas, he now reinstated him in the presidency.
This represented a moral triumph for the llanero leader, and 
a step toward constitutional government in Venezuela. In 
appreciation for his services, the Venezuelan National Con­
gress now bestowed the title of Ciudadano Esclarecido. or 
Enlightened Citizen, on General P&ez. By this time P&ez's 
fame was spreading abroad, and in 1837 King William IV of 
England presented him with a sword of honor. The inscription 
on it rani "from William IV to General P&ez as a proof of 
his admiration for his character, and for the disinterested 
patriotism that has distinguished his brilliant and vic­
torious career.
The Vargas government that P&ez had helped to reinstate 
was short-lived. Dr. Vargas and his supporters attempted to 
bring a truly civilian government to Venezuela, but the 
militarists quickly doomed this attempt to failure. After
40Cunninghame Graham, P&ez. 275. King William IV had 
sent General P&ez this sword as a token of his appreciation 
for the two white deer P&ez had sent him. Porter, Caracas 
Diarv. 957.
47
defeating Monagas, P&ez had proclaimed an amnesty which 
allowed even Monagas and his officers to keep their ranks.
The Congress of 1836 would not tolerate the leniency and 
summarily punished some of the rebels itself. P&ez, who had 
promised these men their lives and honor, fell out with Con­
gress. President Vargas, caught between his loyalty for 
General P&ez and his loyalty to his anti-militaristic Con­
gress, resigned his office. The presidency now was filled 
briefly by three other men until the end of this disastrous 
term.
The standard of revolt was raised again in April of 
1837 by two llaneros. Juan Pablo and Francisco Farfan. These 
two brothers of gigantic stature, whom p&ez had earlier 
expelled from his army because of insubordination, were 
fighting for the reinstatement of the Republic of Colombia. 
Knowing how quickly his fellow llaneros would join any 
adventure, P&ez sped to the llanos. There he encountered 
and defeated the rebels at the town of Payara. Such was the 
feat of arms he accomplished at this battle that it won him 
the title of Ledn de Payara, a name by which he is often 
referred to by his countrymen. His life was imperiled so 
many times during this struggle, that "P&ez always spoke of 
his fight on the Payara, as the most desperate of his life."^
In 1838 Jos& Antonio P&ez was elected once again to 
serve as president of his country. This term of office was
^Cunninghame Graham, P&ez. 273.
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considerably more peaceful them his first. He turned his 
attention now to the deplorable state of transportation 
facilities in his country and saw to it that the first roads 
since the expulsion of the Spanish were built. Faithful to 
the memory of the Liberator, he brought his remains back to 
Venezuela in 1842.
Two political parties, Conservatives and Liberals, 
were formed in 1840 from the remnants of the Mantuanos and 
the Democrats, and came to be Venezuela's two historic 
parties. In the 1842 election, the Conservative Party backed 
General Soublette while the Liberals supported both Santos 
Michelena and Diego Urbaneja. P&ez supported Soublette again, 
and Soublette won and became President in 1843. Although 
the Liberals respected his election and his cabinet, they 
objected to the fact that General P&ez was still influential 
behind the scenes, for he was "still the arbiter. " ^ 2 This 
government filled out its term, for it upheld the Constitu­
tion, Congress, and the courts. In fact, Mordn states that 
this was one of the few honest governments which Venezuela 
has had.*^
It was in December of 1846 that P&ez, accompanied by 
his son Ramdn, paid his last visit to his beloved llanos
* 2Mordn, History of Venezuela. 158. ^ Ibld.^  1 5 9 .
44it was as a result of this trip to the llanos that 
Don Ramdn P&ez wrote Wild Scenes in South America or Life in 
the Llanos of Venezuela (New York, 1862), which contains 
many vivid and interesting descriptions of this region.
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And it was here that he refused the presidency for a third 
term and gave his support to jos& Tadeo Monagas, his chief 
opponent in the east during his previous administration.
P&ez retired now from public life and received outstanding 
honors from France and the Scandinavian countries. King 
Louis Philippe made him a member of the Legion of Honor, and 
the King of Sweden and Norway made him Commendator of the 
Order of the Sword.
The joys of private life were destined to be short­
lived for the old warrior. The Liberals, who had split their 
vote between three candidates, Antonio L. Guzm&n, Jos6 Felix 
Blanco, and General Bartolom& de Salom, lost the presidential 
election to P&ez's candidate, Monagas. President Monagas 
began his government in 1847 with a Conservative cabinet and 
officials, but when the Conservatives objected to the per­
sonal ist rule that Monagas was setting up, in direct 
defiance of the Constitution, Monagas retaliated by replacing 
them all with Liberals. The Liberal leader Guzm&n became his 
Vice-President. The Conservatives now pleaded with General 
P&ez to rebel against the President's tyranny (which included 
forcing Congress by means of armed threats to vote him dicta­
torial powers). P&ez realized his error in supporting 
Monagas, and led a revolt which lasted from February to March 
of 1848. Defeated as much by trickery and disloyalty within 
his own ranks as by force of arms, the old General retired 
to New Granada. In July of 1849 he led another revolt in 
conjunction with a Conservative uprising in Caracas.
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However, this attempt was poorly coordinated! so when P&ez 
met the government forces, led by the former leader of his 
Guard of Honor, Cornelio Muhoz, he was soundly defeated 
again. General P&ez was captured and sentenced to exile 
either in Europe or the United States, but he was promised 
that the life and property of his followers were to be 
spared. Unfortunately, this capitulation was not honored by 
the government, and the llanero chieftain was kept in prison 
for months "suffering the disillusionment of the old, 
despised warrior when even his dignified protest to Congress 
was, of course, rejected. " 4 5  His imprisonment at the 
Fortress of San Antonio de Cuman& must have been made even 
more bitter for P&ez by the fact that his long-neglected 
wife visited him and tended to his needs here religiously, 
while his mistress, Barbara Nieves, stayed away completely.
Finally in 1850 General P&ez was permitted to go into 
exile. He chose to go to New York City. Here he received a 
public welcome, and when he visited Philadelphia later in 
the year he received another public welcome. Following is a 
description of this welcome from the Public Ledger on 
October 3, 1850i
Reception of General Antonio P&ez.— This Venezuelan 
hero was received in this city, yesterday, by the 
Mayor and Council of the City. On the arrival of the 
steamer from New York, General P&ez was received by 
the Philadelphia Greys, Lieut. Vance, and the Washing­
ton Greys, Capt. P. C. Ellmaker. He was escorted to 
Independence Hall, occupying an open barouche. Here
4 5 Mor6 n, History of Venezuela. 163.
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he was received by Mayor Jones and the City Councils 
on the part of the city. The Mayor welcomed General 
P&ez in an appropriate speech, to which the Vene­
zuelan hero replied in Spanish, which was interpreted 
by Sefior Percy. Citizens were then introduced and 
the General was escorted to his quarters, at the 
Washington Hotel. Shortly after he had entered, he 
showed himself on the balcony, and was repeatedly 
cheered by the crowd in front of the hotel.
P&ez was sixty years old now and well educated, speaking both
English and French in addition to his native Spanish.^ He
decided to use Hew York as his headquarters while he traveled
extensively. In 1851 he went to Baltimore where he received
public honors again. In Mexico, General Santa Anna received
him with acclamation. When P&ez went to Europe, King Louis
of Bavaria also greeted him with public acclamation.
Meanwhile, back in Venezuela another revolt against 
the Monagas1s regime, now officially headed by jos& Tadeo's 
brother, Jos£ Gregorio, had broken out in Valencia in 1853 
and had spread throughout the country. Jos& Gregorio helped 
to quell this revolt by signing a law abolishing slavery in 
1854 and thus winning over forty thousand slaves to his side. 
This measure also helped to win the presidential election 
again for his brother, jos& Tadeo, in 1855. Unfortunately, 
Jos& Tadeo developed dictatorial ambitions and had Congress 
draw up a new constitution which extended the presidential 
term to six years with no prohibition against reelection.^7
^Cunninghame Graham, P&ez. 295. Perhaps P&ez accepted 
the services of an interpreter in Philadelphia out of defer­
ence to his many listeners who would not be able to understand 
his English spoken with a Spanish accent.
^ Constitucidn de 1857, Titulo XII, Jos& Gil Fortoul,
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He did succeed in getting elected to another term in 1857. 
However, by now the opposition of both the Conservative and 
Liberal parties became intense. Led by P&ez and his friends 
in Hew York and Manuel Felipe Tovar in Venezuela, the Con­
servatives organized their forces while the Liberals were 
following suit under the leadership of Guzm&n, Wencesleo 
Urrutia, and Joaquin Herrera. These conspirators joined 
forces in an effort to find a common leader. Recognizing 
that General P&ez could not be their choice since he was too 
deeply committed to the Conservatives now, they agreed on 
the Governor of Carabobo, Julian Castro. A successful revolt 
was effected, and in 1858 Castro set up a government and 
installed a National Convention in Valencia to write a new 
constitution.
According to Guillermo Mordn, "From March 15, 1858 to 
July 24, 1863, a wave of anarchy transformed the country, and 
as government after government wiltered, the social and 
political structure changed radically under the blows of war 
and desolation.48 invited by Castro, P&ez made a brief 
reappearance in Venezuela in 1859.49 However, when Castro
Historia Constitucional de Venezuela. 3 vols. (Caracas, 
1942), III, 401-402.
4 8 H1story o£ Venezuela, 169.
49General McLellan had organized a parade in New York 
to bid General P&ez farewell. As fate would have it, P&ez's 
horse slipped and fell on him during the parade. The famed 
horseman sustained a leg injury in this incident from which 
he never completely recovered, for he was almost seventy 
years old now. Cunninghame Graham, P&ez. 297.
53
started negotiating with the Federalists, P&ez hurriedly 
left Venezuela again. He was destined to return in 1860 
when Manuel F. Tovar was elected President; Pedro Gual, Vice- 
President; and he himself, Minister of War and Navy. In 
1861, Tovar resigned and Gual assumed the Presidency. When 
P&ez tried to negotiate with the Federalists, Gual asked him 
to resign. The Commander of the Caracas garrison retaliated 
by arresting Gual and proclaiming P&ez chief. On September 
10, 1861, P&ez became dictator of his country. Unfortu­
nately, P&ez now fell under the influence of Pedro Josg 
Rojas. The latter's evil counsels pushed P&ez into acts 
that destroyed his prestige. He failed to conciliate the 
Federalists; so on June 16, 1863 P&ez signed the Treaty of 
Coche which brought the Federalist leader. General Juan 
Crisdstomo Falcdn, to power. Federation triumphed after five 
years of bloodshed 1
Once again in 1863 Jos€ Antonio P&ez left Venezuela. 
This was destined to be his last exile.^0 Stripped of all 
his property and goods except for a small grant from General 
Falcdn, he returned to New York where he was received with 
respect. At age seventy-eight, poverty, and the inducements 
of greater prosperity offered by his friend, Domingo
Even though he was in exile, P&ez's son. Dr. Manuel 
Antonio P&ez Ortiz, was able to get his name incorporated in 
the list of Ilustres Prdceres de la Independencia Sur- 
Americana. with its corresponding salary, in July of 1867. 
D&vila, Diccionario Biogr&fico. II, 52.
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Faustino Sarmiento, forced him to leave New Yorlc.^ He set 
out for Buenos Aires to serve as a commission agent for a 
cattle company.
When the old llanero leader arrived in Buenos Aires 
in June of 1868, he was welcomed enthusiastically as a 
legendary hero by all of the first families. He took up 
residence with the powerful Carranza family. Dr. Adolfo 
Carranza described him thus: "Of medium height and muscular
body, he had lost his agility as a result of a fall from a 
horse while leading a July 4 parade in Washington, during 
which President Grant served as his aide-de-camp. "52
On October 12 of 1868 Sarmiento assumed the Presidency 
of Argentina. Consequently, the Argentine Senate voted 
General P&ez the rank of Brigadier General in its army with 
the corresponding pay. Perd followed this example by 
granting him a substantial pension. As a result, P&ez was 
able to live comfortably and happily in Buenos Aires. It 
was during these years that he revealed a relatively unknown 
facet of his personality. He composed music and wrote lyrics. 
For the piano he composed a waltz entitled. La Flor del 
Retiro i for the violin and piano, Escucha, be11a Marla. ^3 
In 1870 General P&ez was forced to leave his haven by 
an outbreak of yellow fever. He went first to Bolivia where
5^Sarmiento and P&ez became good friends while the 
former was Argentine Minister to the United States and the 
latter was in exile here by General Falcdn's orders. Francico 
R. Bello, P&ez en Buenos Aires (Caracas, 1941), 17-18.
52Ibid., 20. 53lbid.. 27-28.
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he was received with acclamation. In 1872 he visited Perti 
and Colombia. Finally, he returned to the United States and 
died in New York on May 7, 1 8 7 3 . His ashes now rest in 
the national pantheon at Caracas. In 1905 General Cipriano 
Castro ordered PAez's statue erected in the Plaza de la 
Reodblica.5 5
It is difficult to judge or truly evaluate a man such 
as josA Antonio PAez. Even his contemporaries, his fellow 
countrymen as well as foreigners, varied greatly in their 
opinion of him. From among his countrymen, let us consider 
first Simdn Bolivar's opinion of General PAez. Perhaps it 
is impossible to capture Bolivar's true opinion of General 
PAez, for as Salvador de Madariaga points out in his biog­
raphy of the Liberator, the latter "was always significantly 
careful not to commit to paper any adverse opinion on his 
chief adversary."5® In fact, the thought that he may have 
entertained an adverse opinion is only suggested by a letter 
written to Bolivar by his mistress, Manuela SAenz, in which 
she statest "I wish to God that all these devils on two 
sticks such as Paula (Santander), Padilla, PAez would die . " 5 7
S4m . Leonidas Scarpetta and Saturnino Vergara, Dic- 
cionario BiogrAfico de los Camoeones de la Libertad de Nueva 
Granada. Venezuela, Ecuador i  PerCt (BogotA, 1879), 426.
5 5 Bello, PAez en Buenos Aires. 30.
5 ®Madariaga, Bolivar. 613.
57Victor W. von Hagen, The Four Seasons of Manuela. a
Biography (New York, 1952), 193.
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Contrary to this opinion, a perusal of Bolivar's published 
letters generally reflect the high esteem in which he 
appeared to regard the llanero General. In a letter to PAez 
on October 16, 1825 Bolivar told himx "I have written 
General Santander naming you to serve as intendant in Vene­
zuela. . . . 1 , in truth, do not know anyone better qualified 
to rule her."5® yet in a letter Bolivar wrote to General 
Francisco de Paula Santander on December 27, 1825, after 
mentioning his disapproval of Escalona for the post of 
intendant of Venezuela, Bolivar says regarding PAezi "It is 
a very touchy matter for PAez to enter himself as a candidate
for an office he cannot hold . " 5 9
When the Liberator wrote General BartolomA Salom on
April 14, 1827 he advised him to "Get close to General PAez,
who is my best friend. " 5 0  On May 4, 1828 he wrote to PAezi
"I rely on you to be the man to guide Venezuela's desti- 
fi 1nies."° In a letter to General Pedro Briceno MAndez on
March 26, 1829, he cautioned him to "always take care of
General PAez, for Venezuela's health depends on him . " 5 2  By 
1829 when PAez'a break with Bolivar and Gran Colombia was 
obvious, the Liberator commentedt "This country is beyond
58Vicente Lecuna (ed.), Cartas del Libertador. 
correcidas conforme a. los oriqinales, 11 vols. (Caracas, 
1929-48), V, 126.
5 9 Ibid.. 197. 
6 1 Ibid.. VII, 256.
6 0 Ibid.. VI, 266. 
6 2 Ibld.. VIII, 274.
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helpi "The man (PAez) wants only to be absolute."®^
Finally, in 1630, Bolivar said that he "did not want to 
begin another struggle like that between PAez and Santander, 
which in the end has destroyed us all."°^
Madariaga claims that the root of Bolivar's pessimism 
in 1830 "was PAez, the petty tyrant of all colours and races. 
PAez had been the chief factor in his life; . . . The 
dreaded cowboy had neutralized or reduced to impotence, sub­
servience, or futil rebellion all the Venezuelan generals 
who had remained in the east— Soublette, BermtLdez, Marino, 
Monagas and the r e s t . C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  Bolivar's feelings 
toward PAez were bound to have some hostility. The degree 
of hostility, however, seems to have been tempered by the 
Liberator's awareness of PAez's strength and simple virtues. 
Bolivar knew that without PAez he could not control the 
llanos, and without the llanos Venezuela was lost to him.
It might be also that Bolivar did not break openly with the 
llanero General because he thought PAez would never be a 
threat to him outside the llanos.
Francisco de Paula Santander, whose life and fortunes 
were as much entertwined with those of JosA Antonio PAez as 
were the Liberator's, openly expressed his disapproval of
S^Ibid.. IX, 208. Letter to General Rafael Urdaneta, 
December 6 , 1829.
6 ^Ibid., 389. Letter to General Urdaneta, November 16,
1830.
® SMadariaga, Bolivar. 647.
General PAez. In September of 1826 he wrote to Bolivart 
"Know that this is PAez's thought, to be Venezuela's liber­
ator, or its regenerator, to be called its Washington, become 
richer than what he is and satiate his boundless ambition. "6 6  
When he wrote to General Mariano Montillo in October of 1826 
he stated: "It may be seen, that heads as poorly organized
as PAez's and hearts so filled with self-love could only
think and feel that the people would aspire to disorders and
Venezuela to have a dictator. " 6 7  Again writing to Bolivar 
from Bogota on November 5, 1826, he expressed the belief 
that "paez believes he has greater moral power than anyone,
and PAez is very ambitious. " 6 6  Santander warned Bolivar 
that, "PAez is to be feared because of his ignorance and 
ambition, and everything possible should be done to diminish 
his influence among the troops for the sake of order and 
tranquility."6® The polished, educated, and law-abiding
Santander had little in common with the rough-hewn llanero
chieftain.
General Antonio JosA Sucre, one of the most capable 
and most loyal to Bolivar of all the revolutionary leaders, 
was guarded in the opinion he reflected on most everyone, 
including JosA Antonio PAez. Perhaps this is why he seems
66Vicente Lecuna (ed.). Cartas de Santander. 3 vols. 
(Caracas, 1942), II, 279.
6 7 Ibid., 296. 6 8 Ibld.. Ill, 3.
6 ®Ibid.. 35. This was in a letter written on 
December 23, 1826.
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to have managed to keep intact his friendship with Bolivar
70and with other men. w A perusal of his published letters 
reveals but one instance in which he may be said to express 
an evaluation of the llanero leader. This occurred in 1826 
during the Cosiata. From Chuquisaca he wrote Bolivar the 
following on August 12* "I do not have enough data to judge 
who is right; but 1 see that General PAez has acted violently 
in the manner in which he has conducted himself in the up­
rising in Valencia. If he had complaints against Congress 
he should not have avenged himself in a manner that damages 
the credit and even the existence of the nation."71 Unfor­
tunately, General Sucre was assassinated in 1830. Had he 
lived during the next fifteen years, he might have been 
prompted to reflect a stronger opinion.
The opinions expressed by foreigners who knew and 
worked with General PAez were generally highly complimentary. 
The exception to this was Daniel Florence O'Leary. One of 
Simdn Bolivar's most trusted and dedicated aides, O'Leary 
wrote the Liberator that PAez was "an immoral, malicious, 
insidious man, unworthy of Your Excellency's protection."72
7 0Madariaga, Bolivar. 421.
7*Daniel F. O'Leary (ed.), Cartas de Sucre al Liberta- 
dor (1820-1830), Biblioteca Ayacucho, XXXVI, XXXVII (Madrid, 
1919), XXXVII, 78. PAez weaves into his autobiography the 
opinions and judgments of a New Granadan, the historian JosA 
Manuel Restrepo.
7 2 0'Leary, Memoriae. Ill, 69. This quotation is con­
tained in a personal letter from O'Leary to Bolivar written 
at BogotA on October 8 , 1826.
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O'Leary had previously described PAez in the following 
manneri7 3
He was of middle height, robust and well shaped, 
though the lower part of his body was not pro­
portioned to his bust; his cheat and shoulders, very 
wide, his neck short and thick, a big head, covered 
with dark auburn hair, short and wavy; dark, quick 
eyes, straight nose and wide nostrils, thick lips 
and a round chin. His clear complexion told his 
good health, and would have been very white but for 
the sun. Caution and mistrust were the chief fea­
tures of his physiognomy. . . .
As a guerrilla chief, he was without rival. . . . 
Without organization, without knowledge, without 
moral courage, he was void of effect in politics. 
Inconstant in his friendships, he lavished neverthe­
less, his confidence on the favorite of the moment 
and allowed himself to be guided by his advice when 
it did not clash directly with his interests. . . .
He coveted power, but absolute power, the power of 
caprice and abuse. This ambition and greed were his 
dominant passions. He was able to acquire an 
extraordinary influence over the llaneros that made 
up his army, by tolerating their propensity for 
looting and relaxing military discipline. Such was 
the chief of the Apure.
Cunninghame Graham asserted that O'Leary was the only 
British officer who came into personal contact with PAez and 
disliked him.7^ This assertion is substantiated in the 
memoirs of George L. Chesterton and Colonel Gustavus Hippis- 
ley. The latter, after his first meeting with the llanero 
General, saidt “It was impossible not to be impressed in 
favour of this man. Next to the padre before mentioned, he 
was the only man I had seen who could inspire me with
7 3 Ibid.. I, 451-52.
7^Cunninghame Graham, PAez. 155.
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feelings of friendship at a first interview. " 7 5 Later in 
his narrative, Hippisley wrote:7®
PAez is self taught and sprang up all of a sudden 
from nothing during the revolution. . . . His courage, 
intrepidity, repeated successes and the number of 
his followers speedily gained him a name. His 
followers too were all so many PAezes, looking up to 
their general as a superior being. . . .  On the 
parade or in the field, PAez was their general, and 
supreme. In the hours of rest from the fatigues of 
a long and rapid march, or from conquest over the 
adversary, and the retaliation rigidly executed,
PAez would be seen dancing with his people in the 
ring formed for that purpose, smoking with them, 
drinking from the same cup, and lighting the fresh 
segar from the one in the mouth of his fellow soldier.
Chesterton in his account of proceedings in Venezuela 
in 1819 and 1820 states that the British soldiers "Repre­
sented PAez as a man willing to do more for them than any 
other commander they were ever under; and described his 
manners as amiable, though rough. " 7 7 Although he himself 
never met the llanero chieftain, Chesterton recorded the 
following impression of PAez given to him by fellow 
Britishers: 7 8
PAez is a native of the Plains, and was formerly 
a herdsman. As I have before said, he is much 
respected, and always spoken of favourably. Being 
a mem, who, though uneducated, possesses much natural 
talent, he is beloved by his men who do not desert 
from him; and has been known to act on some occasions
7®Gustavus Hippisley, £  Narrative of the Expedition 
of the Rivera Orinoco and Apure in South America (London, 
1819), 391.
76Ibld., 416.
77George Laval Cheat.rton, ^  Narrative of Proceeding.
in Venezuela in the Years 1819 and 1820 (London, 1820), 117.
78Ibid.. 143.
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with much generosity towards the English officers.
The unknown British officer in the Colombian navy who
wrote Recollections of a. Service of Three Years During the
War-Of-Extermination has left by far the most glowing British
description of General P&ez. After mentioning P&ez's solici-
7 Qtude over his wound, he goes on to describe him thust1
This heroic and noble-minded man has derived all 
his ideas and virtues from nature. Nurtured in a 
country perfectly uncivilised, without the advan­
tages of either birth or fortune, he has, by his own 
personal merit, his prowess and undaunted courage, 
raised himself, through the incidents which have 
from time to time occurred to him during the revo­
lutionary contest, to the command of by far the 
most effective and useful native force of any in 
the country. . . .  He does not appear to have enter­
tained any wish to aggrandise himself at this period, 
nor indeed at any subsequent one, as his conduct has 
ever been marked with a most perfect disinterested­
ness and indifference, as to his own advantage, in 
every action of his life. . . .  He is particularly 
fond of the English, calling them his brothers, and 
ever advocating their claims to the gratitude of the 
country with the greatest enthusiasm. His intre­
pidity rendered him equally beloved by them, and 
excepting General Marino, he was the most popular 
chief with them in Colombia.
He is, above all things, a sincere patriot, and 
certainly a bright ornament to his country, which 
there can be but little doubt he has been the 
principal means of continuing thus long a Republic.
Sir Robert Ker Porter, Great Britain's first consul and 
charge d'affairs to Venezuela, was also a most enthusiastic 
admirer of General PAez. Porter's editor, Walter Dupouy,
79[capt. cowie<?)] Recollections of a  Service of 
Three Years during the War-Of-Exterminat1on in the Republics 
of Venezuela and Colombia. 2 vols. (London, 1828), II, 
173-87.
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states: "Porter admired P&ez second to Bolivar. " 8 0  This
fact Porter easily and quickly reveals in his many references 
to the llanero leader in his diary. Speaking of an occasion 
in 1833 When P&ez called on him to discuss several matters 
of national importance. Porter saysi "On all which subjects 
his good sense and liberality shone conspicuously."8^ in 
January of 1835 Porter noted*8^
General P&ez has published his address to his 
fellow citizens which does honour to his character 
as the most unblemished patriot, and the most 
unambitious of men - I mean unambitious, because he 
had both the means and the feeling of the leading 
people, to continue in power - but he has shewn 
himself [to be] what I always thought of, an 
honest and pure hearted son of liberty and real 
independence.
General P&ez1s apparel and conduct, which were a cause 
of concern for some diplomats, are favorably described by 
this proper Englishman in the following manner*8 3
The General was dressed quite in his llanero 
costume; a low-crowned broad brimmed straw hat, 
white calzoncillos (a sort of short linen 
trouser), black, unpoliBhed long leather gaiters 
lacing up the sides, shoes with spurs, and over 
his person a white linen (but much marked by 
service) Cobija, ornamented round the edges and 
corners with needle work. A scarlet, broad belt 
embroidered with golden oak leaves crossed his 
shoulder, from when hung his trustv sword* He 
looked what he really is, a Hero.
The llanero chieftain*s great increase in wealth 
during the Presidency was also a topic of much discussion
80Sir Porter, Caracas Diarv. lxviii.
8 1 Ibid., 711. 8 2ibid., 819.
8 3 Ibid.. 8 6 8 .
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and concern. The British diplomat explains it thus*8^
P4ez was originally only a simple herdsman, and 
without one single head of cattle he could call his 
own. Now he is the greatest hero, one of the most 
talent patriots in the country - and likewise, the 
richest citizen, both in cattle and estates within 
the Republic of Venezuela. All, all gained 
gallantly, gloriously, and honourably, for services 
rendered to his country.
Sir Porter rendered PAez aficionados a great service 
when he noted in his diary what the people's feelings and 
attitudes were toward General PAez. On June 20, 1826 he 
wrote* "Several weekly papers of a single sheet are now 
published - very abusive and personally violent against all 
those at the seat of Gov*- who oppose or are supposed to be 
inimical to PAez or the views of his party. He is as much 
adulated as the others are abused. " 8 8
Barbarita, the General's mistress, Porter plainly 
referred to as PAez's Madame Pompadour.8 8  He describes her 
as a "good expressioned person -darkish with fine eyes and 
jetty hair -and I am told though fond of filthy lucre, yet 
withall is very charitable and good-hearted. " 8 7  In fact 
Porter even painted a portrait of B&rbara and refers to this
8 4 Ibid.. 689. 8 5ifeid., 108.
8 6 Ibid.. 715.
8 7 Ibid.. 693. John G. A. Williamson, the first Ameri 
can diplomatic representative in Venezuela, felt that Bar­
barita was indeed fond of "filthy lucre." He saidi "The 
Genla woman is said to be sensable and shrewd and cunning 
like all animals in their native state, that she is cal­
culating & worldly there is no doubt, as it is commonly 
reported she has already secured a large sum in money & 
investments of property, sufficient to enrich all her 
children— " Caracas Diarv. 251.
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painting thus: "Finished some days ago PAez's Mad. Pompa­
dour - which I sent [to his] home this day - a great nuisance 
got over . " 0 8  Surprisingly enough, Porter did not react 
unfavorably to PAez's household arrangement as did others. 
Speaking about PAez's illegitimate children, he states:
"The youngest, Juana, is very graceful and well made - PAez 
seems proud of them, and la Sefiora BArbara also - who is an 
excellent person. What a fortunate thing it would be for 
PAez as well as BArbara - if Madame PAez, was to be 'gathered 
to her mothers M l * 1,09
Even after Porter's services in Venezuela were ter­
minated at the end of 1840, he continued to extol General 
PAez's virtues. Having returned to Russia to be with his 
daughter, he noted: "1 had a very long discourse with His H.
the Prince about my part of South America and took good care 
Cto] speak highly in praise of Gen. PAez and the excellency 
of his Government and rationality of his Republic in
1842 in speaking to the Russian Prince again about Venezuela 
he said: "I was not backward in bringing forward Venezuela
and its glorious chief. " 9 1
John G. A. Williamson, the first diplomatic represen­
tative of the United States in Venezuela, who arrived in 
Caracas in 1826, had different opinions about the llanero 
chieftain. In February of 1839 he wrote:02
8 8 s ir Porter, Caracas Diary. 726.
09Ibid., 1011. 9 0 Ibid., 1156. 91Ibid.. 1168.
92Williamson, Caracas Diary,, 310-11.
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Called on Gen1 PAez found him engaged in his 
private cockpit preparing for his great fight some 
day next month - he red me in a jackit & slippers 
without cravat or vest. . . .  A  stranger would 
scarcely have recognized the President of Venezuela 
and the soldier in his present garb.
Gen1 PAez is decidedly the democrat of the 
Country. . . . He has so long commanded free as
the wind, that restraints of Law, Gov^ and con­
stitution, and I may say Civilization are yet but 
threads in his hands, yet obeys and I think will 
continue to do so perhaps for ever and make himself 
the first Citizen of his Country-
In June of 1839 he unflatteringly depicted PAez
thus *9 3
Gen1 PAez is in peaceble possession of the Presi­
dency, running horses, caring not a great deal about 
any thing but his own private views and interests, 
for certainly there is not a man in the Republic who 
thinks more of his own individual interest in all 
things touching money than he does -
Williamson’s attitude relative to PAez's relations
with his mistress was rather harsh also. In describing
President PAez's visit to the George Goslings on the coast
at Camburi, he states: ^ 4
. . .  he takes with him the mother and children of
his present family, she of course a ___________  and
the children all bastards - Mr. Gosling has cer­
tainly but little respect for the feelings of his 
wife to introduce to her society the Genls family 
under these circumstances, and I should be glad to 
learn she has maintained her dignity of mother & 
wife by leaving the house to the possession of her 
unprincipled husband and his guests.
Despite all this, in 1840 the American diplomat had 
the following to say about PAezi "He had tallents, but 
rather of the fiero nature kind instead of the Enlightened
9 3 Ibid.. 335. 9 4 Ibid., 251.
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acquirements of the age - He however suits the Country and 
the state of things that govern it.-"9®
Later writers and historians have had the same diver* 
sity of opinion concerning PAez that his contemporaries had. 
Salvador de Madariaga, one of Simdn Bolivar's noted biogra­
phers, characterized PAez at thirty-five as a man "who, then 
in perfect health, was capable of an untiring physical and 
moral activity; who never complained; for whom no hardship 
was unbearable, no march too long, no task too menial; who 
would cheerfully load mules and canoes, or swim his horse 
back and forth to help across the rivers weak soldiers or 
women."9® He states that when PAez became Boves's successor 
as leader of the llaneroa. although PAez was a republican 
and a patriot, he was destined to become "more of a scourge 
for Bolivar than ever Boves had been."9? He also states 
that the llanero chieftain would eventually "oust Bolivar 
not only from Venezuela but from life itself."9® According 
to Madariaga, "PAez and Bolivar were hardly ever in agree­
ment; and as soon as Bolivar arrived, discord broke out 
again. . . . PAez was as happy as a king warring about in 
the Plains. He was, of course, as good a patriot as any; 
but his chief interest was less to save the Republic than to 
live the life of a warring chieftain of Apure. " 9 9 Madariaga 
further propounds that PAez "had never been Bolivar's friend.
9 ®Ibid.. 380.. 9 6 Madariaga, Bolivar. 343.
9 7 Ibid.. 236. 9 8 Ibid.. 286. " i b i d ., 339.
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He was as ambitious as Bolivar, but lacked the magnanimity 
and the intellect which justified, qualified, and restrained 
Bolivar's ambition. In their relationship, Bolivar had 
always been the more generous, the more reasonable, possibly 
also the more afraid of a break. " 1 0 0
Henry Rowan Lemly, another one of Bolivar's important 
biographers, depicts PAez as "of humble origin and somewhat 
ignorant, especially in the art of war; but he made up for 
the latter by an astute cunning and by his dash and reckless 
bravery."101 in evaluating PAez's break with Bolivar and 
the dissolution of Gran Colombia, Lemly states*102
The conduct of PAez, who had had every opportunity 
of learning Bolivar's true sentiments, was full of 
duplicity. While pretending to the government at 
BogotA that he would proceed in accordance with its 
views, he dexterously availed himself of circum­
stances, with a view to obtaining the first magistracy 
of an independent state, by destroying the Colombian 
union.
Guillermo MorOn, a Venezuelan historian, states that 
"Both in 1826 and 1829 it was obvious that PAez wanted to 
rule, and also that Pefla's gift for intrigue was at his 
service."1®^ However, Mordn goes on to explain that 
"Although Santander and PAez caused the dissolution of 
Colombia and PAez and his friends made the revolution of 
1829-30, the people too wished for separation from
iOOlbid.. 613.
1 0 1 Lemly, Bolivar. 149. 1 0 2 Ibid.. 370.
l m Mordn, History of Venezuela. 145.
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Colombia. . . ."104
R. B. Cunninghame Graham, who has written the only 
biography in English of Jos£ Antonio PAez, seems to have been
completely entranced by his subject. He described PAez in
105the following termsi
. . . a personality that endeared itself to every­
one . . . had those little failings that often make 
a mem more popular than his more admirable qualities.
. . . Moreover he was generous about money, when he 
had any; loved dancing, and was approachable and 
courteous, qualities without which no mortal can be 
popular either with the Spanish or Spanish 
Americans.
He further states that the llanero General "was one of those 
rare men in any country, but rarer still in Spanish America 
in those days, who put his country's welfare above the 
triumph of his principals."106
In describing the political events of 1829, Cunning­
hame Graham asserts that*1 0 7
Certainly a few men in history have had a greater 
chance to seize supreme power than PAez had at this 
juncture of his life. That he resisted is a tribute 
to his character, and shows how a man almost com­
pletely destitute of primary education, exposed to 
flattery on every side, and without one true friend 
on whom he could rely for counsel and advice still 
kept a level head.
This biographer felt that if PAez had "refused to take up
power the country would have fallen into anarchy, for there
was no one of sufficient note or character to take his
place . " 1 0 8
153. l°5Cunninghame Graham, PAez, 192.
1 0 6 Ibid., 237. 1 0 7 Ibid.. 241. IQSlbid.. 245.
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Vicente Lecuna, the greatest authority on Bolivar and 
an expert on the military tactics of the wars for indepen­
dence in northern South America, rates General PAez as 
"master of cavalry tactics."109 He states thati "The few 
patriot losses and the numerous losses of their adversaries 
prove that the confusion and horror introduced in the enemy 
ranks with a series of instinctive and instantaneous acts by 
the violence of the unexpected attack, were very natural 
phenomenons provoked or created exclusively by PAez's 
fertile genius."110 Lecuna1s admiration for PAez extends to 
his ability as a leader also, for he proclaims that "PAez, 
active and vigilant, could not prevent certain omissions and 
negligence, but he maintained order and discipline in the 
army, in so far as the llanero habits permitted.1,111 The 
General's personal qualities did not impress Lecuna equally. 
He refers to PAez's "spirit of pride in wanting to impose 
his will, and his ignorance."112 Regarding the llanero 
chieftain's loyalty to his superior commander, Bolivar, he 
states that in 1818 PAez "did not care about Bolivar's fate, 
nor was he interested in rejoining him."113 In evaluating 
PAez's autobiography, Lecuna reminds us that there "is a 
psychological phenomenon which our self esteem imposes on us
109Lecuna, Crdnica Razonada, III, 417.
110Ibid., II, 284.
112Ibid.. 157. 113Ibid., 188.
111Ibid., 431.
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to erase certain memories and forge others favorable to our 
pride . " 1 1 4
After reading all these reflections written about 
General JosA Antonio PAez. the question arises as to wherein 
lies the true nature of his character. It seems to be that 
of an exceptionally gifted man. both physically and mentally, 
who lacked the polish and refinement of the emotions which 
sometimes results from a formal education early in life. 
Although he did not have the intellect of a Simdn Bolivar, 
he was blessed with a quick and agile mind. Perhaps he was 
not as aware as the Liberator was of the overall picture and 
principles involved in an issue, but on the other hand this 
left his mind free to perceive and evaluate matters at hand 
often times more clearly them Bolivar did. This appears to 
be particularly true when it came to the military tactics to 
adopt in the Apure region. No one, not even Bolivar himself, 
could compare with PAez in instinctively knowing how to fight 
the Royalists in this area. It was not only his familiarity 
with the terrain and his physical prowess that made him 
supreme here, it was also the unusual strategies he employed—  
strategies which defined his innate military genius.
PAez's success as the undisputed military leader in 
the llanos depended greatly also on the control and discipline 
he exercised over the uncivilized hordes of llaneros. In 
this instance, PAez's superior physical abilities stood him
114Ibid.. 273.
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in good stead. Had he not been able to best the llaneros in 
all of their physical feats, he would not have been able to 
demand and secure their blind obedience to his orders. The 
llaneros would follow their Tio. or Uncle, as they affec­
tionately called PAez, into the thickest of any fray. Since 
they were fanatically devoted to him, the llaneros always 
fought at their very best when he led.
PAez1s determination presents another keynote to his 
character, for it was also something quite out of the ordi­
nary. This in itself made him a formidable friend or foe, 
for once he had decided on a course of action, nothing could 
deter him. He was not given to pondering the results a given 
action might have such as Bolivar did. His practical, 
telluric outlook precluded any of the mental anguish experi­
enced by a visionary or dreamer such as the Liberator.
Having sprung from the barbaric, uncivilized llanos. PAez 
was, despite a veneer of civilization, the embodiment of the 
spirit of the llanos— fierce, wild, and strong.
The question of PAez's loyalty or disloyalty to his 
superior, Simdn Bolivar, gives further insight into his 
character. There should be no doubt left in anyone's mind 
that JosA Antonio PAez greatly respected and acknowledged 
the Liberator's privileged intelligence and because of this 
recognized his superior authority. To this extent, he was 
loyal to Bolivar. He even wrote to him as late as 1829 
inviting him to come share his exile with him in
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V e n e z u e l a . H o w e v e r ,  once P&ez became convinced that the 
split with Colombia was inevitable, and men such as Or.
Miguel Pena had persuaded him that Venezuela would fall into 
anarchy without his leadership, his loyalty to Bolivar fell 
victim to his loyalty to his beloved llanos and Venezuela. 
After all, P&ez's horizon had always been circumscribed by 
the llanos.
Having quickly learned both the extent of his capa­
bilities and the degree of his shortcomings, General P&ez 
appears to have been alternately arrogant and then humble. 
This perhaps was the final attribute of his character that 
prevented him from having the international status of a Simdn 
Bolivar or Francisco Miranda. However, it waB one more 
foible that helped to endear him to the masses of people, 
and the bulk of them did love him. Obviously nature had 
further endowed Jos6 Antonio P&ez with a rare gift— that of 
an extremely likeable personality. Perhaps people liked 
PAez because they sensed he liked them. And like them he 
did, for throughout his long and chequered career, he 
revealed concern and compassion for the lot of his fellow 
man. This concern may well be the main key to his character. 
In concluding, it seems appropriate to insert the following 
citation from his autobiography.H 6
I shall not deny that it is the peoples * fault 
if demagogues find in them a passion they can easily
llSp^ez, Autobioarafla. I, 542. ^^Ibid., 516-17.
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seduce, flatter, and convert into harm for society. 
Because of this, 1 shall always place among the 
friends of humanity those who use all their influ­
ence to destroy these vulgar preoccupations, leave 
behind all idea of division, and make all interest 
homogeneous. For the man of talent, regardless of 
his origin, color does not grant or take away 
titles of merit. Color shall always be an accident, 
as is the greatest or slightest perfection of the 
configuration of the human body. God has estab­
lished a more noble inequality which is convenient 
to know because it is an individual justice and a 
social stimulus. Appreciate the man because of 
his soul, because of his capacity, because of his 
heart, and because of his virtues. The most capable 
and the most virtuous shall be the most distin­
guished citizens in a State, regardless of whether 
they are white, black, or mottled. These have been 
the principles I have held all my life, and I have 
professed them with sincerity, publicly as well as 
privately.
INTRODUCTION
It has become the custom, and I might add the duty, 
of every man who has figured in his country's political 
scene, to write an account of the events he has witnessed 
and of the acts in which he has participated. This will 
enable a judicious posterity to have the abundance of docu­
ments and data necessary to disentangle the historical 
truth - a truth often obscured by the impassioned and seldom- 
similar accounts of contemporaneous writers. It is for this 
reason that today, after the anxieties of a very agitated 
life, I undertake to open the archive of my memories and 
register the documents I have managed to save from the 
ravages of time and revolutionary tempests.
The Hispanic-American revolution, last episode of the 
great drama that began in North America and had its most 
interesting period in France, has not yet been properly 
evaluated as a splendid triumph of the ideas of modern 
civilization, or as a training for peoples who suddenly 
trade the smock of the slave for the tunic of the free man. 
The opinions of historians who have written about the events 
of such an important era are not in agreement on many major 
points. Perhaps this is because they did not have access to 
unedited documents, or because of personal interests and
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considerations. Nevertheless, it is necessary to review the 
works of these historians.
Of prime consideration are the official documents of 
Colombia, which some scholars have collected and compiled 
into twenty-two volumes.1 In these volumes can be found the 
most authentic data of the events of the revolution.
Another work of merit for this period is that of Don 
Feliciano Montenegro. An erudite Venezuelan, he dedicated 
to the youth of his country a book that in a few pages covers 
all the principle events of the independence movement.^ This 
work is of great value not only because the author witnessed 
the events he refers to, but because he was a Royalist of 
high military rank. Montenegro gives valuable information 
which today can be found only in the impenetrable Spanish 
archives.
Four years after the publication of Montenegro's 
first volume, Senor Josfl Manuel Restrepo, Secretary of Foreign 
Relations in Colombia, published his monumental history.3
^The author must refer here to the work compiled by 
Francisco Javier Yafies and Cristobal Mendoza, Documentos para 
la Vida Pflblica del Libertador. 22 vols. (Caracas, 1826-29). 
Later these documents were incorporated by Josfl Felix Blanco 
and Ramfln Azpurda, Documentos para la Historia de la Vida 
Pflblica del Libertador de Colombia. Perfl. y  Bolivia. 14 vols. 
(Caracas, 1875-77).
2
Feliciano Montenegro Colfln, Geoqrafla General para el 
Uso de la Juventud de Venezuela, 4 vols. (Caracas, 1623-37).
3Historia de la Revolucifln de la Repflblica de Colombia. 
10 vols. (Paris, 1627). This work contains three volumes of 
important documents, an Atlas with maps of each of the twelve 
departments of the Republic, and a general map of Colombia.
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Subsequently, he wrote a corrected and improved edition.^
The last historian we review is Sehor Rafael Marla 
Baralt.^ He clothed with the brilliant dress of a correct 
and pure style the accounts of those who preceded him in the 
undertaking.
At this point, I must state that in the sections in 
which SefCores Restrepo and Baralt refer to the events of my 
life, 1 have found grave errors. This is particularly true 
of Restrepo who, permitting himself to be chained in more 
than one chapter by the spirit of provincialism, is exces­
sively unjust and too partial in his judgments and evalua­
tions .
If the desire to give my country one more document 
for its history were not sufficient stimulus to make me under­
take the task of writing my memoirs, the need to answer some 
of the charges made by my political adversaries would move 
me to do so. I thank Providence for prolonging my life 
sufficiently so that I could do this. It is my intention 
now to tell all that I know and hold to be certain and truei 
to correct some historical errors that writers have incurred;
^Historia de la RevoluciOn de la Republica de Colombia. 
4 vols. (BesanzOn, 1858). Restrepo condensed the ten volumes 
of the prior work into four volumes and in the Advertencia of 
this edition stated that the prior work had many errors which 
"deformed" its history completely and had been incurred when 
he was not present to correct the printing.
5Resdmen de la Historia de Venezuela deede el descub- 
rimiento hasta el afio 1830. 3 vols. (Paris, 1841) . PAez 
neglected to mention the co-author of this work, Ramdn Diaz.
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and, without failing to confess to the mistakes I may have 
made due to error in judgment, to defend myself from the 
attacks which bad faith or the spirit of party politics have 
engendered against me. I am certain that the hostility shown 
by some writers towards me will be readily understood by 
those who know the hatreds dividing our political society. 
However, since the predominant number of the principles dis­
puted in our political society are not generally known, it 
appears necessary to sketch them here.
On declaring political emancipation from the Spanish 
government, the colonies were confronted with the grandiose 
example of peoples who under the name of the United States 
had confederated for the sake of common security, and yet 
preserved for each section its sovereignty and particular 
laws. The spectacle of the prosperity enjoyed by these 
states made some men believe that the same principles which 
they saw develop there so successfully could be applied to 
us. Yet they believed that the Spanish had left the country 
with a serious affliction as a result of their policy of 
uniting different colonies founded by different conquista- 
dores under the sovereignty of viceroys or captain generals. 
As a result, they felt that all that pertained to centraliz­
ing power, even under the most democratic form, was a 
vestige of Spanish domination which must be destroyed as 
unworthy of a people that had achieved liberty at the cost 
of so many sacrifices. Thus, then, centralization and 
despotism became synonymous to some people. These doctrines.
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expounding the virtues of the dignity of the individual and 
his freedom as opposed to autocratic regimes, as beautiful 
as they are seductive, began to diffuse themselves throughout 
all the peoples of emancipated America. Bach city that had 
participated in the war or could present some historic title 
aspired to become the capital of a sovereign and independent 
state. Each individual, too, believed himself duty-bound to 
use the same mediums with which independence was achieved in 
combating all doctrines opposed to his.
Respectable men who knew the state of our society, 
while greatly admiring the generous impulses of the new 
generation, opposed adopting in the government of their 
country principles that were producing such excellent results 
in North America. They realized that, until the public was 
given a new education, these same principles were impossible 
to establish in a country where despotism had reigned for a 
long time and where all the vices of colonial domination 
remained. Let us listen, then to what Seflor Restrepo, the 
first Secretary of State in Colombia and the first historian 
of the Republic, has to say*®
The author of this history concurred in forming the 
act of federation and was an enthusiastic supporter of 
that system. Seduced by the rapid growth of the 
Republic of the United States and by the complete 
liberty that its inhabitants enjoy, I had the greatest 
veneration for its political institutions. Then X 
believed, as did the leaders of New Granada, that our
&The author footnotes this as follows * "Restrepo, 
Historia de la Revolucidn de la Reotiblica de Colombia. I, 
147, note 9." This citation is correct.
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provinces were in the same state as those of North 
America in 1776 when they formed their confederation. 
However, the lessons of time and the events that I 
have witnessed, added to my reflections, convinced me 
rather quickly to the contrary. There was and still 
is a great difference between the United States, 
which were founded and grew in the shadow of republi­
can institutions, and provinces that had always depended 
on a monarchical and despotic government. In the 
latter, democratic forms were absolutely new. In fact, 
many of them were directly opposed to the customs, 
habits and age-old preoccupations of the peoples 
involved. Generally speaking, in the United States, 
it was necessary only to change from the appointment 
of the governor, as done previously by the kings of 
England, to the election of this official. The con­
stitutional charters and laws of the old provinces of 
North America served as the governing instruments for 
the same areas when they later transformed themselves 
into republics. In New Granada, to the contrary, it 
was necessary to change almost everything that existed 
in order to establish the federal system. The little 
stability of our nacent states, then, was not to be 
admired; their laws did not suit the people and were 
directly opposed to their old attitudes.
The .Liberator himself said in his message to the Con­
gress of Angostura;7
When I admire to the fullest the excellence of the 
federating constitution of Venezuela, I see all the 
more the impossibility of applying it to our situation. 
According to my manner of thinking, it is a miracle 
that its model in North America has existed with so 
much prosperity and that it did not fall into confusion 
at the first appearance of danger or difficulty.
Despite this, that country is an example of political 
virtue and of moral rectitude. Liberty has been its 
cradle, and it has grown in liberty and maintains it­
self in pure liberty. I shall add that that country 
is unique in the history of the human race. And I 
repeat that it is a miracle that a system as weak and 
complicated as the federative one, could have existed 
under the difficult and delicate circumstances under 
which it has. Nevertheless, regardless of the situa­
tion with respect to the government, I must say to the
A copy of this document can also be found in Vicente 
Lecuna (ed.), Proclamas y  Discursos del Libertador (Caracas, 
1939).
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American people that the idea of comparing the situa­
tion and nature of two nations as different as the 
Anglo and Hispanic-American never entered my mind.
Would it not be very difficult to apply to Spain the 
political, civil, and religious code of England? Well, 
it would be even more difficult to adopt in Venezuela 
the laws of North America. Does not the spirit of law 
say that the laws must conform with the peoples that 
make them, and that it is only by great coincidence 
that the law of one nation is suitable to another?—  
that laws should have a relation to the physical state 
of a country, its climate, the quality of its earth, 
its location, its size, and the mode of life of its 
inhabitants? The laws should refer to the degree of 
liberty that the constitution can endure, to the 
religion of the people, to their inclinations, to 
their riches, to their numbers, to their commerce, 
and to their customs and morality.
In addition to the unsuitability of adopting princi­
ples developed in countries that had been conceived in
liberty, so to speak, many patriots, knowing that Spain did
not desist in her pretensions to reconquer, believed that 
the new states could be respected only by possessing a
strong central force that in case of danger could work with­
out any difficulty against exterior aggressions. There 
could be nothing hateful nor despotic in this centralization 
of power, since the head of the government exercised the 
authority that the people deposited with him for a limited 
period of time. I confess that these doctrines do not sound 
as well as those preached by their adversaries. However, in 
dealing with sacred and vital interests one must not allow 
himself to be flattered by theories that sound good, but 
instead he should put into practice truths that produce 
pos itive resuIts.
I have belonged to the group that defends the
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principles just mentioned. For these I have had to suffer 
persecutions, banishment, loss of my possessions, and misery. 
Yet all of this would have been little enough had my adver­
saries not reached the point that, in order to satisfy their 
wrath, they attributed to me faults and errors I have not 
committed. I will not deny that I have made some mistakes. 
But who has not been deceived in dealing with men, unless 
God were to concede to him that marvelous grace of perceiving 
the truth behind the mask which clothes ambition and the 
desire to prosper at another's expense?
How many times have X pondered the future fortune of 
America I Crises will continue to arise. What is happening 
now could have been foreseen, if statesmen had noted how
Q
anarchy has desolated our states.0 The resultant weakness 
has provoked those unjust aggressions that today are 
inflamed by hatreds which time has begun to extinguish and 
that, as was to be expected, have produced no other results 
except to convince Spanish America that only union and 
material power make countries strong and respected.
While llanos, pampas. and sabanas exist to invite men
o
Undoubtedly, P&ez is referring in "what is happening 
now" to the war between Spain and the Quadruple Alliance—  
Perti, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Chile. This war resulted in the 
bombardment of Callao and Valparaiso by the Spanish. The 
conflict, which officially began in January, 1866, repre­
sented a futile attempt by Spain to regain part of her lost 
empire.
90
to enjoy liberty, I do not believe that Spain will again 
conquer even a span of land that it possessed before. But 
it will take many years of work for South America to become 
what she seems destined to b e . Internal discords will con­
tinue as long as the causes of anarchy are in force, and 
sooner or later the question of boundaries and the right of 
navigation on the great rivers will cause new difficulties 
to surge. Will all of these problems promote the establish­
ment in South America of separate and distinct nations, all 
jealous of one another, as has occurred in'Europe? I have 
faith in the future. Still, unless our country adopts a 
program of education for all classes of society, I do not 
see any way for us to safely enter the path of reform which 
the progress of modern ideas demands.
I will not fail in this prologue to expound a desire 
I have cherished for a long time, but which seems impossible 
to realize as long as Spain has colonies in America.9 I 
would like to see not only the fraternal union of the South 
American countries, but also the union of all of these with 
their old mother country. I would still nourish such 
alluring hopes if the events presently verifying themselves 
would not have come to destroy them . ^ 0 If Spain would
At the time that P&ez wrote this introduction, in 
1867, Spain still held Cuba and Puerto Rico as colonial 
possessions.
10Again P&ez refers to the war between Spain and the 
Quadruple Alliance.
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recognize the independence of her old colonies, then both 
parties could put aside the hatreds inflamed by war and 
exist united by the powerful bonds of a common origin. Thus 
we would know each other better and would present to the 
world the grandiose spectacle of more than forty million 
people who, recognizing similarity of origin and language, 
and having the same vices and virtues, would unite always in 
order to stimulate each other in any cultural idea. The 
present generation would forget the offenses of their parents, 
and brothers of both hemispheres could maintain a perpetual 
fraternal commerce, generously exchanging their land produce 
and nobly competing in their literary triumphs. It is evi­
dent to me that liberal men of both hemispheres have been 
animated by these same desires. It is necessary to confess, 
however, that the lack of this fraternity must be attributed 
solely to the government of unfortunate Spain. Spain's 
animosity, which has not and cannot cause us any harm, has 
served only to unite the Americans in a common cause.
There are men that still preach the doctrine of races 
in America, and who want to begin a crusade of the peoples 
they call Latins against what they term the ambitious 
pretentions of the Anglo-Saxon race. That doctrine, which 
is nothing more than a European plan of aggression against 
the United States, can only find followers among those who 
are not familiar with the condition of Washington’s republic 
and that of the Hispanic-American countries. Furthermore, 
it is a fact belied by even the slightest observation of
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this continent, for here the fusion of all races is con­
stantly taking place— a result of modern progress and the 
principle of universal fraternity.
I shall end this introduction recommending earnestly 
to my countrymen to have courage and arms only for a foreign 
war and to work with faith and devotion for the future of 
our country. For our country needs only peace and order for 
the development of all the varied aspects of prosperity.
The latter has not been given the proper attention due to 
the dissensions and anarchy that have always made desolate 
countries so favored by the Supreme Being.
JOSE ANTONIO pAEZ .
New York, April 19, 1867.
CHAPTER I
My Birth— First Years of My Youth— Encounter 
with Highwaymen— Death of One of the Highway­
men— My Flight to Hato de la Calzada— Descrip­
tion of the Hatos— The Negro Manuelote— In 
Business Transactions.
1790-1809
I was born June 13, 1790, in a modest little house on 
the shores of the Curpa stream, near the town of Acarigua in 
the province of Barinas, Venezuela. I was the next to the 
youngest of the children of Juan Victoria P&ez and Marla 
Violante Herrera. Of their eight sons, I am the only one 
living today. My parents were very poor, for my father was 
employed by the colonial government in the department of the 
tobacco monopoly. This department was established in the 
city of Guanare. My father, therefore, had to reside in 
Guanare, and consequently leave my wonderful mother alone 
frequently— my mother who for different reasons never had a 
settled abode with her children.
I was eight years old when my mother sent me to Senora 
Gregoria Diaz's school, located in the town of Guama. There 
I learned the first rudiments of a very limited education. 
Since there was always an interest in preventing education 
from being diffused in the colonies, there were no schools 
under the Spanish government in Venezuela, except in the 
principal towns. The reader can imagine what that school at
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Guam a was like if he pictures a reduced populace, separated 
from the chief centers, concerned chiefly in providing for 
the material necessities of life* The reader must picture 
also a teacher, such as Sefiora Diaz, who opened up a school 
primarily as a means of earning a living. This teacher was 
barely able to teach reading forced us to memorize Christian 
doctrine by means of blows; and at best, taught penmanship 
according to the method of Professor Palomares. I was taken 
from this school by my brother-in-law, Bernardo Fern&ndez, 
who then employed me in his dry-goods store. There he 
taught me to retail goods, but only after occupying my 
morning and afternoon hours with the planting of cacao. I 
remained with my brother-in-law until a relative of ours, 
Domingo P&ez, took me and my brother, Jos6 de los Santos, to 
San Felipe. There he employed us in one of his many busi­
nesses .
My mother, who then lived in Guama, called me home in 
1807. In June of that year, she commissioned me to carry 
certain family papers to a lawyer who lived in Patio Grande, 
a town in the present province of Barquisimeto. I was also 
to take a moderate sum of money. I was seventeen years old 
then, and X was honored by this commission, especially 
because I was provided with a good mule, an old sword, a 
pair of bronze pistols, and two hundred pesos destined for 
my personal use. I was accompanied by a peon, who on his 
return was to bring several things for the family.
The trip to Patio Grande was uneventful. However,
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the return trip was quite different. Completely pleased 
with the idea that I was a trusted young man with quite a 
sum of money, 1 was anxious to show off. 1 took advantage 
of the first opportunity to do so. On passing through the 
town of Yaritagua, I went into a clothing store on the pre­
text of buying something. When 1 started to pay, I pulled 
out all the money I had and put it on the counter. I did 
not notice the persons present, except to flatter myself 
with the thought that they were witnesses to the fact that 
I was a man of means and weapons.
The spectators must have recognized quickly the 
thoughtlessness of youth, and perhaps planned immediately to 
rob me. I thought about them no longer, however, and con­
tinued the trip. I entered the narrow road that crosses the 
Mayurupi mountain, happy to be carrying arms and at the 
thought of using them. I removed the one loaded pistol from 
the saddle to kill a parrot that was perched up on a branch. 
But at that very moment it occurred to me that it was already 
late, that I had to journey an entire night in order to get 
home, and that my principal defense rested with the loaded 
pistol.
1 had barely continued my journey when the occasion 
arose to show the correctness of my reasoning. A tall man 
appeared a few paces from the left side of the road. He was 
followed by three others who darted to grab my mule by the 
bridle, immediately I jumped to the ground on the right 
side, pistol in hand. Young, without having had any
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experiences in dangerous circumstances, my difficulty at that 
moment could not have been greater. But, I was animated by 
an extraordinary recklessness on seeing the treachery of my 
aggressors. I resolved to give them my life only at a high 
price. The one who seemed to be the chief of the highwaymen 
advanced toward me with eyes fixed on the pistol aimed at 
him. I retreated as he advanced. He had a machete in one 
hand and a club in the other. Perhaps he thought I would 
not dare shoot him, for he disregarded my warnings to stop. 
Perhaps he thought it would be as easy to take me as it had
been to take my mule. He kept advancing towards me, and I
kept retreating. When we were about twenty yards from his 
companions, he threw himself on me and lunged furiously with 
the machete. Without hesitating, I fired— still without 
intent to kill. Up to that point, I was satisfied with 
wounding him in the leg. However, in order to avoid the 
bullet, he pulled back violently and got it in the groin. I 
remained mute and motionless for an instant. Believing that 
the shot had gone haywire, and that that horrible man would 
come to deal with me later, I unsheathed my sword. When I 
started to run him through, I stopped, for I saw him fall to
the ground and lay motionless. Blind with anger and thinking
only of saving my life, I ran then with naked sword toward 
the other thieves; however, they did not wait for me. They 
fled when they saw themselves without a leader and pursued 
by someone who had been converted from an unwary and easily- 
frightened youth into a determined pursuer of his aggressors.
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I was really very lucky, for perhaps on that spot I 
might have paid with my life for the temerity of sustaining 
such an uneven struggle. Recognizing this and without losing 
any time, X quickly mounted my mule which the thieves had 
abandoned in the mountain. On passing by the cadaver of the 
highwayman, I threw the pistol on him and hastily continued 
my journey. It was only then that X noticed that the pistol, 
which had exploded in my hands when I fired it, had hurt my 
hand.
Night fell an hour after this event. It was accom­
panied by thundering and a heavy rain, so dark and gloomy, 
that I had to stop many times to find the road. My position 
was extremely cumbersome. Surrounded everywhere by torrents 
that noisily descended on the ground, it seemed that every­
thing conspired to augment my anxieties and fears. This was 
so even though it had occurred to me that what X had done 
was an act justified by divine and human laws.
At four in the morning I arrived home. Though I was 
very worried, X told only one of my sisters what had occurred.
I was fairly calm there for a few days, until rumors began to 
spread that I had been the hero of the episode in the forest. 
Then, without consulting anyone, and induced only by a 
childish fear, X resolved to hide. Heading toward Barinas,
I went as far as the shores of the Apure. There, desiring 
to earn an honest living, I found employment in the peon class, 
earning three pesos a month in the hato de .la Calzada, 
belonging to Don Manuel Pulido.
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I must describe now an hato of that period, for the 
ones found today on those same sites differ as greatly from 
the ones I knew in my youth as civilization differs from 
barbarianism. Progress has introduced a thousand reforms 
and improvements in these farms. Yet, it is important to 
note that the character of the inhabitants has not been 
altered completely. I will not stop, however, to copy what 
the Venezuelan [Rafael Maria] Baralt and the Grenadine [Jos4 
N.] Samper have written with such veracity and exactness. 1 
Instead, I shall proceed to talk about the hatos as I knew 
them.
The hatos were then, as they still are in some respects, 
very rustic cabins with roofs of dried palm leaves. Around 
them, grass grew at will, and the only paths leading to them 
were those formed by the cattle tracks. Skulls of horses 
and heads of alligators constituted the only furnishings of 
the solitary habitations. These served as chairs for the 
llanero when he returned home exhausted from riding an 
ornery colt. The skins of the cattle heads or dried hides 
served as the only bed on which to stretch his weary body 
after having eaten his one meal at 7t00 P.M. Happy was he 
who had a hammock on which to restore his lost vigor I
^Piez refers here to the descriptions of the llaneros 
written by Baralt and Diaz, Readmen de la Historia. I, 349; 
and Jos4 M. Samper, Ensavo sobre Las Revoluclones Politicas 
y  la Condicion Social de las Repdblicas Colombianas {Paris, 
1861), 188.
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The llanero I knew would spend the night in one 
litter or another, lulled frequently by the monotonous sound 
of rain on the roof or the chirping of crickets, frogs, or 
other insects. The rooster, who slept in the same room with 
him, was his clocks the dog, his sentinel. He would get up 
at three in the morning, while it was still raining, and 
saddle his horse. At this time he would have already sur­
mounted the first obstacle of the day. This was to stumble 
barefoot over the pyramids of cattle heads which surrounded 
his home to the small cluster of grass where he had tied his 
horse.
His first task was to round up the cattle and drive 
them to the camping area. This operation was known as the 
rodeo if it included both cows and horses. If only horses 
were included, it was called the junta. "Juntas. 11 the 
llaneros would exclaim later when told of those formed to 
defend the sovereignty of Spain, "We know of no juntas here 
except those we form with animals!"
After camp was made, the yearling calves were 
separated and taken to be branded. Then the cows with calves 
were rounded up, the bulls castrated, and the cattle to be 
sold set aside* If the cow or horse set aside tried to 
escape, the llanero followed it, lassoed it, or pulled it 
down by the tail if necessary.
Just before nightfall, the llaneros would all return 
to their hatos to lock up the cattle. Then they would kill 
a cow, each taking his piece of meat and roasting it over an
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open fire. They had neither salt to season it with, nor 
bread to aid in its digestion. The only luxury of the meal 
consisted of tipping the tapara. a kind of gourd that kept 
water cool. Then the llanero might say with the almost 
resigned despair of the powerlessi
llanero would sometimes begin to sing. It would be one of 
those melancholy songs that are now proverbial as the 
lamenting voices of the desert. If he had been fortunate 
enough to go to Mass that Sunday at a nearby town and been 
able to persuade a troubadour to return with him, he would 
have accompaniment for his song. At other times, he would 
amuse himself by combing his horse's hair and making twisted 
halters.
beyond their horizon, they thought of them as inaccessible. 
They never heard the sound of the bell that recalls religious
obligations, and they lived and died as men who had no fate
other than to struggle with the elements and beasts. They 
limited their ambition to one day becoming the foreman of the 
place where they served as a peon.
With what ease this description is written in a
furnished room next to a pleasant firel But how different
"El pobre con aqua iusta.
Y el_ rico con lo que gusta. " 2 
To pass the time away after his sparse meal, the
Such was the life of the llaneros. Since cities were
This refrain says in essence: "The poor with just
(holy) water, and the rich with whatever he desires.”
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It waa to experience itl The struggle of man with wild 
beasts, for horses and savage bulls are wild beasts, is an 
unceasing struggle in which life survives as if by miracle.
It is a struggle that tests bodily strength, requires bound­
less moral resistence, and much stoicism, or else habits 
acquired since childhood, consider how difficult this 
struggle must have been for me. I had not been born to 
endure it; and furthermore, I looked on it as the punishment 
of my self-imposed exile. Imagine how difficult the appren­
ticeship in such a life was, for this is a life that only a 
robust man can withstand— a man accustomed from early youth 
to exercises requiring great physical strength and good 
health. This was the gymnasium where I acquired the athletic 
robustness that later served me in good stead many times, 
and which even today many men still in the vigor and strength 
of their youth envy me. My body, by force of blows, became 
like iron. My soul, with the adversities of the early years, 
acquired that disposition that even a most painstaking educa­
tion could hardly have given it.
But let me return now to Don Pulido's hato de la 
Calzada and my first employment there. It was my luck to 
have as foreman a tall, taciturn Negro whose grave countenance 
was made more venerable by a thick, bristly beard. His name 
was Manuel or, as all of us called him, Manuelote. He was 
Don Pulido's slave and his overseer. Since the house had 
burned down and the owner consequently did not visit the 
farm at the time, the hato was at the disposal of this grim
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overseer. The suspicions that some peons had aroused in 
Manuelote that I, under the pretext of finding employment, 
had come to spy on him, made him treat me very harshly. He 
always assigned me the hardest tasks, such as the taming of 
wild horses.
The task of taming wild horses was one with which 
Manuelote delighted in initiating any novice placed under 
his orders. His imperious voice would almost immediately 
order the poor peon to ride an unbridled horse, a horse that 
had never even felt the weight of a load on its back. This 
order brooked no objection, excuse, or hesitation. The peon 
would have to leap on a savage colt and grab its rough, 
thick mane. When barely mounted, the wild beast would begin 
to jump and arch its back, or snap furiously at the rider, 
thus placing the rider's legs in grave danger. The beast 
either would continue to try to unload the unaccustomed 
cargo, which was unbearable for him, or spouting what seemed 
to be fire through his eyes and nose, dart furiously in 
search of his companions in the plains, as if to entreat 
their aid against the enemy oppressing its flanks. By now 
the poor rider feels as if a hurricane with all its unbridled 
fury is carrying him and nearly dragging him on the surface 
of the land— the land, which although he imagines but a short 
distance from his feet, is still out of reach, for it, too, 
flees with the speed of lightning. The wind buzzes in his 
ears as if it were penetrating the cavaties of a deep cavern 
with full force. The unfortunate individual hardly dares to
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breathe. And if he does keep his frightened eyes open, it 
is only to see if he can find assistance somewhere, or to 
convince himself that the danger is not as great as he 
pictures it.
Hie land, which to the peaceful spectator seems very 
level, appears at each step to be frightful chasms into 
which rider and beast will certainly hurl themselves. No 
aid, except that which Heaven may offer, can be expected; 
consequently, the rider commands himself with all fervor to 
the Viroen del Carmen, whose scapulary he wears around his 
neck. At each moment he awaits his last second. Finally, 
the anguish ceases, for the horse surrenders out of pure 
tiredness, and little by little abandons the impetuous 
escape that wears out his strength. The next time the 
novice llanero performs this act, he is less frightened. 
Finally, there comes a time when there is no greater pleasure 
for him than to tame the animal that before had made him 
experience inexplicable terrors.
Another duty that Manuelote assigned to me and that I 
hated the most because of the heat and the vigilance it 
required, was to pasture the cattle during the day. At night 
he ordered me to watch the horses in case they got frightened 
and tried to run away. He also gave me the job of chopping 
wood for the fences. Finally, he ordered me to get out in 
the river with the horses, before 1 had learned to swim, in 
order to serve as their guide in crossing from one shore to 
another. I remember that one day, on reaching a river, he
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shouted at m e i "Get in the water and guide the cattle."
Because I hesitated, and thus revealed I did not know 
how to swim, he told me in an angry tone* "I am not asking 
you whether you know how to swim; I order you to get in the 
river and guide the cattle."
I suffered very much while being treated like this.
My hands cracked open as a result of the great efforts I 
made to hold the horses by the horsehair halters used to tame 
them. Forced to struggle with those wild animals, either 
bareback or on a wooden saddle with raw leather straps, my 
thighs were hurt so. that many times they were covered with 
abrasions that bled. Even worms came out of my wounds, but 
this was not rare in those deserts and in that savage life. 
Similar embryos were produced by the multitude of flies 
abounding there in the rainy season.
After finishing the day's work. Manuelote would lie 
down on his hammock and say* "Catire PAez, bring a camazo 
with water and wash my feet." Later, he would order me to 
swing him until he fell asleep. He distinguished me with 
the name of Catire. and chose me above all the other peons 
to carry out the most difficult and dangerous tasks that had 
to be performed on the farm.
Many years later, when I took Manuelote prisoner in 
the Battle of Mata de la Miel. I treated him with the 
greatest kindness, even to the point of making him sit at my
^Catire. blond; camazo. jug.
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table. One day when I revealed the desire to serve him in 
some way, he begged me as sole favor to give him safe conduct 
to go back to his home. I accommodated him. Later, grateful 
for the good treatment he had received, he joined my army. 
Then, the other llaneros in my presence were wont to say to 
one another with certain malicei "Catire P&ez, bring a 
camazo with water and wash my feet." Manuelote, bothered 
with those allusions to other times, would answer them: "I
know you all say that to annoy me; but you have such a strong 
leader, and the nation such a good fighter, because I made a 
man of P&ez."
After living two years in the Calzada farm, I went 
with Manuelote to the farm at Paguey, also belonging to Don 
Pulido. There X was to help capture and brand cattle that 
were to be sold. I had the good fortune then to meet Pulido, 
who elevated me from the peon status. He employed me to 
handle the sale of his cattle and, since my family had 
recommended me to him, offered me his protection by keeping 
me at his side. For almost a year I carried out the charge 
which he gave me. Under his guidance I learned the business 
and later retired to pursue this business on my own. After 
some time had passed, Pulido had to collect a certain sum of 
money through the sale of cattle. He put me in charge of 
this business. Gratefully and with pleasure I carried out 
his charge. When X finished it, X begem again to tend to my 
own business affairs.
There are times in one's life which, although appearing
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insignificant, leave indelible memories, it seems that 
Providence takes pleasure in giving man a certain rest 
before making him a participant of great events, she had 
selected me as one of her tools to contribute to the libera­
tion of my country from Spanish tyranny. Before hurling me 
into the whirlwind of battles, fate wanted me to forget the 
life 1 had spent as a peon and taste the sweetness of a 
period calmed and ennobled by the pleasure of earning a 
living leisurely. During this time, I acquired some worldly 
goods. My work provided me with sufficient means to live 
independently. I felt satisfied and happy, and 1 desired 
nothing else for myself. But, the hour of redemption was 
approaching, and Venezuela was preparing to conquer her 
freedom1
CHAPTER II
Geographic Situation of Venezuela— Population—
Ports— Navigable Rivers— Defense of the Terri­
tory— Joseph Bonaparte's Ascendancy over the 
Spanish Throne— The Colonies Decide to Support 
the Legitimate Monarch— Juntas— Revolutionary 
Movements— War with Spain.
The Republic of Venezuela, previously a Captaincy 
General of the same name, comprises a vast expanse of terri­
tory that lies between New Granada, which forms its Western 
boundary; the Atlantic, which bathes its Northern shores; 
British Guiana, which borders it on the East; and the 
Tapirapecu and Pacaraima Mountains, which separate it from 
the empire of Brazil. She has excellent ports to export the 
riches that are to be found in the interior of the territory. 
Above all, she has the beautiful Gulf of Maracaibo, which 
the first visitors took to be a sea. The topography of the 
land presents great problems of communication between the 
interior and the coast. In order to surmount this difficulty 
in the llanos. Providence gave us majestic rivers such as 
the Orinoco. It flows between rich tropical plains and is 
navigable for ocean-going vessels as far as the city of 
Angostura and even further for smaller ships. This river 
and others fertilize the areas around their shores. Here 
tropical fruits may be grown in abundance. In addition.
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great numbers of cattle, which were and still are one of the 
principal sources of the country's riches, pasture in these 
plains.
Before Independence, according to Humboldt's calcula­
tions, the Captaincy General of Venezuela had 800,000 
inhabitants.  ^ A  great part of this population disappeared 
during the revolt against Spanish tyranny, for Venezuela 
suffered more casualties during the war which it sustained 
for thirteen years them the other colonies that rebelled. 
Furthermore, fears that Spain would attempt to conquer the 
territory anew prevented the flow of European immigration to 
the new republics. Thus in 1822, the year in which Colombia 
was divided into seven departments and thirty-two provinces, 
the total population of this state was 2,644,600.2
^ A e z  refers here to Alexander von Humboldt, the dis­
tinguished German scientist who first visited Venezuela in 
July of 1801. In collaboration with Aimd Bonpland, a French 
scientist, he wrote Relation Historiaue du Voyage aux Regions 
Ecruinoxiales du Nouveau Continent. 1799-1804 (Paris, 1814-33). 
The Venezuelan Miniaterio de Educaci6n Nacional authorized 
Don Lisandro Alvarado to translate this work. It was pub­
lished in five volumes under the title Viaie a. las Regiones 
Eouinocciales del Nuevo Continente. 1799-1804 (Caracas, 1940). 
In the second volume of this translated work, 294-95, Hum­
boldt states that the Capitanla general de Caracas o de 
provinciaa de Venezuela had close to a million inhabitants 
in 1801. In 1823, however, he lists the population of 
Venezuela as 785,000. Ibid., V, 92.
^The Republic of Colombia had been created in December 
of 1819 at the Congress of Angostura. It included the former 
Captaincy General of Venezuela and the former Viceroyalty of 
New Granada. The country was divided then into three main 
departments, former main colonial divisionsi Venezuela, 
with its capital at Caracas; Quito (modern Ecuador), with 
Quito as its capital; and Cundinamarca (modern Colombia), 
with its capital at Bogotd. In May of 1821 the fundamental
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In the new form of government, Caracas was selected 
to be the capital of the department of Venezuela, the city 
where the Captain General had resided previously. Many 
foreigners came to Caracas then, particularly the English 
and French. Enamored of the nation's riches, they estab­
lished their residences and told their fellow countrymen 
about the resources they found. Among the prominent persons 
we had among us then was the celebrated Joseph Lancaster, 
who came to diffuse the benefits of his system of education.^ 
Despite the importance and popularity of Caracas and the 
fact that it is located only a few miles from the port of La 
Guayra, access to this capital was not easy at this time
law of the Congress of Angostura was fulfilled when the con­
stituent congress of Colombia met at Cdcuta. This body 
signed a constitution which designated Bogota as the pro­
visional capital and divided the republic into seven depart­
ments. Venezuela was divided into three departments!
Orinoco, Venezuela, and Zulia which comprised ten provinces. 
New Granada was divided into four departments! BoyacA, 
Cundinamarca, Cauca, and Magdalena which comprised thirteen 
provinces. Henao and Arrubla, History of Colombia. 350-55. 
Mordn, A History of Venezuela. 131-41.
^Joseph Lancaster, who had been born in London in 1778 
and had developed a successful system of elementary education 
for the children of the poor, came to Caracas, Venezuela 
about 1811 with the express purpose of establishing his sys­
tem for education. Although the Lancasterian system demanded 
very little in the way of equipment and supplies, it did 
require "Monitors" to assist the master in teaching large 
numbers. There were few people in Venezuela at this time 
capable of or willing to serve as monitors, and to this fact 
"may be attributed the evanescent influence of the Lancas­
terian schools of Hispanic America." Webster E. Browning, 
"Joseph Lancaster, James Thomson, and the Lancasterian System 
of Mutual Instruction, with Special Reference to Hispanic 
America," Hispanic American Historical Review. IV (Baltimore, 
February, 1921), 60.
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because of the mountains. But today there is a regular high­
way leading to the city which was built during my adminis­
tration.
Another important city in the department was Puerto 
Cabello. Serving as Valencia's port, it was destined to be 
one of the leading market places of the country because of 
its excellent bay which harbors all kinds of ships.
Angostura, heroic Angostura, eighty-three leagues from 
the sea, can ship all the riches from the Guayana provinces 
on the Orinoco River. She was and still is the capital of 
this province under the name of Ciudad Bolivar. The Apure, 
swollen by the waters of other navigable rivers, brings to 
the Orinoco all the riches of the llanos of the Barinas 
Province and all that is sent by the cities of Guanare, 
Araure, San Carlos, San Fernando de Apure, and the province 
of Casanare.
At this point it is easy to observe the need and 
importance of establishing good communications between ports 
and the interior, of opening good roads where there are none, 
and of endeavoring to make our rivers the best means for the 
defense and assistance of the coastal regions. But even all 
these advantages will be of no avail if we do not attempt to 
get all possible profit from the agricultural wealth that 
the interior of our privileged territory possesses. We must 
introduce into our country all the industrial and artistic 
improvements that are producing such good results in states 
less favored by nature.
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Let us pause for a moment here and discuss education 
in the department of Venezuela. In the period preceeding 
the Revolution, it was limited to that offered by the col­
leges and universities in a plan of studies formulated by 
the government of the mother country.^ Naturally, Spain and 
her representatives were very careful to limit the books 
that entered the colonies to those that aimed at inspiring 
in the youth of the territory the respect for all authority 
that had been venerated through the ages. Before this 
authority, they were to be humble and never to examine or 
discuss anything that men had elevated to the stature of 
dogma. Despite this, Don Antonio Nariflo translated 
Rousseau's Social Contract.5 This was a crime for which he
^Higher education during this period was provided 
mainly by Chairs of Grammar, one of which was founded as 
early as 1593 in Caracas by Philip II and another in 1608 by 
Bishop Alciaga. These chairs existed from then on in 
Caracas and possibly in other towns. The education consisted 
of Latin, rhetoric, arithmetic, history, geography, divinity, 
language, and literature. This type of secondary education 
was also given in church schools in the larger towns. In the 
eighteenth century schools were organized using textbooks 
that were current in Madrid. In 1673 the Seminary of Santa 
Rosas was officially opened by Bishop Gonz&lez de Acuna, but 
it was not until 1721 that it secured permission from the 
King to become a University. With the Pope's blessing in 
1722, the University of Caracas became Royal and Pontifical. 
Mordn, History of Venezuela. 81-83.
^Don Antonio Narino, born to a noble family in Santa 
F6 in 1765, was treasurer of tithes, a very remunerative 
office within the Spanish hierarchy. In 1794, he became so 
enamored of A History of the Constitutional Assembly of 
France, that he translated and printed that portion relating 
to the Declaration of the Rights of Man. This established 
him as the Precursor of the revolution. For this, also, he 
was tried by the audiencia and sentenced in 1795 to ten 
years imprisonment in Africa and perpetual exile from
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was locked up in the dungeon of Cartagena and later sent to 
Spain. All rigorous measures were to no avail, for enlight- 
ment began to spread. Just how much progress was made, even 
in the most difficult branches of administration and diplo­
macy, cam be seen in all documents published after independ­
ence. New universities and colleges were established and 
supported by a portion of the ecclesiastical wealth. Maps, 
pictures, and scientific apparatus were introduced. Finally, 
many schools following the Bell and Lancaster plan could be 
counted in Colombia, along with several colleges and univer­
sities .
There are many still alive today who witnessed the 
establishment of the education system founded in Venezuela 
by Senor Feliciano Montenegro. Don Montenegro also gave our 
country a wonderful treatise on geography which is still 
consulted as a source of valuable data. During my presidency 
1 always tried to give my support and attention to the intel­
lectual progress of youth. For this reason 1 established 
mathematics classes from which have emerged men who are
America. Enroute to the African prison, Narino managed to 
escape at C&diz. He subsequently went to Paris, then London. 
In 1797, using several disguises, he returned to his native 
land and presented himself to the Viceroy. He was arrested, 
and in 1803, while still a prisoner, was sent to a house in 
the country to recuperate from an illness. The Spanish 
revolution of 1810 led to his liberation, and when the inde­
pendence movement started in South America, he was one of 
its first advocates. In 1822, he became Vice-President of 
Colombia. He died in Leiva in 1823. Henao and Arrubla, 
History of Colombia. 180-84.
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honoring our country today. I encouraged Senor [Rafael 
Maria] Baralt to give the world his excellent history, a 
classic work that Spain does not fail to place among the 
best works written in her language.
About 1823, naval schools of both a practical and 
scientific nature were established in Cartagena and Guayaquil. 
These were the principal naval stations in Colombia. By then 
the Republic could rely on a respectable armada capable of 
antagonizing the Spanish even in the waters surrounding its 
possessions in the Antilles.
Countries, such as Venezuela, possessing long coastal 
regions that are within easy access even for ocean-going 
vessels and into which great navigable rivers empty, will 
always be exposed to an easy invasion from any naval power. 
This is true unless large sums of money are spent to com­
pletely defend the coastal areas. Venezuela is not rich 
enough to defray the enormous expenses required by modern 
artillery to protect its extensive shores. But then no 
European nor American nation is rich enough to maintain such 
a long line of well-guarded and mounted fortifications.
Only a powerful squadron could prevent the disembarking of 
an aggressive power.
There are other means of defending our territory from 
an enemy invasion. It is a very singular coincidence that 
where Providence has led peoples of the Spanish race to live 
in hot climates, it has also placed them in areas where
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topografic accidents help immeasurably to defend their 
nationalities. During the time of Spanish domination, forts 
were constructed in some ports to push back the attacks of 
the filibusters or buccaneers that would risk penetrating 
their ships even as far as the heart of the bays of populous 
cities. When these fears were ended, those forts were main­
tained in order to enforce maritime ordinances and also to 
threaten the people in case of armed insurrection. But, 
these forts could not protect all the shores effectively 
when they were located great distances from one another.
All these forts fell successively to the patriots, and with 
them all the tools of war that the Spanish had in them for 
safe-keeping.
After our independence was assured, I was always of 
the opinion that those fortified ports only occasioned use­
less expenses, for it was necessary to maintain strong 
garrisons in them. Above all, I considered them harmful in 
cases of insurrection against the established government.
If the forts did not have a strong garrison, there was the 
risk that in a moment of surprise a mutinous crowd, armed 
only with sticks and stones, could easily take possession 
and gain strength, by using the government supplies stored 
there.
After putting up all possible resistance on the coast, 
there are three lines of defense left to us against an 
invader. We cam retire to the narrow mountain passages where 
the European cannot take a step without struggling against
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great obstacles. Or we can go to the jungles where each man 
familiar with the terrain is worth many of his foreign 
adversaries. It would be advantageous to take howitzers 
weighing nine and twelve arrobas6 to these points transporting 
them on mules.
If we are forced to abandon this first line, we can go 
to our plains, which are traversed by copious rivers and 
channels that are very difficult to ford. These are inhabited 
by dangerous animals that terrify the foreigner who is 
unaccustomed to seeing them and struggling with them in mid­
stream as the llanero is. This second line of defense is 
the theater where the cavalry will play an important part.
The horses the enemy might have brought from his homeland 
will be worthless when pitted against our cavalry. That is, 
of course, unless our horses have been rendered completely 
useless in the ravines forming our first line of defense.
The third line of defense would be the immense unin­
habited territory that comprises a great part of the Republic. 
This area is crossed by great rivers and is covered by 
impenetrable jungles. If all else were lost, the Venezuelan 
can come forth from here to rout the enemy— an enemy greatly 
weakened already by the attacks of our first two lines. But 
it is almost impossible for the enemy to reach this point. 
However, if he were to attain it, he would then need an
®One arroba is equivalent to approximately twenty- 
five pounds.
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extensive line of troops to cover his communications and to 
prevent his retreat from being cut off, and from being com­
pletely routed by inferior numbers.
The climate is another one of the elements we rely on 
in case of a foreign invasion, for it is an American patriot 
who will always help its children against the European 
aggressor. Add to this the inconveniences of our roads, 
impassable during the rainy season; the insects; and even 
the fruits which, though a palatable gift of the natives, 
are poison to the foreigner seeking refreshment and nourish­
ment from them. Relying on all these factors, there is no 
need ever to risk a field battle. The need, instead, is to 
force the enemy to march time and again, never giving him a 
place to rest. This will reduce his numbers, tire him, and 
get him in a lethargic state.
Our country is thus unconquerable. But please do not 
believe that because of this I do not approve of being aware 
of the contingencies of war in peacetime. I believe that 
good armories should be built in different places to store 
our tools of war safely rather than depositing these in the 
coastal forts. For example, in Valencia Lake there is a 
small island called El Burro. possessing luxuriant wood­
lands and good pastures and which belonged formerly to the 
Marquis del Toro.7 It is the most suitable place to
7The Marquis del Toro was Francisco Rodriguez del Toro. 
He tried to suppress the insurrections in Coro and Valencia 
in 1806 and failed in both instances. Lecuna, Crdnica 
Razonada. I, xvi-xvii.
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establish a good armory and a military school. Here the 
young cadets could find recreation, in addition to learning 
and practice.
After these pages are written, the experience of what 
is happening now in the Pacific should serve as a lesson to 
the republics on the Atlantic coast.® It should make them 
see the need for fortifying their most important ports if 
they do not want the appearance of one lone enemy ship on 
their coast to place them in difficult straits. They should 
also try to train good sailors, even in foreign schools if 
necessary, in order not to have to rely on foreigners when it 
becomes necessary to form a squadron.
I have wanted to delve into all these considerations 
at this point to give an idea of the state of our country 
and of the good things that Independence has produced. How 
much my country could still profit if her sons would put 
aside the hatreds and grudges that divide opinions, and 
decide to reap benefits from the many gifts with which 
Heaven has blessed this interesting section of the American 
Continent 1
No one is unaware of the fact that the first political 
movements of the South Americans were in the beginning expres­
sions of loyalty and sympathy toward the mother country at a 
time when her King was a prisoner on foreign soil and her
®PAez refers again to the War of the Quadruple 
Alliance [Chile, Perti, Ecuador, Bolivia] vs. Spain.
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throne occupied by an intruder supported by French bayo­
nets.9 While in Spain prominent men and distinguished 
generals applauded the fall of the Bourbons and the rise of 
a new dynasty, and while the Spanish lieutenants in America 
accepted in a pleased and submissive manner the new order of 
things, the American people, full of indignation, refused to 
abandon the cause of him whom they felt was their legitimate 
monarch. The juntas formed in various provinces of the 
Peninsula sent their representatives to the colonies so that 
the latter would recognize them as the supreme ruling 
authority of Spain during the absence of the monarch. The 
colonies, not knowing which of the representatives were 
legitimate and afraid of falling into the misgovemment and 
anarchy that prevailed in Spain, believed themselves within
9This alludes to the events that had occurred in Spain 
in 1808 when Napoleon Bonaparte, Emperor of France, under 
the pretext of stimulating the war with Portugal, asked and 
secured permission from the weak Charles IV to send troops 
across Spain in return for certain concessions wanted by 
Manuel Godoy, Charles I V ' s favorite. The Spanish people 
realized the threat posed to their national independence by 
the presence of French troopst so they rose against Godoy, 
whom they considered Napoleon's agent. Charles IV speedily 
resigned then in favor of his son, Ferdinand VII. When 
Charles changed his mind subsequently about his abdication, 
Ferdinand appealed to Napoleon. Both monarchs then sped to 
Bayonne, France for an interview with Napoleon and settle­
ment of their claims. Napoleon imprisoned them both there 
and placed his brother, Joseph, on the Spanish throne. The 
colonists in America followed the example set by the 
Spaniards in the peninsula and formed juntas declaring 
loyalty to Ferdinand VII, not Charles IV. Baralt and Diaz,
Readmen de la Historia. I, 16-18. Henao and Arrubla, History 
of Colombia. 189-90.
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their rights to create other juntas and assemblies until the 
Spanish monarch was returned to the throne £rom which he had 
been wrested so violently. The intruder King, whose brother 
had placed him on the throne of San Fernando, also sent his 
emissaries to America to demand colonial submission to His 
authority.^
With the legitimate King a prisoner, a civil war in 
progress, and disagreements even among the provinces loyal 
to the King, there could not have been a more opportune time 
for Americans to shake off the yoke of the mother country. 
However, the sentiment of loyalty to their monarch was still 
considered one of their most sacred duties. In July of 1808 
when a French ship arrived on the coast of Venezuela with 
orders from King Joseph, the indignation of the people of 
Caracas was such that the captain of the ship, afraid of 
being attacked, thought it prudent to raise anchor and 
leave.11
lOThe reference here is once again to Joseph Bonaparte 
whom Napoleon had placed on the Spanish throne. In July of 
1808 he sent Lt. Paul de Lamanon to inform the authorities in 
Caracas of the events in Spain and to urge the Spanish Cap­
tain General Juan de Casas to recognize Joseph as King of 
Spain. He failed in his mission and was escorted back to the 
port of La Guaira. There he reembarked only to be captured 
by the British frigate Acasta, captain Philip Beaver. Mordn, 
History of Venezuela. 97.
11The French ship mentioned here was the French 
brigantine Serpent. Actually the direct orders to anchor off 
Venezuelan coast came from Victor Kugues, military commandant 
of French Guiana. Caracciolo Parra-PArez, Hiatoria de la 
Primera Republica de Venezuela. 2 vols. (Madrid, 1959), I, 
195.
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Let us see how this event is described by Captain 
[Philip] Beaver, officer in the English navy, who brought 
the news of the happenings at Bayonne to Venezuela.
On entering the city, I observed a great agitation 
among the people, an agitation such as is wont to pre- 
ceed or follow popular mutinies. When I entered the 
big inn of the city, I found myself surrounded by all 
classes of people. 1 discovered then that the French 
Captain that came yesterday had brought news of all 
that had transpired favorably for the French in Spain, 
that he had announced the ascendancy of Joseph Bona­
parte to the Spanish throne, and that he had also 
brought orders from the French Emperor.
The city armed itself immediately. Ten thousands 
of her inhabitants surrounded the palace of the Cap­
tain General and asked that Fernando VII be proclaimed 
king. The Captain General promised to do this the 
following day. But the people were still unsatisfied! 
so that very afternoon by means of heralds they pro­
claimed him King throughout the city with the proper 
ceremonies and placed his picture between the lights 
in the City Hall gallery.
The French were publicly insulted in a cafe and 
forced to leave. In fact, the French Captain had to 
leave Caracas secretly that very night at 8t00 p.m. 
escorted by a detachment of troops. He barely managed 
to escape with his life, for about lOtOO p.m. the mob 
demanded that the Governor deliver the Frenchman to 
them.13 When they discovered that he had left, three
12The British frigate Acasta had arrived in La Guaira 
in July also. Its captain, Philip Beaver, had been commanded 
by Vice-Admiral Alexander Cochrane, commander of the British 
Leeward Islands squadron, to inform the people of Caracas and 
CumanA that the Spanish people on the peninsula had risen 
against the French. He was to inform them also that the 
French government in Spain was illegitimate, that a govern­
mental junta had been set up in Seville, and that England 
was now Spain's ally against France, their common enemy. 
Captain General Casas received the English commissioner 
rather coolly, for he was more sympathetic to the French. 
Ibid.
1 3By Governor in this instance. Captain Beaver refers 
to the Captain General, Juan de Casas. Andres Bello, who 
served as interpreter for Lamanon and later was secretary
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hundred men began to search for him in order to 
kill him.
Despite the fact that the Governor received me 
coolly, the most respectable inhabitants of the city 
surrounded me and acclaimed me their liberator.
They read the news that I had brought from Cadiz with 
great interest and shouted out their gratitude toward 
England.
At 5*00 p.m., when I returned to the Governor's 
palace, I asked him to deliver the French schooner 
or at least to let me capture it in the bay. He 
refused both demands and told me that he had issued 
orders for its immediate departure. 1 told him that 
1 had already taken measures to capture it if it left 
port, and that if it were not controlled by Spaniards 
on my return to La Guayra, 1 would seize it. He 
responded that he would order the Commandant at the 
square to fire on my ship if I attempted such a thing.
I replied then that he would be responsible for the 
consequences. I further added that the reception he 
had given me was more like that given an enemy rather 
them a friend, even when I brought him news that 
hostilities between Great Britain and Spain had ceased. 
1 pointed out that his conduct revealed his friendship 
to the French even though it was evident that Spain 
was at war with France. He answered that he knew 
nothing pertaining to the latter. 1 repeated it again 
and asked him then if he did not consider the imprison­
ment of the monarchs and occupation of Madrid as acts 
of hostility indicative of war. His reply was that 
His Government had not communicated anything to him 
about this war and that he did not consider the dis­
patches I had brought as official.14
for a meeting called by Casas of the principal Spanish 
officials, describes these events vividly. Miguel Luis 
Amun&tegui, Vida de Don Andrfes Bello (Santiago de Chile, 
1882), 40-46.
l^rhia is taken from part of the letter that Captain 
Philip Beaver wrote Admiral Alexander Cochrane from La Guaira, 
July 19, 1808. The entire letter may be found in Amun&tegui, 
Vida de Don Andres Bello. 47-48. Casas' pro-French feelings 
were not completely without reason. The Americans had a 
voice in their government for the first time under the Bona- 
partist government, for the Spanish National Assembly that 
was called included not only deputies from the Spanish 
provinces, but also from the colonies. Casas could not help 
but remember that in 1808 the Supreme Central Junta of
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When it was known that disorder still continued in 
Spain, the respectable citizens of Caracas went to the Cap­
tain General, Don J[uan] de Casas, and asked that a junta 
similar to the ones formed in Spain be established. This 
public official arrested them. Fortunately, he was forced 
to free them later by the power of public opinion.
In 1809 a junta was formed in Quito under the Presi­
dency of the Marqu6s del Selva-Alegre. The Viceroy of Santa 
F£ wanted to oppose this, but consulted the influential 
citizens of Bogota concerning the course he should pursue.^
, All unanimously agreed that if the authority of the legiti­
mate sovereigns was not quickly restored in Spain, this city 
would follow Quito*s example. Viceroy [Antonio] Amar [y 
Borbon] who was opposed to these measures, asked each citizen 
to write an opinion. To further intimidate those who did 
not agree with him, he ordered the city-guard troops to 
patrol the weapons. As if to further frighten the faithful 
supporters of true authority, which included the most eminent 
citizens, the Viceroy decided to punish what he considered 
an insubordination. He joined the Viceroy of Peril and
Government set up in Aranjuez had two deputies from each 
province in Spain but excluded the American ones. Mordn, 
History of Venezuela. 97-98.
l^pAez refers here to the Viceroy of Santa F6 or New 
Kingdom of Granada (a viceroyalty created in 1717), Antonio 
Amar y Borbon. He had arrived in Santa F6 with his wife in 
1803 and had been received with enthusiasm. Deaf and lacking 
energy, he was a poor choice to rule the colony at this 
critical period. Henao and Arrubla, History of Colombia.
123, 187.
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marched with armed forces to dissolve the junta at Quito.
On August 2 of this year many of the members of the junta 
were barbarously murdered in prison. To punish the city, 
Viceroy Amar then turned it over to the looting of the 
soldiers.
Such atrocities were sufficient to cool the loyalty 
of the Americans; but this sentiment was so deeply rooted in 
their hearts, that the victory at Talavera was not received 
any less joyously in the colonies than in the Peninsula.^ 
The Marqu£s de la Romana declared the Junta Central illegi­
timate t so its members had to take refuge in the Isle of 
Le6n, one of the few spots not occupied by French troops.
*6The Viceroy of PerCt at this time was Jos6 Fernando 
de Abascal y Sousa. Occupying this post from 1806 through 
1616, he wrote Memoria o Relacidn de Gobierno. 2 vols.
(edited by Vicente Rodriguez Casado and Jos6 Antonio Calderon 
Quijano, publicaciones de Escuela de Estudios Hispano Ameri­
canos, Seville, 1944).
17Parra-P6rez calls this "victory" an indecisive battle 
which occurred in May of 1809, and did force the British to 
retreat, but gave Wellesly the illustrious name of Wellington. 
Historia de la Primera Republica. I, 253.
l®The Marquee de la Romana commanded fourteen or fif­
teen thousand troops who were serving with the French armies 
when the Spanish revolt against the French broke out in 1808. 
With the aid of the British, he and his army "defected" to 
Spain. He fought in countless battles against the French. 
After the Junta Central was banished, the regency of Spain 
and the Indies, which was subsequently established, issued a 
decree in February of 1810 advising the Americans to elect 
deputies to the Spanish Cort6s on the basis of one for each 
capital of a viceroyalty and one for the capital of each 
Captaincy general. William Francis Patrick Napier, History 
of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France from 
the Year 1807 to the Year 1814. 5 vols. (Philadelphia, 1842), 
I, 178-79. Henao and Arrubla, History of Columbia. 193-94.
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There they formed a Regency consisting of five members.
It seemed, then, that the colonies had no other alter­
native but to recognize the sovereignty of the French or to 
declare themselves completely independent while the King was 
imprisoned in Bayonne. While they hesitated between these 
two extremes, the Regency sent its representatives to the 
colonies encouraging them to promote their own interests and 
reminding them of the vexations to which they had been 
subjected by the ambition and caprice of the governors. They 
said that the new government planned to end these evils soon.
In 1810 news was received in Caracas of the sad state 
of the national cause in Spain. The people knew that the 
governors were determined to recognize any government in the 
mother country rather than permit the Americans the right of 
adopting measures which they considered revolutionary. As a 
result on April 19, they deposed the Captain General 
[Vicente Emparan] in the name of the Catholic Monarch and 
organized a junta to govern the country until the Spanish 
throne was occupied again by its legitimate sovereigns.
Such measures alarmed the peninsulares residing in 
America. They began to manifest open opposition against the
*9The Captain General at this time was Vicente Emparan. 
By this act of April 19, 1810, the town council of Caracas 
was transformed into the government of the Venezuelan prov­
inces. It took the name of Supreme Junta for the Conserva­
tion of the Rights of Ferdinand VII. This occurred on a 
Holy Thursday and is Venezuela*s First Independence Day. 
Parra-P6rez, Historia de la Primera Repflblica. I, 267-78.
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creoles, whose loyalty they suspected now. In Santa F6, a 
Spaniard insulted an American with offensive words directed 
against his countrymen. As a result of this incident dis­
turbances exploded between the two groups. Parties were 
then formed on both sides.
These events were told to the government of the 
mother country in an exaggerated manner by the governors of 
the colony. Undoubtedly for this reason, the Regency ans­
wered the official dispatches of the junta of Caracas by 
publishing a decree on August 31, 1810, that declared the 
city in a state of siege. In the decree, the Regency accused 
the city of wanting to declare itself independent from the 
mother country under the false pretext of forming juntas 
representing the monarchy. The loyalty of the provinces of 
Maracaibo and Coro was commended, for they had not followed 
the pernicious example of the insurgent capital. The Regency 
proposed to end these evils by rigorously punishing the 
guilty unless they resorted to the amnesty offered them by 
the clemency of the government.
Such language was equivalent to a declaration of war, 
for it came from a gathering of individuals and not from the 
monarchy— the monarchy whose authority and decrees the people 
were accustomed to respecting without appeal. The manifesto 
in which Caracas explained the reasons that had prompted it 
to take the measures termed revolutionary, and which were 
really only a loyal expression of the sentiments which 
joined the colonies with the mother country, could not
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placate the susceptibility of the Regency. The Spanish 
Cortes became indignant at the daring of the Americans. One 
of the deputies said: "If the Americans complain of having
been oppressed for about three hundred years, they shall 
experience the same treatment for smother three thousand 
years.” "I am glad,” said another after the victory of 
Albufera [Albuera], "I am glad we triumphed because now we 
will be able to send troops to quell the insurgents. And 
Deputy Alvarez from Toledo exclaimed: "I do not know to
what race of people those Americans belong."
Thus was loyalty paidl This is the manner in which 
appreciation of a generous people ready to sacrifice their 
dearest interests was shown 1 It was necessary now to answer 
insult with threat, and threat with a struggle of blood and 
fire until arms, and arms alone, would decide where right 
and reason lay.
The rigorous measures taken to intimidate the patriots 
served only to exasperate the spirit of the colonists further 
and separate them more from the mother country, even breaking 
all bonds of fraternity. When the first juntas were formed, 
no one thought of declaring independence from Spain. How­
ever, the conduct of the ministers in Spain and of her
^°The victory at Albuera occurred in 1814 when the 
combined British and Spanish forces defeated the French army 
under Marshal Soult. It was really a nominal victory, for 
it occurred only because of Soult’s error in judgment in 
withdrawing, for in reality he had superior forces. Napier, 
War in the Peninsula. II, 328-40.
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representatives in America was such, that it gave the colo­
nists the right to proclaim before the world that they desired 
and deserved freedom, even at the expense of life and prop­
erty.
The revolutionary movement started in Caracas, On 
July 5, 1811, representatives from several Venezuelan prov­
inces drew up their Declaration of I n d e p e n d e n c e . ^  This set 
an example that was quickly followed by the provinces of the 
Viceroyalty of Santa F&, Mexico, and later on, the provinces 
of the Rio de la Plata region.
The Spanish Cortes became alarmed then and thought to 
resort to conciliatory measures. But it was too late. The 
Americans asked that they be given, according to the decree 
of October 15, 1809, the same rights possessed by Spaniards 
born on the Peninsula. Among other rights, these included 
having representatives in the National Congress; opening the 
doors to the products of allied and neutral nations; having 
free commerce with Spain and the Asiatic colonies; abolishing 
the monopolies that enriched the public treasury and the 
King's coffers, and reimbursing both by levying new duties
21
This "second" declaration of independence came about 
when the Venezuelan Congress took measures which were incom­
patible with the acceptance of the authority of Ferdinand or 
any Spanish government. The new country took the name of 
the American Confederation of Venezuela and comprised the 
united provinces of Caracas, CumanA, Barinas, Margarita, 
Barcelona, MArida, and Trujillo. Coro, Maracaibo, and 
Guayana remained Royalist. The seven stars in the Venezuelan 
flag are for the first seven provinces mentioned. Mordn, 
History of Venezuela. 105-109.
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on the same articles; and giving the Creoles the right to 
hold civil, military and ecclesiastic offices on the same 
basis as Spaniards.
The English, who in 1797 had encouraged the revolu­
tionaries of Venezuela, declared themselves adversaries on 
this occasion.22 In 1810 Lord Liverpool ordered the Gover­
nor of Curazao to interpose his good officers to help adjust 
the differences between the malcontents and their governing 
officials. The government of Great Britain even offered its 
mediation services, encouraging the Americans to reconcile 
with the mother country. The terms they proposed were the 
followingi that hostilities between Spain and her colonies 
cease; that general amnesty for all those involved in the 
movement be granted; that the Americans be given representa­
tion in the Cort6s and freedom of commerce, with preference 
to Spain; that the appointments of Viceroys and Governors be 
made indiscriminately from both peninsulares and creoles; 
that local autonomy be granted to the cabildos of municipali­
ties, whose members should be both Spaniards and Hispanic—  
Americans; that the colonists recognize the sovereignty of 
the Cort£s as representative of Fernado VII. These and other
22After the Treaty of San Ildefonso in 1796, Charles 
IV declared war on England, attempting to reconquer Gibraltar 
and Jamaica; consequently, England captured Trinidad in 1797 
and allowed the Venezuelan revolutionaries to use it as a 
base of operations. However, in 1808 England reversed this 
position after she had signed a new alliance with Spain. 
Parra-P6rez, Historia de la Primera Republica. I, 253.
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propositions were rejected by the Cort6s who saw in them 
only Great Britain's desire to prosper from the commerce of 
the colonies.
On July 24, the Junta de Comercio of C&diz replied to 
the British by issuing a manifesto which saidt
Freedom of commerce with the American provinces 
would be the greatest calamity that could befall 
Spain. Those who want to establish it are imposters 
deserving an exemplary punishment and banishment for 
life, since the fortune of Spain and its political 
existence depend on the solution of this question, the 
names of those who propose such disastrous traffic 
should be transmitted to posterity so that the latter 
may view them with the deserved indignation. The 
Americans have not solicited the establishment of this 
free commerce. Instead, they have detested it as 
prejudicial to their interests since Spain could 
become the toy of foreigners, her commerce and manu­
facturing could be ruined, and all freedom lost. Such 
commerce is against all rights of religion, morality 
and order.
Whether these propositions were of interest to Great 
Britain or not, the fact was that this nation, which had 
previously supported [Francisco] Miranda, now not only showed 
itself indifferent to the American cause, but even hostile 
to a certain extent. This attitude was what was most suit­
able now to her interests on the European continent stirred 
up by Bonaparte. Nevertheless, the junta at Caracas com­
missioned Don Luis Ldpez Mdndez and Don SimOn Bolivar to 
solicit its support, just as it had named Don Tel6sforo Orea 
to entreat the aid of the United States.
Since all efforts to bring help from some foreign 
power were in vain, the patriots now depended only on the 
justice of their cause— a cause which they determined to
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defend at all costs. The Caracas junta deposed the Spanish 
authorities and established itself as a legislative body 
issuing decrees which revealed the progress of new ideas. 
Following its example, other juntas were formed in the rest 
of the provinces except Maracaibo. There the Governor 
[Fernando] Miyares, seized the deputies from the Caracas 
junta and sent them as prisoners to Puerto Rico. As a 
reward for these services, the Regency named him Captain 
General of Venezuela and ordered him to adopt severe mea­
sures to stifle the insurrection.
With the thought of opposing Governor Miyares and of 
protecting the patriotic provinces, the Caracas junta sent 
troops under the command of Marques del Toro. since the 
peaceful negotiations that the latter proposed to Miyares 
were in vain, hostilities broke out. The Marqu6s entered 
the province of Coro in November [1810]. However, he was 
finally forced to evacuate it for fear of losing contact 
with his supply lines.
CHAPTER III
I Enlist in the Patriot Army— I Retire from 
Military Service— The Spanish General [Antonio] 
Tiscar Appoints me Cavalry Captain— I Flee and 
Accept the Same Appointment in the Patriot Army 
— The Battle at Suripa— The Troops Abandon Me—  
Entrance in Canagua— Trip to Barinas— I am 
Sentenced to Death— I Leave the Prison— I am 
Arrested Again and Sentenced to Death for the 
Second Time— "The Army of Spirits."
1810-1813
After the struggle against the mother country started, 
forces began to arise in all parts of America to fight the 
Spanish. In 1810, I was called into the service of the 
patriot army for the first time, and I enlisted in the 
cavalry squadron that Don Manuel Pulido commanded in Barinas. 
I served for some time. Three months before the occupation 
of the country by the Spanish chief Don Domingo Monteverde,
I retired from the army with an indefinite leave.* I had 
attained the rank of first sergeant in 1813.
When Bolivar occupied Cticuta, the deputy police chief
^Don Domingo Monteverde became Captain General after 
the destruction of the first republic in July, 1812. In con­
trol of the area mainly because of Miranda's inactivity and 
the impressions created by the great earthquake, he was over­
confident when it came to his own abilities. He ruthlessly 
pursued the patriots. He was so influenced by ignorant 
favorites, that even the Royalists wanted revenge. Lecuna, 
Crdnica Razonada. I, 25.
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of CanaguA handed me an order from the Spanish General, Don 
Antonio Tiscar, in which he commanded me to go with thirty 
men to the Carrao farm, fifty leagues from Barinas.2 There 
I was to round up all the tame horses and the largest cattle 
in that farm and bring them to his general headquarters in 
Barinas. Although I was not a soldier in the Spanish army, 
for remember I have said I had served in the ranks of the 
patriots and was presently on leave, 1 had to obey that 
order. In the state of military oppression that the country 
was in, any resistance to such orders was considered a crime, 
regardless of whether it was given to a soldier or to a 
civilian. Thus I could not refuse the commission conferred 
on me. With the feelings of repulsion that were to be 
expected, I went to carry out the order. I made an agreement 
with the foreman of the farm not to take more than two hun­
dred horses and only a thousand head of cattle out of the 
fifteen thousand they had. I returned to general head­
quarters with these animals.
This time Tiscar recognized me. He manifested such 
deference to me that he even invited me to eat at his home. 
There I found some other guests who were officers. Tiscar 
had recently imposed a forced contribution on the citizens 
of Barinas. Those who would not or could not pay it were 
obliged to take arms. In this manner he collected funds and
2Don Antonio Tiscar was Capit&n de fraoata and the 
Spanish Commandant General of Barinas. Ibid.. 32.
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augmented the ranks of his army in order to face Bolivar, 
who was approaching with his forces from New Granada.
Wanting to find out how much I had to contribute directly 
from Tiscar, who constantly "courted” me, 1 asked him the 
amount then. He replied that he wanted no contribution from 
me, for he thought to assign me to military service with the 
rank of cavalry captain.
True to his word, Tiscar sent orders for me to come 
to his headquarters a month later. He sent this dispatch by 
Lieutenant Montero, who also had orders to place at my dis- 
posal a company of mounted men and whatever resources X 
needed to get there. Tiscar wanted to encounter Bolivart 
so he ordered me to join his forces immediately. Montero 
presented me with a captain’s commission and told me that 
within three days all would be ready for me to march and 
join Tiscar. Without accepting the commission, I told him 
that I had to go to my farm first and make the necessary 
arrangements. 1 asked him to hold my commission until my 
return, for I would be back in the appointed length of time. 
However, I had already decided not to serve in the Spanish 
army and had resolved to search for the patriots and join 
them. I crossed the Pedraza mountains accompanied by Don 
Antonio Maria FernAndez, a proprietor of Barinas. When we 
arrived at the town of Santa Barbara, I found the patriot 
Commander Manuel Pulido who had come from MArida with a few 
troops. I joined him immediately, and we marched toward 
Barinas over the same road that I had just traveled. On
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reaching that city, we discovered that it had been evacuated 
by the Spanish forces after General JosA FAlix Rivas had 
defeated one of Tiscar's divisions in Niquitao.3 Tiscar, 
along with the rest of the Spanish army, retreated towards 
Nutrias and San Fernando de Apure. The Spanish Commander 
[josA] Yaflez [y Tiscar] then left Guasdualito to join
Tiscar.4
The government established by the patriots in Barinas 
began to organize troops to operate in those areas, for 
Bolivar had left and gone towards Caracas with all his forces. 
It was at this time that the Barinas government conferred
JosA FAlix Rivas or Ribas, named by Bolivar Mariscal 
de Campo. was born in Caracas, on September 19, 1775. He 
belonged to a noble and rich family, and he was Bolivar's 
uncle by marriage. Embracing the revolutionary cause 
immediately, he opposed the recognition of Joseph as King of 
Spain on July 5, 1808. He then became instrumental in asking 
for the creation of the Junta of Caracas. After the Junta 
de Espana e Indias on January 22, 1809 declared the colonies 
in America part of the Monarchy, Rivas was one of those 
accompanying Bolivar to meet in Caracas with the royal com­
missioners, Carlos Montufar and Antonio Villavicencia. Then 
on Holy Thursday, April 19, 1810 he participated in the acts 
of imprisoning and deporting Captain General Emparan. Rivas 
worked ardently to help form the junta that met in Caracas 
on March 2 of 1810 and for the declaration of independence 
on July 5, 1811. While at his hideout in Tamanuce, he was 
surprised and killed by his enemies. Then the head of this 
illustrious Venezuelan was placed on a spike in a public 
thoroughfare. When his wife, Josefa Palacios, was informed 
of his tragic end, she retired to her bedroom and stated 
that she would remain there until the patriots brought her 
news of the triumph of their cause. Bolivar had the pleasure 
of bringing his aunt this news after the Battle of Carabobo. 
Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario BioarAfico. 516-18.
^Don JosA Yanez y Tiscar was the Spanish Commandant 
General of the llanos in Apure. Lecuna, Crdnica Razonada.
I, 12.
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the rank of captain in the patriot army on me aa recompense 
for my refusal of that same rank in the Spanish army.
I never served in the King1s troops. It is very 
probable that the erroneous supposition on the part of some 
historians who say the contrary originated from the followingi 
the aforementioned interview with Tiscar; the issuance of 
the commission which I have mentioned earlier; and the ful­
fillment of the order given me to round up cattle for the 
Spanish, which I had to execute against my wishes.5
The patriots of Barinas occupied the cities of Nutrias 
and Achaguas. The Spanish then set up their headquarters in 
San Fernando de Apure. In October of 1813, General Yaflez 
moved with strong cavalry and infantry divisions on Achaguas. 
He attacked the island and set fire to part of the town. 
Although the patriots did everything possible to maintain 
their position, they finally had to retreat toward Barinas. 
Then Yaflez took possession of Nutrias. While Yaflez was there, 
I received orders to attack Commander Miguel Marcelino, who 
occupied the parish of CanaguA, with a cavalry squadron of 
four hundred horses. I succeeded in finding him in the 
Sabana de Suripa, where he had retreated. At dawn I surprised 
him in a place called “Las Matas Guerrereflas, " and 1 sub­
sequently defeated him. I pursued him as far as the left 
bank of the Apure River, from where I returned to Barinas
5The historians the author refers to in this instance 
undoubtedly must be Rafael Marla Baralt and JosA Manuel 
Restrepo.
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with the prisoners we had taken.
A short distance from Suripa, 1 encountered a soldier 
from my squadron called Pedro Andueza whom I had left in 
Barinas due to illness. He brought me a letter from a 
friend telling me that Yaiiez had occupied Barinas and that 
the patriots had retired towards San Carlos. In view of the 
unpleasant news, I decided to go to Guasdualito. If I could 
not maintain my position there, I would go to the province 
of Casanare in Colombian territory. The squadron accom­
panying me was composed of citizens from CanaguA and other 
nearby points.
I did not have much confidence in the patriotism of 
those men who accompanied me and who had enlisted solely 
because they liked me. Consequently, I recommended urgently 
to the soldier who brought me the letter not to reveal its 
contents. But he did not obey my order. Because of this 
and because of the flanking movement I started, which 
abandoned the Barinas direction, my troops naturally became 
suspicious. Having spent the night in the Calzada farm, I 
started the march before dawn. After about a league, I was 
forced to stop. The repugnance of the troops toward con­
tinuing in that direction had not been kept from me. The 
new day had barely dawned when I told my companions what had 
occurred at Barinas. I let them know that since there was 
no way of joining the forces that had left Barinas, I had 
decided to cross the Apure River by the pass at Palmarito 
and head towards the province of Casanare. I asked them to
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tell me frankly if they warn ted to accompany me and conquer 
the obstacles we might encounter on the way. Some replied 
that it seemed impossible to them to cross the Apure at the 
point X suggested, for there was an enemy force there that 
had control of the ships. They added that they would retire 
to their homes and hide in the forests until the patriot 
troops returned. Then they would rejoin the army. With the 
intent of finding out which ones I could depend on, I asked 
those who wanted to stay to step forward. Nearly all did 
this. I found that only twenty, including both officers and 
men, were ready to follow me.
Vexed, but not discouraged by this disappointment, I 
took the weapons of those who refused to accompany me. Then 
I continued my march to the shore of the Cajaro River and 
hid these weapons there. We marched on, but stopped at the 
Cerrito farm so that my companions could eat. Here they 
decided that they, too, wished to return to their homes.
The only one that stayed with me was an eighteen-year-old 
youth called Jos6 FernAndez, brother of the man who had 
crossed the Pedraza mountains with me. After four days, the 
young man became very despondent. Unable to withstand the 
hunger, mosquitoes, and the rains, he surrendered to a 
Spanish chief who had him shot a few days later.
I was alone then, wandering over those plains and 
suffering every kind of privation. What was even worse was 
that I did not have anyone to communicate with, for all the 
inhabitants of the province of Barinas were fanatic Royalists.
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In addition, they were armed and were pursuing and killing 
patriots or those whom they suspected were patriots.
My friend, Don Manuel Pacheco, was military commander 
of CanaguA at the time. I was also a relative of his, but 
this did not stop him from pursuing me like an enemy. One 
day we had an interview a league from the town of CanaguA. 
This came about when Pacheco sent a soldier for me. I 
replied that he must come alone if he wanted to talk to me.
He agreed and came immediately to the rendezvous. He told 
me how much he hated to see me in that predicament, but that 
he had to fulfill his duty. After assuring me that the 
Spanish authorities were sorry that I had taken up arms 
against the King, he said he was certain that I would 
receive good treatment and no attention paid to my previous 
conduct if I presented myself to them. He concluded by 
telling me that the Governor of Barinas was Don Jos6 Maria 
Luzardo, citizen of Maracaibo, and a friend of mine. This 
was an additional guarantee I could rely on.
I conceived the plan then of joining the patriots that 
were in San Carlos. To do this I would have to accept a 
passport from Pacheco for Barinas. There I would accept 
another from Luzardo on the pretext of joining Yanez who was 
in Guanare. Thus I would be able to travel on the highway, 
for it would be very dangerous to carry out my plan if I used 
another road without a passport. I told Pacheco that £ 
accepted his proposition and that I would leave with him 
immediately for CanaguA. But he replied that it would be
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better to go the following day. I followed his suggestion. 
When I got to town I noticed that the street on which 
Pacheco's and my house were located had a picket of about 
thirty cavalrymen with Pacheco himself commanding. I entered 
my house, dismounted, put away the loaded blunderbuss 1 
carried, and then went out in the street. I addressed the 
picket detail sayingt "Senores, here 1 am! I am the very 
one you have been pursuing. If you have any vengeance to 
wreak on me, there could not be a better time for it. Act as 
you will."
"We have no vengeance to wreak on you," they answered. 
"Long live the volunteer Jos6 Antonio P&ez."
Commander Pacheco approached and asked me for my 
sword. I turned it over to him without the slightest objec­
tion, relying on the good faith he had promised me. However, 
when I was gone from my house, Pacheco came and confiscated 
my blunderbuss. I was so careful with this weapon, that the 
first thing I noticed when I returned was that it had dis­
appeared. I found out immediately through my sister Luisa 
that Commander Pacheco had taken it. X went to his house 
and asked him for a passport to go to the Governor of Barinas. 
He told me that this was unnecessary, for he himself would 
accompany me on the journey when he went to take the picket 
detail. We agreed to leave at twelve noon. When we were 
ready to march, I asked him for my weapons. Since he seemed 
in doubt about turning them over to me, I told hims "You 
cannot deprive me of my weapons and take me as a prisoner in
the middle of troops."
He replied, "1 will confer with these people and see 
if we can return your weapons.”
Indignant at such proceedings and distrustful of 
Pacheco now, I replied that I was determined to recover my 
weapons. Without further evasion, I immediately entered 
Pacheco's house and seized them. I went out into the street, 
and for one-half hour I tried to incite them. Finally, I 
told them, "If you want to take me as a prisoner without
arms, come and get them.”
Throughout all of this, Pacheco begged me not to 
express myself in that manner, for such words jeopardized us 
both and would gain nothing except to aggravate my situation. 
He was finally able to calm me. He made me enter his house 
and there assured me that I would not be molested and that 1 
could go to Barinas with my weapons. But when he got outside 
he told the men who made up the picket that they had seen how 
1 had seized my weapons and that he felt they should take 
them from me. A sergeant replied by saying that it was 
their duty to do this and that he (Pacheco) could count on 
them to be faithful servants of the King. Pacheco responded 
to this by telling them that since I seemed ready to defend 
myself to the last, it would be best not to use force. He 
added that although force would gain the objective, it would 
also result in the loss of some lives. It would be better
to be crafty. They agreed on this. After a short while
Pacheco came to tell me that he was ready to march to Barinas
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We got. under way accompanied by the picket.
At the pass of the Paguey River, six or eight leagues 
from Barinas, I found Fray Sim6n Archila, priest of canaguA, 
and a very good friend of mine. He spoke to me secretly and 
told me how sorry he was I had taken such a step, for the 
Spaniards would rejoice in capturing me. He went on to tell 
me that he knew the members of the picket well enough to know 
that they would be the first to accuse me on our arrival at 
Barinas. I informed him that 1 had presented myself solely 
with the object of joining the patriots sooner. In view of 
what he said, however, I told him that I was going to demand 
that Commander Pacheco order the picket to leave or I would 
not continue. Father Archila begged me not to do such a 
thing, for since Pacheco had seen us talking secretly, it 
would be very natural for him to attribute my decision to 
his advice; consequently, I agreed not to make the demand 
until after we had gone further up the road.
We continued our march. After we had walked about two 
leagues, we stopped at the Espada farm in order to rest.
Then I approached the Commander. Taking him aside, I asked 
him to do me the favor of ordering the picket to return, for 
I did not want to get to Barinas as a prisoner. I added that 
if he were truly interested in me, he would render me this 
service. At first he refused to comply, alleging that he 
carried the troops in order to present them to the military 
governor. However, when he observed my determination not to 
continue with the picket, he acceded to my wishes. He told
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me then that he himself would have the pleasure of accom­
panying me, for he wanted to help me in Barinas.
After the picket had been dismissed, the two of us 
continued our march alone until we were close to the city. 
"Friend," I told him then, "we have come to the point where 
you can lend me your good offices. I want you to enter the 
city and tell Governor Luzardo that I am here and that I 
need a passport from him in order to continue to Yanez's 
general headquarters. 1 rely on you to exert yourself in 
obtaining it and bringing it to me yourself." He offered to 
do it and went on into the city.
After he had talked to the Governor, he returned with 
a letter from the latter asking me to come talk to him. He 
told me not to be afraid of anything and not to doubt his 
word and friendship, for I would be given all the desirable 
guarantees. X decided to present myself before Luzardo, who 
received me with many kindnesses and much affection. He 
informed me that my trip to Yanez's headquarters did not 
seem to be the right thing to do. He felt that it would be 
better for me to remain in his home until some encounter 
between the two armies would indicate more clearly what mea­
sure should be adopted. Innocently trusting in his friend­
ship, I followed his advice. Two hours had barely passed, 
however, when he told me that it would be desirable for me 
to pose for some three days as having been arrested. This, 
he said, was in order to avoid the censure of the Spaniards 
there and to maintain appearances. I submitted myself to the
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pretended arrest.
On the third day, when I expected to be freed, the 
Spanish Commander Antonio P£rez arrived with his cavalry 
squadron. He was immediately proclaimed Governor and Com­
mandant of Arms of the province. The act concluded, Captain 
Juan Rafarte came to the jail with a guard of lancers and 
twenty-six pairs of shackles to put on the prisoners who 
were there. He ordered all the persons to appear in the 
upper corridor of the jail. When Lieutenant Pedro Garcia, a 
prisoner also, begged him to put the lightest shackles on 
him, Rafarte became infuriated. He took a blunderbuss that
they had taken from Garcia away from his assistant and told
himt "This blunderbuss that you loaded in order to blow a 
Spaniard's brains out shall serve to blow yours out. Light 
shackles I Light shackles 1 What a fine kettle of fish!"
Unable to witness that stroke of weakness on the part 
of my comrade Garcia without indignation, and wishing to give 
courage to the others, X said in a loud voicei "As for me, 
it does not matter if you put the heaviest shackles on me.
Put two pairs on if you like, for 1 am a man that can carry 
them." On hearing this, Rafarte and the other Spanish
officers looked at one another. But I, serene and dauntless,
approached the pile of shackles and, taking the largest and 
heaviest, said to Rafartei "Senor Don Juan, do me the favor 
of having these put on me." Who would believe that this act 
of haughtiness failed to incur the anger of the Captain and 
his comrades? Well, this is exactly what occurred. Instead,
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with or without reason, I won the favor of the officers, and 
especially that of Rafarte.
X separated myself from the group of prisoners after 
they had put on our shackles. I went into the capitulary 
hall where they had lodged me. Sitting on my hammock, I 
began to sing in a low voice. One of the officers who had 
witnessed the event concerning the shackles and who had 
curiously found out the identity of the hot-headed youth, 
approached me and ordered me not to sing. "Why," I queried. 
"Do you also want to tie my tongue? Aren't you satisfied 
with the shackles you have put on me?" The officer informed 
me then that he was giving me a warning, for the authorities 
might think that I was mocking the prison. Acknowledging 
the justice of such an observation, I stopped singing.
A few minutes later Rafarte came in and ordered me to 
return to where they were shackling the men so that they 
could exchange mine for lighter ones. Mine were to be used 
on Juancho Silva, a mulatto from Barinas of such extra­
ordinary strength, that he was wont to take a wild bull by 
the horns and kill it with one blow. Silva was also a very 
honest proprietor and in favor of the independence cause.
They took my shackles then and put them on Silva, giving me 
lighter ones. From that moment on, Rafarte showed great 
interest in me. He even offered to interpose his good offices 
with [Antonio] Puy so that he would pardon my life.6 He
6The author is referring here to Colonel Antonio
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pointed out that it must be common knowledge that to be a 
prisoner was equivalent to being condemned to death.
Two hours after Rafarte had shackled all the prisoners 
the Spaniards were most interested in safeguarding, Puy 
arrived with his secretary, the ex-governor, and Don Francisco 
Celis, my friend and Luzardo's partner. Puy ordered a table 
to be placed in the center of the capitulary hall. There he 
questioned all the prisoners about their neighborhood, the 
reason for their imprisonment, and the rank they held in the 
insurgent army. When my turn came, he asked me: "Your name
is Don JosA Antonio P&ez?" "Yes Sir," I answered. Then he 
addressed his secretary and told him: "Put Don Jos6 Antonio
P&ez down as Captain."
Ex-governor Luzardo and Don Francisco Celis told Puy 
that I was very honest. He retorted, "Yes, and very much 
the patriot and very brave, according to what they say.
Notice that his shackles are not well riveted. If he 
escapes,” he told the jailer later, "X will cut your head 
off with this sword." As he said this, he touched the sword 
he carried at his side.
An hour later, commander Ignacio Correa came with a 
party of lancers, took out the list of prisoners, and 
ordered the jailer to bring them to him. Then he began 
calling the names of those wham he had been ordered to put 
in the death house. I was fourth on the list of those
Puig, alias Antonio Puy. He is described as a ruthless Cata­
lan. Lecuna, Crdnlca Razonada. X, 201-202.
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destined to die. About three in the afternoon they locked 
us up in a room where we stayed until twelve that night. 
Correa returned at this time, accompanied by some unmounted 
lancers. They were to take us to the place where we were to 
be executed by lance thrusts. Some of us were not shackled. 
Correa sent those who were shackled outside and ordered a 
soldier to tie the rest with halters. I was one of the ones 
with shackles. When I went outside, 1 missed my hat. I 
begged the Commander to let me go get it. But he answered 
me in a burlesque tone, "You won't need it."
We marched toward the right shore of the Santo 
Domingo River, which was very close to the city. When we 
were about a block from the plaza, one of Puy's adjutants 
overtook us. He gave Correa a secret order from Puy. Then 
Correa countermarched with his victims toward the Governor's 
house. There he locked us up in such a small room that we 
hardly fit in it. We spent the rest of the night without 
being able to lie down nor even sit down for lack of space. 
On the next day, when no one had heard anything about the 
prisoners, everyone believed we had been executed.
About H i 00 a.m. my wife, Senora Dominga Ortiz, who 
had just arrived from CanaguA, went to Puy's house to find 
out where 1 was. She was bringing me a letter from the 
priest of that parish, Fray SimOn Archila. In this letter 
Fray Archila told me that my painful situation had come to 
his attention, and that he hoped the Spaniards would not act 
cruelly against me, taking my honesty into consideration.
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Furthermore, he felt that my commitments were not of such a 
grave nature as to warrant capital punishment. When R. P. 
Archila was writing that letter, he was unaware of my true 
position.^
My wife had gone first to the jail. When she was 
unable to get any news of me there, she thought it more 
opportune to go to Puy's home. There she was told I was in 
the house by the corporal of the guard that watched us.
That same corporal told her that despite the fact that all 
the prisoners were supposed to be held incommunicado, he 
would open the door of the room where we were so that she 
could see me a moment.
That good man carried out his word. Unfortunately, 
Puy himself stepped out at the time that my wife neared the 
door of the room. Because of this, she only had time to 
give me the letter. When Puy saw my wife near the room, he 
offended and insulted her. He then ordered her to leave 
immediately and threatened to shoot the corporal four times. 
This act, so very painful for me, made my situation unbear­
able. A moment later, 1 opened the letter. I was careful 
not to tear it as I opened the seal, for I thought I would 
give it to Puy if its contents were favorable and pretend 
not to have read it. As 1 have said before, though, the 
letter spoke well of me, and 1 resolved to send it to Puy by 
means of the corporal. The corporal fulfilled his charge.
7R. P. means Reverendo Padre or Reverend Father.
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and Puy came immediately with his secretary. He called me 
and gave me the sealed letter so that 1 would read it aloud. 
1 opened it and pretended not to be able to understand the 
handwriting easily. 1 begged him to read it himself or to 
have it read. He ordered the secretary to do so. After the 
letter was read, he took it and went away saying, "This sly 
priest must be very patriotic."
About an hour later I went to the door to get some 
water. 1 had the good fortune to be seen by Senor D. N. 
Escutasol, a merchant who was a very good friend of mine and 
a man of great influence among the Spaniards. He came close 
to greet me and told me how sorry he was to see me in that 
situation. I called to his attention the fact that if he 
put his influence into play and offered the Spanish some 
money, he could perhaps obtain my pardon. He did this. By 
means of his determination and the support of Rafarte and 
other persons, Escutasol achieved the desired end. One hour 
later he returned and told me I would be pardoned for the 
sum of three hundred pesos. After showing Escutasol my 
gratitude for the important service he had just rendered me, 
1 begged him to serve as my bondsman and get the money I 
needed. Although he excused himself from doing this per­
sonally, he offered to get me another bondsman. True to his 
word, he brought Don Cristobal Orzda, who bound himself to 
answer for that sum.
Then I was transferred to the jail, and my shackles 
were removed. Chance would have it that while climbing the
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steps leading to the upstairs of that jail, I should 
encounter Senor Marcos Ledn. He was a handsome individual, 
though advanced in years. He asked me several questions 
regarding my position and told me that the Governor had 
summoned him. As soon as Puy came, he ordered Ledn locked 
up in the room where I had been and where my comrades still 
were. That very night they were all barbarously killed by 
lance strokes, Ledn included. It seems that the unfortunate 
man had gone to replace me.
When I went to Puy to arrange for the payment of my 
pardon, he told me that it was not three hundred pesos, but 
six hundred pesos instead. Although this was double the 
amount that he had previously ordered that I had to pay, I 
had no recourse but to give it to him if I wanted to remain 
free.
Fifteen days after these events, on December 5, and 
while I was in Barinas, one of Puy's assistants came and took 
me to him. Without giving me so much as a glance, he asked 
a soldier who had served under me, what numbers 1 had used to 
attack Commander Marcelino in the Sabana de Suripa. The 
soldier answered that I haul used one hundred and fifty men. 
Turning toward me, Puy asked me where the weapons belonging 
to that column were. When I started to utter the word 
"sir" in order to answer him, he interrupted me brusquely.
He called Commander Correa, whom he always had at his side, 
and told him* "Put him in jail, rivet a pair of shackles on 
him, and put him in the death house."
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At 5sOO p.m. I found myself in the same position from 
which Providence had freed me fifteen days earlier. 
Undoubtedly the soldier had told Puy that I had disarmed the 
column. This had exasperated that monster. I convinced 
myself that my last hour had arrived. The Spanish authori­
ties had adopted the system of executing prisoners by lance 
thrusts in the darkness of the night. Dating from the time 
that my previous prison companions had been killed, various 
parties of prisoners had been sacrificed night after night. 
Thus convinced that that very night I would be killed, and 
no longer relying on any possible aid, 1 gave in to a deep 
sleep that I enjoyed uninterrupted until lltOO p.m. At that 
time I was awakened by shouts of "Long live the King," and 
the noise of troops in the plaza. A ray of hope penetrated 
my mind. Again, I entertained the idea of living. A 
violent reaction took place in me. It seemed that I was 
passing from death into life. A multitude of contradictory 
thoughts accumulated in my mind. I thought I heard the 
shouts and clamor of the patriot army, and in my heart I 
felt the vehement desire to fly to its ranks. Suddenly, I 
remembered that it was that same Commander Puy who, when the 
patriot forces that were retiring from Barinas approached, 
had ordered the assassination of all the prisoners he had in 
the Guanare jail. (The only person who had escaped the rage 
of that barbarian was SefSor Pedro Parra. He had gotten the 
fortunate idea of hiding behind the door of the jail when the 
party of lancers came to carry out the sanguinary order.)
152
This uncertainty between life and death, between hope and 
fear, made my situation unbearable.
The cause for all the movements was a rifle shot 
heard in the direction of the river area. Correa, who was 
sent with a picket to reconnoitre the area, informed the 
Spanish that there was an infantry corps on the other side 
of the river. Puy became alarmed, assembled the troops in 
the plaza, and ordered a new reconnoiseance. While executing 
this order, Correa called out, "Who goes?" According to what 
he said later, he was answered by, "A free America, soldier 
of Death." Then Puy decided to go to San Fernando de Apure 
on the CanaguA road. His first thought was to have the 
prisoners killed as he had done before in Guanare. However, 
he was seized by such terror at the thought that he might be 
attacked by superior forces if he delayed any longer, that 
he marched without ordering the slaughter of the prisoners.
He was anxious only to escape from the "soldiers of Death," 
for Correa had assured him that the moonlight had revealed 
them to be very numerous.
This dreamed-up army was later called even by the 
Spaniards themselves the "army of spirits." It gave 
occasion later also for the inhabitants of Barinas to tell 
me in a joking tones "You are such a lucky man that even the 
blessed spirits favor you 1"
Puy continued his retreat up to Achaguas. The city 
of Nutrias was also abandoned then. Barinas was left without 
troops. However, when the Spaniards retreated from here, an
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officer approached the jailer and entrusted him with the 
care of the prisoners. He threatened him with the loss of 
his own life if he opened even one cell. He told him that 
the forces were going out to reconnoitre near the city and 
would return soon.
CHAPTER IV
Condition of the Patriot Prisoners— My Departure 
from the Prison— I Free the Rest of the Prisoners 
— I March In Search of Puy— Arrival at CanaguA—  
Events that Had Transpired in that Town— Capture 
of Several Indians— March to Barinas— I am Named 
Governor and Commander of the Province— I Do Not 
Accept— I Retire to the Calzada Farm— Persecution 
of Commander Marcelino— Flight.
1813
The prison at Barinas had one hundred and fifteen 
individuals doomed to die in the still of night at the hands 
of Spanish executioners. Arrested without any proof except 
that submitted by mercenary informers, and guilty only of 
being sympathetic toward the independence cause, they 
remained in jail whatever period of time a barbarous com­
mander indicated. They left that jail only when they were 
led to the place of execution. These were the methods that 
had been adopted to terrorize the patriots and to strangle 
the sentiments of freedom and independence. However, such 
atrocities did little to extinguish these sentiments.1
^It seems necessary to mention here that 1813 was the 
year for Bolivar's "Admirable campaign” during which, with 
considerable aid from New Granada, Venezuela was wrested 
from Spanish control once more and placed in patriot hands. 
Beginning with the liberation of San Antonio de Tachira in 
March, Bolivar successively freed MArida, Trujillo,
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Observing that the plaza had been left abandoned and 
that the guard was not in sight, I left the death house to 
look for the jailer. I begged him to remove my shackles.
He did not yield to my pleas, however, even when I offered 
to accompany him in his flight. He was that afraid of the 
threats that had been made to him. Fortunately my bondsman, 
Senor Orzda, came at that moment. He, too, begged him to 
free me and promised I would return if the Spanish army 
returned. Finally, the jailer conceded. He was to pay 
dearly for this act of generosity, for I learned later that 
he was sentenced to be run through.
After I got out of jail, I went home to get my sword 
and my horse in order to free the other prisoners. On 
returning to the plaza, the first thing I saw was the guard
Barquisimeto, Barinas, Valencia, and finally Caracas. The 
liberating army was at first composed of two divisions, one 
under the New Granadan Colonel Manuel Castillo, and the other 
under the Venezuelan Colonel Ribas. Castillo was replaced 
in command by Francisco de Paula Santander once inside 
Venezuela after a disagreement with Bolivar. Santander soon 
had to return to New Granada because of the same reason.
The liberating army was reorganized in Venezuela 
placing Atanasio Girardot in command of the first division 
with Fausto D'Elhuyar as his second-in-command. Ribas com­
manded the rear guard, and Urdaneta became Bolivar's 
second-in-command.
The main battles were at Niquitao, where on July 2 
Ribas defeated Colonel JosA Marti; Los Horcones, where Ribas 
was again victorious; Taguanes, where Bolivar completely 
defeated the Spanish on July 31.
In the eastern part of Venezuela, Santiago Marino, 
along with Antonio JosA Sucre, Manuel Carlos Piar, and the 
Bermeduz brothers, had forced the Spanish Generals JosA 
TomAs Boves and Francisco TomAs Morales to retreat. The 
Oriental Provinces now recognized Marino as their Supreme 
Chief. For a more detailed account of this "Admirable Cam­
paign, " see Lecuna, Crdnica Razonada. I, 1-73.
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in front of Puy's home. He asked me, “Who goes?"
“Spain," I answered.
“Who are you?" he asked then.
“And who are you?" X replied.
"The governor's guard."
"Well, I am the devil who will soon come to take all 
of you away." Pulling back as if I were going to join others, 
I cried, "Forward!"
The guards had barely heard this when they abandoned 
their posts and fled hurriedly. They supposed that the 
Spaniards had left. I went to the jail door then and dis­
mounted. Without saying a word to the guard, who perhaps 
took me to be a Spanish officer and consequently offered no 
resistance, I began to distribute saber blows. I did this 
with such fury, that the mark of one of the many I gave is 
still on one of the doors. Most of the soldiers, sur­
prised and terrified, threw themselves on the ground.
Finally all of them fled, except for the jailer. I ordered 
him then immediately to open the cells where the one hundred 
and fifteen victims were ready for the sacrifice. X 
threatened to run him through with my sword if he did not 
comply with my order immediately. The jailer refused 
tenaciously until I threw myself on him and gave him a strong 
blow with the sword. He decided to open the doors after 
this "argument." Xn fact, such was the terror that seized 
him, that he could not even put the key in the lock. The 
delay this produced filled me with anguish, for X was
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anxious to leave as soon as possible and get to the horse 1 
had left in the street. All the doors were finally opened. 
The shackled prisoners, without even waiting to have their 
chains removed, came out hurriedly, each one seeking to hide 
in the safest possible place.
The undertaking of freeing the prisoners was extremely 
risky and rash, for I had gone into the jail, which was sub­
ject to the arrival of an enemy party. The latter could 
easily have taken me in that most dangerous place of such 
fatal memories. Despite this, however, after 1 had freed 
the male prisoners, I freed the female prisoners also.
This act completed, I went about the city inquiring 
concerning the whereabouts of the enemy forces. About 2x00 
a.m., I found out from a woman that the enemy had taken the 
road leading from Barinas to CanaguA. Then X decided to 
leave Barinas in disguise and join them, for I was intent on 
killing Puy before dawn. And X would have accomplished this, 
too, had X been able to overtake them.
About 8x00 a.m. X intercepted a lieutenant of the 
Spanish army, Don Diego Ramirez, near the Paguey River. I 
felt such anger in my heart, that I proposed to take revenge 
on this person for all the insults X had received. While 
conversing with him, the impetus to carry out my project 
accosted me several times. However, I desisted from this 
act of vengeance when X recalled that Providence had just 
spared my life a few hours earlier, perhaps as a sort of 
recompense for never having committed acts of cruelty. I
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tried, then, to remove this idea from my mind, and 1 asked 
him several questions with regard to the possible reasons 
why Puy had abandoned Barinas. But he could not answer me 
satisfactorily, for he said that he was completely confused 
on the matter himself.
We continued our march together until 3:00 p.m. when 
we arrived at Canagu&. Puy had left with the infantry just 
a few hours earlier, headed toward Nutrias or San Fernando.
He had ordered the cavalry to cross the Apure River at the 
Quintero Pass.
Before Puy's departure he had forced all the families
A*
to leave town, except that of Senor Marcelino Carrizales.
My sister Luisa was his housekeeper. While the Spanish 
officer was resting and my sister was preparing food for the
A*
two of us, Senor Escutasol, Commander Loyola, and some other 
European gentleman appeared. They were surprised to see me, 
for they thought that all the prisoners had been assassinated. 
They could not imagine how I had escaped from Puy's claws 
and had gotten to CanaguA ahead of them. Nor could they 
fathom, how I, after having suffered so much in his hands, 
could place myself in danger of falling into them again. 1 
told them that all their doubts would evaporate when they 
knew that my motive for following Puy was to join his ranks 
and kill him under cover of night. I authorized them to 
repeat all this and to add to it that I was determined to 
fight and die on the battlefield before falling into his 
hands alive again and becoming a toy of his diabolic
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pleasures. I asked them to say that I found myself more 
determined than ever to defend the independence and freedom 
of my country.
These gentlemen were retreating from Barinas and 
following Puy's army. After they ate with me. they prepared 
to leave. Senor Escutasol asked me then to give him as much 
money as I could spare, for he had left Barinas so hurriedly 
that he had been unable to take any money with him. All 1 
had was sixty pesos. I kept one and gave him the rest. At 
the same time officer Ramirez approached me and told me that 
he did not even have enough money to buy bread. He asked if 
I could please help him with something. I pulled out the 
peso 1 had kept and gave it to him. I assured him that it 
was all I had, and that I regretted not having more to offer 
him.
They left after this, but not before advising me to 
desist from my resolution, for they were certain that 
Royalist troops would return to Barinas very soon. I was 
left on those plains without being able to count on one 
individual to accompany me, for all had pronounced in favor 
of the King of Spain. Furthermore, these people were armed 
and defending this Monarch with an ardor worthy of a better 
cause.
The following day I went to the place not very far 
from CanaguA where I had my possessions. I changed horses 
there and returned to town. When I entered my house, I 
encountered five of Yanez soldiers. They immediately seized
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the reins of my horse and asked me who I was and where I was 
going. I gave them a feigned name, and I assured them that 
I was going to San Fernando de Apure to join Puy's army.
They doubted the veracity of my reply, for they asked me why 
1 had waited until that moment to march. They demanded my 
sword and warned me that I must remain with them as a 
prisoner. I told them that I was determined to die before 
surrendering my sword, but that 1 would follow them since I 
was not familiar with the road. Their leader retorted that 
he was certain I not only knew the road, but was also a 
citizen of the town. Despite this, however, they finally 
acceded to my wishes. They eagerly asked me where they might 
find something to eat. X responded pleasantly that I would 
take them to a house that was inhabited, for all the rest of 
that town had gone with the Spanish army. Accosted by hunger, 
the poor soldiers accepted the offer. We went to Senor 
Carrizales's home where I gave them some trifles to eat and 
whiskey to drink. When I saw them quite carried away by the 
liquor, I tried to make them prisoners by means of deception.
I was successful in achieving this and in getting some com­
panions at the same time.
All of these men did not have my confidence. But 
there was a certain Rafael Toro among them, a lively and 
arrogant youth, who commanded the others. I called him to 
one side and said, "I like you quite a bit; therefore, though 
I am in a position to harm you and your companions, I would 
like to avoid it if you cam reward the confidence you have
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inspired in me with loyalty." He responded that he, too, 
had liked me very much, and that he was ready to offer me 
his services for something useful.
"Well then," I told him, "understand that I am a 
Captain in the patriot army. At the outskirts of this town 
I have a company of mounted men. If you want to remain with 
me, you will have all the guarantees you want and my esteem, 
to boot."
"Long live the Republic," answered Toro. He wanted to 
continue his "Long Lives," but I contained him. I told him 
that it was necessary to consult the opinion of his other 
companions.
"They will do what I want," he replied. "Long live 
the patrial You can rely on us."2
All of the men did manifest a desire to accompany Toro 
and continue under my orders, offering fidelity to the 
patriot cause. That night we all slept together. On the 
following day, however, they began to distrust my position, 
for not one man of the imaginary company had appeared. It 
would have been natural for at least one of them to come and 
give me news or to receive orders. I tried to convince them 
that such a company did exist by telling them that my soldiers
2It seems apropos here to interject an observation 
made by the historian and biographer, Salvador de Madariaga. 
"These first campaigns had thrown up a number of factsi the 
first was that the Spanish hold of the country was precarious. 
The second was that allegiance was just precarious either way, 
for everybody wanted peace rather than the victory of this or 
that side." Madariaga, Bolivar, 192.
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were recruits and that they made many mistakes, which we had 
to overlook. I added that they liked to get fresh horses 
for riding, and that I was certain they were engaged in that 
task on the neighboring farms.
Not knowing what to do in such a difficult position,
I went to the bank of the river near the town. A moment 
later I could distinguish eight Indians on the opposite bank, 
who were coming from Palma and were armed with arrows. When 
they were within hearing distance I called out, "Who goes?"
"Spain," they answered.
I ordered them to cross the river. They did so, 
using a canoe. When they jumped on land I ordered them, 
brandishing my sword, to throw down their arms immediately 
if they did not want to be slashed to ribbons. Those poor 
Indians, who did not expect such a welcome, threw down their 
arms, full of terror. I bundled the bows and arrows, put 
them on my shoulders, and herded the Indians up to the town.
I quartered them in a house next to mine. When they dis­
covered later that no one was watching them, they escaped 
that very night.
The following day at 6s00 a.m. Toro told me: "Cap­
tain, I do not believe you have such a company of men: but 
since I have pledged my word to accompany you faithfully in 
the service of this country, I am ready to do so if we leave 
right now for the capital of Barinas. There we shall see if 
we can find some patriots we can join. If you are not ready 
to carry this out, I want to leave with my men this minute."
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This vai precisely what I wanted, for I was ready to 
seize any opportunity to disengage myself from the difficult 
position £ was in. It is needless to point out again that I 
did not have such a company and that I had been accompanied 
only by a youth of fifteen, called Jos6 Fera&ndez. Never­
theless, I still calmly maintained that the company did not 
present itself for the reasons I had given them previously.
I told them, though, that the idea of going to Barinas 
definitely received my approval.
After we decided to march on and I had told them that 
I would leave orders for my company to follow, we set out 
for Barinas. At Totumal, a "stop-over" town, three gentlemen, 
Juan jos6 Osorio, Manuel Ocariz, and Julian Santamarla, 
joined us. We arrived at Barinas the following day. The 
town received me with as much joy as if I were leading a 
column of troops. Immediately a great number of citizens 
gathered in the cabildo to name me Governor and Commandant 
of Arms of the province. Before the appointment was offi­
cially communicated to me, however, I went before that 
assembly and told the members that I had just found out they 
had named me Governor and commandant of Arms. I thanked 
them for such an honorable charge, but I added that it was 
my duty to inform them of the province's state of affairs 
and of the only condition under which I would accept the 
appointment.
"We do not have," I told them, "the elements of war 
necessary to defend the population and sustain the authority
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conferred on me. Furthermore, there is no news of the 
patriot army, although there are rumors that it has been the 
victor in Araure. Nevertheless, if we remain in the plaza 
until said army comes, or if we resist the Spanish if they 
show up, you can count on my services.”
X saw later that these citizens did not have the 
determination needed to carry out my proposals so I told 
them that it would be better for all to stay quiet until 
help came from the patriot troops. In the meantime, I would 
move toward the interior of the plain to assemble more men 
and then return later to aid and protect them. The assembly 
or junta decided to follow my advice, despite the fear they 
harbored of the consequences they had exposed themselves to 
by the Imprudent step they had just taken.
Rafael Toro's resolution to march to Barinas had been 
truly fortunate, for the very night after we left CanaguA, 
Commander Miguel Marcelino arrived with forty cavalrymen and 
the determination to kill me. Several citizens told me then 
that he was not very far away and would soon overtake us.
With the seven men that accompanied me, 1 went to the 
Calzada farm to get some horses for them. Because of certain 
misgivings, I decided not to stay there to sleep, but went on 
into the plains, half a league away. It was very lucky for 
me that I took this precaution. Without it, I would have 
been a victim of Marcelino and his companions that very 
night, for at 3s00 a.m. they circled the farmhouse. They 
were certain that they would find me there. They asked the
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housekeeper a thousand questions. she informed them that 1 
had left to sleep on the plains, but that she could not tell 
them the exact spot. However, she felt certain that 1 would
probably return that very day, for she had heard me say that
I was only going to get some animals. She added that my 
companions had left some clothes to be washed. Marcelino 
decided then to hide his company in ambush in the "Mata de 
Leon," a little more than a mile from the farm. This was 
the exact spot we had to go by our own return.
Marcelino's plans would have been fatal for me. For­
tunately for me again, I heeded a foreboding that seized me 
a mile before reaching the "Mata de Leon." We were taking 
about five hundred animals to corral and tame on that very 
farm. Following a secret instinct, however, I told my com­
panions that I felt certain that we would be assassinated if 
we went to that farm— probably without even being able to 
defend ourselves. The enemy was bound to come at the very 
time we were dismounted getting the horses. Because of this, 
1 was changing the plans. We would tie the animals we 
needed under a tree, a mile from the "Mata de Leon." My men 
kept trying to persuade me that it was better to go on to the 
farm and tie the animals there. They felt that it would be 
impossible to tie them if they were not corraled. This would 
be especially true in the case of two wild horses whose 
beauty excited the greed of all. Luckily for me, the two 
animals escaped just at the moment we were conferring. My 
companions finally decided to march to the place I had
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pointed out. There I climbed a tree and started tieing up 
the animals.
Despite the fact that our enemies must have seen that 
we had changed direction, they still did not leave their 
ambush. They probably thought that we would have to go to 
the farm eventually to get the things we had left there.
From the tree, I was able to inspect a great deal of the 
terrain, for the area was flat and very clear. When I 
finished rounding up the animals, I discovered about a 
league away, in a different direction from the one we would 
have taken to reach the farm, some forms which were indis­
tinguishable because of the distance. Without even waiting 
for some of my companions to finish mounting, 1 got on my 
horse and shouted orders for them to follow me as soon as 
they were mounted. Then 1 left at a gallop, only to find a 
few unarmed men leading a herd of cattle. While I asked 
them questions about Marcelino and his party, my lieutenant, 
Vicente Gallardo, had me observe that a cavalry troop was 
coming out from the center of the "Mata de Leon." I turned 
toward the place indicated. Then I asked the men that had 
already joined me if they were ready to follow me and fight 
until victory or death. I asked this same question three 
times, and each time I received the same answer, "You can 
count on usl" But I realized that we only had one rifle and 
three lances and that the enemy had forty mens so I told my 
people that although I had confidence in them, I did not 
consider the place suited for any resistance. I told them
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that we were too much out in the open and could easily be 
surrounded. Consequently, I thought it prudent to retreat 
to the bank of the Cajaro River, a league away, and seek 
support there.
They were easily convinced of the wisdom of my advice. 
They agreed that I should order the retreat. But the enemy 
was already very near. When they saw us turn our backs, they 
believed it to be the opportune moment to attack us. Acting 
as the rear guard, I turned my face from time to time to 
impose respect on those who were advancing on us. Because 
of this or because they saw that we were retreating orderly, 
they did not attack us. When my comrades got to the river 
bank, they threw themselves in, although it was very deep.
I, who followed as rear guard, was forced to do the same 
thing in the midst of enemy firing. Our pursuers did not 
risk jumping in the river, for although this river was not 
very wide, it was full of quicksand and ferocious animals, 
such as man-eating alligators. Furthermore, since by then 
we had established ourselves firmly on the opposite shores, 
they realized the great advantage of our position. They 
stayed there while I headed out on another road in the direc­
tion of the capital of Barinas. There I had hopes of finding 
some patriot troops.
An incident occurred then which, although funny in 
some circumstances, would have had fatal consequences for me 
had it happened just a little earlier. My horse, so useful 
to me up to that point started shaking. He stopped and was
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unable to continue the inarch except a step at a time. If 
our pursuers had crossed the river, I would have undoubtedly 
fallen into their hands. The fear that they could still do 
this caused me quite a bit of anxiety. Fortunately, at that 
time I saw a Negro at some distance who seemed to have a 
good mount. Instantly I conceived the idea of taking it from 
him. I ordered my companions to continue the march, and I 
went on alone following the road the Negro had taken. At 
first that poor devil tried to change directions. Finally 
we had to meet and then I approached him to talk. I asked 
him several questions about things of little interest. When 
he least expected it, I jumped to the ground, sword in hand, 
and secured the reins of his horse. The Negro then jumped 
to the ground. Without the slightest opposition, he left me 
in possession of the animal. I was able to continue my way 
then in order to join my companions.
A little later, I saw a man on horseback at a certain 
distance who was galloping in the same direction we were, for 
one of my companions recognized my old horse. It seems my 
horse had recovered his strength and was being ridden by the 
same Negro whom I had just robbed.
Not very far away we discovered a group of cavalrymen. 
We were afraid they might be enemies, and I went ahead to 
reconnoiter. The cavalrymen turned out to be fanners of 
Tapia. They had become alarmed by the news the Negro had 
given them of what had occurred to him. They had come, with 
the rest of the citizens of the town, to block the passage
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of those they thought to be a party of bandits. On recog­
nizing us, they put aside all fear. They took us to their 
homes and entertained us all with the greatest generosity.
CHAPTER V
[Ram<5n] Garcia de Sena Puts Me in Charge of the 
Cavalry Under his Command— Treachery of this 
Leader— My March Towards Mdrida— Threats of the 
Royalist [Bartolom^] Lizdn— I Ask [Juan Antonio] 
Paredes for a Post— I Encounter the Royalists in 
Estanques— My Reckless Fearlessness in the Mountain 
Range Along the Road from Estanques to Bailadores—  
My Retreat to the City of Merida— I Join General 
[Rafael] Urdaneta’s Troops— My Disgust at an 
Injustice that Commander Chavez Wanted to Perpe­
trate Against Me— My Plan to Take Possession of 
the Territories of the Apure and Attract the 
llaneros to Me— I Go On to Casanare and join 
[Francisco] Olmedilla— Encounter with the Royalists 
— Defeat of the Latter— Cruelty of Commander 
[Fernando] Figueredo— My Protest and Indignation.
1814
Far from my pursuers, I continued the march up to 
Barinas, where I arrived after traveling forty-eight hours. 
The patriot commander Ramdn Garcia de Sena was there with 
five hundred infantrymen and two hundred horses.1 He put me
in charge of the cavalry and ordered me to lead an excursion
up to Guasdualito by way of the towns of canagud and
Quintero. I carried out his orders with the speed demanded
1Ramdn Garcia de Sena was a colonel in the patriot 
army. He worked zealously to help form the revolutionary 
junta of Barcelona in 1811. He joined Bolivar to help 
liberate the northern part of New Granada. In the battle of 
Cerritos Blancos he fought heroicly with inferior forces 
against the Indian Reyes Vargas. Scarpetta and Vergara, 
Diccionario Bioqr&fica. 176-77.
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by the circumstances, for the enemy army under Yanez1s com­
mand was between the border of San Fernando and the city of 
Nutrias, only three days march away. Permit me to copy here 
the account of the events that transpired later, which were 
reported with sufficient accuracy in an article of the 
Nacional of Caracas on August 12, 1838, number 124.
Under the orders of the aforementioned leader 
(Garcia de Sena), approximately nine hundred men were 
gathered in Barinas at the beginning of the year 1814. 
Among these men, there were about four hundred select, 
well-mounted cavalrymen. On the twelfth, the city was 
beseiged by one thousand cavalrymen under the command 
of Remigio Ramos and the Catalan, Puy.2 Among the 
officers in Sena's army were the Sefiores Florencio 
Palacios, Diego Ibarra, Ledn Ferrer, Rafael Rosales, 
Francisco Conde, Jos6 Antonio P&ez, Francisco Olmedilla, 
and Juan Jos6 Conde. These patriot officers wanted 
very much to go after the beseigers who had set fire to 
the city even as far as a quarter of a mile from the 
plaza. But Sena would not allow this, in fact, the 
rumor began to spread in the army and among the citizens 
that Garcia de Sena was trying to abandon the city. 
Consequently, he found it necessary to present himself 
before the army and swear repeatedly, even by the cross 
on his sword, that this was not so. He told them that 
he would go out to fight the enemy and that, regardless 
of the outcome, he would return to the city. Trusting 
in this solemn oath, almost three hundred of the most 
distinguished citizens of Barinas, almost unarmed, con­
sented to guard the city. On the afternoon of this day, 
January 19, Garcia de Sena and his division left on the 
M6rida road. On the first encounter, they defeated the 
enemy, who fled heading toward Nutrias. Our army was 
not permitted to pursue them. Instead, our men were 
ordered to halt when they were within sight of the city. 
Finally at night fall, they were ordered to march off 
by files toward M6rida on the Barinas road. They did 
this without giving those who remained in the plaza the 
slightest warning, notwithstanding the fact that the
^Remigio Ramos was the Spanish Colonel in command of 
a cavalry division in Apure and Barinas. Lecuna, CrOnica 
Razonada. I, 202, 223, 354, 361. The Catalan Puy has been 
previously identified.
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enemy was so terrified that they had not stopped 
fleeing in two days. On January 22 the people of 
Barinas still believed that our army was pursuing the 
enemy. It was only when the city was beseiged the 
next day that the treachery of Garcia de Sena became 
known.
This one (Garcia de Sena) wanted at all cost to 
join General [Rafael] Urdaneta's division, which was 
in Barquisimeto.3 Then in order to whitewash his 
black action, he tried to say that his cavalry was 
betraying him. He even pretended to fire on these
^General Rafael Urdaneta was born in Maracaibo in 1788. 
He studied Latin and Philosophy in Caracas and Maracaibo. In 
1804 he went to Bogota to work with his uncle who was Conta- 
dor Mayor del Tribunal de Cuentas. In 1810 he became active 
in the revolutionary movement and joined the battalion 
"Patriots of Cundinamarca." In November of this year he was 
placed in command of "Battalion No. 3 of the Union" and went 
with Bolivar to Venezuela. While serving under Colonel 
Castillo he aided Bolivar in the defeat of Colonel Ramdn 
Correa and was promoted to the rank of colonel. He joined 
Jos£ Fdlix Ribas and together they were victorious at 
Niquitao. He was defeated in Barquisimeto and Arao, but won 
laurels with Bolivar at carabobo. He led the retreat when 
Boves defeated the Republic and reorganized the dispersed 
troops. By 1815 he had become a division general. He went 
to the Apure region and accepted P&ez as squadron commander. 
In 1818 Bolivar appointed him Governor and Commandant General 
of the Province of Caracas. In 1819 he represented Barinas 
at the Congress of Angostura. Then Bolivar appointed him 
Chief of Staff of the Army of the Apure. He joined his 
troops with the British Legion and the German Column. In 
1821 he was promoted to General in Chief and Commander in 
Chief of the Military Department. In 1822 he was Commandant 
General of the Department of Cundinamarca. From 1823 to 
1824 Urdaneta served as President of the Senate of Gran 
Colombia. In 1826 he bitterly opposed P&ez's disobedience 
to Colombian laws. He became Colombia's Secretary of War 
and Navy. He voted against Bolivar's dictatorship and in 
1830 was elected a member of the Congreso Admirable. In 1831 
he retired from public office only to return periodically to 
serve his country. He died in Paris in 1845 while serving 
as Colombia's Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extra­
ordinary to Spain. D&vila, Diccionario Biocrr&fico, II, 343- 
49f Memoriae del General Rafael Urdaneta (Caracas, 1888), 
11-15.
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men the first night of the march, after he had left 
them as rear guard. What signs of treason could a 
cavalry troop that had just defeated the enemy and 
marched towards M6rida possibly give? Perhaps they 
might have spoken some words of reproof for a con­
duct which was obviously treacherous, dishonest, and 
prejudicial. The fact was that this cavalry troop 
obeyed as many orders as were given to it. They were 
even forced to go by Callejones, where nearly all the 
horses perished. As a result, very few of the cavalry 
reached the town of Piedras. There Garcia de Sena 
told them to take whatever course they wanted. From 
here P&ez went on foot toward M£rida. He was accom­
panied lay Luciano Blasco, Jos€ Maria Olivera, and 
Andrds Elorza, who later became a Colonel. It was 
also here that Garcia de Sena received an official 
communication from the Governor and Commander of Arms 
in M6rida, Juan Antonio Paredes, asking him for help. 
Garcia de Sena sent him about one hundred infantrymen 
led by Commander Frameisco Conde and went on to 
Barquisimeto to the Trujillo r o a d .4 T he Goths then 
took Barinas and assassinated its unarmed d e f e n d e r s . 5
Governor Paredes was in Lagunilla getting ready 
to march toward Bailadores where the Goths had risen 
up in arms and were threatening the capital. It was 
there that Paredes received a relay sent by commander 
[Bartolom6] Lizdn, who had joined the soldiers of 
BailadoreB with his five hundred infantrymen.6 This
4commander Francisco Conde was born in Caracas in 1780. 
He joined the revolutionary army in 1810 and served first 
under Miranda and later Bolivar. He went to New Granada with 
Urdaneta and later fought with P&ez in Apure. In 1818 he 
became a Colonel. In 1821 he served as Governor of Guayana 
and in 1823 of Barinas. He was named Intendant of the Depart­
ment of Apure in 1825. He died in 1842. Divila, Diccionario 
Bioqr&fico, I, 95-96.
5It is interesting to note that the Latin Americans, 
particularly during the wars for independence, referred to 
the Spaniards as crodos. or Goths. This was a disparaging 
term they used to remind the Spaniards of their barbaric 
Visigothic ancestors, who had ruled most of Spain from 441 
until the invasion of the Saracens under Tarik in 711. Even 
to this day, in some sections of Latin America the term godo 
is used to denote someone cruel and unrefined. Cunninghame 
Graham, PSez. 75.
®The Spanish Captain, BartOlome Lizdn, was able to 
defeat Colonel Francisco Santander and his patriot forces on
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relay told of the surrender of MArida and announced 
that Lizdn would come with a knife in one hand and 
an olive branch in the other♦ He threatened to 
behead all the population and reduce the city to 
aahea if even the loweat of his soldiera waa wounded. 
By means of this relay it also became known that 
Lizdn had stayed in Bailadores with three hundred 
musketeers and then had advanced up to Estanques with 
two hundred light infantry, and two artillery pieces, 
under the command of Commander Matute. Paredes 
resolved to attack the latter before Lizdn joined 
them. In the meantime, PAez had asked Paredea for a 
post, and the latter wanted to put him in charge of 
a cavalry company. However, PAez did not accept this 
command, for he felt that the men of this company 
were not well suited to serve in that capacity. In­
stead he preferred to serve as an assistant in the 
small squadron led by Captain Antonio Ranjel.7 PAez 
was on his own personal mount, an excellent horse he 
had found in Egido.
Then the patriot forces marched from Lagunilla 
toward Estanques, as the famous cacao plantation is 
called. The Goths were there when the patriots 
arrived. Some shooting occurred, and as a result the
October 12, 1814, in the plains of Carrillo. This victory 
placed the Spaniards in possession of Pamplona, the most 
important city in the north of New Granada, and thus put them 
in control of the valleys of Cticuta and to a certain extent 
also, the province of MArida. Baralt and Diaz, Readmen de 
la Historia. II, 202.
^Colonel Antonio Ranjel was born in MArida on June 
13, 1788. He began his services for Colombian independence 
dating from 1810 when he was in Venezuela. In 1813 he moved 
to Casanare where he had PAez under his command after the 
latter's dispute with Commandant Chavez in Bailadores. He 
fought victoriously in Chire in 1815 and participated in the 
action against Vicente Pena in Arauca. In 1816 he fought 
against the Royalist Colonel Francisco L6pez in the battle 
at Palmarito. In 1817 he was defeated in Nutrias by Reyes 
Vargas. In 1819 he returned to the llanos. After partici­
pating in the Battle of Carabobo, he was ordered by Bolivar 
to besiege Puerto Cabello. He died of a fever while carry­
ing out this order. Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario 
BiocfrAfico. 498-99.
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Goths retreated toward Bailadores and the patriots 
took possession of that plantation. The Goths 
crossed the plantation grounds and later formed a 
small column. There Ranjel, PAez, and their fifteen 
riflemen found them. Some shots were exchanged.
Later Ranjel retreated with his men, despite the 
fact that PAez insisted on staying. Consequently,
PAez was the only one remaining to observe the Goths.
After Ranjel retreated, Matute's column marched 
off by files in the direction of Bailadores along a 
slope that in its widest section barely allowed the 
soldiers to march more than in a single file. PAez 
followed the enemy and, observing that they could 
not form to resist an attack, shouted "Long Live the 
Patrial" Simulating different voices, he shot 
suddenly and killed the last sargeant in the rear 
guard. Frightened, the enemy forgot how to defend 
itself. PAez achieved an easy, though very impor­
tant, victory. Some of the enemy soldiers left the 
road and found death in the precipices. Others 
trampled over their companions and presented better 
and bigger targets for the bullets of the daring 
champion. Others threw themselves on the ground and 
shouted for mercy. Still others threw down their 
arms and munitions. They even abandoned their two 
artillery pieces.
The only one who disputed this victory with his 
life was a certain JosA Maria SAnchez, a man who was 
greatly feared by the people of MArida. He forced 
PAez to get off his horse and engage in hand-to-hand 
combat for the possession of his (PAez's) lance.
When PAez finally wrested it from SAnchez, all opposi­
tion c e a s e d . 8 PAez then followed the enemy to where
®PAez states in his footnote to the abovet "This 
SAnchez was famous among the Royalists for his valor and 
daring. He was also greatly feared by the patriots of MArida. 
It was said that in an encounter in the town of Lagunillas he 
had dismounted a violento. or mountain cannon, and carried it 
on his shoulders as if it were the lightest rifle made. When
I was pursuing the terrified Royalists, SAnchez turned sud­
denly and was successful in warding off the lance thrusts I 
aimed at him with the short carbine he carried. When he saw 
that he could not use the firearm freely, he threw it on the 
ground and grabbed my lance, intending to fight me for it. 
Without letting my lance go, I threw myself off my horse. 
Through a great effort, I was able to wrest the lance from 
him and wound him mortally. Seeing him stretched out on the 
ground, I tried to take a handsome cartridge belt or
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the downgrade of the slope ended with a small river 
called the San Pablo. Matute arrived at Bailadores 
with only twelve men. The result of this heroic 
action, in addition to destroying a strong enemy 
column which left all its armaments, flag, baggage, 
munitions, and artillery in our power, was that 
Lizdn fled ashamedly toward Zulia. He officially 
communicated to Commander Briceno (alias Pacheco, el 
Cotudo), residing in Ouasdualito, that he was retreat­
ing, for a cavalry column had destroyed two hundred 
of his men.
When PAez returned, he found our army in the same 
place where SAnchez lay dead. The citizens of MArida 
were there also. They could not find words with which 
to praise him for his victory and for, above all, 
having ended the life of the monster, SAnchez. Our 
troops entered Bailadores on the following day. The 
Mac-Gregor division of New Granada arrived a little 
later.9 Senores Concha, [Fernando] Serrano, and
muleteer's girdle that he had around his waist. He broke out 
in angry words, improper for the moment. I exhorted him then 
to die well, and I said the Apostles' Creed aloud, encourag­
ing him to repeat it. Fortunately for me, I turned my eyes 
accidently and saw that, instead of accompanying me in my 
prayers, he was unsheathing the dagger he had at his waist.
1 confess that my charity died completely, and my indignation
did not permit me to concern myself any longer with the
future of my adversary. With one lance thrust, I freed him
from the anger that engulfed him even more than the blood he 
was shedding.
After this encounter with SAnchez, I continued the 
pursuit. I took the eight Royalist artillerymen prisoners,
and I took possession of their flag and two cannons. One of
the cannon was a gift from a lady of MArida, and her name 
was inscribed over its mouth. According to rumors, this was 
the same cannon that SAnchez had carried from Lagunillas. 
Later we lost this same artillery piece three times and
recovered it an equal number of times."
9The Mac-Gregor division was led by Gregory Mac Gregor, 
descendant of an old Highland family. In his youth he had 
served in the British Army. In 1811 he went to Caracas to 
join the revolutionaries. There he married a Venezuelan lady, 
Dona Josefa Antonia Andrea de Xeres Aristeguieta y Lovera 
Bolivar. He became Colonel and Adjutant-General to Francisco 
Miranda. After the latter's fall, he served under Bolivar 
with such distinction, that he was received into the order of 
Libertadores in 1817. In 1819 he and his men took Puerto
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[Francisco de Paula] Santander, who later figured as 
leaders in Casanare and Guasdualito, were in this 
d i v i s i o n . P A e z  met them at this time.
Cabello, but were surprised by the enemies and forced to flee. 
In 1621 he quit the Venezuelan service and settled on the 
Mosquito Coast. There he made himself Cacique of the Payais 
Indians under the title of His Highness Gregor. In 1839 he 
petitioned the Venezuelan government to be reinstated in his 
general's rank and pay. His request was granted. He died a 
few years later in Caracas. Alfred Hasbrouck, Foreign 
Legionaries in the Liberation of Spanish South America (New 
York, 1928), 25, 26, 154-58; Cunninghame Graham, PAez. 96.
^■°No additional information could be found on Senor 
Concha. Fernando Serrano was the colonel whose forces, pur­
sued by Morillo's troops, had crossed from New Granada to 
Venezuela. He participated in a junta of a small group of 
lawyers and chieftains who decided to set up their own govern­
ment. This junta had appointed Serrano as Supreme Chief, 
Francisco Yafles as Minister of State, and Colonel Francisco 
de Paula Santander as commander of the troops. PAez was 
called before this group and acquiesced in all these appoint­
ments— probably tongue in cheek. However, when PAez returned 
from the horse-catching expedition Santander had sent him on, 
his troops had "mutinied" and insisted that he dissolve this 
government and take both civil and military command. PAez 
obliged his troops in September of 1816. Madariaga, Bolivar. 
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Francisco de Paula Santander was born in April, 1792 
in Cticuta. When the revolution broke out, he was a student 
at the College of Sam BartolomA at Santa FA where he was 
studying law. He was barely eighteen when he took up arms 
against Spain. In 1810, he was banner-bearer of the national 
guards and adjutant of the military commander at Marquita. A 
soldier of the federation, he was made prisoner by Nariflo in 
1812. After his retreat to Casanare, he fought in the Vene­
zuelan campaigns and attained the rank of brigadier general. 
Bolivar, an excellent judge of men, selected him as the most 
capable Granadine to organize and lead the invasion of New 
Granada after the Royalists had regained control there in 
1816* He became famous for his heroism in the Battle of 
BoyacA in 1819 in which the Spanish were defeated. In 1819 
also he was named Vice-President of New Granada, with the 
special commission of directing the war in the liberated prov­
inces while Bolivar went off to conduct the war in Ecuador 
and Perd. When Bolivar accepted dictatorial powers in 1828, 
Santander openly opposed the dictatorship and became Bolivar's 
chief rival. That same year he was banished from Colombia on 
the grounds of suspicion of having participated in a con­
spiracy to take Bolivar's life. He was traveling in Europe
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After the action at Bailadores, I stayed in Mdrida 
until the middle of the year 1814 when Urdaneta arrived on 
his way out of Venezuela.11 He incorporated me in his 
troops, giving me command of a cavalry company that I myself 
had organized in M6rida. This company was composed of all 
those llaneros that Garcia de Sena had cast aside. I went 
on to take part in the Battle of Mucuchies. However, I never 
entered the action because a mile before getting to the 
battlefield, Urdaneta discovered that Barlovento's battalion
when Bolivar died and later when the Republic of Gram Colom­
bia was being dismembered. The Republic of New Granada 
which was subsequently organized elected Santander its first 
President in 1832. Henao and Arrubla, History of Colombia. 
309-25, 393-404, 435-39.
11The year 1814 was militarily disastrous for Vene­
zuela, for all that had been accomplished in the brief but 
memorable campaign of 1813 was undone. The reverses were 
caused mainly by the rise of a new Royalist leader, Jos4 
Tom&s Boves. He defeated Vicente Campo Elias at La Puerta 
on February 3. Boves then advanced toward Aragua while 
Bolivar marched from Caracas to Valencia in order to face 
him. They fought a battle on February 26 and another on 
March 24. Then Boves was forced to face Marino, who was 
coming up from Aragua de Barcelona. Marino defeated Boves 
at Bocachica. Boves then retreated toward Calabozo, pur­
sued by Bolivar. At this point Ceballos had to lift his 
siege of General Urdaneta in Valencia. While Generals Jos6 
Ceballos and Juan Manuel de Cajigal, who came to reinforce 
Ceballos, were being defeated by Bolivar at Carabobo on May 
28, Urdaneta was "saving the army of Caracas" by marching it 
to Cticuta. It was now that P&ez joined Urdaneta.
The rest of 1814 went as badly for the patriots.
Boves recovered enough from Carabobo to defeat the combined 
forces of Bolivar and Marino at the second battle of La 
Puerta. By July 16, Boves was in Caracas and had set up a 
dictatorship even more severe than that of Monteverde. At 
Aragua de Barcelona Bolivar's forces were wiped out by 
Morales. Bolivar escaped and sailed to Cartagena. Lemly, 
Bolivar. 63-101; Madariaga, Bolivar. 241-42; Mordn, History 
of Venezuela, 118-19.
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had been defeated. This battalion had been ordered by 
Urdaneta to remain where they were until he arrived with the 
rest of the troops, composed of battalions from Valencia, 
Guaira, and seventy cavalrymen under my command. Urdaneta 
had to protect Barlovento from the enemy, who was pursuing 
him before his very eyes. Consequently, he did not want to 
enter the battle, but instead countermarched immediately to 
M6rida in order to begin his retreat to New Granada.
In Bailadores, X left Urdaneta because the cavalry 
Commandant General Chavez, decided to take my horse and give 
it to another officer. I objected to this injustice until I 
was finally forced to yield purely for reasons of military 
discipline. Nevertheless, I was so disgusted, that I decided 
to leave and carry out the resolution I had made in MArida 
to go to the plains of Casanare and begin operations against 
Venezuela. X wanted to take possession of the Apure terri­
tory and of the very men who had destroyed the patriots under
the orders of [JosA TomAs] Boves, [josA] Ceballos, and
~  12Yanez. Everyone I told about my project thought I was
^^Boves was born JosA TamAs Rodriguez in Jijdn in the 
province of Asturias, Spain. He had been a pilot's appren­
tice by profession. Convicted of piracy, he was condemned 
to eight years' imprisonment in Puerto Cabello. A Spanish 
mercantile family by the name of Jovei succeeded in getting 
this sentence commuted to confinement and exile in Calabozo. 
Here he dedicated himself for some time to the business of 
being a merchant. (By this time he had changed his name to 
Boves, either out of gratitude for his benefactors or out of 
embarrassment for his own.) His business now took him to 
the various little towns and hamlets in the llanos where he 
purchased the “fruits of the country"— cheeses, hides,
leo
delirious. They could not see how the llaneroa. who had 
shown themselves to be so enthusiastic for the cause of the
feathers, and furs. It was during this time that he learned 
to be the consummate horseman his future exploits proved him 
to be. It was even more important that during this time he 
became popular with the llaneros. A contemporary described 
him then as fair, with blue eyes, of medium height, and 
capable of expressing both great energy and cruelty.
When the revolution broke out in 1810, Boves joined 
the patriots enthusiastically, serving under the orders of 
Juan Escalona. When the latter struck him when he refused 
to do the duty of a common soldier, Boves deserted and joined 
the Royalists under Monteverde. He soon rose to be a cap­
tain in the Royalist ranks. When the Spanish General Cajigal 
evacuated the town of Barcelona in 1813, he left Boves and 
his lieutenant Francisco Tom&s Morales his ammunition and 
arms. At this point, Boves, taking advantage of his knowl­
edge of the llanos and its inhabitants, retired to the llanos 
and raised a large army, partly by promising the plunder of 
the towns as reward. Boves called this force the Infernal 
Legion. (At this same time another Spaniard, Yafiez, was 
raising a second army of llaneroa on the plains of Apure.)
In October of 1813, Boves was defeated by another Spaniard, 
Vicente Campo Elias, who was serving the patriot cause, at 
La Sabana de Mosquitero. When Campo Elias celebrated his 
victory by cutting the throats of one-half of the inhabitants 
of Calabozo, the llaneros flocked by the hundreds to join 
Boves, most anxious for revenge. Boves then found himself at 
the head of an army of seven thousand and marched victori­
ously on Ocumare. After his victory over Bolivar at La 
Puerta, Boves swept onward like a prairie fire, destroying 
everything and murdering all prisoners. His cruelty seemed 
to grow. He bound his followers, who were mainly of mixed 
blood, closer to him by declaring war and death on all 
whites— this despite the fact that he was white himself. He 
defeated Bolivar again in the second battle of La Puerta. 
Fortunately for the patriots, Boves was killed in battle in 
December of 1814.
Boves’ bloodthirstiness and excessive cruelty have 
become legendary and caused him to be known as another 
Atila, the Hun. Despite these traits and his great personal 
ambition, Boves unintentionally made two great contributions 
to the patriot cause. First of all, he organized the 
llaneros not only into a cavalry unit, but also into a con­
scious group with a collective spirit ready for a leader such 
as JosA Antonio PAez. Secondly, he established a social 
democracy in his forces, freeing slaves and promoting mixed
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Spanish Monarch and who had committed themselves so deeply 
in the fight against the patriots, could change and decide 
to defend the patriot cause. If 1 were unable to change their 
loyalty, everyone also felt that I would find it difficult 
to defeat them in the battles which would necessarily follow, 
for they were superior in numbers and horses.
Despite the logic of these objections, I left 
Bailadores for the Casanare plains without a passport from 
Urdaneta, but still with the firm determination to carry out 
my plan. In fact, my resolution was so firm, that I refused 
the command of a cavalry regiment that Garcia Rubira offered 
me when I went through New Granada. Defying a thousand 
difficulties and traveling on foot the greater part of the 
way, I was able to cross the Andes and arrive at the Casanare 
plains accompanied by my family and some Venezuelans. I had 
been forced to resort to selling several personal objects in 
order to provide a meager subsistence for us.
When we arrived at Pore, the capital of casanare, I
breeds to high military rank— practices unknown in 1814. 
Cunninghame Graham, PAez. 64-66, 66-67, 69-70, 70-71. Juan 
Uslar Pietri, Historia de la Rebelion Popular de 1814 
(Caracas, 1962), 83-115. Montafio Valdivieso, JosA TomAs 
Boves (Caracas, 1931), 1-147.
JosA ceballos was the military commander of Coro who 
opposed the independence movement in Caracas in 1810. He 
ordered Monteverde to begin his offensive against the 
patriots from Coro. As mentioned earlier, he had beseiged 
Urdaneta's army in Valencia and was defeated by Bolivar at 
Carabobo in 1814. Mordn, History of Venezuela. 108, 109, 
118, 119.
General JosA Yafiez y Tiscar has been previously 
identified.
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went to see the Venezuelan commander, Francisco O l m e d i l l a . 1 ^ 
He had been appointed Commander-in-chief by the Casanare 
government. Olmedilla and the government welcomed me enthus­
iastically. They facilitated funds and proved so eager to 
help me with my plans, that within three days I was able to 
be in the town of Betoye at the head of a cavalry regiment. 
Several Venezuelan officers who were there without a post 
joined me. Soon we had a cavalry corps of more than a 
thousand men. Then we started the march to Venezuela on 
October 10, 1814.
Under Olmedilla's command, our division crossed the 
deserts of the plains of Larenas in order not to be seen by 
the enemy. We only marched at night and rested during the 
day. We swam across the Arauca River, carrying out weapons 
and saddles over our heads. I carried the weapons and 
saddles of those who did not know how to swim in this manner 
in cow-hide boats. Thanks to these precautions, we were
13Francisco de Olmedilla joined the revolutionary 
movement.,in 1810. The Governor of Barinas then, Manuel A.
P. Briceno, placed him in comm am d of a cavalry detachment.
From 1812 until 1813 he was in exile during Monteverde's rule. 
He joined Bricefio again in 1813 and fought against the Royal­
ists in Berinas. He joined the Liberator in the Declaration 
of 1813 and fought with him in Araure. He returned to Barinas 
with Garcia de Sena when Governor Briceno resigned his post 
after a disagreement with Bolivar over governmental princi­
ples. After the siege of Barinas in 1814, he emigrated to 
New Granada. He went from casanare in Arauca and in 1615 
defeated Colonel Miguel Bricefio Pacheco in Guasdualito. 
Olmedilla fell into Brigadier Calzada's hands in Pore in 1816. 
DAvila, Diccionario BiogrAfico. II, 27-28.
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able to arrive at the village of Guasdualito at 4t00 a.m. on 
January 29 without having been discovered by the enemy.
There were about eight hundred Royalists there, counting 
both cavalrymen and unmounted dragoons on garrison, under 
the command of Commander Pacheco Briceno, nicknamed el cotudo. 
Our division was organized in three columns. I led the first 
column, and we were placed on the road leading away from 
Guasdualito and into the interior of Venezuela and San Camila. 
The second column flanked the town, while the third was 
situated across from where I was.
Before dawn, Olmedilla imprudently ordered a cannon 
blast and the sounding of reveille. This let the enemy know 
they were surrounded. They formed full strength in a column 
in the plaza. Then they marched to where I was and attacked 
suddenly. It was so dark, that we failed to see the enemy 
forces until they started firing at close range on one of 
the squadrons that was at the front of the street where they 
were heading. Consequently, they were able to break through 
this line. Unwittingly, the enemy failed to notice that 
there was another squadron on the left flank, for I had 
established a hammer formation— the only one permitted by 
the terrain. Suddenly this squadron, which I was leading, 
attacked the enemy from behind. Despite the many efforts of 
the Spanish Commander, the enemy was completely defeated in 
this one lone charge. Very few of the soldiers escaped 
death or being taken prisoner. There were more than two 
hundred dead and wounded left on the battlefield, and
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twenty-eight men were taken prisoners. The enemy then tried 
to take the road called "Manga," which goes out to the 
valleys of cdcuta, for they were attempting to seek refuge 
with General [Sebastian de la] Calzada who had marched the 
previous day with fifteen hundred men from Guasdualito to 
invade those valleys.^ <phe routed enemy was fleeing in the 
area between the town and the Apure River, one league away. 
Among them were Commander Manuel Maria MarchAn, Captains 
Francisco Guerrero and JosA Ricaurte, and other officers. 
Well-mounted, these men had been able to withdraw from the 
battlefield. I followed them very closely.
When they reached the shore of the Apure River, these 
men went separate ways. Three of them went into the forest. 
Two of them stopped and threw down their swords. Commander 
MarchAn and Captains Guerrero and Ricaurte hurled themselves 
in the river with their horses. I hurled myself in the 
river also. Guerrero and Ricaurte came out on the opposite 
shore and left their command behind. X interrupted the 
letter's retreat, for I got to land before him. I waited on 
the river bank for him and let the other two go. As soon as
^General SebastiAn de la Calzada was a Spaniard of 
humble birth and education who had served in the Queen's 
battalion in 1810. He succeeded General Yanez in command of 
the Spanish forces after the latter1s death in battle in 
1814. Although Calzada was generally considered little more 
than a guerilla chieftain, he still refused to yield to 
Morales's order to surrender Puerto Cabello in 1822 after the 
capitulation order had been signed. He fought bravely to 
defend Puerto cabello, but lost to PAez. Cunninghame Graham, 
PAez, 85, 92, 203-209; Madariara, Bolivar. 303-304.
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MarchAn's horse set foot on land, 1 ordered him to surrender. 
He did this without any opposition, but begged me to spare 
his life. I told him I would and ordered him to come out of 
the river. I was astonished that this man, who was riding 
such a famous horse, did not have the determination to 
escape. I was also astonished that he did not have the 
courage to attack me, particularly when he saw that I could 
not receive help from my people.
MarchAn agreed to cross the river with me again. On 
the opposite bank, I found that my troops had destroyed the 
crews of two Royalists boats. I organized my people then 
and went to Olmedilla with two hundred and twenty-eight 
prisoners. When 1 finished giving him the account of the 
battle, which had ended so happily, I told him that 1 had 
offered to spare the life of the Spanish commander.
"How do you have the courage," he asked me, "to pre­
sent this man alive to me? Why have you not killed him?
Because I have never used my arms against the van­
quished I" I answered. "There he is. Kill him if you want 
to! "
On the spot Olmedilla ordered Captain Rafael Maldonado 
to cut MarchAn's head off. Maldonado carried out this bar­
barous order. Immediately Olmedilla ordered all the troops 
to go to the plaza with the prisoners. The troops formed in 
a square, with the prisoners in the middle. Olmedilla 
ordered his second in command, Fernando Figueredo, to have
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all the prisoners' heads cut o f f . F i g u e r e d o ,  who rivaled 
Olmedilla in savage cruelty and bloodthirstiness, flew to 
witness the execution. He appointed Captains Juan Santiago 
Torres and Rafael Maldonado to carry out the order.
The prisoners had been unaware of the meaning of 
those preparations until they noticed Chaplain A. Pardo 
coming with a Santo Cristo in his left hand. They fell on 
their knees as he started to bless them with his right hand. 
Immediately, the two captains began cutting off heads.
When the fifth head fell, I could no longer contain my 
indignation. I headed my horse toward the two executioners, 
and I warned them that if they killed just one more indi­
vidual, it would cost them their lives. The captains, 
frightened and surprised, stopped the execution. Meanwhile, 
Figueredo reprimanded me. He was irritated by my opposi­
tion to the fulfillment of the orders of our commanding
15Colonel Fernando Figueredo was born in San Carlos, 
Venezuela in 1790. He entered the revolutionary army as a 
captain in 1810. In 1812 he was imprisoned for seven months 
in Coro and Puerto Cabello. When he got free, he joined 
Bolivar and continued the campaign. In 1814 he fought with 
Urdaneta and was forced to emigrate to New Granada. After 
fighting under Ranjel and Olmedilla, he joined P&ez in 1815. 
When Olmedilla decided it was useless to fight for the 
patriot cause any longer against such great obstacles, he 
left his troops to Figueredo's command. In 1816 Figueredo 
joined these troops to P&ez's to fight in Apure. In 1819 he 
fought with P&ez in Las Queseras and with Bolivar in BoyacA. 
At this point he was rated one of P&ez's most trusted "lieu­
tenants." As a colonel in 1824 he fought in the Battle of 
Carabobo. For three years he was Commandant of Arms in San 
Carlos and later served in this same capacity in the Province 
of Carabobo until 1827. He died in Nutrias in 1841. D&vila, 
Diccionario Bioar&fico, I, 150-51. Scarpetta and Vergara, 
Diccionario Bioar&fico. 154-55.
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officer. I told him calmly that I was determined to die in 
order to defend the lives of those unfortunate beings whom 
they were assassinating so horribly. Figueredo screamed at 
me, insisting that the prisoners must die regardless of what 
I had to say.
When the captains stopped obeying Figueredo's orders, 
the latter went to Olmedilla so that he could dispose anew 
how to carry out his wishes. Before Figueredo found 
Olmedilla, however, I had already presented myself to him.
1 was telling him what was happening and trying to make him 
see the inhumanity and stupid barbarity of that slaughter.
I pointed out how unwise this action was particularly when 
the time came to penetrate Venezuelan territory with the 
title of liberators and friends of humanity. Olmedilla, 
without reasoning, coldly answered me that the life of the 
prisoners was in Figueredo1s hands.
"Well, if this is the case,” Figueredo answered, "they 
shall all die."
We started arguing again before the troops and the 
prisoners. Finally, I won the argument, for Figueredo was 
unable to have another man killed. Furthermore, he was unable 
to have me punished as he wanted to do, for he knew that the 
troops would not permit a violent act to be perpetrated 
against me.
Thus, the lives of those unfortunate beings were 
saved. They had been condemned to death by the evil heart 
of a vandal. The good treatment they received now made
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friends out of our former enemies. In fact, all of them 
later enlisted in our infantry. They became such faithful 
and inseparable companions in so many battles that, had 
there not been many witnesses to these events, these men 
would run the risk of passing before posterity as fables 
invented for solace and entertainment.
This account— and I say it deliberately— involves one 
of the acts of disobedience and insubordination with which I 
am accused by those who dislike me. Insubordination to 
Olmedilla and Figueredo i n d e e d N o !  obedience, even in 
its strictest military sense, cannot change the sword of the 
soldier into the knife of the executioner, or transform war 
into the slaughter of prisoners. I give the Almighty 
infinite thanks because he has left me time, reason, and the 
good memory necessary to relate these events as they hap­
pened so that just men might judge them as they deserve.
l®PAez's insubordination was really to Simdn Bolivar 
and his Decree of 1813 which declared "war to the death" to 
all Spaniards.
CHAPTER VI
Olmedilla Orders Seventy-Six Prisoners Killed 
During My Absence— Figueredo Takes Charge and 
Tries to Arrest Me— Disastrous End of Olmedilla 
— The Battle of Chire— Inevitable Ailments Pro­
duced by Battles— A Night’s Adventure on the 
Battlefield— Dress of the Military While on 
Campaign— Surprise at Palmarito— The Valiant 
[Vicente] Pena— How I Saved Him— Battle of the 
Mata de la Miel*— My Promotion to Lieutenant 
Colonel— Military Mutiny in My Favor— I Break it 
Up.
1815
An order from Olmedilla to countermarch to Casanare 
ended our dispute over the prisoners. With the latter well- 
secured , the army started moving. We were afraid that 
Calzada would return to Guasdualito when he heard what 
Guerrero and Ricaurte were bound to tell him about our 
slaughter of the troops he had left there. That very after­
noon , the army got to the shore of the Arauca River, only 
five leagues from Guasdualito. Olmedilla put me in charge 
of crossing the army, ordering me to send the prisoners 
first. This operation took the entire night, for we had 
only one canoe. The following morning about 9*00 I crossed 
to the other side of the river. At the carnp I discovered 
that they were assassinating the seventy-six prisoners at 
that very moment at a place called "Las Cuatro Matas." Many 
of the officers came to me and begged me to save them. I
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asked how much time had elapsed since they had been gone. I 
deduced from their answer that it was too late to save them.
Olmedilla continued the march to Cuiloto. When we 
got there, though, he had left the troops under Figueredo's 
command while he himself headed toward Pore, the capital of 
Casanare. Before his departure he revealed that he was very 
displeased with the Casanare government. He stated that he 
would not return to head the troops and told everyone to do 
whatever he thought best. Figueredo then ordered all the 
men to remain on foot at the outskirts of Cuiloto. He put 
the horses on the plains in the direction of the enemy camp. 
This act alarmed the troops greatly, for they were still 
afraid that Calzada might march against us. Because of this 
fear, a junta of officers was formed which commissioned four 
of its members to tell Figueredo that the horses were not 
well placed. They wanted to point out that should the enemy 
forces attack suddenly, they could easily take possession of 
our horses. They also wished to remind Figueredo that there 
were other roads, that were not covered by advance guards, 
which the enemy could use to advance. This commission was 
composed of Major Rosario Obregon, captains Genaro v&squez, 
and Juan Pablo Burgos, and myself.^ Since 1 commanded two
^No further information was available on Rosario 
Obregon and Juan Pablo Burgos, captain Genaro VAaquez, a 
native of Venezuela, started his military career in 1814.
His comrades-in-arms described him thuai "Valor was a habit 
with him." P&ez always relied on him for his riskier under­
takings. V&squez was killed in the Battle of Ortiz on March
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squadrons. It fell my lot to be the spokesman. We all feared 
that Figueredo, a capricious and haughty man, would not 
receive our commission well. We were correct.
When we were brought before Figueredo, 1 told him 
that we wanted to talk to him privately about military 
affairs. He ordered us to a room and closed the door. After 
we had placed our swords on the table, I fulfilled my charge 
by telling him what had brought us there. X pointed out to 
him the need of putting the horses at the rear of the army 
and of covering our unguarded points. Figueredo showed great 
displeasure on hearing these observations. He retorted that 
the army had nothing to say about the measures he took for 
its security, and that he was of the opinion that the camp 
and the horses were in a secure place. He added that in the 
final analysis he was the only one responsible for the army; 
therefore, he would appreciate it if in the future we would 
abstain from making observations that he had not solicited.
"Commander," I responded, "Permit me to tell you that 
you are not the only one here who is responsible for this. 
army. Each one of us has his share of responsibility, and 
I, for one, am not satisfied to have another person be fully 
responsible when my life and honor are at stake."
27, 1818. Fourteen years later, in 1832, P&ez took his 
remains to Valencia. Seeking to perpetuate the name of his 
beloved friend, PAez named the lake at his farm in San 
Fernando after him. Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario 
Bioqrafico. 675.
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Figueredo could not contain the anger that dominated 
him any longer. Pronouncing a certain military word ener­
getically, he kicked the floor and shouted at ust MI repeat 
that I am the one who is responsible here, and that the army 
has nothing to say about my measures."
It was not possible for me to let that exclamation go 
unanswered, so I replied with equal vigor and firmness.
Then Figueredo, who was already predisposed against me because 
of the incident involving the prisoners in Guasdualito, 
opened the door of the room, called Lieutenant Juan Antonio 
Mirabal, and said to himt "Take Commander P&ez prisoner and 
shackle him."
I already knew the manner of man I was dealing with.
I took my sword and left the room, exclaiming in a loud voice* 
"Come and get me. But let me warn you that I am determined 
to die killing rather than let myself be dragged like a 
criminal. If I am to be judged, an order for my arrest will 
be sufficient. Force, however, shall never be able to con­
quer m e ." Then I headed toward the troops.
Figueredo immediately suspended the order to imprison 
me and spoke with the other three men who had remained in 
the room. He asked them to go quiet me, for he supposed 
that I had gone to raise the troops against him. When he was 
convinced that I had not thought of such a thing, he resumed 
his haughty tone. He told me that I was insubordinate and 
that he would gladly give me a passport if I asked him for 
one.
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The following day Figueredo did issue me a passport 
for the capital. Twenty-four hours after I had left, the 
greater part of his army had already deserted. Figueredo 
then informed the government about what had transpired. 1
did, too; and I related the event clearly and justified my 
resistance to the unjust prison order he had issued against 
me. The government approved my conduct and removed 
Figueredo from command.
General Calzada then advanced toward the camp at 
Cuiloto where only one hundred and eighty men remained out 
of the original thirteen hundred. This remnant retreated 
under the orders of citizen Miguel Guerrero to a town named 
El Puerto, which bears toward the left shore of the Casanare 
River.^ Guerrero then replaced Figueredo in command of the 
troops, and thus he began his military career.
Calzada got as far as Cuiloto and took possession of 
a great part of the horses, saddles, and lances that had 
belonged both to the troops that had deserted and to those 
that had followed Guerrero. The latter had left in such a 
hurry that some of them had not been able to corral horses
^Miguel Guerrero became a general in the Venezuelan 
army. Although he had performed many invaluable services to 
the cause of independence while under Olmedilla's command, 
his military career really began at this point. Later he 
served with P&ez in the Battles of Chire and Mata de la Miel. 
He was in the battles against Peffa in Arauca and Palmarito.
In 1819 he was a member of the Congress of Angostura. In 
1826 he declared himself in favor of Bolivar in Venezuela. 
Later he was opposed to PAez as Commandant of Arms in Barinas. 
Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario BioarAfico. 204-205.
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for their retreat. A shipment of salt that had just arrived 
from Chitaga also fell in Calzada*s hands. Salt was a very 
rare commodity and of prime necessity for the troops. At 
this time Calzada could have easily taken possession of the 
entire province of Casanare if he had continued. I do not 
know why he countermarched to Guasdualito, for the patriots 
in that province then had time to organize a new corps of 
troops.
When I arrived at Pore, I found Olmedilla there. 
Knowing that I had left the army, he asked me to come to his 
house. 1 went without delay. He was somewhat indisposed, 
or at least he seemed that way. "I regret to hear," he told 
me, "that you have left the army, for I know what an asset 
you are to it. On the other hand, though, 1 am glad, for it 
offers me the opportunity to tell you what 1 think about the 
unequal battle that America has undertaken against the power 
of Spain. 1 believe that it is impossible for us to win, 
and that we shall all perish in this contest without profit­
ing from our labors and vigilance, and without even the 
gratitude of the people or of those we command. Therefore,
1 have decided to leave the army and go to Vichava— a place 
which is inhabited only by savage Indians, but which is com­
pletely inaccessible to the Spanish troops. I rely on some 
companions, who are convinced of our critical circumstance, 
to follow me. I hope that you, too, commander P&ez, will 
follow me. If you do, I will order you to return to the army 
immediately. There you will hand pick some two or three
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hundred men and an equal number of horses. In the meantime,
I shall return to the Meta with my family and yours. There 
I will get what I can for our embarkations. I will also get 
salt, which is indispensable, and a priest to serve as our 
pastor there. On your return trip from Cuiloto, you shall 
take the gold and silver vessels from the church in Pore and 
all the money you can wrest from the citizens, because l am 
certain that everything will fall later into Spanish hands. 
Take heart, amigo PAez, to carry out this plan, for no one 
can carry it out better than you. Then, too, I know the love 
you profess for the army."
This speech, coming from Olmedilla, left me astounded. 
I did not know what to say to him. Knowing him, though, it 
seemed better not to contradict him suddenly, but I did not 
want to agree with him, either. Thus, without revealing my 
opinion on this matter, I asked him to let me go home to 
think his propositions over carefully. I returned an hour 
later. Then I pointed out to him the necessity and suita­
bility of having him continue at the head of our army. I 
admonished him not to abandon the cause he had embraced in 
such dangerous times, and to desist from a project which 
seemed unwise to me for many reasons. Although he did not 
say a single word, I knew, of course, that 1 had displeased 
him greatly. Aware of this and lamenting his conduct, I 
took leave of him.
About two hours later, I received a dispatch from 
Olmedilla ordering me to return immediately to the army and
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assume command of my regiment. 1 did this. As I was leaving 
town, I noticed that Olmedilla was setting out with his 
family for San Juan de los Llanos.
On the way to rejoin my regiment in the town of Puerto, 
I found the one hundred and eighty men who under Guerrero's 
command had fled from Calzada. This small corps had been in 
Puerto augmenting its ranks with new recruits from all over 
the province.
Meanwhile, quite unexpectedly, Governor N. Solano 
appeared and proclaimed the news that Olmedilla had 
deserted.^ Solano was determined to have Olmedilla arrested, 
and he ordered me to do so immediately. This order dis­
pleased me greatly, not only because of the personal consider­
ations I owed Olmedilla, but because of the fact that he had 
revealed his plans to me confidentially. He was bound to 
believe that 1 had denounced him. Despite all the excuses I 
could offer, 1 was finally obliged to obey Solano's order. 
Accompanied by four officers and their assistants, I left at 
a forced march to overtake Olmedilla and his companions.
After five days of uninterrupted travel, we overtook 
Olmedilla at dawn in the province of San Martin. He was 
lodged in a way-side inn. When he and his companions dis­
covered our presence, they armed themselves. Then Olmedilla
^N. Solano was the new patriot governor of the remote 
province of Casanare, a haven for defeated patriots. 
Cunninghame Graham, P&ez., 88-89.
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appeared, armed with a blunderbuss and a sword, at the fence 
gate and askedi “Who goes?"
“A free America," I answered.
“What are you doing here?" he asked me.
"Ordering you and your companions to surrender as 
prisoners," I replied.
Olmedilla responded to this with an outburst of 
insults against the government. He went on to say that he 
was determined to die rather than return to Casanare as a 
prisoner. Furthermore, he stated that I had no authority to 
arrest him, for he was outside the jurisdiction of the 
patriot government. I told him that my orders were to cap­
ture him wherever I found him.
“Very well," he replied. “I would like to see the 
order for my arrest."
After he had read this order, which authorized me to 
take him dead or alive, he expressed a desire to talk to me 
privately. With this in mind, we went to the spot he 
designated. He stayed inside the fence while I remained on 
the outside.
“Let us see how we can fix this affair, P&ez," he 
told me.
“This affair will be fixed in Casanare," I replied. 
“Do not resist me. Instead, rely on my influence and that 
of my friends, and nothing will happen to you."
“Promise me that you will take me to Bogota as a 
prisoner. Then I will go with you."
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"I cannot take you to that city," I answered, "For I 
have been commissioned by the government of casanare and not 
that of Bogota."
"Pieces of Olmedilla," he replied furiously. Throw­
ing the paper that contained my orders at me, he said again, 
"You will take pieces of Olmedilla, but you shall never take 
him alive 1 "
"I will regret having to take you in pieces, my com­
mander; but if you insist on this, I shall have to comply.” 
"Whenever you are ready,” he replied. Heading toward 
the hut whe^re his wife and children were, he said, "Daughter, 
I am going to die, for Olmedilla does not allow himself to 
be captured alive.”
With surprising resignation she told him, "You are 
doing the right thing. £ prefer to see you wallow in your 
blood and be a witness to your agony, than to see you 
humiliated and a prisoner.”
Olmedilla turned to me then and said, "Well what have 
you decided, P4ez?"
"I am going to decide this minute, my commander," Z 
said as I dismounted. I ordered my companions not to move, 
and then I began to remove the locks from the door. When I 
entered the inn, Olmedilla cocked his blunderbuss and put 
himself on guard. With much serenity and a peaceful tone, I 
said to himi "Is it possible, my commander, that after 
having been together on so many battlefields, tearing the 
enemies of our country to pieces, and sharing all the
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dangers and disasters of war, we might now destroy one 
another? How can we do this when we have before us a vast 
field in which to collect laurel wreaths, when we can offer 
the burnt sacrifice of our lives to the cause of the freedom 
and independence of our country?"
"I am not a slave," he responded, "to be forced to 
serve, and I do not choose to serve this cause any longer."
Both my comrades and I saw Olmedilla's desire to kill 
me, for he probably thought that I had told the authorities 
at Casanare about his plan to desert. Nevertheless, 1 
approached him, showing the greatest confidence. I intended 
to distract him with conversation while I tried to grab the 
blunderbuss he held. His wife, armed with rifles, was some 
paces away with two of her children. Believing that she 
might bring him to surrender without resisting, I asked her, 
"Seflora. use your influence and help me to convince your 
husband to return with me to Casanare. I give you my word 
of honor that nothing bad will happen to him."
"I have already told my husband," she replied, "That 
it would affect me less to see him die than to see him 
humiliated and taken prisoner."
Her response made me lose the aplomb and patience I 
had shown until then, and 1 answered rather annoyedt "Well, 
if you think that would be very difficult, I want to prove 
the contrary to you." Drawing my sword, 1 turned toward 
Olmedilla who was still complaining to my comrades about the 
manner he was being treated. I asked him firmlyt "Do you
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surrender or not?"
"I see/' he said, "that what you want is to humiliate 
me and have me sacrificed in Pore. Well, 1 am going to 
please you." He handed me his sword and his blunderbuss. On 
hearing his words, his sons and the others who accompanied him 
flung their weapons spitefully on the floor. His sons shed 
tears of anger.
That same day I countermarched with Olmedilla, leaving 
the other persons that were there to protect his wife. On 
the way, Olmedilla held back his horse repeatedly and would 
exclaim, full of despairi "What have I done? Is it possible 
that I was cowardly enough to surrender and see myself 
humiliated in this manner?" I repeatedly tried to calm him 
and inspire him with confidence until we got to Pore. There 
I turned him over to Governor Solano. The latter treated 
Olmedilla very harshly and immediately ordered him to be put 
in two pairs of shackles.
Later that day Olmedilla sent for m e . After much 
difficulty, I was able to get Solano to give me a pass to go 
see him. Olmedilla was very uncomfortable, for the shackles 
did not permit him to move. I offered to talk to the 
Governor to see if I could relieve his situation. I found 
Solano so inflexible that, despite the deference he had for 
me, I was successful only in having one pair of shackles 
removed from Olmedilla.
All of Olmedilla's friends made many efforts to save 
him. Among them was Senor M4ndez, later Archbishop of
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Caracas. Finally we were able to get the government of 
Bogota to pardon him. But then, when the capital of New 
Granada was lost by the patriots after the defeat of General 
Rovira in Cachiri and the Spaniards invaded the province of 
Casanare, Olmedilla jeopardized his position again. Instead 
of going to Guasdualito as the other patriots did, he 
remained in Casanare, still pursuing his favorite scheme. 
There, in the deserts of that province, he was subjected to 
the greatest poverty. According to some of his friends, he 
was even forced to eat the cadaver of one of his small 
children in order to satisfy the horrible hunger that over­
whelmed him. Thus ended the life of that chief.^ Had he 
only possessed greater perseverance, he would have been able 
to render great services to his country and leave a name full 
of glory for posterity. Olmedilla was then replaced in the 
patriot army by General [Joaquin] R i c a u r t e . ^
At the end of 1815, the province of Casanare was 
invaded by General Calzada. With an army of three thousand 
infantrymen, five hundred cavalrymen, and two pieces of
4p&ez does not include in this account the fact that 
Olmedilla was beheaded by General Calzada and his head 
placed on public display.
^General Joaquin Ricaurte was born in BogotA. On July 
2 0 , 1810 he signed the act of independence and was designated 
a Sergeant Major in the army. In 1812 he went on to Vene­
zuela where he was second in command. By 1814 Bolivar had 
conferred the rank of general on him. He proved his valor 
and loyalty to his country in countless battles, specifically 
the Battle of Chire in 1815. Ricaurte died a natural death on 
July 27, 1820. Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario BioarAfico. 
513.
202
artillery, he penetrated up to the region of Chire. In that 
area, in a great plain called Banco de Chire, our troops 
were waiting under Ricaurte's command. Ricaurte assembled 
the army and then had the strange idea of retreating to the 
rear guard some three miles back, with his chief of staff 
Vald£z, before the enemy had even come within cannon-fire 
range. There he ordered his assistant, Antonio Ranjel, to 
climb a tree and observe the outcome of the battle. The 
worst of it was that Ricaurte took the eighty dragoons, 
armed with the only rifles we had, as his personal guard.
It was December 31, 1815. I commanded squadron 
Number Two, consisting of two hundred men. Ramdn Nonato 
pgrez commanded squadron Number One.^ His forces formed the 
first line of defense. After the enemy artillery had opened 
fire. Commanding General Miguel Guerrero gave orders for our 
cavalrymen to file off to the right. But before continuing 
with this account, I believe it apropos to mention here a 
singular event, one that has influenced several acts in my 
life. At the beginning of all battles, when the first shots 
were fired, a violent and nervous excitement would sieze me 
and impel me to hurl myself against the enemy and receive 
the first blows. I would have always done this if my
^Ramdn Nonato Pgrez became a Colonel in the Venezuelan 
army. He was born and reared in Venezuela, and he played an 
active role in the terrible wars of the llanos from 1815 to 
1619. He served P&ez well and faithfully. When he joined 
Bolivar in the campaign against Cundinamarca, he crossed the 
cordillera and fought in Paya. He was wounded in this 
battle and returned to his beloved llanos where he died. 
Ibid., 460.
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companions had not contained me with great efforts. An 
attack of this nature hit me before entering the fight at 
Chire, for I had already come forward and had an encounter 
with the advance guard. My companions were struggling to 
hold me to the rear of the army; however, when they heard the 
first firing by the Royalists, they had to release me to go 
occupy their posts. Fortunately, by then I had recovered 
from the affliction and mounted a horse. Seeing the flank 
movement of our cavalrymen, whom I thought were trying to 
flee, I ran toward them. I put myself at the head of my 
squadron and shouted without consulting anyone, "Forward and 
load!" This order was carried out immediately. The enemy 
cavalry had also seen our flank movement. Undoubtedly they, 
too, believed that we were fleeing* so they loaded. We 
went to meet them so une3q>ectedly however, that we set them 
in complete flight. We also routed the left infantry wing 
which was formed four deep in a single line.
The bewilderment of the enemy infantry after this 
encounter was such that I was easily able to go behind their 
lines in search of Calzada or some other chief. If possible, 
I wanted to distinguish myself that day by killing one of the 
Spanish chiefs. Our forces continued pursuing the enemy. 
However, when our cavalrymen found the commissary and all 
the equipment that the Spanish had left behind, they stopped 
their pursuit in order to take possession of the spoils. The 
Spanish infantry, which otherwise would have fallen in our 
power, was thus saved. Had our cavalry continued its pursuit
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on the Salina de Chita road, we would have spared ourselves 
many misfortunes, including the defeat of General Urdaneta 
in Chitaga. For Calzada in his flight encountered Urdaneta 
and his forces and whipped them completely. The other fugi­
tives took advantage of our soldiers' disorder and took to 
the summits of the mountain range that was at their right. 
They followed the Chita road and penetrated into the heart 
of New Granada as far as Ocana.
Accompanied by a caribineer, I pursued the enemy 
tenaciously to the other side of the Casanare River. I 
recall that in the midst of the pursuit X found a soldier, 
assistant to Commander Delgado, whom I intimidated into 
surrendering. At this time I took a famous saber belonging 
to his chief from him, which I gave later to Captain Miguel 
V&squez. 7 The assistant pleaded with me not to kill him.
I told him I pardoned his life and asked him to take my hat, 
which my comrades knew well, as proof of the fact that I 
had pardoned him. He did this; but he still almost lost 
his life, for my comrades, who did not see me return, sup­
posed that he had assassinated me and taken my hat. They 
started to kill him several times.
On the other side of the Casanare River, the twenty-
7Miguel VAsquez, a native of Venezuela, eventually 
became a colonel in the army as a result of his heroic 
actions in the battles for independence. He joined P&ez in 
Guasdualito after defeating the Spanish Colonel Torrellaa. 
Later he fought to support P&ez and his government. Ibid., 
675.
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five fugitives who were ahead of me scattered in the woods. 
Among these men was the young Juan Jos6 Flores, who later 
became a General and President of Ecuador.8 He had been 
with the patriots in the siege of Valencia where he had been 
taken prisoner by the Spanish and added to the military 
health department. After four or five days of fleeing 
through the woods along the river bank, he came to us volun­
tarily. From then on he served in the patriot ranks, under 
my immediate command, until the beginning of 1821. Then he
8Juan Josd Flores was born in Puerto Cabello in 1800 
of Indian parents. He was a Venezuelan like Miranda, Bolivar, 
and Sucre. Having little formal education, he enlisted in 
the Spanish army at an early age. When his master in this 
army was taken prisoner, Flores joined the ranks of the 
patriots and soon became one of Bolivar's most trusted lieu­
tenants and fought in more than twenty-three battles. He 
was a Lieutenant Colonel at twenty, a Colonel at twenty-two, 
a General of Brigade at twenty-six, and a General of Division 
at twenty-nine. He was major Chief of Staff in the army of 
the West in the Battle of Carabobo and later Chief of Staff 
to Bolivar in the Battle of Cuenca. After the defeat at 
Pasto he retired from the army and went to live in PopayAn. 
There he succeeded General Solom in 1824 as Chief of the 
Army. He brought the revolutionary war to a close after his 
victories at Sucuimbo and Pasto. In command of all Ecua­
dorian armies now, he quelled the military rebellion in Quito 
and Guayaquil. Along with Sucre he won the famous Battle of 
Tarqui against Perti. When his army helped declare the inde­
pendence of the province of Quito from Gran Colombia, Bolivar 
sent General Sucre to supersede him. Sucre was assassinated 
in route and many claimed Flores was the instigator of the 
foul deed. When Bolivar died in 1830, Flores succeeded in 
establishing Ecuadorian independence from Gran Colombia. He 
was elected to the presidency for two years then but served 
in this capacity until 1834 when he "condescended" to let 
Rocafuerte be elected to this high office. He was reelected 
President in 1839 and served until 1845. He remained a power­
ful force in Ecuadorian politics until his death, of natural 
causes, in 1864. A. Curtis Wilgus, South American Dictators 
During the First Century of Independence (Washington, D . C ., 
1937), 348-63.
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went to join the army formed in New Granada to invade Vene­
zuela.
When I crossed the Casanare River and found myself 
completely alone, 1 realized the imprudence I had committed 
in going ahead so far. 1 decided to move back, not on the 
road I had used to come, but on a different one, for I was 
afraid of falling into the hands of one of the enemy parties 
I had left behind. To make my risky position even more 
difficult, my horse was lame. Fortunately, I found another 
one in the lowlands of the river which I was able to capture 
after considerable effort. I continued my march along the 
lowest slope of the mountain which was covered with straw.
1 did not know exactly where 1 was, and 1 was guided solely 
by a bonfire I saw in the distance. I supposed our camp was 
located there. The fire 1 saw, however, had been started on 
the plains by rifle plugs during that day's battle.
Grouping thus in the dark and surmounting a thousand 
difficulties, I descended in the direction of the fire about 
midnight. 1 found myself at our camp. It was completely 
covered with the enemy spoils that our men had abandoned 
there as useless. Without knowing what fortune had befallen 
our army and even afraid that it might have been defeated, I 
decided to go to the place where we had agreed to reunite in 
case of disaster. A few moments after starting out, I heard 
the call, "Who goes?" instead of answering this query, I 
asked the same question. "A free America," cried out a voice 
which 1 recognized as belonging to the courageous [Francisco3
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Aramendi. I told him who I was then, and I was received 
with a great deal of joy by my companions, for they had 
thought 1 was dead.
The day after the Battle of chire, General Ricaurte 
ordered everyone who had taken booty from the Spaniards to 
place it at the disposal of the Chief of Staff. He 
allegated that the sole objective of this measure was to 
force the soldiers to be more prompt in pursuing an enemy 
that was still in sight. He offered to divide the booty 
later among the troops. All the soldiers religiously turned 
in the spoils of war they had wrested. Ricaurte then marched 
to the town of Morcote. He took the valuable cargo with him, 
and these he later divided exclusively among the individuals 
of his staff and escort.
The troops remained under the command of Guerrero who 
was ordered to march toward Guasdualito. It happened that 
some days later I went to Pore to fulfill my military duty 
and present myself to Ricaurte. I was barefooted and poorly 
dressed. My trousers, of green flannel, were gnawed up to 
the middle of the leg. I presented a miserable sight from 
head to toe. However, this was very common during those 
times of war, even among the military of the highest rank.
9p&ez refers here to Colonel Francisco Aramendi, 
designated at P&ez's inseparable companion. He fought with 
unsurpassed bravery in the battles for Venezuelan indepen­
dence from 1814 to 1823. He was assassinated in 1827. 
Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario BiocrAfico. 23-24.
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"I congratulate you. Commander P&ez, 1 he told me,
"for your courage and heroic comportment in the Battle of 
Chire. But how can you come before me in that beggar's 
get-up?"
"My general," I responded, "It is the only one I have. 
I believed it my obligation as a military man to present my­
self to my superior. I have done this without bothering 
about my clothing and believing that no one is forced to do 
more than he is able to do." Anyone would think that the 
heir of the victors of Chire, seeing my painful need for 
clothes, would at least offer me some; but the man changed 
the conversation then and did not mention dress etiquette 
again.
About the middle of January we heard that the enemy 
was rounding-up cattle in the plains outside the town of 
Arauca. Immediately we decided to set an ambush at daylight 
in a brushless plain. We were able to accomplish this feat, 
although at firBt sight it appeared very difficult. We put 
six hundred cavalrymen in the hollow of a dry ravine. They 
were so well covered that they could only be seen at a dis­
tance of about one hundred varas.10 Stretched out over the 
horses' necks, our cavalrymen awaited the enemy. The latter, 
five hundred strong, were under the orders of Commander
^®There are 2.8 feet in a vara.
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Vicente Pena.1 1 These men were leading the cattle and horses 
they had gotten in the Larenos farms and were headed toward 
Guasdualito. Since we were well hidden and quiet, the 
Spaniards marched on, completely unaware of our presence.
When they were about three hundred feet from us, we took 
them so by surprise that they were forced to flee. We 
charged them on the front and flanks. Then we pursued them 
to the Arauca River where they threw themselves in the water. 
The outcome of that surprise attack was very profitable for 
us. Without having to round them up, we got over two 
thousand cows, nine hundred horses, and eighty prisoners.
The greater part of the enemy corps perished, for only Pena 
and twenty-five of his men later joined Arce in Guasdualito 
to relate what happened.1 2 Captains Nonato P€rez, Rafael 
Ortega, Genaro V&squez, Basilio and Gregorio Brito
^Vicente Pena fought heroicly against the patriots 
during 1815 in the Province of Barinas under the orders of 
Francisco Ldpez. In Palmarito he was defeated and captured 
by P&ez. Pena's bravery and stoicism so impressed P&ez, that 
he used all his power to save him from being killed and then 
to persuade him to join the patriot cause. He finally joined 
the patriots in 1815 and went on to fight in the Battle of 
Mata de la Miel against his former chief, Colonel Ldpez. In 
1817 PAez promoted him to the rank of lieutenant colonel.
In 1821 he fought at carabobo and later in 1823 he took part 
in the siege of Puerto cabello. When the government of 
Bogota promoted him to cavalry colonel in 1823, he retired 
to Villa de Obispos. Pena died in Obispos in 1826. D&vila, 
Diccionario Biocrr&fico. II, 81-82.
12Colonel Arce was the Spanish governor of the province 
of Barinas. He gave refuge to Juan Vicente Pena in Guas­
dualito. Judging this town indefensible, he evacuated it in 
1815. P&ez immediately occupied it. Cunninghame Graham,
P&ez. 94.
210
distinguished themselves particularly in the encounter.1 3
On the third day of this journey we occupied Guas­
dualito, which had been abandoned by Arce. Under orders 
from from Colonel Francisco Ldpez, Arce headed toward the 
capital of the province of Barinas to organize new forces in 
the town of Quintero.^ We knew that Quintero was only 
seventy miles from Guasdualito and that Ldpez intended to 
march against us. We also knew that Ldpez had a detachment 
of five hundred cavalrymen posted in the pass of Palmarito,
13Nonato Pdrez and Genaro V&squez have been identified 
previously.
Rafael Ortega was born in San Carlos in 1790. He 
enlisted in the revolutionary army in 1810 and by 1814 had 
attained the rank of captain. In 1814 he went to Cticuta to 
join General Urdaneta. It was after he went to Casanare 
that he joined P&ez and fought valiantly with his forces. He 
attained the rank of general. On July 6 , 1836, he died of 
natural causes in Maracaibo. Scarpetta and Vergara, 
Diccionario Bioqr&fico. 411.
Basilio Brito, a native of Ospino, was Gregorio 
Brito's brother. He fought valiantly for the independence 
cause in the battles of Mata de la Miel and Carabobo.
Ibid., 6 6 .
Gregorio Brito was born in Ospino also. He was one 
of the first to enlist in the independence movement. He 
fought valiantly under P&ez until he was mortally wounded in 
the Battle of Mata de la Miel. He died on February 16, 1815
the day after this battle. Ibid.
^ F r a n c i s c o  Ldpez, Venezuelan by birth, was General 
La Torre's second in command when the latter became the 
Royalist commander when General Morillo was wounded at La 
Puerta. Cunninghame Graham in his Jos& Antonio P&ez on page
146 describes him as "an energetic soldier and well accus­
tomed to guerilla warfare." He was the man who, relying on 
the fact that then only special regiments from Spain wore 
distinctive uniforms, conceived the plan to surprise Bolivar 
in the middle of his camp. His men, masquerading as patriots, 
would have killed Bolivar in his hammock if he had not risen 
exceptionally early that morning. When Ldpez was killed in 
battle following this surprise attack on Bolivar in 1818, the 
Spanish lost their best cavalry officer. Ibid., 146-49.
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on the Apure River. Consequently, 1 inarched with three 
hundred of our men to surprise them. I ordered meat to be 
roasted and prepared for three days in advance so that we 
would not have to slaughter cattle and attract the vultures, 
very numerous in those plains, which would have announced 
our presence. At the end of a three-day march, we arrived 
at daybreak at the Spanish camp; and at 6 a.m., on February 
2, completely unexpected by the Spanish, we attacked and 
destroyed them completely. Almost all the Royalists fell 
prisoners. Among them was Chief Vicente Pena who had been 
held back by one of our soldiers as he was attempting to 
swim across the river.
When Pena was brought before me he saidi "Commander, 
I am not asking you to spare my life, for I should not and 
do not want to do so. The only favor I ask of you is to let 
me say goodbye to my wife."
"We are not assassins," I answered. “Although we try 
to destroy the enemy on the battlefield, we are generous 
with the vanquished."
The arrogance and serenity of that man who knew well 
the fate that awaited him in that era of implacable war to 
the death, called my attention in an extraordinary manner.
I tried to win him over to our cause by pointing out the bad 
choice he had made, for he was an American. I told him 
enthusiastically how useful it would be for him to support 
the principles of freedom and to give his valor and deter­
mination of purpose to the sacred cause of his country. But
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he always answered without hesitation that he looked on life 
with the greatest contempt and that he would take glory in 
dying for the King's cause which he believed to be very just. 
It was impossible for me to permit such a valiant military 
man to be sacrificed. Contrary to the practices of the 
times, I sent him to Pore with the rest of the prisoners, 
recommending him very highly. In Pore there were many 
eminent patriots, among them Sehor Mendez and Or. Yanez.
These men, though uselessly at first, made the greatest 
possible efforts to convert Pena to our cause. Finally, he 
was unable to resist the influence of those eloquent men who 
were sacrificing all for their country. He decided then to 
serve under the banners of independence.
The Pore government sent Pena to our camp, where I 
welcomed him with the greatest joy. However, President 
Serrano, who was in Guasdualito, did not believe that Pena 
served us in good faith. ^ 5 Fearing that he would escape and 
tell the Spaniards about our critical situation, he ordered 
me once and for all to take his life. All my efforts to 
persuade Serrano of Pena's sincerity were useless. Finally,
I had to obey, and I issued the necessary orders for his 
execution. But when they were taking him away, I was unable 
to contain the desire I had to save him. Assuming all the 
responsibility for the wrath my action might incur, I sus­
pended the order. Pena remained impassive.
l^See Footnote 10 in Chapter V.
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I returned to Serrano's house. I begged, pleaded, 
and presented new arguments so that he would spare the life 
of that valiant man. Serrano remained inflexible. But 
after great efforts on my part and after saying that 1 would 
be personally responsible for the good conduct of my protege,
I was finally able to save him at the last second. Later 
events were to prove how correct I had been in my opinion of 
Pena— an opinion which I had formed exclusively because of 
his courage. But I shall talk about this later in the 
course of the narration.
I was with Pena, resting in a log cabin, when a 
cavalryman presented himself to Pena and said to himi "There 
is nothing wrong in the Mata del Cardonal." The poor man 
did not realize that Pena was a prisoner. This official 
communication drew my attention greatly. Consequently, 1 
called the messenger and induced him to take us to the place 
where he had come from, warning him that any deception on 
his part would cost him his life. The good Indian guided us 
along the bed of a ravine leading to the place indicated.
He did this with so much certainty and secrecy that we com­
pletely surprised the guard detail to which the communique 
referred, and did not even give them time to think about 
defending themselves.
The guard detail consisted of a complete company, minus 
a captain. It was lodged in an orchard which was so free of 
brush that everything was visible under the trees. Where was 
the captain of this guard then? We searched and asked for
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him in vain, for his loyal soldiers refused to tell us where 
he was. We retreated then, accompanied by the prisoners we 
had taken there. We had gone some distance when one of our 
soldiers, Romualdo Salas, yelled and pointed out the missing 
captain to us. It seems that he had climbed a palm tree and 
covered himself with its fronds so well, that he could not be 
seen from beneath, except by accident. He was intimidated 
into coming down right away. When he hit the ground he said 
as serenely as he did cleverly, "My goodness 1 In Guasdualito 
I escaped on the wings of the rabbit; but here not even our 
Sehora del Cobollo was able to save me." Charmed by the 
conduct of that courageous man, I sent him to BogotA. I do 
not know what his fate was later.
After we had been in Guasdualito a short while.
General Joaquin Ricaurte arrived and placed himself at the 
head of our forces. He established his headquarters here.
At midnight on February 15, a servant of Commander 
Miguel Guerrero arrived at our camp which was situated out­
side Quasdualito. He had been sent by one of Guerrero's 
brothers, called "el Chato," who served as a captain in the 
Spanish army, to warn Guerrero not to participate in the 
battle which was to ensue, for we would probably lose it.
He pointed out that the enemy had more men than we did, and 
that these soldiers were more select and well-disciplined.
He informed him also of the enemy's proximity and told him 
that we would be attacked the following day. Guerrero warned 
the servant to keep silent. At 6*00 a.m., he went to
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General Ricaurte's home to tell him what was happening. He 
took that very servant with him so that he could give all 
the information wanted from him.
After Ricaurte heard this account, he ordered Guer­
rero and his brother's emissary not to say a single word on 
the matter. He assembled all the army officers, telling 
them that he wanted to know their opinion on a plan to 
retreat to the other side of the Arauca River in the province 
of Casanare. Since several moments passed without anyone 
responding, he turned to me and asked my opinion on the plan. 
1 answered that I had told the people of Guasdualito that we 
would defend them from the enemy until the very last. I 
begged him to release me from his orders if he intended to 
carry out the plan to retreat and allow me to remain with my 
squadron, because I wanted to fulfill my promise to the 
people of Guasdualito. Without saying another word to me, 
he asked the other officers the same question. They all 
answered that they shared my opinion. "Well, then," he said 
angrily, "Let Commander P&ez command you. I no longer wish 
to lead you. Those who do not want to follow me to Casanare 
may continue under his orders."
In effect Ricaurte retreated to Casanare without 
telling us one thing about the proximity of the enemy. He 
was followed by calvary Captain Miguel Guerrero, Chief of 
Staff Miguel Vald6 z, the staff, an infantry company, auiother
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company of dragoons, and a few more chiefs and officers.
I was left, then, as chief and with a force that had been 
reduced to five hundred cavalrymen.
Not knowing what the others knew, those of us who 
stayed set out immediately in search of the Spanish army to
fight it wherever we found it. About a league away our
reconnaisance met the enemy's reconnaissance, attacked it, 
and set it in flight. Our men then pursued these Royalists 
with ardor and courage, but were unable to take a single 
prisoner because the Royalists had very good horses.
While our reconnaissance forces were pursuing the 
fleeing Royalists, we were left behind without any news. I
had remained looking over the town so that no men would stay 
behind. When 1 was leaving to catch up with my forces, 1
ran into a soldier who was galloping at full rein to tell me
about the encounter our advance guard had had. Alarmed by 
the news, 1 accelerated the march. After X had joined my 
forces, X issued an order to double the march. X went on
^Colonel Miguel Vald6 z was born in Puerto Cabello 
about 1774, son of Lieutenant Colonel Juan de Dios Vald6 z de 
Yarza, who was Governor of the island of Trinidad. He joined 
the army in 1790 and campaigned with Miranda in 1811 and 1812. 
In 1813 and 1814 he fought with Bolivar and attained the rank 
of Colonel. He helped General Ricaurte defeat General 
Calzada at Chire. In 1817, together with Generals Urdaneta, 
Carreno, and Cordoba, he left the Army of the Apure to seek 
out Bolivar. Gravely ill with cancer, though, he was forced 
to stay behind in Urbana del Orinoco where he died in 1818. 
D&vila, Diccionario Bioqr&fico, XX, 3S8-59 states that P&ez's 
troops, with P&ez's knowledge and approval, stripped Vald6 z 
of all his possessions before his death. Miguel Guerrero 
later denounced this to Bolivar.
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ahead until 1 found our reconnaissance forces. They had 
stopped to watch a big cloud of dust that was rising from 
the place called the "Mata de la Miel.” This was the first 
inkling we had of the presence of the Spanish.
Quickly I grasped the fact that that cloud was being 
raised by an army that was heading toward us. I decided to 
approach it, despite the fact that it was very far away, in 
order to familiarize myself with its quality and numbers. 
Commander Nonato P&rez and sixteen dragoons, who were a 
little ahead of our reconnaissance, had also left to recon­
noitre. He asked me where 1 was going. I stopped long 
enough to answer him and then continued at a gallop. For­
tunately, he followed me with his dragoons.
When I was within sight of the enemy, I stopped in 
order to conduct a better inspection. The enemy reconnais­
sance, consisting of thirty men, was about six hundred yards 
from its army. Their officer in charge and 1 began to boaBt 
to one another impudently. I challenged him to single com­
bat. I did this with such ardor that, without realizing it,
1 got closer than was suitable for my personal safety. He 
ordered his men to fire then, and one bullet succeeded in 
mortally wounding my horse. The handsome animal fell, 
pinning one of my legs under his body. With great difficulty 
I managed to free myself. The Spaniards would have had 
enough time then to knife me while I was on the ground. How­
ever, they contented themselves only with firing some shots 
at me. Since Nonato P6 rez and his men stayed immobile about
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a block away, I shouted for him to advance as soon as I 
could get on my feet. He obeyed and killed five of the 
enemy's advance guard. P6rez then returned to the place 
where I was. I took the horse belonging to one of the 
dragoons and rejoined my troops. I addressed them then, I 
remember as if it were today, with the most astonishing 
proclamation that ever occurred to any general. Full of 
sorrow over the loss of my horse, I told them, "Comrades, 
they have killed my good horse. If you are not ready right
now to avenge his death, I will hurl myself against the
enemy alone and die in their ranks." They all answered, 
"Yes, we will avenge itl"
I accelerated the march again for it was so late in
the evening that many of the leaders thought we should sus­
pend the attack until the following day. They felt that by 
the time we got within rifle range it would already be dark. 
I retorted that the darkness of night would be as great a 
handicap to the Spaniards as it would be for us. At a 
moderate distance from the enemy, I ordered the formation of 
two lines. The first was to be under the command of the 
valiant Nonato P6rez; the second, under that of the gentle­
manly and enterprising Commander Genaro Visquez. We marched 
slowly and approached the Spanish army until we forced it to 
start firing.
The Spanish chief. Colonel Francisco Ldpez, let us 
approach to within less than half the rifle-range distance. 
Then he broke out with his artillery and musketeers. Our
2X9
first line, with Nonato P6rez at the lead, charged so 
impetuously and orderly then, that it may be said that it 
pulled more than two-thirds of the enemy cavalry out of forma­
tion and defeated them completely.
I had warned V&squez not to advance until he received 
orders from m e . 1 was located between his column and
Nonato's . When X had noticed that the enemy was aiming and 
ordered the first line to advance, V&squez believed that 
order included him also; so he advanced. I had to run 
toward him in order to detain him. When I was doing this, 
my horse was wounded by a bullet and began to leap. He 
threw me quite a distance, with my saddle between my legs, 
and fled in the direction of the enemy. I remained on the 
spot, covered by a thick cloud of dust raised by the cavalry, 
without even knowing where I was. Fortunately, I left those 
shadows and ran into citizen Esteban Quero. I asked him for 
his horse, which he generously gave me as soon as he recog­
nized me. I had barely mounted when I noticed that the 
second line was retreating.
I sped to halt that retreat. After a good struggle,
I succeeded in making the cavalry turn back. Animated again 
by my presence and effectively aided by V&squez and the 
officers, we hurled ourselves full blast on the remains of 
the enemy cavalry, which had stayed to the right and con­
sisted of about four hundred men. The enemy could not resist 
the impetuous attack. They whirled about and immediately 
started to flee. Pursued by our men, the enemy forces ran
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into our first line which had broken them first and was not 
further ahead. The worst part for the enemy occurred then, 
for we lanced them without pity. We did have the misfortune 
of counting among our wounded the courageous Captains Rafael 
Ortega and Gregorio Brito. The latter died the next day, 
lamenting the egoism of Ricaurte and Guerrero, who had not 
told us about the proximity of the enemy.
The very bloody struggle with the enemy cavalry ended. 
Then, since it was already about 8 1 OO p.m., we turned on the 
infantry. But the infantry had already left its former 
position and started its retreat toward the thickets of the 
Apure River. Although we did encounter this enemy infantry 
about 9*00 p.m., we barely took any prisoners.
Baralt, commenting about that day states t "There is 
nothing sadder than a battle in the darkness of night. For 
then deeds go by without witnesses or glory. Those who die 
do so without exciting compassion. There are no friends to 
aid you. Even courage and skill are worthless against the 
enemy blows. " 1 7 Such was the Battle of Mata de la Miel in 
which the enemy lost nine hundred men, four hundred killed 
and five hundred taken prisoners. The enemy also lost 3,345 
horses and a great number of lances and rifles. Captains 
Genaro VAsquez, Nonato PArez, Miguel Antonio Figueredo,
17This exact citation may be found in Baralt and Diaz, 
ResAmen de la Historia. I, 350. Note that Baralt lists 
this battle as occurring in 1816.
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Antolin Mujica, Francisco Hurtado, Hermenejildo Mujica, 
Gregorio Brito, and Juan Antonio Romero distinguished them­
selves in this battle as u s u a l . T h e  government of New 
Granada, on which the troops under my command in Casanare 
were dependent, then sent me a dispatch promoting me to 
Lieutenant Colonel.
l®No further information was available on Miguel 
Antonio Figueredo.
Captain Antolin Mugica was a native of Venezuela. He 
enlisted in the patriot ranks in 1814 and fought most out­
standingly against the Royalists. In December of 1815 he 
fought with P&ez at the Battle of Chire against General 
Calzada. He was at the surprise attack on Vicente Pena at 
Arauca. Distinguishing himself particularly at the Battle 
of Mata de la Miel, he went on to another victory against 
the Spanish at Paso del Fr£o. In 1816 he joined Captain 
Antonio Ranjel in the Battle of Achaguas. He was defeated 
and captured. Colonel Andr£s Torrellas had him shot and 
beheaded. Then his head was fried in oil and placed on 
public display in Calabozo until 1818 when Bolivar and F&ez 
entered the city, removed it, and buried it with the proper 
pomp and circumstance. Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario 
Biogr&fico, 371-72. Cunninghame Graham, P&ez. 110-11.
jos6 Francisco Hurtado joined Piez's forces in 1816 
as company captain. In 1819 he became a cavalry lieutenant 
colonel and a member of P&ez's Honor Guard. In 1826 he 
attained the rank of colonel. D&vila, Diccionario Biogr&fico. 
I, 252-53.
Colonel Hermenejildo Mujica was Antolin's brother and 
a fierce warrior who waged battle as if death were meaning­
less. He fought in the battles of Achaguas, Mucuritas,
Ortiz, and Rincon del Toro. He particularly distinguished 
himself at the Battles of Mata de la Miel, BoyacA, and 
Carabobo. Ibid., 392-93.
Juan Antonio Romero was born in Santa Lucia about 
1795. In 1813 he enlisted in Miranda's squadron and fought 
in Mosquitero. He fought under campo Elias at the first 
battle of La Puerta in 1814 and was defeated. In 1819 he 
fought under PAez at La Cruz. Continuing to fight ardently 
against the Royalists, Bolivar promoted him in 1827 to the 
rank of lieutenant in the cavalry. P&ez gave him his retire­
ment papers in 1830. In 1845 he became Militia Captain in 
Orituco and by 1853 was second in command there. Romero 
died of cholera in 1856 in Caracas. Ibid., II, 204.
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I gave the prisoners from the Spanish army the freedom 
to desert and return to their homes if they so desired. 
Because of their good treatment, many of those whom X did 
not send to New Granada, joined my ranks before the end of 
the month. Nearly all of them were Venezuelans and in that 
time there was middle ground between friend and enemy. The 
news of my generosity toward the prisoners and the glory 
brought by victory spread throughout the towns of Barinas 
and j^>ure. Their inhabitants, who previously had held a bad 
opinion of the patriots because of the cruel conduct of some 
of their leaders, were converted to the justice of our cause. 
Coaxed by the leniency of our conduct toward the vanquished, 
they slowly began to join our ranks and become later the 
bulwark of the forces for Colombian independence.
While we were still pursuing the remains of LOpez's 
army in the direction of Barinas, Commander Guerrero pre­
sented himself in Guasdualito with orders from Ricaurte to 
assume command of the forces I was leading. This was stupid 
of the mam after he had turned us over to the enemy— an 
enemy which was now fleeing before our troops. After all, 
these troops, on the strength of their own efforts and 
guided by other leaders, had just triumphed over the very 
forces that had set Ricaurte and Guerrero into flight. 
Although the bulk of these troops had not yet returned, 
Ricuarte's authority was immediately disregarded by those 
who were with the wounded and with the prisoners. I was pro­
claimed head of the army, as x had been in the battle.
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Despite the good reasons for the action taken by the troops, 
I countermarched hurriedly toward Guasdualito as soon as 1 
received news of the event. Exercising my influence there 
with the leaders of the uprising, I achieved Guerrero's 
reinstatement. He continued in command. This was much to 
my satisfaction, for despite all the inconveniences, it was 
better to have him as leader them to get rid of him at the 
cost of a mutiny or a barracks' congress which is usually 
ill-advised and seldom beneficial.
CHAPTER VII
[Miguel Antonio] V&squez's Occupation of Mantecal—  
The Priest, Colonel [Andres] Torrelias— Ldpez Decides 
to Attack Me— I Prepare for the Defense— I Take the 
Offensive Against the Spaniards— Obstacles of the 
Apure Campaign— The Valiant Captain, Antolin Mugica—  
His Disastrous End— I Go to Arichuna Parish--Movements 
of the Royalist Army under the Command of [Miguel de] 
La Torre— Tasks that the Chief of the Army, Colonel 
Francisco de Paula Santander Assigns to Me— I am 
Named Supreme Chief in Place of the Latter on My 
Return— Condition of the Army I had Under my Command.
1816
Eventually [Miguel] Guerrero was called to the province 
of Casanare, and I was left in charge of the army in Guas­
dualito. I ordered Commander Miguel Antonio Vdsques to march 
with five hundred cavalrymen to occupy the town of Mantecal.
He did this, destroying a picket of forty enemy riflemen 
that he found there. However, he was quickly dislodged from 
Mantecal and pursued up to Trinidad de Arichuna by a column 
of eight hundred enemy cavalrymen. This column, under the 
command of the priest Colonel Andr6 s Torrellas, then lodged 
itself in that town.^ V&squez continued retreating toward
^Colonel Andrds Torrellas was a priest in the town of 
Siquisique when on March 10, 1813, he joined the Royalist 
forces to fight against his countrymen. He came to be one 
of P&ez's implacable foes in the terrible wars of the llanos. 
In fact, he was so zealous in his devotion to the Royalist 
cause, that he shot maity patriot prisoners, among them the
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Guasdualito. When I heard about this, I set out to meet 
him. Placing myself at the head of his column, we returned 
immediately toward Mantecal. Torrellas, either afraid or 
cautious, did not wait for me. Instead he retreated to Mata 
de Totumo. I pursued him without results, for he retreated 
constantly until he reached the other side of the Apure River, 
which he crossed at the Paso del Frio. I stayed in Mantecal 
where, about the middle of June, Ldpez decided to attack me.
Despite the fact that our army had suffered many 
casualties, we went out to wait for the enemy in an open 
plain. There I stationed my small column of three hundred 
men. I had sent fifty of my men in formation under the com­
mand of Captain Basilio Brito to the town of Rincon Hondo. 
Ldpez formed his men to the right of the ditch at Caicara.
He had a force of twelve hundred cavalrymen and four hundred 
infantrymen and six pieces of artillery. Neither side 
gained any ground during the day since there were only a few 
skirmishes between the two hundred Royalist riflemen and 
fifty of the patriots led by the very brave Captain Antolin 
Mugica. Our force repelled the enemy in several attacks, 
killing many of them. Our only casualties consisted of
Brave Antolin Mujica. By 1822, however, he embraced the 
patriot cause and fought for it with equal zeal. Soublette 
then named him governor of the province of Coro. Though 
Torrelles supported P&ez in his movement for the separation 
of Venezuela from Gran Colombia in 1826, Bolivar still named 
him General of the Colombian army when P&ez submitted to 
Bolivar's authority. He died near Caracas in 1848. Scar- 
petta and Vergara, Diccionario BioorAfico. 624-25.
Cunninghame Graham, P&ez. 110-11.
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three wounded and Mugica's horse.
Afraid of being surprised during the night, I retreated 
to a sand dune which was behind us and surrounded by somewhat 
deep water. Here the Spaniards did not dare attack us, not 
even the following day. They stayed in sight until they 
retreated on the following night to the Nutrias road in 
search of Paso del Frio. It was not in keeping either with 
my character nor my plans to remain idle any longer. The 
minute I discovered their retreat, 1 gave the order to march. 
We overtook the Spaniards two days later. What was even 
worse for them was that we surprised them at 4i00 a.m. at 
the Paso. The battle which ensued was disastrous for them. 
Their casualties amounted to over three hundred men. This 
included the dead, scattered, and wounded, and five hundred 
horses. We were unable to inflict greater damage because of 
the swampy terrain. Covered with woods and water from the 
overflowing river, the area afforded the Spanish infantry a 
cover from which to defend itself advantageously.
Normally, the Apure campaign presented infinite 
obstacles. Moreover, we had to cross an estuary about a 
league long in order to reach the aforementioned river pass.
It was so full of water, that our horses could barely stand 
up. The pass was as full of alligators as the rest of our 
plains. This trip, across the overflowing waters and in the 
darkness of night, seemed little less than impossible. It 
took the Spaniards completely by surprise when we were able 
to carry out this operation successfully.
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After this surprise at the Paso del Frio, I returned 
to Mantecal. There Captain Antonio Ranjel and some other 
officers insisted that I send them to take the city of 
Achaguas, which was seventy leagues from Mantecal and 
unguarded. To take it by surprise, X detached one hundred 
and fifty men under the command of Ranjel, and ordered them 
to remain hidden as long as possible. To do this, they had 
to go around the Zancudo corner, cross the Apure Seco River 
below the mouth of the Payara River, and attack the city 
unexpectedly from behind.
The difficulties that Ranjel had to surmount in order 
to carry out this plan are inconceivable, for all the terrain 
he had to cross was inundated by the overflow of those rivers, 
and by the qamelotales which grow at the edge of the water. 
However, he was finally able to get to the vicinity of
Achaguas without having been detected. There he discovered
that there were one hundred grenadiers in the barracks in the 
plaza. These forces had come down from Frio and embarked 
with the purpose of collecting their scattered forces and 
augmenting their ranks with new recruits. Unfortunately, 
Ranjel was not informed that there was another barracks at
the edge of the river, about two blocks from the plaza, with
two hundred unmounted lancers.
At dawn, Ranjel attacked the infantry barracks and was 
able to enter, killing all who resisted him either with a 
lance or a saber. At that moment, the two hundred lancers 
charged and forced the patriots to retreat outside the city
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and abandon their prisoners and the arms they had taken.
Ranjel proposed to retreat now by the same road that he had 
come. The fiery captain Antolin Mugica, said he would not 
do this. He added that he would rather die continuing the 
fight than be the bearer of the unhappy news of an unfor­
tunate battle. He invited all the men to accompany him in 
continuing the attack. Unfortunately for him, some men did 
follow him, and in the charges and countercharges that took 
place, his horse fell in a rainwater pool, created for the 
purpose of drinking water in the summer. There he was made 
a prisoner and shot by the priest. Colonel Andres Torrellas. 
His head, separated from the body, was fried in oil and sent 
back to the city of Calabozo. There it was placed on a spike 
and remained in execrable exhibition until we found it in 
1818 when, by General Bolivar's order, it was taken down and 
buried with due reverence.
After this unfortunate event, I decided to change my 
position to the Arichuna parish in order to facilitate com­
munications with Guasdualito. Meanwhile [Pablo] Morillo's 
troops had occupied New Granada and destroyed the government.2
2General Pablo Morillo was born in Fuentesecas, Spain, 
on May 5, 1778. A man of humble birth, he had served in the 
Spanish army first as a soldier, corporal and sergeant. At 
the time of the French invasion in 1808, he became an officer. 
He fought so brilliantly in the siege of Vigo, that he won 
the rank of colonel. Serving under Wellington until the end 
of the Peninsular Campaign, he finally attained the ranks of 
field marshall and lieutenant general. Unfortunately, he was 
the type of man who was only at home in an army camp. The
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With a strong column under [Miguel de] La Torre's command, 
the Royalists had also pursued the remains of the Republican 
troops up to casanare.3 General [Manuel de] Servier, leader 
of the patriots in the unfortunate retreat from Bogota to 
Casanare, was able to save only about two hundred men from 
the defeat that Lieutenant colonel Antonio Gdmez had
title of Pacificador and the mission to subdue all of South 
America in one hundred and sixty days were incompatible with 
this man. He was in command of the Spanish forces in 
America from 1815 until he was replaced by La Torre in 1820.
He held the titles of count of Cartagena, Marquds de la 
Puerta, and Captain General of Madrid and New Castile. He 
died while in France in 1837. Henao and Arrubla, History of 
Colombia. 269-70, 347. Thomas Rourke, Man of Glorv. Simon 
Bolivar (New York, 1939), 235-36. Laura F. Ulrich, "Morillo's 
Attempt to Pacify Venezuela," Hispanic American Historical 
Review, III (November, 1920), 535-65.
^General Miguel de la Torre began his career as a 
common soldier. When he had become a sergeant, he came to 
America where his valor and knowledge were influential in 
his promotion to brigadier. In 1816 he was given an impor­
tant command in Venezuela where he distinguished himself 
particularly in the siege of Angostura. He was forced to 
abandon Angostura by illnesses and lack of supplies. In 
1820 he was promoted to field marshal, and soon replaced 
Morillo as supreme commander of the Spanish forces in America. 
He was defeated by Bolivar and P&ez in the Battle of Carabobo 
in 1821. In 1822 he was still in command of the Spanish 
forces. By 1823 he was named civil and military governor of 
Puerto Rico, a post he maintained until 1837. Espasa- 
Calpe (Hijos de j. Espasa, eds.), Enciclopedia universal 
ilustrada Europeao-Americana, 70 vols. (Madrid, 1905-30); 
Appendices. 10 vols. (Madrid, 1930-33), LXII, 1301.
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inflicted on him in Caqueta on June ll .4  Two days later. La 
Torre overtook Servier, but he was unable to prevent the 
letter's retreat which was accomplished, although with some 
losses, because of the cover afforded by the intervening 
Ocoa River.
On June 22, La Torre overtook Servier again in Upia 
and finished scattering his troops; consequently. General 
Servier arrived at Pore to join General Urdaneta on June 23 
with a very insignificant number of men. There Servier 
joined the emigration and was deprived of his command by 
order of Colonel Miguel Vald6 z. The latter had replaced 
General Ricaurte in Guasdualito when he had resigned, unknown 
to Urdaneta, under the pretext that the government was dis­
solved and unable to appoint him. Meanwhile in Pore, Colonel 
Juan Nepomuceno Moreno remained in command with the title of 
governor but without sufficient forces or means to maintain 
himself.®
^General Servier is usually referred to as General 
Manuel de Serviez. He was a Frenchman who came to Cartagena 
in 1812 and fought for two years in the Cauca Valley under 
Marino. In 1616, at the head of the second line of defense, 
Servier saved the patriot army from destruction and led what 
was left of it to safety at Bogota. In October of 1816, 
when he had gone to Achaguas to cooperate with PAez, he was 
assassinated. Hasbrouck, Foreign Legionaries. 343.
^Juan Nepomuceno Moreno was born in the province of 
Casanare. He fought with PAez, Aramendi, and Olmedilla for 
the cause of independence beginning with the Battle of 
Guasdualito until the Battle of Yagual and the seizure of 
Achaguas. As Governor of Pore he assembled regiments that 
fought with Bolivar in countless battles. He himself fought 
against the Royalist in the Battle of BoyacA. While serving
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Two other patriot columns had also crossed the moun­
tain range headed toward Casanare. La Torre, anxious for 
them to approach, stopped his march. He intended then to 
surround Pore and end the campaign in that province. One of 
La Torre's columns, under Lieutenant Colonel [Matias] EscutA's 
command, went from Tunja, by way of Sogamoso and Taso, to the 
salt mines of Chita.® There it occupied the site of Sacama 
as an impregnable position. Colonel Juan Villacicencio then 
came down from San Gil with two hundred and seventy horses, 
and on June 29 had an encounter on the plains of Guachiria 
with eighty cavalrymen and seventy-five infantrymen under 
Moreno's command.7 Both forces disputed the field gallantly 
until, mutually pressed by the fear of being charged by
as Chief of the Republic's troops in Casanare, he refused to 
accept Venezuela's separation from the confederation. In 
1830 he defeated General Justo Bricefio in a battle ensuing 
from the revolution which was promulgated against the exist­
ing government. He entered BogotA with his troops then and 
took part in the junta that supported Vice-President Caicedo. 
He succeeded in getting the head of the government to issue 
his decree of June 10 by which the doors of the country were 
opened again to those who had been exiled after the con­
spiracy of September 25, 1828. Scarpetta and Vergara, 
Diccionario BioarAfico. 359-60.
6Colonel Matias BscutA was in command of the first 
of Morillo's two squadrons in Venezuela in 1816. Lecuna, 
Crdnica Razonada. II, 2.
7Colonel Juan Villavicencio is sometimes listed as 
Colonel Manuel Villanvicencio. He was in command of another 
one of Pablo Morillo's columns in Venezuela. Villavicencio 
left San Gil with some of Ferdinand VII's cavalry and light 
artillery to join EscutA and take over the command of both 
Spanish columns. D. Mariano Torrente, Historia de la 
Revolucidn Hispano-Americana. 3 vols. (Madrid, 1829), II,
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greater forces (their exact numbers were hidden by the dark­
ness of night), they abandoned the struggle. Villavicencio 
returned toward the mountain with quite a number of losses.
The patriots returned toward Pore, and remained masters of 
the llanura until they evacuated the city and went with a 
large part of the emigration to Arauca.
La Torre occupied Pore on July 10 and pursued the 
patriot forces to Bocoyes. He failed to overtake them, 
returned to Pore, and established his winter quarters there 
until the worst of the rains had passed and the swollen rivers 
had returned to their normal size.
Morillo considered La Torre's march from Bogota in a 
period of forty-four days an unheard of feat. During this 
time La Torre did not sleep in an inhabited place and only 
had meat to eat. He had been forced to endure continuous 
rains and cross swamps and the copious Negro, Upi, and other 
rivers. According to what he himself said later, the 
smallest of these rivers was wider than the Ebro at its 
mouth. For a native of our country, admiration for having 
conquered such hardships and difficulties is incomprehen­
sible, for we do not need many comforts while on campaign and 
are used to eating only meat, without bread or salt or any 
other condiment. When we do get any of these articles men­
tioned, we are completely satisfied. We do not need shoes 
and always live out in the open. We sleep on the plains or 
in the forest as if we were under the most comfortable roof.
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We are frugal, and we are never despondent or desperate when 
we find ourselves surrounded by difficulties and dangers.
For a European, La Torre's march was truly extraordinary. 
However, it is insignificant when compared with what the 
Colombians accomplished who covered the immense territory of 
five republics in need of everything. The few of them who 
are alive today talk about their dangerous marches to Cuzco 
as if they had been nothing more than excursions of fun.
In Trinidad of Arichuna, I received a communication 
from Colonel Vald6 z, the Commanding General of the Casa­
nare troops, to come to Arauca and attend a meeting of the 
Granadine and Venezuelan leaders and officers for the pur­
pose of establishing a provisional government and selecting 
a leader. Lieutenant Colonel Fernando Serrano, ex-governor 
of Pamplona and a person of great merit, was unanimously 
named President of the State. Doctor Don Francisco Javier 
Yahez was named Secretary of state and Generals Servier and 
Urdaneta were named Counsellors. Colonel Francisco de Paula 
Santander was appointed General-in-Chief of the army. This 
government was later installed in Guasdualito, and its members 
swore to support it and never capitulate.
After this event, I went with Santander to the town 
of Trinidad where the column under my command, the only one 
that existed then, was stationed. The horses were unable to 
begin active operations. Ramdn Nonato P6 rez was in the 
plains of Cuiloto with two hundred men and one thousand
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horses, but he refused to recognize any authority.® San­
tander commissioned Father Trinidad Travieso and me then to 
persuade him and his people to join our army.® He offered 
to do so, but did not carry out his word.
In view of the need we had for horses, Santander him­
self also commissioned me to go to the Lareno farm to get 
colts to use for cavalry mounts. I did this and was bringing 
five hundred of them to headquarters when, about a league 
away, I found out through several leaders and officers who 
came out to meet me, that the troops had named me supreme 
chief and were in formation at camp waiting to get my consent 
for their action. These chiefs and officers begged me when 
we reached the camp not to report the outcome of my commis­
sion to Santander, for he was no longer chief.
This is one of the most notable events of my life, 
and perhaps the beginning of that continued series of 
caprices with which fortune chOse to elevate me and give me 
a place in the history of Colombia. Now let us hear what
^Although Scarpetta and Vergara state that Nonato 
P6 rez served P&ez well, Vicente Lecuna mentions that Colonel 
Ramdn Nonato P6 rez was brought to trial in 1816 supposedly 
because of inflicting arbitrary deaths, stealing, communi­
cating with the enemy, and bad conduct toward the refugees 
in Guasdualito. In reality, the charges were “trumped up" 
by P&ez as a means of punishing a disobedient chief. Scar­
petta and Vergara, Diccionario Biogr&fico, 460. Lecuna, 
Crdnica Razonada. II, 308.
®Father Trinidad Travieso was b o m  in 1798 in San 
Felipe, Venezuela. From 1813 until early in 1822 he served 
as aide-de-camp to General-in-Chief, Rafael Urdaneta. 
Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario Biogr&fico. 633.
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Baralt (and Diaz) in their Historia de Venezuela. Volume I, 
page 289. have to say about Serrano's and Santander's govern­
ment. 1 0
The truth is that this apparatus of regular govern­
ment in those waste lands, designed by a few fugitives 
without either subjects or land to govern, was highly 
ridiculous, illegal, and what is more, embarrassing. 
Serrano was an excellent man. However, he was from 
New Granada and was now in Venezuelan territory.
Which republic was he to direct? And where was the 
army Santander was to lead— Santander who was a Gran- 
adine also and unknown in Venezuela? Servier. French 
by birth and a Gram adine officer, could not inspire 
any confidence. The names of Urdaneta and Yanez, so 
respected in Venezuela and New Granada, were not suf­
ficient to lend authority and weight to that wretched 
government, situated as it was in the midst of semi- 
barbaric men for whom civil virtues, and even military 
virtues of a certain elevated order, were strange and 
foreign things. Naturally, that retinue only lasted a 
very short time, for it had barely arrived at Trinidad 
de Arichuna, when several Venezuelan leaders thought 
about destroying it and substituting it with what was 
needed then. And this was one sole and absolute leader 
who had the confidence of the llaneros and could lead 
them in war. A mutiny of three squadrons was attempted 
while a junta of officers met to pretend to be intimi­
dated, seek means to appease the troops, and find these 
means in the deposition of Santander. The latter cut 
short the confusion by presenting himself before the 
junta and immediately after before these squadrons. 
Realizing that he was not the man needed in these 
circumstances, he resigned his command immediately in 
the presence of President Serrano. The junta, composed 
of colonels Juan Antonio Paredes and Fernando Figueredo, 
of Lieutenant Colonels Jos£ Marla Carreno, Miguel 
Antonio V&squez, and of Sergeant Major Francisco Conde, 
went on later to elect a person who would occupy both 
Santander's and Serrano's positions simultaneously— a
10In the 1939 edition of Baralt and Diaz, ResCimen de 
la Historia published by Descl6 e de Brouiver in Paris, this 
citation may be found in Volume I, 351-54.
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man who was to be the absolute leader in the llanos. ^  
The election went to Ptiez, caudillo of the only force 
there was there, and this explains his victory. As 
for the rest of this curious event, which seen in the 
light of military regulations is a true anomaly, it was 
very natural in those circumstances. The error, of 
course, was not in the destruction of that kind of 
government, for it had been the work of an unauthorized 
junta. Necessarily, it would last only as long as the 
voluntary submission of the chiefs, officers, and troops 
to which the Republic had been reduced. It was easy to 
foresee that such obedience would not last long. San­
tander himself said it when he wrote in 1827 t 'I saw 
only too well that everything that was being done would 
tumble the day that one of those chiefs wanted it, and 
this would be a chief who, by analogy of the customs, 
also would have influence over the llaneros. Further­
more, by then I had already been labeled an enemy of 
the Venezuelans because of the differences originating 
in Cticuta between Bolivar and [Manuel deljCastillo.'12 
And further on Santander writesx 'This attempt sup­
pressed, X could not continue commanding men who leaned 
toward rebellion, particularly in a country where it 
was believed to be dishonorable for a Granadine to 
command Venezuelans.'
H-No further information was available on Juan A. 
Paredes.
Josti Marla Carreno was born in Cua, Venezuela. He 
joined the revolutionary army in 1810. On September 13,
1813, he lost the use of his right arm in the Battle of 
Cerritos Blancos, but he still continued the campaign. He 
later became Governor of the Province of Santa Marta and 
Intendant of the isthmus, Zulia, and Orinoco. In 1830 he 
was a deputy to the Congreso Admirable, and in 1832 he 
returned to Venezuela as General of Division. He died in 
Caracas in 1849. Dtivila, Diccionario Biogr&fico. I, 73.
^2Baralt refers here to Manuel del Castillo, a New 
Granadan, who in 1813 was in command of one of Bolivar's two 
divisions destined to liberate Venezuela. Castillo and 
Bolivar quarreled, and in Cticuta Castillo was replaced in 
command by Santander. In 1815 Castillo was governor of 
Cartagena and refused to help Bolivar to carry out his com­
mission, given by the government of New Granada, to liberate 
Santa Marta from the Royalists. Because of this, on May 8 , 
1815, Bolivar resigned his command in order not to quarrel 
with another patriot official and sailed for Jamaica. Mortin, 
History of Venezuela. 114, 121.
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The truth of the matter is that Santander had 
strong antipathies working against him. He was not 
man enough for the situation and in the final analysis, 
wlthough gifted with a distinguished capacity, he did 
not have the background nor the natural disposition to 
wage war. He had been placed by the llanero in that 
derogatory category of officers called 'of letters. 1 
But Serrano, it will be said, exercised a purely civil 
authority and was in addition a good and respected man. 
Whose way was he in? unfortunately, he was in every­
body's way, for there was nothing more to the republic 
than a camp of semibarbaric soldiers. Therefore, 
Serrano's supreme authority embarrassed war operations, 
especially when the ignorant and the ignored of the 
country could not direct them. No; the evil was that 
in saying the military hierarchy, indispensable basis 
of discipline, P&ez was to command officers of rank 
higher than his. Among these was a Venezuelan General, 
capable, courageous, and known for many and eminent 
services. History can respond to this with the fact 
that Santander's election was in this same category, 
and that Urdaneta, aspiring only to join Bolivar 
wherever he appeared, did not want to take part in 
these affairs. He knew the llaneros too well to believe 
that he could command a troop of them— alone as they 
were and without ever having been submitted to the rule 
of any ordinance.
Servier, a foreigner and unknown to the country, 
contributed to not being considered by showing his 
jealousy of Urdaneta. The other leaders, although 
very worthy of esteem and considerations, because of 
their merit could not compete with P&ez who was wor­
shipped by his troops. He was caudillo or the only 
force that existed, famous because of his valor and 
the constant success that had accompanied him in all 
his undertakings.
That election, which could easily have been marked 
by intrigue and violence, met with success instead. In 
fact, it is evident to us that several courageous 
citizens, including Servier, were very anxious to pro­
mote the change spontaneously. It so happenens, 
though, that these citizens came to flatter themselves 
into thinking that they could later direct P&ez. But 
P&ez shook himself from them, leaving them feeling a 
little cheated and peeved.
I have cited Baralt as the best authority among us.
However, I will not fail to correct the errors his narration
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contains, said I shall relate the events in the manner in 
which they occurred.
On September 16, 1816 1 arrived at Santander's head­
quarters. After the events which I have mentioned previously, 
the leaders and officers who had stayed in the camp, accom­
panied by a large part of the civilians, came out to welcome 
me. They proclaimed me their supreme leader. Surprised by 
this, I reprimanded them and asked how they could disregard 
Santander and the other authorities who governed them. They 
answered that they did not find Santander capable enough or 
with sufficient judgment to save them in those very dangerous 
circumstances, and that they had agreed to take this step "in 
order that I would liberate them from the deathhouse in which 
they already considered themselves." They insisted that I 
should not refuse their proclamation since everyone at head­
quarters was in agreement. I reprimanded them again, telling 
them that I was not disposed to support them. They pointed 
out that they, representative of the emigration from New 
Granada and Venezuela, and the only relics of both Republics, 
were the only sovereign. Because of this, they felt that 
they were in a position to resolve and execute what best 
suited them on this occasion.
They made many other observations to me, all of which 
I ignored. In fact, I tried to detach myself from them in 
order to go to Santander's house and give an account of the 
commission he had given me. They tried to prevent me from 
doing so and to make me see that 1 was their chief and
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consequently had to account to no one. They begged me to 
march with them before the troops and be recognized as supreme 
chief. 1 resisted and got away from them. Then I went to 
Santander's house and gave an account of my commission with­
out telling him anything concerning what had just occurred.
After I had retired to the ranch that served as my 
home, the same leaders and officers, accompanied by even 
more citizens, came to urge me again to go with them before 
the troops that were in formation and ready to recognize me.
I refused for the hundredth time. But at this point 
Santander came in and asked what was happening. He had 
noticed that the troops were in formation. They told him 
that since they considered themselves to be in eminent danger 
because of the critical circumstances that surrounded them, 
they had resolved to confer the supreme command on me and to 
obey my wishes blindly; they were certain that 1 was the only 
one who could save them from the dangers that threatened them 
from all sides. Santander answered that he agreed with them 
and that, furthermore, he would submit himself to my orders 
with pleasure if they would accept the resignation he would 
tender right then. They pointed out the uselessness of such 
a resignation, for they had already ignored his authority.
They told him further that they, along with the people that 
had saved themselves from the Spanish, represented sover­
eignty, for there was not any government left anywhere in New 
Granada or in Venezuela. Santander still insisted that he be 
permitted to resign. The assembly resisted his request
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vehemently until Santander stuck his sword in the ground and 
said emphatically that he preferred that they take his life 
with his sword rather than give his consent to this outrage.
I spoke then for the first time and pointed out the justice 
of Santander's demand. I said that I would not accept the 
command if he were not permitted to resign. They finally 
yielded, and then I accepted the supreme command and was 
recognized as chief.
In the citation from Baralt [and Diaz] which I gave 
previously, it is easy to detect another error when he [they] 
ascertained that I attended the meeting called to decide on 
Santander's deposition and my elevation to command. I have 
already said that at that time I was executing the commission 
that that chief had given me to corral horses for the troops 
and to convince Nonato P4rez to join our army.
Restrepo states in Volume 27, page 326 of his work
thatt^
Such was the confidence that all had in P&ez1s 
courage, in his energy, in his influence on the 
llaneros. and in the other gifts that graced him, 
that Generals Urdaneta and Servier, and some colonels 
submitted themselves willingly to his authority.
They looked on this step as the only narrow chance of 
salvation in that frightful disaster. P&ez immedi­
ately decreed the end of President Serrano's functions 
by declaring before the troops that he alone had the
l^The work of Jos6 Manuel Restrepo, Historia de la 
Revolucidn de la Repflblica de Colombia, published in 
Besanzdn in 1858 by the Imprenta de Jos6 Jacquino is con­
densed into four volumes. The second volume contains dis 
cussions of the years 1815, 1816, and 1817 among others. 
This citation could not be located in these discussions.
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supreme authority. In that difficult and sad occasion, 
it could not have been any other way. Civil authority 
and division of command would have caused difficulties 
in adopting and executing the active and energetic 
measures that were needed, and without which the unfor­
tunate relics of the patriots that had taken to the 
llanos situated between the Arauca and the Apure could 
not have been saved.
After speaking to the troops and the people and 
thanking them for the confidence they had shown in me, I 
advised them to ask Divine Providence not to deny me the pro­
tection I needed in the arduous enterprise before me. I was 
thinking about leaving that very day to encounter the enemy, 
after I had placed the non-combatants in the safest possible 
place.
Now I was in control of the supreme command of what 
remained of the Republics of New Granada and Venezuela.14 j 
formed a junta then in order to familiarize myself with the 
opinions of the principal officers concerning the operations 
we had to undertake to save our last hopes. We had to agree 
on a plan of operation against the enemies of our independence.
It is necessary at this point to give the reader an 
idea of the condition of the troops and the resources we 
relied on to save our country. The army horses, untamed and 
new, were worn out because the pasture in the plains where we 
were was scarce and poor in quality. Most of the soldiers
14At this time the Supreme Commander, Simdn Bolivar, 
was in Haiti, where he had been forced into exile by the 
Spanish reoccupation of Venezuela. His liberating expedition 
did not leave Haiti until December of 1616. Restrepo, 
Revolucidn de la Repdblica de Colombia. II, 369-70.
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had no weapons other than the lance and apricot-tree sticks, 
sharpened like a pike at one end. Very few of them carried 
fire arms. They clothed themselves with ouavucos.1 5 Their 
hats had rotted with the rigors of the rainy season. They 
had no saddles, and we could not even supply them with a 
blanket or any other soft seat. When we killed a cow, the 
soldiers fought over its hide, for they needed it as shelter 
from the rain at night in the open plain. We were forced to 
stay on the open plains in order to prevent being taken by 
surprise; for, with the exception of the territory where we 
were, all the rest of the area was occupied by the enemy. 
Those who committed the indiscretion of separating themselves 
from the center of our forces were pursued and killed.
The historian[s] Baralt [and Diaz] state with con-
1 fiaider able accuracy!-10
It is impossible to imagine the depths of poverty 
endured by those men who then and later fought a war 
in the llanos. The soldiers were so naked, that they 
were forced to use the raw hides of the cows they 
killed to cover themselves. A few of them had hats, 
but none had shoes. The customary and only source of 
nourishment was meat without salt or bread. In addi­
tion to all this, the rains were very frequent, and 
the overflowing rivers and ditches had inundated the 
territory. There was a need for horses, and since these 
are indispensable to the llanero soldier, it was neces­
sary above all things to look for them. Consequently, 
the first movements were aimed at this acquisition.
The horses that were usually found were wild and had 
to be tamed by squadrons according to the custom of 
the llanos. This was by the effort of the riders.
^ Quavuco is a loin cloth used by the Indians of 
Venezuela and Colombia.
16Baralt and Diaz, Restimen de la Historia. I, 354-55.
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It was a curious spectacle to see five or six 
hundred men at a time struggling with those 
ferocious animals. Several officers were placed 
around the camp of exercise. They were mounted 
on tame horses, not for the purpose of helping the 
riders that fell, but for chasing the horses that 
had knocked them down and retrieving the saddle, 
even if it was nothing more than the tree and bow 
of a saddle with raw leather straps. 'We wanted 
risk,' wrote a witness much later, 'in order to end 
such a bitter life with glory.' . . .
In addition to all this, there were the difficulties 
presented by a numerous emigration and the need of pro­
viding a livelihood at each step, for there were no 
storage facilities. This group of men, women, and 
children, without homes or country, vividly presented 
the image of a nomadic people who, after having con­
sumed the resources of the area they occupied, lifted 
their tents to conquer another by force.
I would add that our emigration reminded me of the 
exodus of the Israelites from their captivity in Egypt. The 
sole difference was that we did not have a cloud of fire to 
guide us on our way. Neither did the poor Moses leading us 
have a wand capable of making manna rain from the heavens 
nor water burst forth from the ground as did the Hebrew 
caudillo. To make the comparison more exact, news reached 
us that General Morillo, as another Pharoah, was searching 
for us to reduce, us again to the old slavery.
Oht Those times! Only God knows what we suffered. 
Rather than go to the towns and there risk life in the arms 
of a despised and vengeful tyranny, we had to acquire more 
than stoicism and heroism to face an existence so full of 
dangers and needs, that it seemed more than a human could 
endure. Our children will never be able to imagine even 
remotely the price we paid for independence; but those times
244
brought forth men who possessed bodies and souls that were 
tempered of steel. Nothing was left to us then but hope and 
an indomitable resolution which was greater than all the 
calamities and misfortunes put together. Hope nourished us 
and our determination served as a basis on which to raise 
again the sacred altar of our fatherland.
CHAPTER VIII
Morillo's Expedition— Condition of Venezuela and 
New Granada at Time of his Arrival— Siege and 
Occupation of Cartagena— Morillo's Cruelties—  
System of War Adopted by the Patriots— Organiza­
tion of the Army— Emigration— Encounter in "Los 
Cocos"— Action at Yagual— Interview with the 
Royalists, Ldpez— Seizure of Nutrias— Event at the 
Entrance to Masparro— Surprise Attack on Some of 
our Boats at the Entrance to La Portuguese— Battles 
in El Palital and Rabanal— March to Achaguas—  
Terror of Some Patriots on Hearing of Morillo's 
Movements— Defense of the Army of Apure— Correc­
tion of Some of Baralt's [and Diaz's] Errors.
1015-1816
Spain would not abandon her goal of reconquering the 
countries that had risen against her domination. She was 
barely free from the French invasion when, without stopping 
for any reconstruction, she readied an expedition to accom­
plish this purpose. Spain felt that she would get more than 
enough compensation from the reconquest of the rebellious 
territories. Don Pablo Morillo headed the expedition. Lord 
Wellington, recalling the distinguished military attributes 
and integrity of character that Morillo had exhibited in the 
Peninsula, had recommended him as the most apt person for 
the undertaking. Morillo has been justly compared with the 
celebrated Duke of Alba, whom Philip II had considered the 
most capable of his generals for the subjection and punish­
ment of the rebellious Flemish. He was seconded in command
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by Don Pascual Enrile, a native of Habana and thus a dis­
grace to the American name .1 This expedition consisted of 
10,642 men, selected from the cream of the Spanish troops. 
They sailed in sixty merchant vessels and were escorted by 
three large war frigates, thirty smaller ones, and the war­
ship, San Pedro Alc&ntara.
The question arises now as to what the condition of 
the patriot cause was in New Granada and Venezuela at this 
time when the mother country was sending such a formidable 
force to subjugate them again. In New Granada the fire of 
civil discord had ignited. Bolivar had been forced to sus­
pend his activities against the Royalists in order to reason 
with the people who refused to recognize the government of 
the Union. This was particularly true of Cartagena, a city 
which he finally had to lay under siege when it resisted
^Brigadier Enrile was of noble lineage and was born 
in CAdiz. Since he spent his childhood in Havana, it was 
believed to be his native city and explains P&ez's error in 
this instance. He had excellent military training and 
served with distinction in the Peninsular War against 
Napoleon. At this time he commanded the Spanish naval forces. 
As Morillo's Chief of Staff, he wielded great influence over 
the expeditionary leader. Henao and Arrubla, History of 
Colombia. 270, 276, 287, 294. Lemly, Bolivar. 111.
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peaceful transactions.2 Bolivar eventually was forced to 
abandon command and embark for Jamaica when the means to 
continue the war were refused him under deceiving pretexts. 
Even his absence was not sufficient to end the internal dis­
cords, for the dissensions had grown to such proportions, 
that they could have been detrimental to the American cause 
if the need for a common defense had not come to conciliate 
spirits.
Meanwhile the patriots of Venezuela had been subjected 
by Boves's llaneros. The patriots did not even have am army 
with which to protect Caracas. They were forced to abandon 
the siege of Puerto Cabello, and La Guaira was then occupied 
by Boves. Valencia, after resisting with unequal fearless­
ness, was forced to capitulate at a high price. The bar­
barous and ferocious Boves, failing to fulfill solemn oaths.
2Pdez's and Henao and Arrubla's views on this incident 
(see Footnote 13 in chapter VII) are not shared by some later 
writers. Salvador de Madariaga, for instance, perhaps over­
looking the facts that the Congress of Mew Granada had given 
Bolivar military command and that General Castillo in Carta­
gena was his subordinate, is highly critical of Bolivar's 
action in this instance. He points out that Bolivar used 
the troops that the union Government had given him to fight 
the Spaniards in Santa Marta for the purpose of subduing 
Cartagena and its Military Governor, General Castillo. 
Madariaga statest "We are told Bolivar could not take Santa 
Marta because he lacked the means which Cartagena possessed; 
and that, therefore, he had to go to besiege and take Carta­
gena and wrench from the obdurate city the means to fight 
Santa Marta. How could he then force Cartagena without 
means7 As all this is sheer nonsense, the sense must be some­
where else. Bolivar wanted first to get rid of Castillo and 
then to liberate Santa Marta and Venezuela, but on condition 
that he would be the one and only Libertador." Madariaga, 
Bolivar, 249.
248
sacrificed the best citizens after having insidiously taken 
possession of all their riches.
This was the condition of both countries when on 
April 3, 1815 the expedition presented itself at Cartipano.
It advanced quickly to the island of Margarita where some 
Venezuelan patriots, including the never sufficiently-praised 
[Francisco Esteban] Gdmez, [Juan Bautista] Arizmendi, and 
[Jos4 Francisco] Bermddez were s t a y i n g . 3 Any resistance to
^General Francisco Esteban Gdmez was born in Margarita. 
He served the independence cause until Morillo landed in 
April of 1815. In 1816, when the island fell into patriot 
hands again, Gdmez served as Governor of the island while 
Arizmendi went to Barcelona to aid Bolivar. He welcomed 
Bolivar to Juan Griego on December 28, 1816. From 1817 until 
1819 he fought Morillo's reoccupation of the island. In 1819 
he became Governor while Arizmendi was named Military Chief. 
Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario BiogrAfico. 182-84.
Juan Bautista Arizmendi was a native of the island of 
Margarita and was half-Creole and half-Indian. He was the 
leader of the local movement on the island which seconded the 
Junta founded in Caracas on April 19, 1810. When Margarita 
set up its own Junta, Arizmendi became Commander of Arms.
This weighed heavily against him when the island fell into 
Spanish control under Pascual Martinez. Martinez treacherously 
imprisoned Arizmendi. However, on June 13, 1813 Arizmendi led 
a revolt that forced the Spanish garrison to surrender. On 
April 7, 1815 when Morillo's forces sighted Pampatar, the 
chief city and port of Margarita, Arizmendi ordered the Spanish 
flag raised. On April 9, the Spanish troops landed after the 
island offered to surrender if forgiven for its past deeds. 
Arizmendi stayed on in Margarita and reported to Morillo 
under cover of Morillo's proclamation granting amnesty to all 
rebels. Morillo forgave Arizmendi, even against Morales's 
advice. In November of the same year, Arizmendi broke his 
word to the Spanish General and initiated a second revolt in 
Margarita. It has been said that this act of treason com­
pletely altered Morillo's policy of conciliation. Madariaga, 
Bolivar. 216, 257-58, 274.
General J. F. Bermudas was born in Venezuela in 1782.
As early as 1809 and 1810, he fought Spanish domination in 
the revolutionary juntas of Caracas. He joined General 
Marino's forces in 1812 and with him suffered the defeat at
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the disembarking of the expeditionary troops would have been 
futile. A great number of those who were on the island, 
including Bermddez, escaped between the enemy ships and 
took refuge in Cartagena and the Antilles.
After disembarking at Margarita, Morillo went on to 
Caracas where some Royalist corps joined him. In August he 
left Puerto Cabello with the object of beseiging Cartagena, 
a patriot stronghold. He stopped in Turbaco to form his 
line that was to cut land communications to the plaza. Then 
he occupied “Boca Grande" and severed its sea communications. 
Just as heroicly as at Sagunto, Numancia and Zaragoza, the 
plaza was defended against the repeated attacks of the
La Puerta in 1814. With Generals Rivas and Piar he helped 
defeat General Morales in Maturln in 1814. He fled to 
Margarita this same year and joined General Arismendi only 
to flee to the mainland again when Morillo was landing his 
Spanish troops. Legend says that he escaped by passing 
right through the heart of the Spanish fleet, shouting who 
he was and insulting the Spanish. In 1816 Bolivar named him 
Chief of the First Division, and in 1819 he replaced Marifio 
as head of the Army of Oriente. He was victorious at the 
Battle of Carabobo in 1824. In 1826 he did not support 
PAez in his split with the Union. By 1831, he yielded to 
the inevitable and recognized the legitimate government of 
PAez as President of Venezuela. Later this same year he was 
assassinated in CumanA by Francisco Carrera. Scarpetta and 
Vergara, Diccionario BioarAfico. 47-49.
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Spanish troops.4 Although the patriots found themselves 
reduced to the extreme of eating even the most unclean ani­
mals, they would not surrender. Finally when the daily 
mortality rate ascended to that of one hundred persons, they 
evacuated the plaza, forcing passage with their ships through 
the midst of the enemy ships.
When the Spanish entered this city, according to the 
account given by captain General Montalvo, they found only 
cadavers, people who were dying, and an air of pestilence
^The Battles of Sagunto, Numancia, and Zaragosa have 
become legendary in the history of the Iberian Peninsula as 
examples of the indomnitable courage of the Spaniards when 
fighting for their fatherland.
The Battle of Sagunto or Saguntum (the town is now 
officially known as Sagunto) took place in 219 B.C. When 
Hannibal took over supreme command of Punic Iberia, he led 
his victorious armies over the whole of southern and eastern 
Spain. One city alone resisted this Carthaginian onslaught 
in such a courageous manner that "the name of Saguntum 
lives in history, as glorious as that of Hannibal himself." 
Ulrick B. Burke, A History of Spain from the Earliest Times 
to the Death of Ferdinand the Catholic. 2 vols. (London, 
1900), I, 12. See also Rafael Altamira, A History of 
Spanish Civilization (London, 1930), 26, 27.
The Battle of Numancia or Numantia took place inter­
mittently from 209 to 27 B.C. when the Celtiberians here 
defied the Roman legions that had conquered most of the rest 
of their territory. It took sixteen months of a continuous 
siege led by Scipio Africanus to make the city surrender. 
When the Romans entered the city, they found that those who 
had survived the famine, had slaughtered each other rather 
than yield to Rome. Burke, History of Spain. I, 14-28.
The Battle of Zaragosa or Saragosa occurred in 1809 
during the Peninsular Wars against French domination under 
Napoleon. It was only after the most desperate resistance 
failed that the city was captured. Louis Bertrand and Sir 
Charles Petrie, The History of Spain 711-1931 (New York, 
1934), 443.
251
C
that interfered with breathing. There were groans and 
laments from all parts. When the great deeds of the South 
American Revolution, which are second to none, become known, 
history shall do justice to this heroic defense.
With Cartagena occupied and the Cachiri battle lost. 
New Granada was at the mercy of the conqueror.8 Morillo 
quickly took possession of Santa F6 . There he covered his 
name with well-earned infamy by killing its most illustrious 
citizens.? Among these was the eminent scholar, Don 
Francisco JosA de Caldas, whose loss Granadine letters will 
always mourn .8 The expeditionary leader wrote to the
5Field Marshal Francisco Montalvo, a native of Havana, 
was appointed in 1813 as Captain General of the New Kingdom 
of Granada. In 1816 a royal decree made the captaincy gen­
eral of New Granada a viceroyalty once more and Montavlo was 
appointed Viceroy. His residence then was in Cartagena with
the royal audiencia. In February of 1818, he resigned and 
abandoned his post. Henao and Arrubla, History of Colombia.
248, 265, 271, 273, 276, 299, 302.
8The Battle of Cachiri occurred on February 21 and 22 
in 1816. The patriots led by Garcia Rovira held their posi­
tion at the entrance of the cachiri and fought desperately 
for two days against great odds. The Spanish Commandant 
Calzada finally defeated them with a cavalry charge. Ibid., 
277-79.
?Madariaga asserts that Morillo's harsh attitude 
toward the citizens of Santa F6 stemmed directly from 
Arizmendi's betrayal. Madariaga, Bolivar, 290-91.
sDon Francisco JosA de Caldas, known as El Sabio or 
Wise One, was born in Popay&n in 1771. He graduated from the 
Colejio del Rosario where he specialized in physical sciences 
and mathematics. He published treatises on these subjects in 
el Semanario and the Dlario Politico. In 1810 he consecrated 
himself to the independence cause and became a Colonel in the 
engineering corps, supervising the manufacture of cannons and 
gun powder. When PopayAn fell to the Spanish again in 1816,
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Minister of War in a letter, found on board a ship siezed by 
a corsair from Buenos Aires, that the scholars of New Granada 
were the ones that directed the revolution while the patriots 
of Venezuela helped with the sword. Morillo wrote: "They
owe everything to the rebels of Venezuela. These men fight 
like animals when they are in their territory. If they are 
successful in getting able leaders, it will take many years 
to subjugate them. Even so, this objective will be accom­
plished only at the price of much bloodshed and considerable 
sums o f money."
The system of war that the patriots had to adopt 
against these veteran troops was like the one the Spaniards 
themselves had adopted in the Peninsula to destroy their 
invaders. These Spanish troops were accustomed to fighting 
in terrain similar to ours. In addition, they were well- 
disciplined, courageous, and extremely loyal to their cause. 
In Columbia, as in Spain, the terrain offers natural de­
fenses in all parts. Later with sufficient reason the 
Liberator said to the Congress of Bolivia, "that the savage 
nature of this continent (America) itself rejects monarchical
he fled to Paispamba. There he was taken by Simdn Munoz and 
brought to Bogota. Pablo Morillo had him executed in Octo­
ber of 1816, saying to those who pleaded for his life—  
"Spain has no need of wise men." Scarpetta and Vergara, 
Diccionario Biour&fico. 76-77.
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order, for deserts invite independence. 1
The guerrilla system of warfare is and always shall 
be the type to adopt against an invading army in countries 
such as ours where there is more than enough land and not 
enough people. The forests, mountains, and plains invite 
men to freedom, while the hills and plateaus nurture him in 
their breasts to protect him from the numerical superiority 
of the enemy. In the mountains and in the forests the 
patriot must never take the offensive. However, in the 
plains he should never neglect any opportunity to take the 
initiative against the enemy and attack him with vigor and 
courage. He, the Americans, owe the advantages that we 
gained while we still lacked a numerous and well-organized 
army to this type of warfare. Against the discipline of the 
Spanish troops, we pitted the patriotism and courage of each 
individual combatant. Against the bayonet, that powerful 
weapon of the Spanish infantry, we hurled the formidable 
lance as wielded by the even more formidable arm of the 
llanero. With this weapon, whether on horseback or on foot, 
the llanero broke the Spanish squares and swept over their 
battalions. Against the superiority of their artillery, we 
used the speed of our movements, aided by the noble animal 
raised on our llanos.
9P&ez refers here to the speech that Bolivar made 
before the Constitutional Congress of Bolivia. This particu­
lar citation may be found in Lecuna (ed.), Proclamaa y 
Diacursos. 327.
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The llanos opposed our invaders with all the incon­
veniences presented by a desert. If the enemy did penetrate 
them, we knew how to keep from them any of the advantages 
that the llanos held for us. The rivers served to block 
their march; however, they were but a small obstacle to us, 
for we knew how to cross their currents with as much ease as 
if we had been born in the water. All of these factors, 
plus the hope that the people would finally become aware of 
the sanctity and justice of the cause we defended, made us 
disregard the formidable forces that pretended to subject us 
again to the yoke of Spanish domination.
Our leaders could not agree on the action that should 
be taken. Some of them felt that we should go to Barinas, 
while others felt that we should cross the Orinoco and join 
[Manuel] Cedeno's party in Caicara.10 I felt that we should 
attack and destroy the enemy that was in Achaguas. Thus we 
would be able to take possession of the Lower Apure and 
there find the resources necessary to face Morillo. This 
would add to the advantage we would have already gained by
*°General Manuel Cedefto was born in Apure in 1784.
He enlisted in the revolutionary movement in Caracas in 1810 
and was active in it until his death. He was particularly 
active in pursuing Boves in 1814. On March 8 , 1815, he 
defeated the Spanish Governor Cerriti and knifed the rem­
nants of his forces in Caicara. He joined Bolivar in the 
Battle of Yagual. He became Governor and Commandant General 
of Guayana. He was chief of the Second Division of the army 
which freed Venezuela at Carabobo in 1821. He was killed in 
this battle. Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario Bioqr&fico. 
103-104.
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getting in touch with Cedeno and not being situated between 
two enemy forces, both stronger than ours. My opinion 
finally prevailed.
Toward the end of September, we went to the Lower 
Apure along the road that leads from Trinidad to Rincdn 
Hondo and from there to Achaguas. The Royalist Colonel, Don 
Francisco L6 pez, knowing that I was searching for him, came 
out to meet me then. He had been in Queseras Blanqueras, 
not very far from us, when one of our men, called Ramon La 
Riva, detached himself from the emigration, went before him 
and told him among other things: "Do not wait for the
patriots in aui open field, for although they know very well 
that they are inferior in number and weapons, they rely 
greatly on their skill in handling the lamce. With this 
weapon they do not fear the enemy in open-field combat. Also, 
keep in mind that these men are determined to seel their 
lives at a high price, and even to kill one another in the 
event of misfortune."
Ldpez took heed of the information given to him by 
that intelligent deserter. He countermarched some leagues 
to claim the left bank of the Arauca and take a strong posi­
tion in the farm of Yagual, the property of a Biscayan by 
the name of Elizalde. When l received the news about that 
movement, 1 marched with my troops and the emigrants up to 
the sand bank of the Araguayana, sixteen or eighteen leagues 
from Achaguas, There 1 left the women, children, and men 
who were unable to fight under the custody of a select
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cavalry company led by Captain Pablo Aponte. Then 1 Incor­
porated in the army all who could carry arms and formed a 
reserve corps consisting of clergymen, men of letters, and 
those incapable of military service. X placed the latter 
group under the command of Captain Juan Antonio Mirabal.H
Since Trinidad de Arichuna, the patriot forces had 
been organized in three squadrons. The first squadron was 
under the command of General Rafael Urdaneta; the second, 
under General Servier; and the third, under Colonel 
Santander. All of these troops, including the reserve, 
formed a total of seven hundred combatants.
With this small army organized, I still could not set 
out until I had consoled those unhappy families we were 
leaving behind with a few words of goodbye. I was leaving 
them there with very little hope of any of us ever seeing 
each other again in this world, for the coming campaign 
offered great obstacles. The superiority of the enemy, the 
flooded rivers of the Lower Apure during that season, and 
the enemy embarkations defending its fords, were all going 
to present us with a thousand difficulties. With all this 
in mind, those families listened to my goodbye while showing 
signs of great anguish. More than one tear, too, shone in
1 ^ -Captain Juan Antonio Mirabal was born in San 
Fernando de Apure. On PAez's recommendation, Bolivar pro­
moted him to the rank of colonel. In 1830 he was Governor 
of Angostura. As General Munoz’s Chief of Staff, he fought 
against his former chief. General PAez, in 1848. He died in 
San Fernando in December of 1849. DAvila, Diccionario 
BioqrAfico. I, 368-69.
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the eyes of those brave men who were courageously going to 
encounter the enemy.
After this moving scene, we started the march. Our 
weak and tired horses could barely travel three leagues a 
day to search for an enemy that had provided its cavalry and 
its reserve with good mounts. The day after our departure 
from Araguayuna, when the division was already on the march,
I went ahead about a league as usual. I was accompanied by 
nine people, including aides-de-camp, officers, and order­
lies. I did not expect to find enemy troops in that vicinity. 
However, when I got to a little house and asked its only 
occupant, a woman, whether she could tell me anything con­
cerning the whereabouts of the Royalists, she replied that 
one of their battalions had been in the farm of "Los Cocos," 
a mile away, on the previous day. Looking in the direction 
she mentioned, I saw a cloud of dust. This was a sure sign 
that there were troops in that area. Immediately we all 
mounted in order to go attack them. In our position, we were 
left no choice but to fight without intermission and to seek 
out our enemy in all parts. In effect, that cloud of dust 
had been raised by fifty-five Royalist cavalrymen. They 
were reconnoitering under the orders of Captain Facundo 
Mirabal. Thirty of them were armed with both rifles and 
lances, and the rest had only lances.
When the leader of the enemy party saw that we were 
approaching, he came out of the farm hurriedly and drove out 
about one hundred horses so that we could not get them.
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Horses 1 Imagine what these meant to us then when we did not 
have any 1 On the spot I decided to get them. We marched 
hurriedly toward the enemy who halted and faced us. Without 
hesitating, we hurled ourselves impetuously against them.
We charged with such courage and spirit, that they quickly 
yielded ground. When they saw that neither the discharges 
from their thirty guns nor the points of their twenty-five 
lances could make us retreat, they began to flee. The 
Royalists lost many from their ranks then, including those 
taken prisoners and those who were killed. In fact, only 
eight of them escaped, and among them was Captain Mirabal.
He abandoned his horse and took refuge in the forest of 
"Mata de la Madera," for he saw that Aramendi and I were 
already pursuing him closely with our lances in hand.
This unexpected stroke of good fortune was equivalent 
to a great victory, for we not only procured the horses we 
needed so badly, but in addition our troops gained moral 
strength. They saw that the enemy's greater numbers were 
not indicative of the final outcome of the battle— no matter 
how desperate our position might seem to be.
All those who accompanied me in this encounter rivaled 
each other in courage. They were as followsi the courageous 
lieutenant, Francisco Aramendi; the then-rankless Vicente 
Pena (whose life I had saved in Guasdualito); Pedro Chirinos, 
who was wounded in this encounter; sergeant Ramon Valero; 
First Corporal c o m e l i o  Munoz, who later became a brigadier 
general; and soldiers Paulino Blanco, Francisco Ortiz,
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Francisco Villamediana, and JosA Maria Olivera.1 2
The following day the division continued its march, 
and we camped in Aguaditas. The enemy now was to our right 
and about a league away. I was purposely leaving the enemy 
to one side in order to mount a large inlet that almost com­
pletely surrounds the Yagual farm. We stayed there without 
moving and rested the horses. That night we started the 
march, filing off in a semicircle so that we could get behind 
the enemy. We endured a thousand hardships, for it was dark 
and the road was so swampy that our horses got stuck at 
every step. Furthermore, there were ravines over which our 
horses stumbled frequently and which impeded our march— a 
march that necessarily had to be very silent in order not to 
alert the enemy and have them encounter us at the exit of 
the inlet.
Finally at dawn we came out on dry land and looked 
over the enemy camp. They had seventeen hundred cavalrymen 
and six hundred infantrymen about a mile away from us.
Ldpez had formed the cavalry behind the house and the corral.
^2No other data were available on the other men men­
tioned except for C omelio Munoz. Corporal Munoz was born 
in Venezuela. He began his career in the revolutionary army 
in the Battle of Guasdualito in 1815. From then on, he 
fought incessantly for the cause of Venezuelan independence, 
taking part in the celebrated seizure of Puerto Cabello on 
November 8, 1823. In 1826 he was Governor of the province 
of Apure and was promoted to the rank of General by Bolivar. 
He died a natural death in Caracas, in 1852. Scarpetta and 
Vergara, Piccionario BiogrAfico. 374-75.
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He had placed the infantry within the sheepfold, and its 
door was defended by four pieces of artillery. In the 
Arauca River, which is almost a rifle shot's distance from 
this farm, the Royalists had four ships armed with cannons.
I wanted to attain two goals with this operation. In 
the first place, I wanted to force my troops to fight with 
desperation, for they could see that the land behind them 
was occupied by the enemy. Then secondly, I wanted to get 
all the horses that the Royalists were guarding at that 
point. The success of this operation would fulfill my 
wishes and hopes.
We approached the enemy and formed three lines. 
Urdaneta's squadron was at the vanguard; Servier's, in the 
center? and Santander's, at the left. The reserve, consist­
ing of the prominent patriots whose names the reader already 
knows, was located as rear guard, outside the range of rifle 
fire because I wanted to preserve the lives of these eminent 
men. Nevertheless, the clergymen, Ramdn Ignacio M£ndez, 
[Ricardo] Becerra, Trinidad Travieso, and the Colonel Priest, 
Josd Felix Blanco, came to take part in the battle. The
13Ram6n Ignacio M£ndez I la Barta was born in Barinas 
in 1794 and was Archbishop of Caracas when the revolution 
started. On April 19, 1810 he became a member of the govern­
ing revolutionary junta and later became a member of the 
Congress in Caracas. He was P&e2 's comrade in the Battles 
of Arichuna, Achaguas, San Fernando, and Yagual. In 1823 
and 1826 he was a member of the congress of Colombia. In 
1827 he was elected Archbishop of Caracas. Later he refused 
to accept the Venezuelan constitution when it subjected the 
church to the state. In 1830 he was expelled to Curazao,
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example they set and the words they spoke greatly encouraged 
the combatants.
While Captain JosA Marla Angulo with a picket of 
riflemen was reconnoitering the terrain to the right of the 
enemy, he was attacked by the enemy's superior rifle forces. 
If X moved to reenforce Angulo with the rest of our company, 
LApez would realize that a general attack could be started 
along my right flank. Following this line of thinking, he
from where he wrote PAez begging him to conciliate Church and 
State. PAez was able to accomplish this when Archbishop 
MAndez signed the constitution and ended his exile in 1832. 
Political events in 1836 forced his final exile from Vene­
zuela. He died in BogotA on August 6 , 1839 of natural 
causes. Ibid., 316-17.
Ricardo Becerra wrote Vida de Francisco Miranda. 2 
vols. (Caracas, 1896). See Parra-PArez, Historia de la 
Primera Republica. I, 112.
The Priest Colonel, JosA FAlix Blanco, was a native 
of Venezuela. He left the priesthood for an army career, 
feeling that he could best serve his country in the latter 
capacity. He served as a colonel under PAez in many battles, 
including those of Yagual, Calabozo, Carabobo, and Puerto 
Cabello. Bolivar promoted him to the rank of General in 
1830. Blanco, with the assistance of RamAn Azpurda, col­
lected and edited a fourteen-volume work entitled Documentos 
Para la Historia de la Vida Pdblica del Libertador de 
Colombia. Perfl y  Bolivia. Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario 
BiogrAfico, 51. Lecuna (ed.). Cartas del Libertador. XI,
349, 407, 408, 409.
^4josA Marla Angulo became a Colonel in the Venezuelan 
army. He was a native of Venezuela and had joined the army 
at the beginning of the independence movement. A brave 
warrior of the llanos, he served under PAez in the Battles 
of Mata de la Miel, Achaguas, Yagual, Trinidad de Arichuna. 
When he was a Lieutenant Colonel, he was one of the one 
hundred and fifty men selected by PAez to humiliate Morillo's 
six thousand soldiers in Queseras del Medio. He also fought 
in the Battle of Carabobo. Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario 
BiogrAfico. 20.
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ordered a squadron of his riflemen to flank our right. These 
men approached us at less than half rifle-fire range. Here 
they were favored by a ravine that was between us which was 
full of water. In addition, this ravine formed several 
curves which would make it necessary for us to cross the 
water many times if we were to attack them.
When the enemy opened fire, most of the advantages 
were on their side. To begin with, there was the short dis­
tance that separated us. Furthermore, we did not have suf­
ficient fire arms to am awer their discharges. So, I decided 
then to detach half of Santander's squadron, under the com­
mand of the intrepid Genaro V&squez, and ordered it to cross 
the ravine and dislodge the enemy from that favorable 
position. V&squez was able to accomplish this and had the 
Royalists in flight when a squadron of lancers came to assist 
the latter. V&squez was forced to fight them and lost the 
ground he had won. Then I sent Colonel Santander with the 
other half of the squadron, and they were able to repel the 
enemy again.
The Royalist leader was determined not to yield this 
ground, and sent two squadrons for reinforcements. I 
counteracted this by ordering General Servier to advance 
with the second squadron, assist Santander, and simultaneously 
attempt to flank and surround the enemy on the right. When 
Santander and Servier were most engrossed in a rigorous lance 
battle, Colonel Torellas, who was Ldpez's second in command, 
came out on the right. He had a squadron of two hundred men
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under the orders of Commandant Mordn. one of Ldpez's most 
trusted leaders. His objective was to destroy Santander's 
and Servier1s forces along the rear. In order to achieve 
this objective. Ldpez ordered the remainder of his cavalry 
to attack them at the same time. When I saw this movement.
I ordered General Urdaneta to encounter him. I accompanied 
Urdaneta myself, and we attacked him with such daring, that 
the Royalist commander did not have time to carry out his 
operation. In fact. Urdaneta even dashed Torellas against 
the shore of the lake that was at their side. The fight was 
desperate and bloody. Some of the men were finally forced 
to throw themselves in the lake and swim across. This 
victory saved Santander's and Servier’s brigades when they 
were in difficult straits.
We pursued the Royalists vigorously. We even charged 
after them as far as the very door of the corral of the farm. 
Here the valiant Captain Vicente Braca died when he was 
pierced by a lance that a zambo. called Ledesma, hurled at 
him as if it were an arrow. A great part of the enemy 
cavalry left the field in defeat. L6pez was left with only 
some one thousand cavalrymen who had taken refuge behind the 
infantry on the outskirts of the corral.
I reorganized my forces quickly and remained the rest 
of the day at half rifle-fire range from the enemy. The 
latter, having had enough for the day. did not dare to start 
the battle again. As for us. we could not have started to 
fight again except poorly, for LOpez maintained himself in a
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very strong position. His infantry was protected inside the 
corral fences and the corral in turn was defended by the 
artillery.
Our horses were now on the ground panting out of sheer 
exhaustion. Night fell, and in order to avoid being attached 
by surprise in the darkness, we got in a ravine on our right 
that was full of water. Had we failed to do this, the 
thousand cavalrymen led by Torrellas, who looked for us all 
that night, would have attacked us. But who would have 
thought to look for us in the water?
On the following day we, who were masters of the terri­
tory that was behind us and of the enemy horses that were 
there, remounted our people. Then we ate, for we had not had 
time to do so the day before. That afternoon we attempted to 
provoke the Spanish into a new battle. They refused to 
accept the challenge and retreated in the cover of night to 
Achaguas. They sent their wounded and their artillery to 
launches which went down the Arauca River to its junction 
with the Apure Seco River, and then on the Apure Seco to the 
city it passes. We pursued them, and on the following day 
we got to the right bank of the Apure Seco River, facing 
Achaguas. There, from a woman who crossed the river in a 
small canoe, we found out that the Royalists had retreated 
from that point also.
Urdaneta, Santander, Servier, [Jos6 Marla] Vergara, 
[Tom&s] Montilla, I, and some others then crossed the river.
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two by two in the canoe.^ We entered a house in the plaza 
in order to find some newspaper or notice that would tell us 
what was happening in the world. We had not been in the 
building long when we heard a shot. We abandoned it hurriedly. 
Immediately a dragoon presented himself to us and said that 
he had been shot by the enemy who lay in ambush at the out­
skirts of the city, opposite the river. We hurried to
^Undoubtedly, the Vergara P&ez refers to here is 
Jos£ Marla Vergara who was born in Bogota December 8 , 1792.
He was educated in Spain, for his father had died while the 
two of them were in route to C&diz, and the young boy had 
remained there. He became an officer in the Spanish Guards 
and fought in the Peninsular wars in 1808 and 1809. He 
managed to return to his native state, however, when he heard 
of the revolutions in Caracas and Bogota. He served in 
Urdaneta1s, Santander's and Servier's armies and fought in 
the Battles of Cachiri, Los Cocos, Yagual, and Achaguas. In 
1819, Bolivar promoted him to the rank of General of Brigade. 
He served as a member of the Congress of Angostura and did 
research on the English jury system. His productive years 
ended in 1820 when a mental disorder gradually deprived him 
of his reason. He died thirty-six years later on June 19, 
1857. Scarpetta and Vergaga, Diccionario Bioqr&fico. 689-90. 
See also Lecuna, Cartas del Libertador. XI, 121.
Of the two famous Montilla brothers, Mariano andTom&s, 
P&ez refers here to Tom&s. A member of one of the most 
illustrious and wealthy families of Caracas, Tom&s was one 
of Bolivar's comrades in the Revolutionary Clubs and a power­
ful member of the Junta of April, 1810. He was imprisoned 
later by Monteverde when he refused to accept the agreement 
the latter had made with Miranda. On July 31, 1812 he helped 
Bolivar to prevent Miranda's departure. In 1813 Bolivar 
named him Secretary of War. In 1815 he sought out PAez and 
fought in the Battles of Arichuna, Yagual, and the seizure 
of Achaguas. In 1818 he was Governor of Guayana and a member 
of the Congress of Angostura. He died of natural cause on 
June 25, 1822. Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario BiogrA- 
fico, 345-46. See also Madariaga, Bolivar. 188, 209, 249,
312, 315, 371; Lecuna, Cartas del Libertador. XI, 164.
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recross the river after I had sent orders to Captain Genaro 
VAsquez, who had already crossed it with a company of rifle­
men, to take a defensive position in a plantation on the 
riverbank.
Four enemy gunboats appeared navigating upstream, 
obviously trying to cut off our retreat. Then the enemy 
infantry that had been in ambush ran up the shore of the 
river and occupied a trench that had been prepared before­
hand. From this position, they fired on those of us who 
were on the opposite side of the river and also on VAsquez's 
company which was to their right. The boats also fired 
cannon shots and approached intending to cut VAsquez down. 
However, aided by our riflemen, we forced the boats down 
river five or six times. In the meantime, VAsquez made his 
soldiers swim across little by little and used the canoe to 
take weapons and clothing. He was finally able to join us, 
having lost only twelve men, including the wounded and 
scattered. Night put an end to the battle. During the 
night the enemy left Achaguas and went toward the San 
Fernando plaza.
Ldpez had left beforehand to go with the cavalry and 
some infantrymen to the town of Apurito. He left the rest 
of his infantry, which we found in Achaguas, under the
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command of Reyes V a r g a s . i n  the meantime, he crossed the 
Apure River and situated himself on its left bank between 
the towns of San Antonio and Apurito. Then he appointed 
Commandant Loyola to be in command, and he and some officers 
embarked for the fortified city of Nutrias.
I sent Colonel Miguel Guerrero to Sam Fernando with a 
part of my forces. With what remained of them, I went on to 
the town of Apurito. I was unable to find the enemy there, 
for Ldpez had already crossed the Apure River and taken a 
position on its left bank to dispute our passage with four 
gunboats.
We remained in that position for some days, for we 
positively lacked the means with which to cross the river. 
Meanwhile, Ldpez returned from Nutrias. Knowing that I was
^Colonel R. Reyes Vargas was a full-blooded Indian 
chief who, along with the priest Torellas, started a pro- 
Spanish movement in 1811 that swamped the first Republic.
Able to comm am d the entire Indian population of Venezuela, 
this chief represented a powerful force for the patriots to 
contend. Reyes Vargas further injured the republican cause 
when he saved Boves from the clutches of Escalona in 1812. 
Finally in 1813, after he had inflicted much damage on the 
patriot troops, one of Bolivar's commanders, Garcia de Sena, 
was able to defeat him at Cerritos Blancos, not far from 
Barquisimeto. In October of 1820 he defected from the Royal­
ist cause and proclaimed ardently for the independence move­
ment. In January of 1822 he fought against Morillo and was 
defeated, and in July of 1822 he was defeated by Morales 
also. He was assassinated by Colonel Reyes Gonz&lez in 1823. 
Bolivar, who had great affection for Reyes Vargas, had 
Gonz&lez tried for the crime and then shot on the exact spot 
where he had killed the Indian chief. Madariaga, Bolivar. 
194, 215-16, 220. Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario 
BioqrAfico. 671-72.
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there, he asked for a conference. Yielding to his wishes, I 
went with some officers to meet him in a canoe in the middle 
of the river. Lbpez embarked in a gunboat and received me 
with great courtesy. After exchanging the first civilities, 
he began to praise my activity and commend my military feats, 
lamenting that 1 did not consecrate my efforts to the defense 
of the "sacred rights of the King." He told me that he 
believed that I had abandoned the King's service due to some 
injustice that a Spanish leader might have wreaked on me. I 
responded that he was ill informed about my ever having 
served in the King's army, for I had begun my career in the 
patriot ranks. I told him further that I had never and would 
never abandon these ranks, regardless of how great our adver­
sities might be or how flattering his words of seduction. He 
interrupted me then saying that he had not asked for an 
interview in order to convert me, but rather to satisfy the 
desire he had to know me personally and to thank me for the 
generosity with which 1 had always treated prisoners, 
especially "the poor Europeans." We parted cordially and 1 
returned to my camp. Who would have made that man believe 
then that his days were already numbered, and that his life 
would end shortly?
Returning, as 1 have said, to the other side of the 
river, I ordered as many dragoons as would fit in the only 
canoe we had to embark. Their leader was Vicente Pena, whom 
I had elevated to the rank of captain and they were to 
operate against the enemy camp so that they would start
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firing and thus end the truce occasioned by the interview. 
Pena manned the canoe with eight men, and then he came to 
ask me what he was supposed to do. I was angered by this 
query, for I had already given him his orders. Nevertheless, 
I told him again to cross the river and attack the enemy 
camp. The leaders present there could not keep from pointing 
out to me that this order was tantamount to ordering the 
useless sacrifice of those few men. 1 remained deaf to their 
indications and did not revoke the order. I was relying on 
the good fortune that had always protected my rash under­
takings. In truth, this undertaking could not have been any 
more rash.
Pena carried out his orders perfectly, and he crossed 
the river without being seen by any of the enemy guards.
The latter were in the shade of a forest of mangroves and 
were eating (it was about noon), when our dragoons opened 
fire and charged them violently. They had barely fired one 
hundred shots when the terrified Royalists began to flee.
They thought that they were being attacked by forces superior 
to theirs. Chief LOpez embarked and retreated without even 
attempting to approximate the number of those who were 
attacking. 1 ordered a company of lancers and eighty un­
mounted riflemen to go to Pefia's assistance. Before night­
fall, 1 ordered the lancers to recross the river. This was 
so that Ldpez, who was watching, would believe that there 
were no more enemy forces left on the other side. Then, just 
in case he would come up stream to go to the plaza at
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Nutrias, and this was probable, 1 ordered the riflemen to 
divide in two sections; one was to be in ambush in the man­
groves, and the other, in the shelter of a flying sap which 
was on an island of sand situated in the middle of the stream.
My supposition was correct. At 8*00 p.m. Ldpez's 
squadron began to come up the river. Our ambushes opened 
fire. Two of the enemy’s long, sharp canoes retreated. One 
of them got stuck in the sand, and its men were forced to 
abandon it. We imprisoned them. Ldpez, however, succeeded 
in passing the point where our men were in ambush. From one 
of the prisoners, 1 found out that it was the Governor's 
canoe that had passed. Immediately I decided to capture it.
I had already sent a cavalry party to get another canoe on 
the way to the town of Banco Largo, ten leagues from 
Apurito. This had been achieved. In order to take advan­
tage of all the fruits of this victory, I immediately sent 
an order to that same party to come quickly in the canoe, 
encounter LOpez, and assault him while he was boarding the 
ship. Our canoe obeyed promptly. Navigating downstream, it 
encountered Ldpez's canoe at dawn the next day. Ldpez 
realized that our canoe was not friendly. Aided by the cur­
rent, he turned on the side to gain the advantage. The two 
boats came downstream, chasing one another.
From our camp we could see that the first ship 
belonged to Ldpez. We wanted to cut off his retreat, and to 
this end we equipped one canoe with eight men and the canoe 
we had captured the night before with all the people it
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could hold. Then we went to encounter the boat that was 
obviously fleeing. Ldpez ordered his men to row quickly, 
and we were unable to prevent his canoe from passing in front 
our boats. However, we continued to chase it, and finally a 
bullet succeeded in killing the pilot of the Royalist launch. 
Without its pilot and as it was making a hazardous turn, we 
were able to board the canoe. Ldpez, two officers, and all 
the crew fell into our hands.
Already possessing three armed launches, I saw to it 
that they were immediately put in a serviceable condition.
I wanted them to attack smother four enemy launches that 
were stationed in front of the town of Santa Lucia, six or 
eight leagues from Apurito. 1 charged Captain Vicente PefLa 
with this commission and the command of these canoes. With 
the intent of deceiving the leaders who commanded the Royal­
ist convoy, I made Pena put on Governor Ldpez*s three-cor­
nered hat and go in the letter’s launch. Furthermore, he 
was to sit at the prow so that he could answer the enemy's 
"Who goes?" as if he were the Governor. This way he would 
be able to get close enough to board those ships without 
firing a shot. This was useless strategy, however, for when 
Pena approached the Spanish, they ordered him to halt, 
despite the title he assumed. Disregarding this, Pena 
ordered his men to row ahead. When he was within less than 
half-cannon shot range, he received the first shots. He 
boarded then with such courage and good fortune, that the 
four canoes fell in his hands. He went to Apurito with them
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in order to go back to the Apure and fight another squadron 
which, under the command of Son Juan Comos, was in the port 
of Nutrias. I crossed the Apure then with all the forces 1 
had there and went on to Nutrias.
After marching for two days, I spent the night in the 
town of Santa Catalina which is situated on the left shore 
of the Apure River. At dawn the next day I was informed 
that there were five enemy launches a little ways from the 
town. These were the ones belonging to Comos. Lacking the 
means to attack them, X decided at least to detain them until 
our launches arrived. To do this, I had to get in the river 
with Aramendi and twenty-five lancers. All of us got in 
water up to our chests and stood on a bank of sand, situ­
ated in the middle of the river, where the Apure runs deep.
We carried out this operation within view of the enemy. They 
immediately attacked us. They fired grapeshot with their 
cannons for more than an hour without inflicting damage on 
us, for we ducked in the water when we saw the flame from 
the mouth of the barrels.
When they finally saw that they were not harming us, 
the enemy launches went back by the canal on the right. We 
got out of the water and mounted our unsaddled horses. We 
went up ahead a little and thrust ourselves in the river 
again, determined to board at least one of the launches. We 
did not succeed in our mission, however, for the configura­
tion of the deep hollow of the river and its impetuous cur­
rent scattered us so, that we did not have any unity of
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action. We were fortunate that we did not have to lament any 
personal misfortune in that crazy enterprise.
Within a short time our gunboats arrived, for they 
had been attracted by the sound of the enemy cannon. However, 
by this time the enemy had gotten too far away. Therefore,
1 continued my march toward Nutrias, and I slept that night 
in the town of Santo Domingo. 1 left the following morning 
and headed toward the river, which was not far away. I 
intended to obstruct Comos's trip as much as 1 could. I got 
into a well-manned canoe and succeeded in delaying him for 
more than three hours. I would always attack the last of 
the ships that they were withdrawing so that the others would 
have to pull back and defend it. The Spanish chief, detect­
ing our squadron’s sails, continued his retreat, thanks to a 
favorable breeze and in spite of the shots that were fired 
from both shores.
I continued my march to Nutrias by land. When I got 
to this city, though, the enemy had already abandoned it.
Comos continued to sail upstream. He took with him all the 
shipping that there was in the port of Nutrias and many indi­
viduals who belonged to the Royalist party. Pena overtook 
him at the mouth of the Masparro River and attacked him there. 
He was able to take possession of all the enemy’s armed and 
unarmed ships, a total of twenty-four. As a reward for this 
glorious deed, I elevated the intrepid Pena to the rank of 
Lieutenant Colonel in the Navy. I placed all our naval 
forces under his command. All this might seem insignificant
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now. To have achieved this then, was the equivalent of a 
Roman undertaxing.
In Nutrias I appointed General Urdaneta to occupy the 
capital of Barinas with all his forces. He was to form an 
army there and operate in accordance with what the circum­
stances demanded. Then I went with my squadron of twelve 
launches down the Apure with the object of taking possession 
of the plaza of San Fernando. Before I left, I ordered Pena 
to continue descending the river as far as the mouth of the 
ditch of Biruaca and there await my instructions.
I disembarked in the town of Apurito. I went from 
there to Achaguas to rejoin my second-in-command. Commandant 
Miguel Guerrero, who was in Rabanal. With the small guard 
that I found in Achaguas, I continued my march toward San 
Fernando. Later I added Guerrero's forces to mine and sur­
veyed the plaza by land. Then I took two hundred cavalrymen 
and sent them to the mouth of the ditch of Biruaca. They 
were to embark in the twelve launches and assault the plaza 
during the night along the side facing the river, while I 
attacked on land with two hundred lancers that I had primed 
for that purpose.
This plan was not as successful as I had expected it 
to be, for a Royalist named Herrera, whom we had imprisoned 
and pardoned a few days before, warned the enemy of our 
plans. Herrera had found out all the details because he was 
always at Guerrero's side. Being Apureno, he was also very 
familiar with the obstacles we would face just a little more
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than a mile from the plaza when we ran into a shoal that 
forms at the junction of the Apure and Portuguesa rivers. 
There our men would have to disembark from the launches and 
carry them across. Provided with this useful information. 
General [Ramdnl Correa, leader at the plaza, ordered a strong 
infantry column to take ambush on the shore of the river at 
the spot that Herrera indicated.1-7 When our men disembarked, 
they opened fire on them, scattered them, and took possession 
of eight of the twelve launches we had. Fortunately, I had 
ordered the two hundred men who were to attack the plaza by 
land, and who were already less than pistol-fire range from 
it, to return to their horses and immediately take their 
place in line if they heard any firing that was not directed 
against the city.
I continued surveying the plaza on the south side.
With the purpose of cutting its communications with the 
capital and the plains of Calabozo, I ordered Commandant 
Ranjel to cross the river with eighty men from Guardia at
17'General Ram6n Correa was the commander of the Spanish 
forces in Pamplona and C&cuta. Bolivar had defeated him in 
1813 in the Battle of Cticuta. Later that same year, Correa 
refused to meet Bolivar's forces in battle at Merida. Correa 
served also as Governor of Maracaibo. In 1816 Morillo sent 
him with six hundred men to fight in the Apure area at 
Nutrias. He established himself then with the Fourth Divi­
sion in Nutrias and Barinas. In November of 1820 he was one 
of the Spanish commissioners present at the armistice treaty. 
His honesty was so legendary that Bolivar named him to repre­
sent Colombia in the negotiations. Lemly, Bolivar. 40, 41,
43, 45. Lecuna, Crdnica Razonada. I, 10, 14, 363; II, 5, 34, 
6 8 , 464, 465; III, 31, 32.
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the mouth of the Cople. He was to surprise the town of 
Guayabal and then camp on the road that leads to Calabozo 
and Caracas. There he intercepted a communique that Correa 
was sending to Lieutenant colonel Don Salvador Gorrln.
This dispatch, in answer to one dated in CamaguAn, which is 
seven leagues from San Fernando, told him that he was coming 
with sufficient forces to aid him. Knowing that Gorrln had 
left calabozo with five hundred infantrymen, three hundred 
cavalrymen, and five hundred horses with which to remount 
the cavalrymen who were on foot in the plaza, I decided to 
go attack that force. 1 could not let these forces join 
those beseiged in the plaza, for this would give them great 
advantages over us.
At the head of two squadrons, I marched toward the 
Diamante hacienda. We walked all night, arrived there at 
dawn, and crossed the river. Two or three hours later we 
also swam across the Apurito. Taking the Quayabal road, I 
went to rejoin Ranjel who was waiting for me at the Falital 
Lake. At that moment Ranjel's squadron of riflemen was 
engaged in battle with Gorrln's, 1 hurried the march in 
order to arrive in time to help my people.
l®Don Salvador Gorrln was born in the canary Islands. 
He began his military career as a cavalry officer and later 
became oflcial general in Margarita. When P&ez beseiged San 
Fernando, Gorrln marched to the aid of the Spanish there. 
Morillo later appointed him to head one of the two major 
Spanish cavalry divisions. Lecuna, Crdnica Razonada. I,
69, 509; II, 3, 6 8 .
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I had barely gotten my forces, which were augmented 
then by Ranjel'a eighty men, in formation when Gorrln opened 
fire. 1 charged him on the front and on the side and 
succeeded in making his cavalry flee. Then I took possession 
of the horses he brought for remounting. After this first 
charge, Gorrln formed an arch with the infantry (whose line 
was a picket of about fifty lancers) and the rest of the 
cavalry he had brought.
1 divided my forces into four parts, and then I 
hurled them simultaneously at the enemy's front, flanks, and 
rear guard. Despite the efforts we made to break that 
formation, we were repelled by the infantry fire and by the 
cavalry. The latter, dismounted and with rapid lances, 
resisted us tenaciously. They lanced our horses and killed 
some of our men. However, X did not desist in my determina­
tion to break the enemy because of this. I formed our men 
again in the same manner as before. We charged again and 
were repelled anew. There I lost some of my best and most 
courageous officers, including the valiant Captains Pedro 
Ledn Gdmez, Remijio Caridad, and Josg de la Paz Rojas. The
gallant Commandant Francisco Hurtado was wounded.
I did not continue in this attack, for it would have 
been imprudent. I recalled that when I started my march 
against Gorrln, I had received a bulletin from the town of 
Mantecal telling me that General Morillo had occupied 
Guasdualito. Therefore, I suspended the attack; and Gorrln, 
aided by a column that came out of the plaza, entered San
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Fernando.
With this state of affairs, I ordered our retreat on
the same road by which we had come. After recrossing the
river, I rejoined Guerrero in the site of Rabanal. He had 
retreated because he lacked sufficient forces to withstand 
the sallies that might be forthcoming from the plaza.
I had left Commandant Freites in Guayabal with a com­
pany to recruit men with which to augment the forces we would 
use to fight the enemy in those llanos.19 The day after I 
rejoined Guerrero, the enemy came out through the forest at 
the edge of the river. Shielded by the woods, they came to 
Rabanal and ordered a company of riflemen to advance on my 
guerrillas. I charged them with a squadron of the Guard and 
destroyed them completely. Then the enemy countermarched to 
the plaza along the same path they had come.
With the object of going to Achaguas and other towns
to gather forces with which to resist Morillo, X marched 
with my Guard. X left Guerrero in Rabanal at the head of
^Of the several Freites prominent in the independence 
movement at this time, P&ez refers here to J. M. Freites, a 
native of Venezuela. He had been with P&ez1s forces from the 
time he escaped from jail in Barinas. He returned to Barinas 
to free all his comrades who were imprisoned there and then 
went on to fight the terrible war of the Llanos. He fought 
at Mata de Le6 n in 1812; at Estanques and Bailadores in 1814; 
at Chire in 1815, and at the Battles of Mata de la Miel, 
Achaguas, Yagual, Palital, Rabanal and Paso del Frio. He was 
killed in 1816 in Guayabal when he headed patriot forces of 
three hundred men that were pitted against General Morillo*s 
forces of over one thousand. Scarpetta and Vergara, 
Diccionario Biogr&fico, 164.
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eight hundred cavalrymen. A few days later the enemy re­
turned to this spot. They attacked Guerrero, scattered him 
completely, and forced him to cross to the other side of the 
Arauca along the Caujaral and Marrereno passes. He notified 
me from there of what had happened and told me that he had 
been successful in reuniting only two hundred men. They 
awaited my orders there. 1 admonished Guerrero to stay at 
that point.
Then I continued my march to Mantecal by way of the 
towns of Apurito and Banco Largo. In Banco Largo I received 
the news that Colonel Nonato P£rez and Governor Moreno of 
Casanare, were in the Los Cocos farm with some part of the 
force that they had taken from Cuiloto. I went to see them 
immediately, leaving the forces I had already gathered in 
the plains of Mucuritas. When these leaders placed them­
selves under my orders, I returned with them and their people 
to Mucuritas. There I incorporated them in our army. I 
organized a division of twelve hundred men and gave Nonato 
P£rez the command. I ordered him to march to Guasdualito 
and fight Morillo provided that [Juan Vicente de] Arce, the 
Spanish chief who was coming down from Cticuta along the San 
Camilo mountain, had not joined him.2° in case Arce had 
already joined Morillo's forces and these combined forces
20p&ez must be referring here to Juan Vicente de Arce, 
who had previously served as Spanish Xntendant for the 
Caracas area. Parra-P6 rez, Historia de la Primera Repub­
lics, I, 330.
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were to march against him, P£rez should always retreat with­
in sight of the enemy. He and his men were to join me then 
in the farm at Frio or the one in Mucuritas.
After P6 rez left, 1 returned to Achaguas to recruit 
more men and then return to Mucuritas to wait for him. This 
was the place where I wanted to fight the enemy. When I was 
in Achaguas, and after 1 had gathered some forces, I 
received fatal and unexpected news. This news included the 
defeat and death of Freites, who had assembled three hundred 
men in Guayabal; the destruction and death of Commandant 
Roso Hurtado, who with six hundred men had been in the town 
of San Jaime, province of Barinas; and the scattering of 
General Urdaneta's division. The latter, finding himself in 
the capital of Barinas, retreated toward Apure by way of 
Nutrias. He was pursued as far as the town of Santa Cata­
lina by General Calzada who had come from New Granada using 
the by-ways of M 6 rida.
This series of adverse happenings, coupled with the 
news that Morillo was already approaching with forces three 
times as large as ours, made many chiefs and officers feel 
that 1 and my few troops could not resist the numerous and 
veteran ones led by the expeditionary general. Some asked 
me for passports to retreat to the province of Guayana, 
while many left without a passport. Following this pernicious 
example, some rifle officers deserted with eight of their men 
and took the two loads of stores which constituted our entire 
armory. Among those who abandoned me with a passport in that
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dangerous position were Santander, Conde, Blanco, Carreno, 
[Manuel] Manrique, [Manuel] Vald6 z Doctor Josd Marla Salazar, 
Doctor [Francisco Javier] Yanez, and the priestB M 6ndez and 
Becerra.21
^^Manuel Manrique was born in San Carlos in 1795. He 
participated in the revolutionary juntas of Caracas in 1809, 
1810, and 1811. He joined P&ez's ranks and fought with him 
in all the battles until the seizure of Achaguas. Then he 
left P&ez and sought Bolivar. In 1821, he was in charge of 
the defense line in the siege of Puerto Cabello. With P&ez 
again in 1822, he helped defeat Morales at Cumbre de Valen­
cia. Finally in 1823, he beseiged Maracaibo and defeated 
Morales. He sent a silver key to Vice-President Francisco de 
Paula Santander to the Fortress of San Carlos i Barras of 
Maracaibo. He died on November 30, 1823 in Maracaibo while 
serving as Commandant of Zula. Scarpetta and Vergara, 
Diccionario Biogr&fico, 289-90.
General Manuel Valddz was born in Caracas in 1785.
He embraced the revolutionary cause in 1810. After the 
Treaty of San Mateo between Miranda and Monteverde and the 
consequent loss of Venezuela to the Spanish, Valdez joined 
Marino in Trinidad and started to campaign against the Spanish 
once again. He fought bravely in the Battles of Bocachica,
San Mateo, Carabobo, La Puerta, and Angostura. In 1819 
Bolivar appointed him and Urdaneta in charge of foreign 
troops and went on to Cundinamarca with them as Chief of the 
Army of the South. He defeated Colonel Ldpez in Pitayo in 
1820. Then Bolivar named him head of the first Colombian 
division to aid Perd. In 1926 he was Commandant of Arms in 
Guayaquil and with Intendent Castillo formed the July act for 
Colombian acceptance of the Bolivian constitution. In 1831 
he opposed General Montilla and was exiled from Colombia.
He died in Angostura in 1845. Ibid.. 661-63.
Doctor Josd Marla Salazar was born in Antioquia, New 
Granada, in 1785. He was a Doctor of Jurisprudence and 
Rector of the College of Mompox in New Granada when the revo­
lution broke out in 1810. Miranda named him Minister Pleni­
potentiary. He went on to the Apure area later and in 1816 
served as Auditor in P&ez's army. Then he spent a few years 
in Trinidad. In 1820 he became a Minister of the Supreme 
Tribunal of Venezuela and in 1827 he was Minister Plenipo­
tentiary to North America. He died in Paris in 1828 while 
serving as Colombian Minister. D&vila, Diccionario Bio- 
qr&fico. II, 231.
Doctor Francisco Javier Yanes was Cuban, but he had 
joined the republican cause in Venezuela in 1810. He fought
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These great mishaps were not sufficient to make me 
lose heart, however* They could not force me to abandon 
what had been half-started and what could be successfully 
accomplished if only faith, daring, and confidence were not 
lacking. When in any undertaking a man experiences that 
extraordinary force called faith, he should always follow its 
impulse, and recall that a sacred oracle has told us that 
faith works marvels and miracles. In addition to this faith, 
I had the firm conviction that those llanos of Apure, even 
if the rest of Venezuelan territory was subjected, could 
represent to us what the mountains of Asturias had for the 
Spanish patriots after their disaster on the shores of the 
Guadalete.
Fortunately for our cause, the people of Apure in that 
occasion were true to the pattern of heroic patritism which 
they had demonstrated so many times before. Thinking little 
about the veteran forces that were coming to attack them and 
the many laurels that these had won in other battlefields, 
they prepared to resist them with the fury possessed by 
lions when hunted in their native jungles. The people of 
Apure, although they had the indifference of the Spartans in 
their civic virtues, always showed all the daring of the 
Cossack and the intrepidness of the Arab on the battlefield.
with P&ez in the Battles of Arichuma, Yagual, and Achaguas. 
An attorney, he was a member of the Congress in Caracas in 
1811. He died in Caracas in 1842. Scarpetta and Vergara, 
Diccionario Bioqr&fico, 707.
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They had placed their haciendas at the disposal of the 
patriot cause, and they had consecrated their indomitable 
courage to its triumph. The number of heroes in the areas 
that the Apure River bathes could be counted by counting the 
number of its inhabitants. How good, how courageous they 
were!
To stop desertion as much as possible, I sent a cavalry 
party to overtake those who were leaving and did not have a 
passport. They were able to bring back only Lieutenant Josd 
Marla Corboda (later renamed General of Colombia), and Cap­
tain Ram6 n Durin.^3 a war council condemned them to death. 
However, they were pardoned in the end, for the Governor of 
Casanare, Padre Trinidad Travieso, and the worthy Lieutenant
^There is no further information available on captain 
Ramdn Dur&n. josd Marla Cordoba was born in Rionegro, 
September 8 , 1799. He was an engineering student when the 
revolutionary war broke out. In 1816 he was in the retreat 
of the emigrants from Casanare, where his inseparable friend, 
Servier, had been assassinated. He fought with P&ez in the 
Battles of Arichuma, Yagual, Achaguas, and Guasdualito.
After the Battle of Boyac& he attained the rank of Lieutenant 
Colonel. He helped to defeat the Spanish General Villalobos 
in the Battle of Matara, and it was on his head that Bolivar 
placed the crown of gold and precious stones that PertS con­
ferred on him. In 1828 he was Bolivar's Secretary of War and 
later chief of the Army that went south to combat Obando and 
Ldpez. He rebelled against Bolivar in 1829, much to the 
letter's chagrin and disbelief. The three hundred men under 
his orders were no match for O'Leary's three thousand! so he 
was defeated at Santuario on October 17, 1829. While wounded 
and alone in a hut, he was assassinated by an English officer, 
Rupert Hand. Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario Biocrr&fico. 
112-12; Lemly, Bolivar. 291-93, 343, 353, 359, 360-62.
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2*i
Pedro Camejo, alias the First, interceded in their behalf.
I do not exaggerate when I say that if Morillo's 
troops had fought the Apure forces then, they would have dealt 
a mortal blow to the patriot cause in Venezuela. If the 
enemy had secured control of that territory, it could have 
taken all its immense resources and then marched against 
[Manuel Carlos] Piar in Guayana and destroyed him completely.2 4
22Trinidad Travieso has been identified previously.
Pedro camejo was known as "Negro Number One" because he had 
been the slave of a proprietor of Apure, a certain Don 
Vicente Alfonso, and because he fought so valiantly. Don 
Alfonso had enlisted Camejo in the Royalist army, but the 
latter had become so disgusted with the cause he was serving, 
that he deserted and hid in the Apure area for a long time. 
After P&ez's victory at Yagual, Camejo presented himself to 
P&ez and enlisted in his ranks. He worshipped the brave, 
active PAez, a man after his own heart, so to speak, and re­
mained at his side after that until he was killed at the 
Battle of Carabobo in 1821. Both Bolivar and PAez wept over
the loss of this Negro, whom they had admired and loved not
only for his unsurpassed courage, but for his wit and humor.
Cunninghame Graham, PAez. 189-90, 193-95.
24Manuel Carlos Piar was born to a Negro mother and 
white father in 1782 in Curasao. He came to Colombian soil, 
however, to defend the independence movement in 1810. With 
Miranda, he waged the first campaign against the Royalists 
in 1811. In 1813 in Maturin he defeated Monteverde, who lost 
his equipment and escaped miraculously. He participated in 
the siege of Puerto Cabello. In 1817 he defeated Morales in 
the famous Battle of San FAlix which Bolivar himself designated 
as the "most brilliant success our army has had in Venezuela." 
Later that year, however, Piar joined the unfortunate con­
spiracy of General Maririo and Bermudez against the authority 
of the Liberator. Marino and Bermudez managed to reconcile 
themselves with Bolivar, but Piar refused the pardon and pass­
port granted him and went to Angostura to stir up a revolt.
On October 15, 1817, he was unanimously court-martialed and 
sentenced to death. He was executed the following afternoon 
in the presence of the entire army. Scarpetta and Vergara, 
Diccionario BioorAfico. 464-65. See also Lemly, Bolivar. 132- 
37, 142, 143, 144, 145-47; and Cunninghame Graham, PAez, 96, 
106-107, 134.
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The enemy forces could have done the same to the other 
leaders who had parties in the provinces of Barcelona and 
Cumana. Thus, it was indispensable not to let the enemy 
take possession of the Apure plains.
The fate of the Republic was determined in the llanos 
of Apure in the Battles of Mata de la Miel, Yagual, and 
Mucuritas, and in the 1819 campaign against Morillo. It is 
painful to note that those who have written the history of 
our independence have not seen it this way. General Morillo 
understood this well, though, for it was to the llanos of 
Apure that he came three times when he believed New Granada 
was pacified, and he wanted to subject Venezuela. Further 
on I shall describe this General's plan in his campaign 
against us in 1819. However, now I want to pause briefly to 
refute several errors that the historians of Colombia have 
copied from one another. They depict the army of Apure in 
that epoch as a dispirited soldiery, accustomed to stealing, 
without respect or obedience to any authority. I plead with 
future historians to refute these statements and to keep 
uppermost in their mind the data I am going to present in 
order that they may do more justice to the heroic army to 
which Colombia owed so many triumphs.
I had taken the most severe measures, dating from the 
time I took over the command, to maintain order and discipline 
in this army. Illustrative of this fact was the decree I 
issued ordering capital punishment for those who were found 
committing any act of violence. Commandant RamOn Zapata was
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assassinated at that time by Second Lieutenant Lorenzo 
Serrano, a Europe am, and Sergeant Rafael Toro. The latter, 
knowing the fate that would befall them if they fell in my 
hands, went over to the enemy. I was able to take these men 
prisoners, though, and they were immediately sentenced to 
death. I will not deny that some crimes were committed; 
however, their perpertrators were villains who had served in 
other armies and not in the one I commanded at the time.
I shall copy now what Baralt [and Diaz] have to say 
about these crimes on page 295 of the first volume of 
Historia de Venezuela;^5
Shortly after the battle of Yagual, Servier was 
assassinated at the headquarters in Achaguas by men 
who had the audacity to show their spoils of war 
with impunity. The most singular thing about the 
case was that this infamous crime had been whispered 
about beforehand in the camp. It seems that almost 
everyone expected it to occur, but lacked the means 
of preventing it. Later on, the old Giraldot, father 
of the celebrated Atanasio, and Lieutenant Colonel 
Miguel Vald£z met the same fate.
When Senor Baralt returned from Paris, after his work 
had been printed, I called his attention to some errors that 
I had noted in it. I lamented that he had not added respect 
for justice and historical truth to the beauties of his 
lyrical style. He answered that many of the notes that he 
had used for his history had already been given to him when 
he sailed for Europe. Also, he added that since he had been 
away from the people who could have supplied him with data,
25<rhiB citation may be found in the 1939 Desclfte 
edition of Baralt and Diaz, Readmen de la Historia. I, 359.
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and since I had refused to give him any information on the
events in which I had participated, he had been forced to
write only with the documents and the information that he 
had in his possession. Therefore, I feel that I must correct 
now what he wrote as truth when he placed too much confidence 
on ill-intentioned individuals who deceived him.
General Servier left our headquarters at Achaguas with 
my permission to go in the country for a few days and rest 
from the fatigues of a war that had ruined his health. He 
went toward "Chorreron," a place a league away from Achaguas, 
to the home of a woman called Presentacidn. While he was 
there, according to what this woman said, four men on horse­
back came late at night and knocked on the door. They said
that they brought an order from me for the General. He told
them to send it to him, but the men replied that it was a 
verbal message and that they had to tell him in person. 
Servier came to the door and was subsequently captured by 
these bandits who must have been from the scattered forces 
from Yagual. They took him to a nearby forest and assas­
sinated him.
An extensive investigation was conducted to find out 
where the assassins were. The only witness to the event, 
however, did not know them. No data were ever found later 
to determine their identity. In those times when there were 
so many men loose in the fields who did not belong to the 
army, it was imprudent on the General's part to have gone 
far from it. This was especially so since he had more than
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enough enemies who had followed him from New Granada. He 
did not have any enemies among us, for he had just come to 
our soil and had behaved very well in the Battle of Yagual.
Giraldot, who had taken a passport to go to the prov­
ince of Guayana, was overtaken in his march and assassinated 
near the banks of the Orinoco by two men. I had them 
followed immediately. We overtook one of them, a Lieutenant 
Juan Ignacio Garcia. He was tried and later killed in 
Yagual. His accomplice, a certain Santa Maria, escaped to 
Trinidad.
Baralt commits another error in placing Lieutenant 
Colonel Miguel ValdAz among the number of victims of that 
time. Vald£z died on the banks of the Orinoco from cancer 
of the face.^ This is verified by a letter written by his 
doctor, Miguel Palacios, which I have in my possession.
Dr. Palacios still lives in Calabozo.
26P4ez's account of Valdez's death is verified by the 
accounts given by D&vila, Diccionario Bioqr&fico and 
Scarpetta and Vergara in their Diccionario Biogr&fico* 
D&vila states that P&ez's troops stripped Vald6z of all his 
possessions before his death, with P&ez's approval. But he 
still says that he died of a grave illness. D&vila, Dic­
cionario BiogrAfico. II, 359. Scarpetta and Vergara, 
Diccionario Bioqrafico, 664, state that he died of cancer.
2?Dr. Miguel Palacio Fajardo joined the ranks of the 
patriot cause in 1610. In 1816 he joined General Piez's 
forces and served with him until 1821. He was promoted to 
Lieutenant Colonel of the cavalry in 1821. In 1825 he 
received his certificate as member of the “Order of Libera­
tors." He died in Calabozo in 1871, ruined financially by 
the federalist wars. DAvila, Diccionario BiogrAfico. II, 
58-59.
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I recall nothing about Lieutenant Colonel Miguel 
Santana, whom Montenegro places among the victims of that 
time. I do not remember either having heard any talk about 
this event which even Baralt fails to mention.
CHAPTER IX
I Join Nonato PArez— Battle of Mucuritas— Defeat 
of General La Torre— Operations in Barinas and 
Casanare— Surprise Attack on the Royalists in 
Chire— Dissensions in Casanare— I continue My 
Operations in Barinas— "Astonishing Boldness" of 
[Guillermo] Iribarren in Banco Largo— Battalion 
"Bravos de P&ez"— Defeat of Royalist Commandant 
[Jacinto] Perera— My Camp in El Yagual— Heroic 
Deeds of Vicente Pena and Aramendi— We Take the 
Things we Need in Barinas— Return to Yagual—  
Arrival of the Commissioners Sent by the Libera­
tor— I Recognize his Authority as Supreme Com­
mander- -Our Cavalry Captures the Enemy Launches 
at the Mouth of the CoplA.
1817-1818
I ordered the people at the hospital and the civilians 
to go to the Yagual farm, and then I left with five hundred 
men to look for Nonato PArez. The latter, who was already 
in Mantecal, was to join me in Mucuritas at the Frio farm. 
After four days' march, I arrived there. However, I did not 
find PArez, for lack of water and horses had forced him to 
retreat to a spot a league away. For the same reasons, I 
found myself forced to go where I thought he might be. His 
forces had diminished so greatly, that he could only count 
on six hundred men. The rest of the soldiers had left him 
because of the poor manner in which he treated them. This 
chief, though very valiant, was very haughty and despotic 
with his subordinates.
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While the Spanish General Calzada, who had left 
Nutrias with a division, joined forces with Morillo in the 
Mantecal region. General La Torre continued his inarch in 
search of us with three thousand infantrymen and seventeen 
hundred cavalrymen commanded by Colonel Remigio Ramos. This
cavalry chief had distinguished himself greatly since the
times of Boves and Yanez.
On January 27, La Torre spent the night at the Frio 
farm, which was about a league away from the place I had 
selected for the battle. The following morning, when we 
marched to occupy this site, we noticed that La Torre was
already marching through it. 1 then had to march obliquely,
and double the pace until we were marching with the wind.
In the llanos. and particularly those of the Apure, marching 
against the wind is dangerous, particularly for the infantry. 
This is because of the dust, the powder smoke, the wind, and 
above all, the danger of fire starting from plugs in the 
straw.
Once I attained the windward position on the plains,
I formed my eleven hundred men in three lines. The first 
line was commanded by the enterprising commandants Ram6 n 
Nonato P6 rez and Antonio Ranjel; the second, by the 
intrepid Commandants Rafael Rosales and Doroteo Hurtado.1
1Commandant Rafael Rosales took an active part in the 
military campaigns of 1811, 1812, and 1813. In 1814 he was 
with Urdaneta in the Araure campaign. He was one of the 
twenty-five officers who were turned over by Urdaneta to
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The third line, under the orders of the brave Commandant 
Cruz Carrillo, was to remain in reserve.^
With both armieB facing each other. La Torre came out 
accompanied by twenty-five hussars to reconnoitre my right 
flank. He stopped when he reached a place where he could do 
this. 1 immediately detached Sergeant Ramdn Valero and 
eight soldiers, selected because of their personal valor, to 
attack that group. I threatened them all with death if they 
did not return to the formation with their lances stained by 
enemy blood. They set out on their agile horses; and the 
enemy hussars, seeing them within firing range, discharged 
their rifles. Through the smoke my courageous cavalrymen 
hurled themselves on the enemy, lancing them with such fury
Miguel Antonio VAsquez. From 1816 on he campaigned with 
PAez. He was with PAez in 1618 when General La Torre defeated 
him in Cojedes. In 1819 Bolivar promoted him to the rank of 
Colonel. He died a natural death in Valencia on August 18, 
1845. DAvila, Diccionario BioorAfico. II, 217-18.
Commandant Doroteo Hurtado was a citizen of the Prov­
ince of Barinas. In 1821 Bolivar promoted him to lieutenant 
colonel in the cavalry, back-dating the commission to 1817. 
From 1821 to 1825 and from 1822 to 1827, he served as Chief 
of Arms of San Jaime. He helped pacify the Alto Llano in 
1829 and in 1830 PAez promoted him to the rank of Colonel in 
the cavalry. He died in Guadarrama in 1852. Ibid., I, 252.
^Cruz Carrillo was born in Trujillo in 1796. He took 
part in the military campaigns of 1813, 1814, and 1815. In 
1816 he was with PAez in the Battles of Mata de la Niel, 
Yagual, and Achaguas. He was also with PAez at the defeat 
at Cojedes. In 1819, after the campaign of BoyacA, he was 
promoted to the rank of Colonel. As Civil and Military Chief 
of Trujillo in 1821, he helped to distract the Royalists from 
Carabobo. He was a representative in the Conorsso Mmirable 
of 1830. In 1846 he helped to pacify Barinas, and in 1848 he 
rose to the defense of the Congress killed by josA Tadeo 
Monagas. He died a natural death in 1865. Ibid., I, 74-75.
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that only four or five of them remained alive to flee, terri­
fied, to rejoin their army. La Torre had judged it prudent 
beforehand to retreat when he saw our men leave ranks to 
attack them.
It is impossible to relate here the enthusiasm and 
hurrahs with which the army welcomed that handful of valiant 
men who returned covered with glory and proudly showing the 
lances they had stained with the blood of our enemies. I 
took advantage of this opportunity— for my previous order 
had had no other objective— to make my troops see that they 
should count the enemy's numbers only in terms of the pris­
oners they could take or in the number of dead that their 
lances could leave strewn on the battlefield.
Without losing time. La Torre advanced on us until he 
had gotten within firing range. When he opened fire, our 
first line charged him vigorously. Half-way across this 
charge, and in accordance with my instructions, our column 
divided to the right and to the left. These two sections 
were to flank the cavalry that formed the wings of the enemy 
infantry. I had prepared my men to retreat toward the summit 
and feign defeat if they were repulsed. This would deceive 
the enemy. Then the men of our first line were to turn 
around when they saw our second line attacking the Royalist 
cavalry from behind. This operation had the desired success, 
and soon the enemy was left with nothing but some two hundred 
European hussars. The rest of their forces were completely 
defeated and scattered.
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At. this point, the fifty men whom I had instructed to 
furnish themselves with combustibles, set fire to the llano 
in different areas. Immediately the llano became an inflamed 
sea which issued forth waves of fire on the front, on the 
right side, and on the rear guard of La Torre's infantry. 
Fortunately for the enemy, the llanos to the left had been 
burned a few days previous to this battle. This coincidence 
afforded them their sole means of retreat, and thus saved 
the Spanish army from perishing in a situation far more 
terrible them that of Cambyses in the Libyan dessert. Even 
so, in this retreat the Spaniards had to endure the repeated 
charges of our cavalry who jumped over the flames and pur­
sued them to Paso del Frio, a league away from the battle­
field. There their persecution ended, for the Royalists 
took refuge in a forest on the right edge of the river where 
it was impossible for our cavalry to penetrate.
Reporting on this battle later, Morillo wrote in a 
manifestoi "Fourteen consecutive charges on my tired bat­
talions made me realize that those men were not a small gang 
of cowards, as I had been told, but organized troops capable 
of competing with the best His Majesty the King had to offer."
This combat forced the Royalists to lose a great part 
of their supplies, many beasts of burden, and a great number 
of weapons that their soldiers threw down when fleeing from 
the fire. Our losses, on the other hand, consisted of the 
death of the valiant Commandant Segarra and a few other 
officers and soldiers. This victory gave our cause a great
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moral strength, for it represented the first reverse that 
Morillo's army suffered after its arrival in Costafirme.
When Morillo, who was in San Vicente, heard about the 
disaster that had befallen his lieutenant, he came that very 
night to Paso del Frio to join the army. From there, the 
Royalists took the road to Banco Largo and headed toward 
Achaguas— always marching through the forests. Since I 
could not follow them there with my cavalry, X continued 
marching on the plain in a line parallel to theirs. When 
they got to Achaguas, I was there before them. However, they 
refused a new battle and went on to San Fernando; I continued 
marching on the plains to San Juan de Payara.
From San Fernando, Morillo sent General La Torre to 
operate against Piar in Guayana. He also sent forces to 
Nutrias. Leaving one troop to defend the new fortifications 
he had constructed in the San Fernando Plaza, he marched 
with the rest of his men from the province of Barcelona to 
operate against the patriots who were on the island of 
Margarita.
For my part, I divided my forces also so that they 
could operate from the province of Barinas in different 
directions.3 I sent Captain Juan Galea with his company to
^P&ez inserts the following footnote here. "Among the 
forces that I designated to operate at different places, 
there was a guerrilla force under the command of Captain 
Correa and later under Commandant Hipdlito Cuevas. It had 
orders to take possession of the district of Rio Negro, in 
Guayana, and achieved this with eighty men who imprisoned
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C a s a n a r e .^ He was to wage a discreet war in that province 
and recruit all the men possible. They were to join the 
other guerrillas there who already amounted to a respectable 
corps. In his march, Galea encountered an enemy cavalry 
column under the command of Don Antonio P16 and heading 
toward Guasdualito.® Despite the fact that Galea had only 
forty men, he fought the Royalist troops and cleared a path 
through them. The Spanish leader [juli4n] Bayer, who was in 
Casanare, received confused notices about this encounter.6
the Royalists guarding these points.
At this time I received a communique from Commandant 
Orozco, who was imprisoned by the government of Brazil, I 
do not remember for what reason, in which he asked me to 
reclaim him as a Venezuelan. Although he had served in the 
Royalist ranks, I did not ignore his petition. The follow­
ing year, when I was with Bolivar in Potreritos Marrereflos,
Z succeeded in getting a satisfactory reply from the 
Brazilian government. Orozco joined my troops in the winter 
of 1818."
4Juan Galea was a native of Casanare and attained the 
rank of Colonel. In "pacifying" the important province of 
Barinas, he completely defeated the Spaniard A. P1A. Later 
in Cuiloto he defeated the Spanish Colonel Juli&n Bayer, 
whom he shot. In 1816 he helped to defeat the Spanish Cap­
tain Manuel Jim6nez in Chire. He participated with P&ez in 
the attack on Puerto Cabello in 1823. In 1826 he joined 
Colonel Guerrero in helping formulate opinion against P&ez in 
Achagua and Mantecal. Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario 
Bioqr&fico. 167-68.
^Don Antonio P1A was a Spanish Colonel. He was in 
command of two squadrons of the Lanceroa del Rev or King's 
Lancers. Lecuna, Crdnica Razonada. II, 193-94.
^Lieutenant Colonel Juli&n Bayer was in charge of the 
second of the four columns that General Morillo had organized 
to invade the Santa F6 area from different directions. He 
had attempted and failed to penetrate the Atrato River area 
in 1812. Torrente, Historia de la Revolucidn. II, 238-39.
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Wanting to know the truth about it, he left Pore with six 
huasars and four dragoons. He arrived in Cuiloto after 
Galea had joined his forces with those of Captain Francisco 
Rodriguez.7 The latter came out and attacked the enemy by 
surprise with such luck that he was able to imprison Lieu­
tenant Colonel Bayer and all those who accompanied him.
Thus united, our two chiefs marched on to Chire intent 
on surprising an enemy cavalry squadron consisting of one 
hundred and twenty men, led by Captain Don Manuel Jimenez.® 
The latter, not knowing of Bayer's disaster, was so unpre­
pared that the guerrilla patriots even found a great number 
of the Royalist soldiers still in bed. Consequently, they 
were destroyed, scattered, or imprisoned. We took posses­
sion of their weapons and clothing. Disguised in these 
seized Royalist uniforms, our men marched on to Pore, 
entered the city at bugle call, and imprisoned the guard 
defending it. Thus the province of Casanare was liberated 
from the enemy.
Galea notified me of his victories and asked me at 
the same time to appoint a leader for that territory. I sent
7Francisco Rodriguez was commissioned a captain by 
Vice-President Santander in 1826. The commission was back­
dated, 1816. This indicates that he had served in the army 
since 1816. He served on the island of Margarita until 
1821. He retired with a salary in 1844. D&vila, Diccionario 
Bloqr&fico. II, 180.
8Don Manuel Jim6nez was one of Morillo's "lieutenants." 
He was considered to be a very competent officer. Madariaga, 
Bolivar. 296, 299.
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Ramdn N. Pgrez, accompanied by Governor Moreno and the rest 
of the Casanarenos that were in Apure. I also sent Galea 
one thousand horses. Almost immediately difficulties began 
to arise between the civil and the military authorities as a 
result of pgrez'a outrages. It got to the point that I found 
it necessary to send Commandant Miguel Antonio V&squez to 
assume command and send the turbulent P&rez to me as a 
prisoner.9
It seems opportune here to correct the error Restrepo 
makes in his Historia de Colombia in stating that the patriots 
were divided between Juan Galea, whom I had appointed General 
commander, and the old governor of the province, Juan 
Nepomuceno Moreno. He further states that in order to support 
my favorite I was on the verge of moving to Casanare with my 
Honor Guard. The Colombian historian was misinformed on 
this. I have just stated how I had reconciled the divided 
wills, without encountering opposition and without resorting 
to the illogical plan of interrupting my operations to adjust 
a local question which at best deserved only a command. I
was that certain that no one would fail to recognize my 
authority or fail to submit to the leaders I appointed.
But let us return to our operations in Barinas. The
9See Footnote 9 in Chapter VII.
l°This citation cannot be found in the 1858 Imprenta 
Josg Jacquin edition of Restrepo's Historia de la Revolucidn 
de la Repdblica de Colombia available in the library at 
Louisiana State University.
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separate parties I had sent to operate in that province had 
attained the desired goals of recruiting men and securing 
all the horses, even those that were useless at the time to 
keep the enemy from using them later. At the end of March,
I gathered these separate parties and those that had been 
operating in the province of Barinas at my headquarters.
The enemy forces crossed the Apure, and, interested 
in occupying both river banks, they intrenched themselves 
with an infantry company in the town of Banco Largo. Knowing 
this, I sent Captain Guillermo Iribarren and his company to 
attack the enemy trenches.^ Marching under cover of the 
thickets, Iribarren appeared unexpectedly before the enemy. 
His troops assaulted the trenches before any but one lone 
shot was fired— a shot which mortally wounded the valiant 
Sergeant Roso GonzAlez.
To reward Iribarren for his conduct on this occasion,
I gave him a gold coat of arms with the motto, "Astonishing 
Thrust." The prisoners he took then served to help me organ­
ize my first infantry battalion which 1 called, in accordance 
with the requests of its leaders, the "Bravos de PAez."
H j u a n  Guillermo Iribarren was born in Barquisimeto 
in 1797. After the campaign at Banco Largo, he participated 
in the Battle of Yagual and the seizure of Achaguas. In 1817 
he took part in the seizure of Barinas; and in 1818, that of 
Calabozo. He fought in Cojedes and later participated in the 
Junta de Guasdualito which resolved to let Bolivar wage the 
campaign in New Granada and let PAez contain the Royalists 
in the llanos. He fought beside PAez in the famous Battle 
of Carabobo in 1824. He died April 26, 1827. Scarpetta and 
Vergara, Diccionario BiogrAfico. 235-56.
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This formed the basis of the famous corps which distinguished 
itself in many battles. Later, it was worthy of having its 
name changed to Conquerors of BoyacA because of its heroic 
conduct of this battle.
After the Battle at Banco Largo, a column of two 
hundred infantrymen under the command of Commandant Jacinto 
Perera arrived from Nutrias, the center of enemy operations 
This column intrenched itself in the town of San Antonio, a 
league away from the Apure River. Four days later, using an 
out-of-the-way road and circling around, I came out in front 
of this town at the same spot where the enemy had entered.
1 organized our attack immediately. At full speed, we hurled 
ourselves on the trench before us and dismounted hurriedly.
We destroyed a scouting party that was outside the trench, 
and then we succeeded in entering one of the openings. The 
enemy took refuge in a second trench at the rear. Some of 
our men followed them there. Among these was a soldier 
called Jos6 Camacho. With machete in hand, he penetrated as 
far as the parlor of the house, wounding and killing those 
he encountered. Finally, he fell, stabbed like a sieve.
We organized anew, returned to the battle, and dis­
mounted with lance in hand. Our men, protected by the 
trenches and stimulated by the thought of the rewards I had
12commandant Jacinto Perera was a Venezuelan who had 
joined the Spanish forces. According to Lecuna, he defeated 
P&ez's forces in this Battle of Sam Antonio— a fact which 
P&ez does not relate here. Lecuna, Crdnica Razonada. II, 6 , 
7, 274.
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offered those who would seize rifles from the Royalists, 
grabbed weapons from the enemy as they tried to take aim. 
Finally, aided by night and by the surrounding forests, the 
enemy abandoned that position and retreated to Nutrias. We 
went on to our camp at Yagual with our wounded.
At Yagual we found ourselves in the direst poverty.
In order to shelter all those people who had placed them­
selves under my protection, we had to construct ranch houses. 
The rainy season was approaching and these emigrants were 
accustomed to the comforts of civilian lifer therefore, it 
was necessary to provide some shelter for them. Furthermore, 
there were many invalids among them due to old age and sick­
ness; and this did not include the women and children. I 
issued a decree ordering the civilians to give me all the 
silver they might have with them so that I could return it 
to them stamped and sealed. Right then and there, a silver­
smith from Barinas, called Anzola, made a seal and converted 
into money all the metal those citizens had brought with 
them when they had been forced to leave their homes.
Among the belongings which the citizens of Apure placed 
at my disposal were their slaves. I freed them when I 
liberated all the territory. This provision was confirmed 
later by the Congresses of Guayana and Cticuta in their laws 
of manumission.
In the midst of these events and despite my absolute 
dedication to the war, I never lost sight of the importance 
of preserving the herds of cattle as a matter of vital
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interest to the country. X gave my whole-hearted support to 
this project, and clearly showed it by the efficacious mea­
sures I dictated to prevent the annihilation of the cattle.
I flatter myself in believing that these measures preserved 
a seed bed of riches which, despite the long duration of the 
war and the heavy consumption of the belligerent armies, 
germinated later throughout the Republic. This is evidenced 
by the fact that the beginnings of all the farms that exist 
in our country today have come from the Apure.
General Santander, when speaking of our plight at this 
time in his Apuntamientos Histdricos, states
During the campaign in the llanos in 1816 and 1818, 
war was waged on the Spaniards with cavalry and very 
little infantry. The mobility of the cavalry, the 
ease of crossing the rivers and swollen ravines by 
swimming, the practical knowledge of the terrain, the 
abundance of cattle which furnished the only source of 
nourishment for the troops, the lack of hospital, 
armories, and provisions— all of these gave the inde­
pendent troops considerable advantages over the 
Spanish. The horse and cattle were taken as common 
goods wherever they were found, without any counting. 
Those who had clothes wore them; those who did not, 
rode naked on their horses in the hope of acquiring 
clothing in the first encounter with the enemy. 
Accustomed as the llaneros were to living on meat alone, 
and to securing strength from enduring the rain, they 
were not afraid of the lack of other foods nor of the 
harsh winter in that territory. Swimmers by habit, no 
river detained them in their marches; courageous by 
nature, no risk intimidated them. From this it can 
be inferred that the officers, soldiers and civilians 
who were not llaneros had to endure labors and priva­
tions almost impossible to conceive. The recruiting 
was generally always made among all persons capable of 
bearing arms. No one was exempt. Thus it happened
^General Santander's Apuntamientos Histdricos were 
unavailable, and therefore it was impossible to verify this 
quotation.
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that in the Battles of Yagual and Mucuritas, lawyers, 
priests, and all capable persons wielded their lances. 
Until 1818 everyone, including the military and civil­
ians, men and women, old and young, was forced to live 
and march together. Everyone was fed alike on roasted 
meat, without salt, and everyone went barefoot.
In the month of June in 1817, eight enemy launches 
convoyed by an enemy gunboat were coming up the Apure River 
from Guayana toward Barinas. These were protected by one 
hundred grenadiers. I knew that they were carrying clothingi 
so I decided to seize this commodity which my troops needed 
so badly. With this goal in mind, I embarked men in five 
bongos that I had in Yagual, armed with small cannons.
Aided by a favorable wind, the enemy ships passed the point 
at Apurito where our men had hoped to attack them. My 
bongos. under the command of the daring Vicente Pena and 
manned by men from my Guard, followed the orders of Captains 
Aramendi and Laurencio Silva and continued navigating.^
^Laurencio Silva was born on September 7, 1792 in 
Tinaco, Venezuela. He joined the patriot army in 1810 in 
Caracas and from then on fought unceasingly for the cause of 
independence. He fought in the Battle of Junin. In 1817 he 
participated in the attack on the enemy ships at Paso del 
Frio and saved Aramendi's life on this occasion. He fought 
in the Battle of Carabobo and in the assault of Puerto 
Cabello on November 8 , 1823. Because of his deeds of bravery 
at the Battle of Ayacucho, he was promoted to the rank of 
General. He supported Bolivar in the Bollvar-P&ez dispute in 
1831; consequently, he was exiled from Cartagena on April 23 
of this year. Much later in 1849 he was Monagas' adversary.
In 1855 he was named Secretary of War and Councilor of state. 
Silva was Bolivar nephew-in-law, for he had married the 
letter’s niece, Felicia. Believing in a fusion of races 
which would produce a new and stronger American racial type, 
Bolivar had forced his niece to marry Silva who was a 
mulatto. General Silva died on February 27, 1873, after 
having been one of the handful who had stayed with the 
Liberator until his death. Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario 
Biogr&fico, 587-88. Rourke, Man of Glorv. 328-29, 355.
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They found the launches and the gunboat anchored a little 
further up from Paso del Frio.
The enemy had barely seen our improvised and weak 
squadron at a distance, when they started firing on it. When 
one of our cannon answered their fire, it fell in the water. 
Another one of our ships, loaded with men, capsized on 
firing the first volley. The men who had manned it managed 
to swim ashore despite the heavy firing from the enemy 
launches that were also pursuing our bongos. The latter, by 
much rowing, also managed to get to the shore. Our men got 
to land almost at the same time that their pursuers did. 
Aramendi turned around and gave the grenadier who pursued 
him the closest a thrust and started yelling for the cavalry. 
All the grenadiers were frightened by this and thought it 
prudent to abandon the pursuit and reembark in their 
launches, taking only one of our bongos. The valiant 
Aramendi was wounded in this encounter.
Frustrated in this plan, 1 returned to Yagual deter­
mined to organize an expedition to march on Barinas and sieze 
the goods that the launches carried to the warehouses there.
1 could not bear the idea that they might escape me, 
especially since the clothing was indispensable to us.
Necessity forced us to fight not only men, but nature 
also. However, we determined to use the obstacles presented 
by nature to our advantage. We knew that the enemy relied 
on these obstacles to feel secure and confident in their 
position. Who would have thought it possible for our cavalry
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troop to cross the Lower Apure at that time when so much of 
the terrain was covered with water and when, above all, 
several ravines and five rivers were all flooded at the same 
time? So I decided to take one thousand lancers mounted on 
dapple-gray horses and an equal number of reserve horses, 
also dapple-gray. The llaneros believe, and I do too, that 
a dapple-gray horse swims better than any other.
We got to Paso de Quintero on the Apure River. For­
tunately we did not encounter the enemy launches there, for 
they were in the port of Nutrias. I ordered seventy men of 
the Guard to cross the river and attack the town of Pedraza 
since the warehouses there contained some clothing. These 
men were to join me with their booty later in the town of 
Canagua. l warned them above all not to alarm the enemy at 
Barinas, for if the latter found out that some patriot 
forces crossed the Apure River, they would ascertain that it 
was a party with the sole objective of pillaging the ware­
houses at Pedraza. In the meantime, I swam across the river 
with the rest of my troops and sent weapons across in a 
canoe.
The men of my Guard, having fulfilled their objective, 
were returning from Pedraza when they were attacked at the 
farm of Mamom by a strong guerilla force under the command 
of Captain Teodore Garrido. However, they succeeded in 
defeating this force without any further misfortune than the 
wounding of one of our officers. They continued their march 
and finally joined us in Canagua. Garrido, seeing our men
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countermarch toward the Apure, notified Barinas of this 
movement. He did not realize that I had taken advantage of 
this stratagem to deceive the enemy there.
With all my forces reunited, I headed toward Barinas. 
We swam across the Canagua and Paguey rivers carrying our 
saddles over our heads. We appeared so unexpectedly in 
front of the plaza, that by a rare coincidence Remigio Ramos 
at that very moment was assuring the inhabitants as a group 
that the party of thieves from the Apure that had pillaged 
Pedraza had taken refuge again in the territory from where 
they had come. I went to the street openings in the city 
and sent three cavalry columns, along three different streets, 
to charge the five hundred European infantrymen and one 
hundred cavalrymen, which had arrived from Caracas and with 
which Ramos opposed us. The enemy's resistance was in vain, 
for we swept away all who came before us on the points of 
our lances and with the impetus of our horses. Ramos escaped 
with some officers and was pursued to Bocono. The rest of 
the enemy force remained in my power.
The outcome of this surprise attack was that we were 
able to seize the resources we needed with which the ware­
houses of Barinas were well-stocked. The goods that the 
eight launches had brought, and the very reason for our pur­
suit, also fell into our hands. Furthermore, we got two 
thousand equipped mules that served to transport all the 
goods that we had secured— clothing, munitions, rifles, et 
cetera.
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Leaving the fortified plazas of San Fernando and 
Nutrias behind (particularly the armed launches which were 
in the latter place), and fearful that the guards of these 
two plazas would invade the Yagual, I hurried my return to 
the Apure. On the way to the town of Canagua, I seized many 
dry hides that I fortunately found in a warehouse there.
From these I made boats to cross the Apure River with our 
load of confiscated goods.15
Thinking that the gunboats would locate themselves at 
Quintero to prevent our passage, I sought out an accessible 
point that I knew, which was about two leagues further up 
and a little below the Suripa River. Commandant Don Juan 
Comos, chief of that enemy squadron, went down the river in 
his canoe, for he feared that we would cross it at another 
point. With this in mind, we went into the Suripa, a 
tributary of the Apure. Some patriot soldiers that were 
going along the banks of this river told me they saw a canoe 
which they thought belonged to Captain Como. To prevent his 
going into the Apure River and joining the rest of the 
launches which would then dispute our passage, 1 ordered a 
cavalry company armed with rifles to hide behind a parapet 
at the mouth of the Suripa. Comos tried in vain to force
J-Spdez inserts this footnote here. "This boat-making 
procedure is as follows. You take one hide and, running a 
rope through the holes that are made in its ends, you place 
the goods inside. Then you tighten the rope and knot it.
Then a man is able to pull this bundle across by carrying the 
cord in his teeth.”
308
his way through, but our men repelled him. Meanwhile, I 
crossed the Apure River and carried the cargo in the hide 
boats we had made.
As I feared. General Calzada had left Sam Fernando 
with five hundred men and headed toward the Yagual. However, 
when he got to Achaguas, I was already theret so he went on 
to Apurito. He surprised the small garrison 1 had there 
under the command of Commandsmt Rebolledo, who died there. 
Calzada returned afterwards to the San Fernando plaza via 
the Apure River.
Thus ended this very risky undertaking. In this 
instance an urgent need had compelled me to weaken the Apure 
forces by operating so far from my base. After my arrival 
at Yagual, the only notable event that occurred was the 
arrival of the commissioners that the Liberator sent to 
propose that I acknowledge him as supreme commander.
Or. Felipe de Larrazabal has just published a pompous 
eulogy of Bolivar in New York (Life of Bolivar. 1886).
This writer has inflicted the Liberator with the incomparable 
misfortune, among his many and great misfortunes, of estab­
lishing himself as his Homer. Larrazabal is my merciless 
enemy. He blames only me for Colombia's ills. He finds no
16Felipe Larrazabal, Vida y  Correspondencla General 
del Libertador SimOn Bolivar. Enriouecida con la inaerciOn 
de los Manifiestos. Menaages. Ex p o s iciones. Proclamas. &, 
Publicados por el Heroe Colombiano desde 1810 hasta 1830 
(New York, 1887). This volume was edited and brought up to 
date by R. Blanco-Fombona who shortened the title to Vida 
del Libertador SimOn Bolivar (Madrid, 1918).
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merit in my services, nor in those of any other South 
American leader, except Sucre. This newspaperman, due to 
ingratitude, swore vengeance on me and mine. He does not 
waste any opportunity to depict me as a savage, incapable of 
reasoning and always ready to rise up in arms. It is an 
immeasurable calamity that the greatest man of America, the 
Genius of Liberty of a Continent, should suffer the post­
humous grief of having his eulogy written by a stunted 
author. It is no less of a misfortune, however, that in the 
end a good man should be forced to defend himself against 
the attacks of hatred. This "historian" accuses me always 
of having opposed the Liberator. The event which I am about 
to relate and others that will appear later will be suffi­
cient to convince those unfamiliar with the history of our 
revolution of the falsity of Larrazabal1s charge.
After I had defeated the Spaniards with untrained 
soldiers in all the encounters we had had, I had organized 
in the Apure a cavalry corps and the famous Battalion PAez. 
victorious later in BoyacA. Bolivar was not as surprised by 
the fact that I had formed this army, as by the fact that I 
had succeeded in maintaining it in a good disciplined state. 
This was so because the greater part of this army was com­
posed of the same individuals who, under Yanez and Boves, 
had been the scourge of the patriots. To be honest, who 
would have ever believed that those men, classified as 
savages by same writers and accustomed to venerating the name 
of King as holy, could have ever decided to abandon their
310
sacred cause to follow that of the patria— a name which held 
no significance for them? Who would have ever believed it 
possible to make those men, who held everyone and everything 
in contempt who could not compete with them in brute force, 
understand that there was a force superior to this, to which 
it was necessary to submit? Nevertheless, despite all these 
drawbacks, I succeeded in aligning them with me. 1 was able 
to get them to suffer, content and submissive, all the 
miseries, discomforts, and necessities of war. At the same 
time, I inspired in them a love for glory, a respect for life 
and property, and a veneration for the name of patria.
There in Apure I also came to possess the resources 
of this province, which its inhabitants generously placed at 
my disposal. It was calculated then that the properties of 
Apure were as much as a million cows and five hundred thousand 
riding horses. 1 had forty thousand of the latter, pastured 
and ready for campaigning. I also had under my command mili­
tary men of recognized merit. Furthermore, I exercised the 
authority as supreme chief that had been conferred on me in 
Trinidad de Arichuna by the remnants of the Republics of New 
Granada and Venezuela.
Now at this time, when I had at my disposal all the 
resources mentioned and had under my command an army of 
invincible men who obeyed me with pleasure and loved me as a 
father--now when 1 found myself vested with an all-embracing 
authority— Bolivar, whom I still did not know personally, 
sent Colonel Manuel Manrique and Vicente Parejo from Guayana
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to propose to me that I recognize him as supreme chief of 
the Republic.1 7 If I had harbored ambitious designs, there 
could not have been a more opportune occasion to show them. 
However, without hesitating a moment, I respectfully received 
the commissioners in the farm at Yagual. Then I informed the 
army of my resolution to acknowledge Bolivar as supreme chief 
of the Republic.
The troops were very happy to know that he [Bolivar] 
was in Guayana. Still and all, when I told them I was going 
to recognize him as chief, the greater part of the army and 
the civilians pointed out to me that I did not have the power 
to delegate the authority of supreme commander which I had 
been granted. Considering only the good of the country, 
keeping in mind Bolivar's military gifts and the prestige 
his name carried even in foreign countries, and realizing 
above all the advantages of having a supreme authority and a
l7Francisco Vicente Parejo was born in CumanA in 1780. 
In 1810 he was a militia Captain in Chamariapa. He fell a 
prisoner in the attack on Angostura in 1811 and remained one 
until he managed to escape in 1813. He joined Marino's 
forces then and fought with him in all the battles. When 
Bolivar arrived in Margarita in 1816, Parejo was filled with 
joy and immediately recognized him as the head of the nation. 
Then he joined MacGregor's forces. In 1821 he participated 
in the Congress of Angostura. In 1825 he succeeded in getting 
Cisneros to surrender. He opposed PAez in the separation of 
Venezuela from Colombia. In 1836 he was promoted to General 
of Brigade. Since Bolivar was always the sole thought of 
Parejo's public life and the only object of his disinter­
ested affection, it seems appropriate that when he died on 
July 24, 1864, his ashes were placed under the same roof as 
those of the Liberator in the National Pantheon in Caracas. 
Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario BiogrAfico. 439-40.
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focal point to direct the various caudillos operating in 
different sections, I decided to subject my authority to that 
of General Bolivar. I ordered the troops that I had in 
Yagual to get into formation. Then I called Father Ramdn 
Ignacio Mdndez, later archbishop of Caracas, to receive my 
oath acknowledging General Bolivar as supreme chief in the 
presence of these troops. Later 1 ordered the troops to 
follow my example and also commanded the corps in other 
places to follow suit.
A few days prior to the arrival of these commissioners, 
I had received a communique from the "Congress" of Cariaco 
brought to me by Commandant Rebolledo, in which I was noti­
fied of the meeting of that group and asked in strong terms 
to acknowledge and support its resolutions.^ 8 I openly 
refused this demand and responded that although X was not 
under Bolivar's orders, I felt it necessary for all to 
recognize him as supreme commander in directing the war and 
smoothing over the difficulties that might stand in the way 
of the meeting of a true national Congress.
Although Larrazabal does not make any accusations 
against me in this instance, I have wanted to delineate this 
occasion fully to prove that I was against opposing Bolivar.
1 8 A1 though Marino had recognized Bolivar's supreme 
authority in 1817, the minute Bolivar left Barcelona to go 
to Guayana he attempted to usurp Bolivar's authority. He 
called a Congress at Cariaco which proclaimed a Federal 
Republic. Marino was soon defeated and lost Cumani and 
Barcelona. Mordn, History of Venezuela. 126.
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This was true even at a time when I exercised a boundless 
authority with the unanimous approval of those who had con­
ferred it. Further on we shall see this same thing confirmed 
in more them one act of my military life.
At this time, fevers developed along the slopes of 
the rivers and forced me to move to Achaguas, a city that 
had been abandoned for some time. While I was there the 
Spanish chief [Juan] Aldama threatened me from N u t r i a s . H e  
informed me that if I did not submit to the King's authority, 
he would come looking for me and reduce me to obedience. He 
asked me to remember that he was the victor of Barcelona and 
that he brought victory in his pocket. I answered this boast 
by saying that I would save him the trouble of crossing the 
Apure to come and search for me, for it was my intention to 
be the first to test my forces against his. Immediately, I 
detached Commandant Ranjel with a column of four hundred men. 
They took possession of the town of Santo Domingo, four
-^9Juan Aldama was a Spanish Colonel. In the battle 
that occurred on April 7, 1817 when he forced his way into 
Casa Fuerte, his troops behaved with unbelievable cruelty. 
On July 20, 1817 Aldama’s division landed on the island of 
Margarita in order to help Morillo maintain Spanish control. 
Despite the fact that the Spanish troops advanced steadily, 
Morillo evacuated Margarita when he heard of the loss of 
Guayana and the threat to Caracas. Now Morillo decided to 
concentrate on the mainland, for by the end of 1817 he rea­
lized that the troops of Aldama's division were the only 
seasoned soldiers left him. Vicente Lecuna and Harold A. 
Bierck, Jr. (eds.), Selected Writings of Bolivar (New York, 
1951), I, 141. Madariaga, Bolivar. 297, 302, 303.
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leagues away from Nutrias, after having destroyed the small 
garrison they encountered there. Ranjel continued his march 
toward Nutrias, and for a few days had Aldama contained with­
in the boundaries of the city. When I found out that Morillo 
and Calzada were going to join Aldama, I ordered Ranjel to 
return to my headquarters.
Aldama marched to join Morillo and joined him on the 
plain at the farm of Camoruco. From here both marched to 
occupy the town of Apurito. They crossed the Apure, learned 
that 1 was sick in Achaguas, and ordered three hundred 
cavalrymen under Commandant A. Ramos, to attack me by sur­
prise.^® Fortunately a soldier by the name of jos£ Marla 
Ariza, who deserted them in the march, flew to notify me of 
the danger 1 was in. 1 hurried to evacuate the sick and the 
civilians, sending some by land and others in the ships there 
were in that port to the shores of the Arauca. I stayed 
with fifty men on the other side of the river to attack the 
enemy when they entered the city and to gather more forces 
in the meantime.
I was about a league away seeking better pasture for 
the horses when, about 8:00 a.m., I was informed that the 
enemy had occupied the town [Achaguas]. Immediately 1 started 
to march against these forces, but they did not stay. They 
left when they saw that there was no one in the city. I
20Antonio Ramos was commandant of the Spanish squadron 
of Ouayabal. Later he took charge of a cavalry regiment. 
Lecuna, Crdnica Razonada. II, 5, 6 8 , 263.
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pursued them for about a league. Failing to overtake them,
I countermarched to Chorreron where some forces joined me. 
There I discovered that the entire enemy army had already 
crossed the river and was entrenched in the church in this 
town, while the cavalry maintained itself posted a league 
away. I sent Colonel Aramendi with a squadron of lancers to 
surprise this cavalry. He was completely successful in the 
attack, for he kept his march a secret until he thrust him­
self suddenly on the camp, killing and scattering many people. 
Meanwhile, 1 went to San Fernando with the Battalion P&ez and 
some cavalry.2* I arrived at that plaza at night and 
attacked it vigorously— yelling "hurrahs" for Bolivar and 
the troops at Guayana. The object of this was to call 
Morillo's attention toward Calabozo and get him to abandon 
the Apure campaign.
1 believe it was this false attack rather than the 
cavalry loss sustained in Aramendi's surprise attack, that 
prompted Morillo*s forces to recross the river along the
2*P&ez inserts the following footnotet "I was also 
taking three hundred Cunabiche Indians. They were under the 
command of one of their own men, called Linache, whom X had 
given the rank of general among his companions.— Before the 
simulated attack on the plaza, knowing how cowardly the 
Indians became on hearing the whistling of the bullets, I 
distributed rations of whisky among them. This liquor made 
them gain so much spirit, that they pierced their tongues 
with the points of their arrows and then bathed their faces 
in the blood that came out of these wounds. Then they 
hurled themselves, full of the greatest daring, against the 
enemy trenches. One of my Indian captains, called Dos- 
Reales, hurled himself ahead of time against a trench and 
was killed by machete blows."
316
same Apurito and road to San Jaime. They crossed the 
Portuguesa River and went to calabozo. The Spanish General 
had ordered the Fifth Division previously to locate in the 
town of Guadarrama and the squadrons to form again in the 
towns where they belonged. These movements amounted to 
giving Bolivar the advantage of being without Morillo's 
opposition as he marched to join me in San Juan de Payara 
Where I awaited him.
At the beginning of 1818, knowing that Bolivar was 
already in the farm of Canafistola, about four leagues from 
Payara, I went on to meet him. X was accompanied by my 
chief army leaders. He had barely seen me from a distance, 
when he immediately mounted to come receive me. When we met 
we dismounted and happily embraced tightly. X let him know 
that his being in the llanos was a very happy omen for the 
patriot cause. X hoped his privileged intelligence in find­
ing new methods and utilizing the resources we placed at his 
disposal would launch rays of destruction against the enemy 
we were trying to conquer. With the generosity that char­
acterized him, he answered me in flattering phrases. He 
praised highly my constancy in withstanding the dangers and 
privations of every kind in defending the patria. Then he 
assured me that our mutual efforts could completely destroy 
the enemy that oppressed us.
Bolivar was then in the prime of his life and possessed 
a robustness which civilian life seldom gives. Although he 
was not tall, he was not short enough so that a sculptor who
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wanted to depict a hero would ignore his stature. His two 
chief distinctive features were the excessive mobility of 
his body and the brightness of his eyes which were black, 
alive, penetrating, restless, and had the gaze of an eagle. 
These factors were more than enough to make him outstanding 
among his companions despite his slighter stature. He had 
black and somewhat curly hair, hands and feet as small as 
those of a woman, and a voice that was sharp and penetrating. 
His skin, toasted by the sun of the tropics, still maintained 
the cleanliness and luster which the rigors of an outdoor 
life and the continuous and violent changes in climate had 
not been able to wrest from him. Those who expect to find 
the man of arms only in the robust athlete, however, would 
have been disappointed on seeing Bolivar. An artist, how­
ever, or any keen observer for that matter, could find in 
him at a single glance the outward signs characterizing a 
man who is tenacious in purpose and ready to carry out under­
takings requiring great intelligence and great constancy.
Despite the agitated life that he had lived until then, 
calculated to undermine the most robust constitution, he 
[Bolivar] was still healthy and full of vigor. He had a 
happy and jovial disposition. Though he had a placid char­
acter in personal dealings, he was impetuous and dominating 
in dealings of national importance. Thus he combined the 
pleasantness of the courtier with the spirit of the warrior.
He was fond of dancing and was very gallant and 
susceptible to women. Skillful in handling horses, he liked
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to gallop at full speed over the plains of Apure and pursue 
the deer that were abundant there. In camp he maintained 
good spirits with opportune jokes. On marches he always 
seemed somewhat restless and tried to distract his impatience 
by singing patriotic songs. He was fond of battles and per­
haps even squandered too much of himself on them. However, 
while the battle lasted, he was completely serene. He never 
failed to set the example, to provide the commanding voice 
and sword in order to restrain the defeated ones.^
I must repeat that Bolivar's outward appearance, his 
weak frame, accustomed from infancy to the comforts of a 
home, provided quite a contrast to that of the inhabitants 
of the llanos; for the latter were robust athletes who had 
never known any other way of life but the continuous struggle 
with nature and wild animals. It can be said here that the 
two indispensable elements needed to wage war were joined 
now— the intellectual force to guide and organize plans, and 
the raw material to carry out these plans. Both elements
22Thomas Rourke in his biography of Bolivar includes 
a quotation from a certain Fernando GonzAlez to describe PAez 
which is both interesting and appropriate at this point. 
GonzAlez says of PAez, "He was an innocent child, a primitive 
who looked on Bolivar as a god and at other times, when he 
was afar, as a devil. He was a child even unto his crimes, 
enamored of anything that shone." Rourke, Man of Glorv. 193. 
Another apropos quotation reads as follows 1 "Bolivar is 
real, PAez unreal. Bolivar belongs to history, PAez to 
legend; their cooperation has the smack of Bonaparte joining 
hands with Achilles." Thomas Russell Ybarra, The Passionate 
Warrior, Simdn Bolivar (New York, 1942), 148.
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must help each other mutually and can do nothing without the 
other. Bolivar brought with him the knowledge of military 
tactics learned in books and which he had already put into 
practice on the battlefields. For our part, we were going to 
give him the experience acquired in places where it becomes 
necessary to vary the plans conceived beforehand at each 
step, and to operate according to changes in the terrain.
Bolivar, impatient to begin the campaign, had been in 
San Juan de Payara for three or four days wondering how to 
cross the Apure River with the army. We did not have the 
ships necessary to do so, and in addition, the enemy was 
guarding the only place where we could cross the river with­
out exposing ourselves to the cannon of the plaza. He was 
in a state of turmoil pondering how to solve these problems, 
while I kept encouraging him to start the march. I assured 
him that I would get him the necessary ships. He kept asking 
me, "But, man, where will you get them?" I told him that I 
would get those that were at the river pass opposite to us.
"And how can we take possession of these?"
"With cavalry."
"Where is that water cavalry?" he asked me, "For land 
cavalry can not perform such a miracle."
Finally he decided to march and approach the river, 
not with the hope that the anticipated operation would be 
carried out, but to decide what means to take. A mile before 
reaching the river, I begged him to halt the army so that I 
could detach the men we needed to seize the enemy launches.
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Although he still felt that this was either a dream or a 
joke, he yielded to my wishes.
I took only fifty men from the Cavalry Guard, and we 
arrived at the river bank with loosened girths and without 
cruppers so that we could roll our saddles on the ground 
without dismounting. We did this and all fell in the water 
at the same time. This unexpected operation shocked the 
enemy so, that they only fired a few cannon shots. Immedi­
ately, the greater part of their men jumped in the water.
Our cavalry group hurried to place itself in front of the 
plaza in order to prevent the enemy forces from informing 
General Morillo who was in Calabozo. We captured fourteen 
ships, including both the armed and unarmed ones. Bolivar 
was astonished. He declared that if he had not witnessed 
this act, he would never have believed it.
All I have to do now is to copy here the written 
testimony of an English writer. Although I do not know this 
Englishman's name, he says he served under m e . 23 This cita­
tion will be long, and even though the narration could endure 
corrections, it is beautiful and true and certainly worth 
reading. The book is entitled, Recollections of a Service 
of Three Years During the War-of-Extermination in the 
Republics of Venezuela and Colombia— London, 1828, and states 
as follows.^
2^The Englishman was Captain Cowie, first name not
listed.
24captain Cowie (?), Recollections of a, Service of 
Three Years, II, 173-87.
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Proceeding on toward the town of Barinas, I was 
informed by some of the natives that Bolivar was 
encamped a few miles from it, in the direction of the 
Villa de Aranca, and I there joined him. The brave 
General PAez received me, though a stranger, with the 
greatest cordiality, and seeing me weak from a wound 
which I had received in the engagement with the 
Spaniards, generously offered to yield up all his own 
little accommodations till I should be quite recovered.
This heroic and noble-minded man has derived all 
his ideas and virtues from nature. Nurtured in a 
country perfectly uncivilised, without the advantages 
of either birth or fortune, he has, by his own personal 
merit, his prowess and undaunted courage, raised him­
self, through the incidents which have from time to 
time occurred to him during the revolutionary contest, 
to the command of by far the most effective and useful 
native force of any in the country. He is a native of 
the plains of Capac (sic), and descended from the 
horde of Llaneros, who have ever lived there in the 
most barbarous and savage manner. When the revolution 
was first agitated, he was then a young man, and a 
private in one of the bands of Lancers which are 
raised on the plains. In this humble situation he 
soon found means to distinguish himself. His extra­
ordinary courage and strength enabled him to beat all 
competitors in the gymnastic exercises, to which the 
Llaneros daily accustom themselves; and by the adroit­
ness which, from continued practice, he had acquired 
in the use of their favorite weapon, the lance, he 
could with ease beat them into submission when any 
disputes arose. These, together with the numbers he 
always placed hors de combat in their numerous skir­
mishes, procured him the respect of all his companions, 
while his mild and unassuming disposition ensured him 
their respect and friendship. He does not appear to 
have entertained any wish to aggrandise himself at this 
period, nor indeed at any subsequent one, as his conduct 
has ever been marked with a most perfect disinterested­
ness and indifference, as to his own advantage, in every 
action of his life. The usual fate however of the 
chiefs of these bands, and the general esteem in which 
he was held, soon placed him in command. The leader of 
the party he belonged to having been killed in action, 
the whole of the troops instantly and unanimously 
elected him their chief, and in this station he enacted 
so many deeds of bravery, and with such universal 
success, that his band was hourly receiving volunteers, 
and in a short time became augmented from about 300 to 
above 2000. With these he commenced operations on a 
larger scale, and soon became the most formidable foe
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the Spaniards ever had in Venezuela, and to him may 
certainly, with the strictest justice, be attributed 
in a great degree the independence of that part of 
Colombia, while his exertions in the cause of New 
Granada have been also great and extremely beneficial 
to it. He could not, at the time I served with him 
either read or write, and, until the English arrived 
on the plains, he was totally unacquainted with the use 
of knives and forks, so rude and uncivilized had been 
his previous life. As soon however as he began to 
mingle with the officers of the British legion, he 
copied their manners, customs, and dress, and invari­
ably acted as they did, as far as his previous habits 
would admit, on all occasions. He is about five feet 
nine inches in height; his frame is very muscular and 
finely formed, and he possesses wonderful strength and 
agility. His countenance is handsome and manly; his 
hair thick, black, and curling; his temperament san­
guine, disposition warm, generous and kind, and his 
mind, though quite uncultivated, enriched with all the 
virtues which most adorn human nature. Open, frank, 
and unsuspecting, he is the best of friends, and being 
perfectly free from the baser passions, the most 
generous of enemies. He is particularly fond of the 
English, calling them his brothers, and ever advocating 
their claims to the gratitude of the country with the 
greatest enthusiasm. His intrepidity rendered him 
equally beloved by them, and, excepting General Marizio, 
he was the most popular chief with them in Colombia. 
Frequently, when the jealousy of the native officers 
has led them to make harsh and unmerited observations 
respecting the services of the British Legion, has he, 
by a well-timed reproof, checked them; and he was, with 
but two or three exceptions, the only one who ever 
candidly acknowledged the benefit which the cause of 
liberty derived from their services; and he alone ever 
proposed a public testimonial of it on the part of the 
Congress.
To enumerate all the anecdotes of this extraordinary 
man would more than fill a volume, so numerous and 
romantic are the actions of his life. One of them, 
which is truly characteristic of his bravery and resolu­
tion in cases of emergency, and which illustrates his 
military character, I will relate. Bolivar was on the 
plains of the Apure, with his troops in a starving 
condition, and without the means of procuring food for 
his army, unless he took a circuitous march of many 
leagues, to which the strength of the men was incom­
petent, or found means to arrive at the point he wished 
to gain, by crossing the river Apure, on those banks, on 
the opposite side, were plenty of cattle, grazing within
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sight of the newly famished troops. The latter could 
not be accomplished, as he had no boats of any descrip­
tion, or timber to construct rafts; but about midway 
across the river was a fleet of sixty flecheras which 
belonged to the enemy, and were well armed and manned. 
Bolivar stood on the shore gazing at these in despair, 
and continued disconsolately parading in front of them, 
when PAez, who had been on the look out, rode up and 
enquired the cause of his disquietude. His Excellency 
observed, "I would give the world to have possession of 
the Spanish flotilla, for without it I can never cross 
the river, and the troops are unable to march." "It 
shall be yours in am hour," replied PAez. "It is impos­
sible," said Bolivar, "and the men must all perish."
"Leave that to me," rejoined PAez, and galloped off. In 
a few minutes he returned, bringing up his guard of 
honour, consisting of three hundred lancers selected 
from the main body of the Llaneros, for their proved 
bravery and strength, and leading them to the bank, thus 
briefly addressed them: "We must have these flecheras,
or die. Let those follow Tio who p l e a s e . "25 A n d  at the 
the same moment, spurring his horse, dashed into the 
river and swam towards the flotilla. The guard followed 
him with their lances in their mouths, now encouraging 
their horses to bear up against the current by swimming 
by their sides and patting their necks, and then shout­
ing to scare away the alligators, of which there were 
hundreds in the river, till they reached the boats, when, 
mounting their horses, they sprang from their backs on 
board them, headed by their leader, and, to the astonish­
ment of those who beheld them from the shore, captured 
every one of them. To English officers, it may appear 
inconceivable that a body of cavalry, with no other arms 
them their lances, and no other mode of conveyance 
across a rapid river than their horses, should attack 
and take a fleet of gun-boats amidst shoals of alligators; 
but, strange as it may seem, it was actually accomplished, 
and there are many officers now in England who can tes­
tify to the truth of it.
The strength with which nature has endowed General 
PAez, is surprising. He will at any time, for mere 
sport, when his troops are catching wild cattle by means 
of the lazo, sxngle out a bull from the herd, and
25cowie footnotes Tlo thusi "Uncle. A name by which 
the Llaneros frequently address PAez, particularly the guards 
of honour, who are more privileged than the others." At
this point PAez makes no explanation of the discrepancy in
the number of men which he says he took (50) and the number
that Cowie says he took (300).
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following him on horseback seize him, while at full 
speed, by the tail, by a sudden twist of which he will 
throw the animal over on his side.26 if upon any 
excursion he meets with a tiger or wild boar, he 
instantly transfixes him with his lance. Prom thirty 
to forty men have been known to fall by his single arm 
in one engagement, and he is unquestionably the first 
lancer in the world. He has, since he has risen into 
notice, generally had from 3,000 to 4,000 men under his 
command, all of the Llaneros tribes, and these form by 
far the most formidable native force in the Republic; 
with their aid and by his own indefatigable assiduity 
he was always able to hold Morillo in check. P&ez has 
ever proved himself a most inveterate enemy to the 
tyrannical dominion of Spain, and a terrible avenger 
of his country's injuries. For weeks and months he has 
followed the steps of Morillo, unceasingly clinging to 
him like his shadow, and upon every opportunity dashing 
into his camp at night with frequently not more than 
150 to 200 men, slaughtering all whom he encountered, 
and on every occasion cutting his way back with very 
trifling loss. At other times, when the Royalist army 
was passing through the country, he would seize a 
favourable moment, when they were fatigued by a haras­
sing day's march, to drive off all their cattle and 
baggage mules, leaving them without provisions. It 
was acknowledged by Morillo, that, upon one occasion, 
when marching from Caracas to Santa-f£-de-Bogata, he 
was deprived of upwards of 3,000 men, and the whole of 
his military stores, by the unceasing attacks made 
upon him by P&ez, and that he was in consequence 
obliged to abandon the object of his expedition until 
he was reinforced.
The Llaneros are natives of the plains of Capac and 
the Apure. They are raised in the manner of militia, 
but receive no pay excepting what arises from their 
plunder, which is equally divided amongst them. They 
are mounted on horses, which, from being long habituated 
to abstince and fatigue, are the most serviceable and 
hardy animals in the world, being trained to perform 
almost everything their owners can desire. When mounted 
either in the field or for the chase, both horse and 
rider appear as if they were actuated by the same 
impulses; the sagacity of the one enabling it to
26cowie footnotes lazo thus* "A slip knot, or noose, 
which is thrown with great preciseness over the head of the 
animal intended to be caught. This operation has been so 
well described by other travellers, that any account of it 
here is unnecessary."
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comprehend the most trifling motion of the other.
The Llaneros are badly apparelled and accoutred; 
their covering and appointments being of the same 
scanty nature as that worn by the Guerillas, com­
manded by colonel Montes, but they are far more 
brave, and better qualified for field operations; 
they are exceedingly dextrous and active, and perform 
any required movements with amazing velocity. Their 
only weapon is the lance, the shaft of which is from 
nine to twelve feet in length, light and elastic, 
but tough and durable. The lance itself has not what 
is termed a shoulder, like those of European cavalry, 
but is formed like the blade of a long knife, both 
edges of which are as sharp as a razor of good metal, 
substance, and temper. This is lashed to the shaft 
by cow-hide thongs, leading from the top of the 
socket to about eight inches downwards. From their 
earliest childhood the Llaneros are accustomed to the 
use of this weapon, small ones being made for such 
practice by their parents. Previously to their being 
admitted to the ranks of the bands, it is necessary 
that they should be duly instructed in the use of this 
weapon, and that they should be able to catch a wild 
horse, never before mounted, and after placing one of 
their large and severe bits in his mouth, go with him 
at once into action. They are therefore trained to 
horsemanship as soon as they can strike the steeds of 
their fathers, and constant practice gives them a per­
fect fearlessness, so that they will ride on the brink 
of a precipice and over rocks that would make a less 
experienced horseman shudder to look at. No observance 
of respect towards their superior officers is observed 
amongst them; all appear on the same footing; but they 
pay the most unlimited attention to their orders in the 
field, where they know it is certain death to treat them 
with levity. In this point, I believe, lies all their 
discipline; as out of the field they are dirty, irre­
gular, and dishonest, and treat their officers (who are, 
it must be confessed, but very little better than them­
selves in any respect) with the same freedom as they do 
each other. It was a thing of usual occurrence to see 
one of these ruffians approach General P&ez, and 
address him by the appelation of Tlo, or compadre, and 
ask for anything he might want, without the smallest 
anticipation of a refusal, from his known good nature; 
and if the chief happened to be absent when they wished 
to see him, they would go all over the camp or town in 
search of him, uttering the above names in a loud 
sonorous tone, till he had heard and satisfied them.*7
27cowie footnotes Compadre as "Protector."
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At other times, while on service, if he were at his 
meals, which were generally enjoyed in the open field, 
should any of them take a fancy to the piece of 
tassao, or other provisions, he was about to eat, they 
would with peculiar adroitness go behind him and snatch 
it away, at which he would only laugh, and cry out 
animo Justo. . . .28
The Llaneros express themselves on most occasions 
when they are deeply interested, and particularly in 
their armours, in couplets, which are perfectly extem­
pore; their rhymes are generally very happy, and their 
meaning very applicable to the occasion. They also 
play on a guitar of rather rude construction, upon which 
they accompany themselves while serenading their mis­
tresses, and their songs are always extempore. They 
have a habit, which they derive from education, of 
appropriating the property of others to their own use.
28Cowie footnotes animo justo "Well done— right."
Paz omits an entire paragraph here, since it was not par­
ticularly flattering to the llaneros. it appears to be worth 
including. "The Llaneros only yield in bravery to the 
Sambos, and this arises, 1 presume, from their not enter­
taining the doctrine of fatalism; to all the remaining races 
they are superior in courage. They are decidedly the best 
of the native forces, but are nevertheless obstinate, and at 
times will yield to a very inferior force, not wholly 
through fear, but for the sake of betraying any of their 
officers, who may have offended them, into the hands of the 
enemy. Their evil propensities are to be ascribed to their 
mode of living in their youthful days. Exclusively bred on 
the plains, not having any intercourse with the more civi­
lised inhabitants of the Republic, and living as they do 
beyond the pale of any law, they carry on a system of rapine 
and murder from their childhood, over which the government 
appears not to have the slightest control, but who will, I 
apprehend, at a time perhaps not far distant, have to deplore 
and dread the increased exercise of their lawless power." 
Captain Cowie (?) Recollections of a Service of Three Years. 
II, 182-83.
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which becomes so natural to them that no dread of 
the most condign punishment can divest them of it.29
The Llaneros are a tall, muscular set of men, 
capable of great fatigue, and are commonly abstemious, 
but they are deceptive, cunning, and prone to revenge. 
The latter passion, they will employ every means in 
their power to gratify, and that in the most cruel and 
sanguinary manner they can devise. They shed the blood 
of their dearest ties on the most trivial occasions 
with frigid indifference, and had they not been 
restrained in a great degree by the active and powerful 
energies of their leader, they would long before this 
have had the whole of the wealth of the country in their 
hands. General P&ez possesses all the requisites of 
commanding this horde, and of keeping them in subjection, 
and is perhaps the only man in Colombia who could so 
effectually restrain them in their rapacity and passion 
for murder. He has no laws by which he governs them, 
but trusts solely to his own prowess to quell all dis­
turbances, and to chastise all their delinquencies. 
Whenever any of them commit acts which are deserving of 
punishment, or express dissatisfaction at any regula­
tion which may have been adopted, he tells them they 
must meet him in single combat; and this they are 
obliged by their own usages to do, or their comrades 
would drive them from the ranks. They thus receive the
2®Padz omits another paragraph and a half here from 
his citation. This portion is as followsi "The horses 
belonging to the officers of the British Legion, which were, 
in most cases, of the Santa F6 breed, and are esteemed the 
finest in the country, were always stolen, whenever the owners 
of their servants left them but a few moments unguarded. One 
instance of this kind of theft is rather ludicrous, and, as 
it shows their dexterity, it may be worth while to relate it.
"Major Manby had two very valuable chargers, and having 
reason to apprehend that they would be stolen, as several of 
his brother officers had met with similar losses, he was 
determined to secure them if possible. With this intention 
he tied their halters, which were made of very strongly 
twisted hide, to each of his own legs, leaving the animals 
sufficient room to graze, and laid himself down under a tree 
to sleep. When he awoke he found, to his dismay, that the 
horses were both gone, and his legs so firmly fastened to 
the tree with the halters, that he was obliged to use his 
sword to release himself from his bed. There is no possi­
bility of ever regaining animals thus purloined, as they are 
immediately driven two or three hundred miles across the 
plains to a place of security." Ibid., 183-84.
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reward of their offences from the hands of their chief, 
whose valour always prevails; and this circumstance 
gains him more weight and respect with such troops than 
any other method he could pursue.
General P&ez is subject to attacks of epilepsy upon 
any violent excitement of the nervous system, and they 
generally seize him either during an action, or immedi­
ately after it. The manner of warfare followed by the 
Llaneros, consists in charging repeatedly with the 
utmost fury through the thickest of the enemy's lines, 
until they succeed in throwing the whole into confusion, 
on which they slaughter all around them. On these 
onsets the exertions of P&ez are so violent, that he is 
seized with sudden vertigo and falls from his horse, 
which is so trained that it will stop the instant it 
feels his rider leaving its back, who remains on the 
ground until some of his men raise him. He is then 
taken to the rear, and the only means used to recover 
him are dashing cold water over him, or, if there be 
sufficient at hand, by immersing him suddenly into it, 
accompanied by a violent shaking. These attacks have 
subjected him to the most imminent danger, the enemy 
having been known to pass over him several times 
before his men could approach to rescue him. He is 
generally very weak for several days after these fits, 
although he invariably re-enters the field, if suffi­
ciently recovered to be able to retain his seat on 
horseback, before the action is finished. In some 
instances he has done this, notwithstanding he had been 
nearly speechless from the severity of the fit. In 
short, he is altogether a most wonderful man; and were 
the numerous extraordinary incidents of his life to be 
formed into a narrative, it would have more the sem­
blance of romance than authentic biography. He is, 
above all things, a sincere patriot, and certainly a 
bright ornament to his country, which there can be but 
little doubt he has been the principal means of con­
tinuing thus long a Republic.
I repeat that this narrative could be corrected some­
what, and I must add that a few of these corrections would be 
required by modesty. But since so very much has already been 
written against me, why not publish also what has been said 
in my favor?
Let us now continue the interrupted narrative.
CHAPTER X
March on Calabozo— I Seize the Cattle the Enemy 
Had at the Outskirts of this City— Morillo Comes 
out with his Staff to Check the Proximity of our 
Army— We Charged and Placed the Expeditionary 
General in Grave Danger— Defeat of Three Hundred 
European Hussars— Bolivar's Plan— My Opinion of 
This Plan— Reply to the Charges of Insubordination 
that Restrepo Has Made Against Me— The Campaign 
Plan I Proposed to the Liberator— X Leave to Seize 
the San Fernando Plaza— Encounters in the Ravines 
of the Biruaca, the Negro, and the Enea Rivers—  
Union of Colonel Ldpez's Forces with Those of 
General La Torre— Battle in Ortiz— Death of Genaro 
V&squez— My March Against Ldpez— The Liberator is 
Saved Miraculously at Rincdn de Los Toros— La 
Torre's Movements— Action at Cogedes— I March to 
San Fernando— Return to Achaguas— The San Fernando 
Troops Name Me General-in-Chief— In Defense of the 
Army of Apure.
1816
The event that I have just related occurred at the 
mouth of the Copl£ River, less than a mile from San Fernando, 
and proves that there is no greater danger than unprepared 
men. The army crossed the river then with the greatest 
speed, and Bolivar immediately started the march on Calabozo. 
He did not use the highway, but an out-of-the-way road 
instead to avoid having some enemy patrol detect him and 
notify Morillo. Before his departure he stationed Colonel 
Miguel Guerrero with a squadron in front of San Fernando to 
prevent the men in the plaza from getting supplies. Guerrero 
was also to expedite our communications and maintain our line
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of operations with Apure and Guayana.
We succeeded in completing the march without being 
discovered. We crossed the Guarico River at the Altagracia 
farm. Then we crossed the Orituco River at the pass of Tres 
Moriches and spent the night on the right bank, three leagues 
from Calabozo. At four in the morning we raised camp, and I 
went on ahead with a cavalry party. My plain was to seize 
the cattle that were in a corral at the outskirts of the 
city which the enemy garrison used to ration its troops. We 
succeeded in accomplishing this at dawn. Putting the cattle 
behind us, I remained at the outskirts of the city, in the 
open plain that bears to the Southwest.
When Morillo was told that the cavalry party that had 
seized the cattle was still at the outskirts of the city, 
apparently waiting for smother enemy army to join it, he 
jumped from bed and exclaimedi "What army was able to get 
here? Did it fly here?" To further ascertain this matter, 
he mounted his horse and rode out to the outskirts of the 
city accompanied by his staff and two hundred infantrymen 
that he left in ambush behind him. When l saw cavalry 
accompanying an enemy officer, I surmised immediately that 
it must be Morillo and his staff. With my comrades, I 
approached them little by little until they turned to go 
back to the city. Then 1 charged them fu11-blast in order 
to lance them before they entered the plaza. Morillo waited 
for us until he felt it imprudent to let us get any closer. 
Then he turned around. We charged with such tenacity and
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got so close, that the Intrepid Aramendi almost lanced 
Morillo. He was prevented from doing so by a Captain Carlos 
in Morillo's staff who came between the two and received the 
mortal blow intended for his chief.
At this point the infantry Morillo had left in ambush 
behind us, opened fire on us. This precautionary measure 
Morillo had taken proved to be his salvation and that of his 
staff, for without it not even one of them would have escaped. 
We were finally forced to return to the llanos by breaking 
through this ambush.
We were bemoaning the fact that such an important 
prisoner had escaped us, when Captain (later general) 
Francisco Guerrero saidt "Here comes an infantry and cavalry 
column, which I know does not belong to our army, for it is 
coming from an opposite direction."^ We went to reconnoitre 
and discovered that it was a corps of three hundred infantry­
men and three hundred hussars, all Europeans. They had been 
posted in the MisiOn de Abajo with orders to march to Apure, 
for this was where Morillo planned to go when the cavalry 
joined him. We charged them, were repelled, and then pursued 
by the hussars. When we saw that the latter had separated
^General Francisco Guerrero was a native of Venezuela. 
A companion of the very intrepid Colonel Francisco Aramendi, 
he participated in the Battles of Chire, Guasdualito, Mata 
de la Miel, los Cocos, Hato del Frio, and Carabobo in 1824.
He was very instrumental in organizing am auxiliary division 
in Carabobo for Perd. He supported and assisted P&ez in 
setting up the government of Venezuela. Scarpetta and 
Vergara, Diccionario Biocrr&fico, pp. 201-202.
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from the infantry, we turned around and defeated them com­
pletely. Only about sixty of these men were able to go to 
the plaza.
The Liberator, approaching with the army, heard the 
firing. He ordered the Apure Guard to go at full gallop and 
reinforce us. Later he also sent a company of scouts from 
the Barcelona Battalion under the command of Captain Jos6 
Maria Arguindiguez. Bolstered by this aid we continued to 
attack the enemy with greater vigor. They, too, had been 
reinforced by two hundred men that had been detached for this 
purpose when Morillo got to the outskirts of the city. Our 
Guard charged the Royalist infantry in square formation six 
or eight times without being able to break the square.
Finally our Guard dismounted. Lance in hand and accompanied 
by the scouts, they advanced and destroyed that entire force 
— a force that had defended itself with unequaled d a r i n g . 2 
By this time our army, consisting of two thousand infantrymen, 
over two thousand horses, and four artillery pieces, had 
arrived. It formed in front of the city in the open plain. 
Despite this, however, the Royalist Battalion Castilla, which 
was in Misidn de Arriba, succeeded in getting into the plaza
^PAez footnotes this as followst "The Spanish soldiers 
fought with such desperation that our llaneros, commenting 
that night on the events of the day, said that (and I will 
allow myself to repeat it in their very words), 'When there 
were four left, they defended themselves c... with c....'
This is to say, that even four of them formed a square.
This was very true. They would not surrender, and it was 
necessary to kill them."
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without further losses than its equipment and some men that 
we had taken prisoners.
Morillo, finding himself without food stuffs even for 
as short a period as eight days, already thought himself 
lost. In effect we would have been able to finish him then 
if Bolivar had abandoned the idea of leaving him in the 
plains to go seize Caracas. He attached such great impor­
tance to the occupation of the capital, that the idea of 
leaving the Spanish Chief in an area where he could very 
soon gather forces and then march in search of us, did not 
detain him.
We started the march, and the army recrossed the 
Guarico at the San Marcos pass. From there we went on to 
the town of Rastro. But first, we left Commandant Guillermo 
Iribarren and his squadron in front of Calabozo to observe 
enemy movements.
In the town of Rastro, three leagues from Calabozo 
and on the way to Caracas, Bolivar summoned me to a con­
ference outside the house. He wanted to know what I thought 
of his plan to leave Morillo in Calabozo in order to go march 
on the capital. He told me that his objective was to take 
possession of it, not only for the moral strength that such 
an acquisition would give the cause, but also because of the 
certainty that he would be able to recruit four thousand 
citizens in the valleys of Aragua and Caracas to reinforce 
our army. I responded that although I was always ready to 
obey his orders, I did not share his opinion on this matter.
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I told him that none of his arguments seemed sufficiently 
strong to me to warrant exposing ourselves to the risk of 
leaving Morillo as rear guard. Morillo would quickly be 
able to assemble the forces that he had distributed in 
various places not too far from Calabozo, and these all 
together were greater them ours. I pointed out also that 
our superiority over the enemy was in our cavalry, and that 
this superiority was nullified the moment that we entered 
hilly, rocky territory covered with forests. Elucidating 
further, I told him that it was unwise to leave the fortified 
plaza of San Fernando in Apure. Then I added that even if he 
were successful in recruiting all the men he hoped to, we 
still would not have any equipment for them. This confer­
ence was so long and heated, that it attracted the atten­
tion of those who were watching from a distance and who 
perhaps thought that we were quarreling.
At dawn the following day, while Bolivar was still 
undecided, a communique came from Iribarren. The latter, 
the reader will recall, had stayed close to Calabozo observing 
the enemy. He informed us now that Morillo had evacuated the 
city in the middle of the night, and that as yet he did not 
know what direction he had taken. Bolivar immediately 
ordered the army to countermarch to Calabozo. He insisted 
on this order although those familiar with the area told him 
that if we continued the march toward Caracas we would be 
able to recross the Guarico River at the Palomas ford and 
appear unexpectedly before the enemy. He felt that it was
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always more convenient to follow the enemy's tracks; there­
fore , it was indispensable to go to Calabozo and find out 
exactly which road they had taken.
I particularly call the reader's attention in this 
instance to compare this account with the one that Larrazabal 
copied from Restrepo.^ He will be surprised to see how events 
are distorted when related by those who have found out about 
them through ill-intentioned channels or those who report 
what they have not witnessed.
We marched to Calabozo then, which was already occu­
pied by Iribarren. There a certain Pernalete told me that 
someone had told Bolivar that I had come ahead with my forces 
so that I could loot the city.4 Full of indignation, I went 
immediately before Bolivar, who was in the plaza. I told 
him that if such a thing had been said to him, X was deter­
mined to punish the person who had been vile enough to invent 
such a perfidious lie with the very sword that I wielded in 
defense of my country. Bolivar was extremely irritated on 
hearing about this falsity. He told me that the man who had
3p&ez refers here to Larrazabal's statement that 
Bolivar wanted to pursue Morillo's fleeing forces but that 
P&ez and some other chieftains objected. Larrazabal foot­
notes this in a manner which removes any doubt but that he 
secured this information from Restrepo. Vida v Corresoondencla 
del Libertador. II, 126-27.
4in his biography of P&ez, Cunninghame Graham men­
tions this incident and cites Pernalete*s name. However, he 
gives no additional information about this informer. 
Cunninghame Graham, P&ez. 142.
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said this was a liar. He urged me to name the infamous liar 
so that he could have him shot immediately. I was satisfied 
with these assurances, and I did not want to expose Pernalete 
to suffer the consequences of Bolivar's anger.
It is very probable that some who witnessed this scene 
interpreted it as lack of respect for the supreme chief. 
Certainly it must have been because of this that it began to 
be rumored that we were at odds with each other and that con­
sequently were going to abandon pursuing Morillo. Those who 
believed this were wrong, however, for after having lunch 
together that very day, we left about twelve to pursue 
Morillo. Despite the time we lost in Calabozo, we still 
could have overtaken him with all the army had it not been 
for a mistake. Unfortunately, our infantry took the road to
Calvario instead of the one to Sombrero and had to retrace
its steps more them a league. As we marched, we took the 
stragglers as prisoners. When I came out at Uriosa, a 
spacious and clear plain, I took only fifteen cavalrymen with 
me, among them were the brave leaders General Manuel Cedeno 
and Colonel Rafael Ortega. I overtook the enemy's rear guard 
then and imprisoned those 1 found drinking water in a rain 
pool and successively all those who came to this spot. All 
in all, I took four hundred prisoners without ever seeing 
the enemy chief.
The above occurred at 5s00 p.m. At six, when the sun
was setting, and reinforced by some one hundred and fifty
cavalrymen, I attacked the enemy who were separated from us
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by the Uriosa ravine. My objective was to fight seventy 
hussars that had advanced about rifle range from their army, 
and comprised the only cavalry the enemy had. These hussars, 
although good soldiers on horseback. did not withstand our 
charge. They fled and when they got to where their infantry 
was. the latter opened fire on them and on us. Seven hussars 
and three horses died from bullets fired by their own com­
rades. while we were repelled without any losses.
By 9*00 p.m. our army was assembled in Uriosa. and so 
we continued the pursuit at that hour. The next morning we 
were about a mile from the town of Sombrero where the enemy 
awaited us. They had already set up their defensive mea­
sures at the pass of the neighboring river. We waited for 
the Liberator here so that he could hear the testimony of a 
deserter from the Royalist hussars who had come to us mounted 
on the horse of the Spanish leader. Don Juan Juez.^ He 
advised us not to go by the real river pass, for he said 
that Morillo had set from seven to eight hundred men. count­
ing both grenadiers and scouts, in ambush on the cliff 
opposite this pass. He also suggested that since the ascent 
to the cliff was very narrow, it would be better for us to 
take a nearby path where we could cross the river without 
opposition and approach the town from the open plains.
^Don Juan Juez was a colonel in the Spanish army and 
the Commandant General of the llanos. In September of 1817 
he defeated Julian Infante near the valleys of Barvacoas and 
Camatagua. Lecuna. Crdnica Razonada. II. 67.
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Bolivar arrived. When he was informed of all this, 
he preferred to listen to the dictates of his impetuous 
nature rather than to all the observations made by the 
hussar. When the infantry joined us. he saidt ‘'Soldiers, 
the enemy is right there in the river. Let's break them to 
drink water 1 Long live the patria1 At a trotl"
Our infantry got to the river bank and in less than 
fifteen minutes of heavy fire was repelled. We suffered 
considerable losses, particularly among the officers. For­
tunately, we had left the cavalry in the depot at Sam&n.
When the enemy noticed it, they abandoned their pursuit and 
retraced their steps to occupy their first positions on the
opposite bank of the river. This gave us the advantage of
having sufficient time to assemble our scattered men.
That afternoon we crossed the river at the place indi­
cated by the hussar. We still did not achieve our objective, 
for Morillo had continued his retreat that very night, taking 
the road to Barbacoas and going into sloping territory where 
it was not possible to continue pursuing him. By then the 
horses were very bruised, and the infantry, counting the men 
who were dead, sick, or had deserted, was four hundred men
short. As a result, we left Sombrero and returned to
Calabozo. Here Bolivar consulted me about the best plan 
possible for us to adopt in these circumstances.
At this time 1 reiterated that 1 believed it supremely 
important not to take one step forward without leaving our 
base of operations assured. The latter 1 thought should be
339
the San Fernando plaza which we would have to wrest from the 
enemy. Under enemy control, this plaza became a threat to 
Guayana in the event that we should suffer a defeat. I also 
said that in addition we should occupy all the towns situated 
in the plains of Calabozo and that we should try to win the 
inhabitants to our side. Until then, these people had always 
been enemies of the patriots. If we were successful in doing 
this, we would augment our cavalry with the one or two 
thousand men they had serving under the Royalists at the 
time; and we would also prevent future enlistments from this 
section in the Royalist army. In my opinion the capture of 
San Fernando would contribute much to this objective. I 
reminded Bolivar that the scourge of the patriots in the 
years 1813 and 1814 had come from these llanos; and that in 
the final analysis, it seemed too risky to leave them behind 
us as we went to intern ourselves in the valleys of Aragua 
to battle an enemy who was strong in numbers, brave, and 
well disciplined. I also warned him that half our cavalry 
would not reach those valleys, for the terrain that we had 
to cross was rolling and rocky and would render our horses 
useless. If fortune did not grant us a victory in the 
valleys or Aragua or while we were passing through them, our 
complete ruin would be more than probable. For the llaneros 
of Calabozo would be certain to finish us off before we 
reached the Apure. and the enemy army then could pursue us 
up to their fortified plaza at San Fernando. From here they 
could easily embark one or two thousand men in five or six
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days and go downstream to Guayana, which they could occupy 
without encountering opposition since we had no forces there. 
If Angostura were occupied by the Royalists, the Orinoco 
Carnal, by which we received our war supplies from abroad, 
would be closed to us.
We all knew that the hope that Miguel Guerrero would 
take Sam Fernando was in vain, for the enemy scorned this 
chief so much, that they frequently and openly would leave 
the plaza to forage for supplies on the right shore of the 
Apure and on the edges of the Biruaca ditch. Later they 
would return to the city loaded with foodstuffs without 
having encountered the slightest opposition from their 
beseiger. For all these reasons, Bolivar agreed that I 
should go take San Fernando.
When I got to the plaza, I found Guerrero reinforced 
by two hundred men that had come from Guayana. Before 
tightening the siege, I sent a delegation three times to the 
chief of the garrison, offering him and all who accompanied 
him a pardon. However, he refused to accept this offer; and 
on March 6, at 3:00 a.m., he left the plaza with his entire 
garrison. He took the road that leads to Achaguas with the 
intent of heading toward the province of Barinas. We pur­
sued these men heatedly, and at 7*00 a.m. we overtook them 
in the ditch of Biruaca. Here they tenaciously resisted our 
attack. The forests surrounding the ditch facilitated their 
retreat to the ditch at the Negro [River], which was not 
very far. A second battle ensued here in which they repelled
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my vanguard of two hundred scouts by using bayonets.
A  little further up from the Negro, we had another 
encounter and forced the enemy to retreat up to the site of 
Enea. Here at the edge of a thick forest they stood and 
resisted us with admirable courage. It got dark then, and 
both of us retained our respective positions. Night hushed 
the clamor of arms.
At dawn the next day, we opened fire again and the 
Royalists surrendered within a few minutes. While we 
uttered our victory cries, several of their chiefs and 
officers fled. However, since in the Apure area the Royal­
ists could not find anyone to help them, they were all 
finally taken, except for four or six who managed to save 
themselves.
Jos« M. Quero, from Caracas, had commanded these 
Royalist troops.** A man of proven valor, he continued 
dauntlessly to command his people each time they were 
attacked even though he had received two wounds during the 
first attack, and one of them was mortal. On our side, we 
lost seven cavalry officers, among them Captain Echeverria 
and three others of this same rank. The brave Commandant
®The Spanish historian Torrente lists jos6 Marla 
Quero and the division he commanded in San Fernando de Apure 
as repeating the "magnificent example of the old heroes of 
Numancia and Sagunto." He further states that Quero with­
stood three attacks and was finally shot the last time while 
in the hammock in which he was being carried around on the 
battlefield. Historia de la Revolucidn. II, 451-52.
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Kermenegildo Mugica was also wounded. Our other casualties 
included twenty dead and thirty wounded.
This simple account of what occurred is sufficient to 
belie the error in Sehor Restrepo's work when he states that 
I marched to take possession of San Fernando against Bolivar' s 
wishes and decision.® Such conduct would have amounted to 
desertion on my part, and I certainly would not have returned 
to join him as soon as he notified me from the city of 
Victoria that he needed help quickly in a very precarious 
situation. This communique was the first news I received 
concerning his march toward Caracas.
Colonel Don Rafael Ldpez, after the defeat that 
Bolivar suffered in S6men, came out from Tiznados with 
almost a thousand cavalrymen to cut off the latter's
7P4ez inserts the following footnote heret "In the 
principle plaza, we found the head of the honest, courageous, 
and very refined gentleman. Commandant Pedro Aldao. It had 
been placed as a jeer on a pike by Boves1 command, who had 
sent it from Calabozo as a trophy. When we took it down to 
honor it and give it a Christian burial, we found that a 
little bird had formed its nest in the cavity and had two 
offspring there. The birds were yellow— the distinctive 
color of the patriots.H
®Restrepo states that Bolivar was not interested in 
or planning to stop long enough to take San Fernando. Rather 
he wanted to give the impression that this was his objective 
so that the Spanish leaders would be taken off guard when he 
attacked the troops stationed at Calabozo. Revolucidn de 
la Republica de Colombia, n ,  437.
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retreat.9 In the plains of San Pablo at a place called 
Mangas Largas he surprised Commandant Blanco, who was lead­
ing some of those who had been defeated, and knifed all 
those who fell in his power. Fortunately, the Liberator had 
left that place and was in Calabozo; and many others had 
headed in other directions from the town of Ortiz, six 
leagues from Mangas Largas.
La Torre marched at the head of the victorious army 
of SAmen, and Ldpez joined him in the pass at Caiman, where 
he executed his last slaughter. From there they marched 
together up to Banco del Rastro, a league away from the town 
of the same name. That very day I arrived at Banco del 
Restro with twenty-two hundred men, including both infantry 
and cavalry, on the Guardatinajas road. I immediately noti­
fied the supreme chief of my arrival there, that the enemy 
was a league away, and that I was ready to engage them in 
battle. My communique was taken by an officer who found him
9Colonel Rafael Ldpez, though a native of Barinas, was 
La Torre's second in command. At this point, Morillo named 
him Commandant General in the llanos and gave him orders to 
attack the patriots wherever he found them and to prevent 
Bolivar's reunion with P&ez. Cunninghame Graham, P&ez. 146. 
Restrepo, Revolucidn de la Republica de Colombia, II, 456.
The Battle of SAmen took place on March 16, 1818. 
According to Mordn this battle occurred after Bolivar tried 
to surprise General Morillo at Calabozo on February 12,
1818 and chased the Royalist army toward Caracas. Mordn 
statest "PAez could not or would not bring his men to leave 
their chosen fighting terrain, the llanos, so that Bolivar, 
advancing in the Valleys of Aragua, was forced to retreat by 
Morillo, reinforced by fresh troops under his lieutenant 
Calzada, before being defeated in a battle at Semen on March 
16th." History of Venezuela. 127.
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at Lake Chinea, two leagues from Calabozo. Bolivar replied 
that I was to wait for him where I was then. The following 
day he joined me with three hundred men, counting the 
soldiers and emigrants from the valleys of Aragua.
The day prior to this reunion, General Cedeno had 
asked me for twenty-five men from my Guard to go provoke the 
enemy cavalry. However, the latter did not move from their 
camp, despite the fact that our men got within rifle range.
General La Torre, who commanded the entire army now 
that Morillo was wounded, retreated toward the town of Ortiz 
when he discovered my arrival at Rastro.^O However, as soon 
as X was reunited with Bolivar, we began the march to over­
take him at a double pace. We were not able to do this on 
the plain, for he, too, doubled his pace until he reached 
the rolling terrains and narrow passages.
The Royalist General, while passing through the plain 
of San Pablo, ordered Ldpez to situate himself in the 
Tiznados in order to sever our line of communication with 
Calabozo and Apuret so LQpez waited for us in the town of 
Ortiz. Here he placed himself in a favorable position in 
the elevated area dominating the entrance to the town. Here 
Bolivar engaged in a six-hour battle which was more than 
frightening, for our cavalry could not participate because 
of the terrain. Several times our infantry ascended the
10p&ez includes the following footnote heret "In the 
Battle of semen the then-Captain Juan Pablo Farf&n wounded 
him with his lance."
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slope and was forced to return in defeat. This occurred 
despite the fact that Bolivar was repeatedly told that there 
was a point on our right from which to overcome that hill.
As the situation stood, it was impossible to force our pas­
sage. Here we had to lament the irreparable loss, among 
others, of Colonel Genaro VAsquez, who was mortally wounded 
when the corps of two hundred riflemen in his command dis­
mounted and succeeded in reaching the top of the hill. When 
VAsquez was wounded, an enemy infantry column descended on 
another side and came up to the spot where the rest of our 
infantry was in formation and pushed it back some two hundred 
yards. However, with the quick and efficacious help that 1 
was able to give our infantry by ordering Iribarren to 
charge vigorously with a cavalry column, the enemy returned 
to the top of the hill. Then VAsquez and his column were 
able to rejoin us. VAsquez arrived wounded, carried by his 
soldiers. He died that very night.
The sun was almost setting, and since we were all 
terribly thirsty and had no water there, Bolivar ordered our 
retreat to a place about six leagues behind us where there 
was some. The enemy took advantage of this movement and 
started their retreat up to the valleys of Aragua, approxi­
mately eight or ten leagues from Ortiz.H
U p A e z  inserts this footnote here. "The loss of 
Genaro VAsquez was very painful for me, for he was one of 
the champions from Apure on whom I had always relied for any 
kind of undertaking, regardless of how risky it might be. A
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Bolivar marched with the rest of the army to San Josd 
de los Tiznados with the intent of operating against the 
enemy west of Caracas. Thus he changed his line of operation, 
for till then the road to La Puerta had been dismal for 
h i m . ^  When we got to the town of San Jos6 de los Tiznados, 
he decided to go to Calabozo with part of the troops to 
organize forces with a column that came from Guayana. I 
received orders to march toward San Carlos so that Colonel 
Ranjel could join me there. The latter with a cavalry corps 
had been ordered to operate in the West. I was to go across
grateful patria must not forget the name of this valiant man 
because there is no monument to commemorate the names of 
those who died for her on the battlefields. Fourteen years 
after his death, I gathered the remains of this gallant 
comrade-in-arms and took them to Valencia. In his memory I 
named a lake that is in the patio of my San Pablo farm— the 
place where he was first buried.”
l^The author refers to the three bloody battles the 
patriots had lost at this site. Early in 1814 the forces 
Bolivar organized under Campos Elias to prevent Boves from 
advancing further north after his victory over the patriots 
at San Marcos were routed. On June 15th of the same year 
both Marino and Bolivar were totally defeated in La Puerta 
by Boves' men. Few of the patriot soldiers escaped the 
bloody carnage that followed this terrible disaster. Again 
in 1818 on the plain watered by the Semen rivulet, close to 
La Puerta, Morales and his troops, aided by the fresh troops 
brought by Morillo, completely routed Bolivar's troops.
Morillo led the attack against the patriots himself. Although 
he received an almost fatal wound in this encounter, he 
inflicted the following losses on Bolivar's forces— eight 
hundred dead, four hundred prisoners, and all Bolivar's 
papers. From this it may be deduced that P&ez was mild in 
his evaluation when he states that the road to La Puerta was 
"dismal" for Bolivar. Restrepo is more dramatic and perhaps 
more accurate when he describes La Puerta as a "funeral site" 
for the patriots. Restrepo, Revolucidn de la Reodblica de 
Colombia. II, 223, 258-59, 450-51. Madariaga, Bolivar. 224, 
227, 229-30, 231, 307, 400.
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the province of Barinas, and at the same time see if I could 
defeat Ldpez who was in the Pao of San Juan Bautista. The 
latter refused the battle that I offered him, and retreated 
to Canada along the Valencia road. However, when he saw that 
I had crossed the Pao, he started toward Tiznados along the 
mountain range headed toward Cocuizas. His goal was to fight 
Bolivar whom he figured by then was coming to join me with 
seven hundred cavalrymen and four hundred infantrymen.
While LOpez was in the town of San jos6 waiting for 
the Liberator, the latter camped with his forces a league 
away at Rincdn de los Toros. When he got to this town and 
discovered that LOpez was very near, he sent General Cedeno 
with twenty-five cavalrymen to tell me to stop and let me 
know he was already marching to join me. That very night 
one of our sergeants went over to the enemy and revealed the 
saint and sign of the division, the strength it counted on, 
and the place where the Supreme Chief rested.^ Ldpez con­
ceived the idea then of attacking the Liberator by sur­
prise . ^ 4  He entrusted this operation to Captain Mariano
^Restrepo*a account is at variance with P&ez's in 
this instance. He states that Lbpez captured a servant of 
Bolivar’s aide-de-camp and forced this information from him. 
Revolucidn de la Repflblica de Colombia. II, 456.
^4Restrepo states that it was Renovales, and not 
Ldpez, who conceived the idea of surprising and killing the 
Liberator that night of April 17. Ibid.
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Renovales and eight other men selected for their courage.1 5
Meanwhile Bolivar rested in his hammock which was hung 
between trees a short distance from camp. About 4*00 a.m. 
when Colonel Santander, Chief of Staff, was going to tell 
the Liberator that all was in readiness for the march, he 
stumbled on Renovales' men. After demanding the saint and 
sign, he asked the nature of this patrol. Renovales responded 
that he had come from reconnoitering the enemy camp in 
accordance with orders he had received from the Supreme Chief. 
He was trying to find him now so that he could report the 
findings of his commission. Santander told him to come with 
him, for he, too, was going to find Bolivar and notify him 
that all was in readiness for the march.
When they got to the outskirts of the group of trees 
where Bolivar and his retinue had hung their hammocks, 
Santander pointed out Bolivar's white one to them. Immedi­
ately the Royalists fired on his hammock.1** Fortunately, 
Bolivar had left his hammock just a few minutes before to go 
mount his mule. He already had his foot in the stirrup when 
the mule, frightened by the shots, broke out running and left
15Both Restrepo and Lecuna give Renovales' first name 
as Tom&s. Restrepo states that he was a Captain of Dragoons 
in Ldpez's army, and Lecuna states that he was a native of 
Calabozo who was in the service of Spain. Lecuna, CrOnica 
Razonada, II, 191. Restrepo, RevoluciOn de la Repflblica de 
Colombia, II, 456*
^ P & e z  footnotes this as follows* "Bolivar himself 
told me what happened here. The shooting killed some of 
those who accompanied the Liberator."
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him. Surprised by such close shots, Bolivar tried to save 
himself. In the darkness of the night, he could not find 
the camp site.
This event has been related with considerable inac­
curacy by some Colombian historians. There have even been 
those who have recorded it in both a ridiculous and dis­
honorable manner for the Liberator. It should not be surpris­
ing that he could not find the camp, for even the best llanero 
who gets lost in the dark in those places finds himself in 
the same predicament as the navigator who, in the middle of 
the ocean, loses his compass on a stormy night. I have 
thought myself lost in the llanos during an entire night, 
only to discover at dawn that I had been at the foot of the 
same tree many times.
The confusion that resulted in the camp when Bolivar 
failed to appear was great. Everyone thought that he was 
either dead or held prisoner by our enemies. Consequently, 
when the Royalists attacked our camp at dawn, they encount­
ered very little resistance, for panic still reigned. Some 
of our brave leaders died in this attack, while others were 
imprisoned and shot later by Morillo's orders. Our compen­
sation was that Rafael LOpez was killed here, and he had been 
the best cavalry leader that the Royalists had, as much for 
his courage as for his wisdom. He was a native of Pedraza, 
province of Barinas, and a member of one of its best-known 
families.
General Cedeno, although he slept far from the camp,
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heard the combat fire and countermarched to find out what 
had happened. When he arrived at the camp, he did not find
either friend nor foe. Still he realized that the patriots
had suffered a disasteri so he went to Calabozo to search 
for Bolivar. In the meantime, the scattered forces of Rincdn 
de los Toros found the Liberator and gave him LOpez1s horse, 
which Commandant Ronddn had seized after the rider's death.^
I received news of the disaster. Since Bolivar did 
not send me a counter order, however, I continued my march 
toward San Carlos where La Torre was with three thousand men. 
When we got to this city, we encountered a party of hussars 
leaving it, and we mowed them down with our lances. To do 
this, we had to go up to the very plaza where the troops 
were quartered in two-story houses. They fired on us, and
we were forced to retreat outside the city.
General La Torre left San Carlos then and took a 
position in the small San Juan hills. For five days I stayed
17Madariaga states that this horse was such a good 
one, that Bolivar thought that Colonel Ronddn meant to trap 
him and deliver him to the enemy. Bolivar, 308.
Commandant Ronddn is Juan JosA Rondon. Born in 
Caracas in 1790, he served in the Royalist ranks until 1817 
when he joined Bolivar and PAez. He fought so well under 
PAez in the Battle of Queseras del Medio when ordered to pro­
voke the enemy with twenty of his lancers, that PAez himself 
shouted at him, "Bravo! Bravlsimo commandanteI" To this 
Ronddn replied, "This is the way that the sons of the Alto 
Llano fight." He also fought heroicly in the Battle of 
BoyacA and the second Battle of Carabobo. In the Battle at 
Cerro de Valencia, he got wounded in the foot, contracted 
tetanus and died as a result on August 23, 1822 in the city 
of Valencia. Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario BiogrAfico. 
541-42. Lecuna, Crdnica Razonada. I, 510; II, 6 6 , 280, 281; 
III, 234.
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In the plains in front of him. Finally, suspecting that he 
was waiting for reinforcements, 1 thought it wise to retreat 
to the town of Cogedes and summon Ranjel who was in Cabudare, 
which was almost a suburb of Barquisimeto. Ranjel came, but 
he only had two hundred cavalrymen with him. He informed me 
that the rest of this column had deserted. Despite the fact 
that my forces were not strong, I decided to return to San 
Carlos and fight against whatever numbers might present them­
selves. The same day that I left Cogedes, in the site of 
Camoruco, I unexpectedly encountered the enemy. They were 
looking for me after having been reinforced by fifteen hun­
dred men, mostly cavalrymen.
I was forced to countermarch, for since the terrain 
in those areas is hilly and very wooded, I did not even have 
a field in which to form my men. The enemy attempted to 
trample me with a battalion while I was retreating. However, 
at a turn in the road my Honor Guard, which I had left posted 
there, fell upon them. They killed some men and forced the 
enemy to abandon the road and separate to either side of it. 
Then I was able to continue an orderly retreat to the plain 
of Cogedes. Here I decided to wait for the Royalists. I 
formed my troops at the edge of the plain, with their backs 
to the town that was about half a mile away.
Although I saw that the enemy was very superior in 
forces, for they had close to a thousand men, I still did not 
lose hope of obtaining a victory that day. This shows what 
great confidence 1 had in the courage and daring of my troops.
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I set my three hundred infantrymen in a two-line battle 
formation. 1 placed the cavalry guard under the command of 
Cornelio Munoz to the right, and Iribarren and his squadron 
to the left. The rest of the cavalry, under Ranjel's command, 
formed the second line.
1 communicated my plan of attack to General Anzo&tegui
who commanded the infantry, to the rest of the leaders, and
18to my chief of staff. This plan amounted to waiting for 
the enemy without firing a shot until they were very close. 
Then we were to open fire while both the Guard and Iribarren's 
squadron charged the enemy cavalry. After the latter was 
defeated, and I held this to be almost certain, we would 
execute a flanking movement while maintaining the formation 
we had. This would place us at the enemy's left flank and 
within rifle range. This move was intended to prevent the
i@General Jose Antonio Anzo&tegui was born in Barce­
lona, Venezuela in 1789. When the republic was reestablished 
due to Bolivar's heroic efforts, he joined in the terrible 
campaign of 1813-1814. When Venezuela was subjugated anew 
by the Royalists, he went to New Granada with the remnants 
of Urdaneta's army. Under Bolivar's orders, he attended the 
unfortunate struggle with the Government of Candinamarca.
In 1815 he retired from military service and went into exile 
in the English colonies. In May, 1816 he presented himself 
to Bolivar with the daring project of invading Venezuela! so 
Anzo&tegui was one of the three hundred officers who went to 
destroy Ferdinand's empire in Venezuela which was supported 
by more than 10,000 soldiers. He became Commandant General 
of the inf am try and second in command in the Occidente army. 
At the Battle of Boyac&, the Liberator promoted him to divi­
sion General. When he was marching to assume command of the 
army of the North, he died suddenly on November 15, 1819 in 
Pamplona. He was only thirty years old. Scarpetta and 
Vergara, Diccionario Bioqr&fico. 21-23.
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enemy, when they saw themselves forced to move and without 
cavalry, from trampling us as they sought refuge in the 
forest and town that were behind us. The plan appeared excel­
lent to all; however, Anzo&tegui begged me three times not 
to advance with the cavalry, for he felt that my presence 
was needed in order to carry out the movement.
At this time, I confirmed the common saying that there 
is no sane man on horseback. Forgetting my promise, I 
advanced with the Guard and trampled almost all the enemy 
cavalry and also broke an infantry battalion that was on 
reserve. The havoc that my three hundred infantrymen wreaked 
on the enemy was horrible. Even the Royalists themselves, in 
letters that were later intercepted in Mew Granada telling 
of that event, said that there were bullets that went 
through three men. This is completely credible, for the 
enemy advanced in closed column, and we opened fire only when 
they were within pistol range. In that moment of both firing 
and charging, that compact corps of men swayed as would a 
tree that is bending under the woodcutter's ax.
In the heat of battle, I remembered what I had prom­
ised Anzo&tegui, but it was too late then. I held my horses 
back and saw that my men were fleeing scattered, without 
knowing why. Immediately I ordered my cavalrymen to abandon 
the rich booty they were gathering. With the first twenty- 
five men that I assembled, I charged the enemy to see if I 
could save my infantry. It was too late. They were fleeing. 
The enemy also abandoned the camp. They left their wounded
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with their weapons and went to seek refuge in the town sur­
rounded by forests. I remained, then, master of the terrain 
with my Guard. Soldiers from the latter joined me little by 
little as they returned from pursuing the enemy. I stayed 
on that battlefield all night and until 8s00 a.m. the follow­
ing morning. We had thirty-six dead. I collected all our 
rifles and those belonging to the enemy that were scattered 
throughout the camp. Then I distributed two hundred of these 
among the soldiers of my Guard; and forming files with the 
rest that we left abandoned, I started my retreat along the 
same road that my scattered men had taken.
In the village of Araure I found out that all of my 
men had united and had passed by there. I dispatched a 
picket to overtake them, and they found them in the site of 
Guamito. There they waited for me. When I joined them, I 
placed the leaders and officers, with the exception of 
Anzo&tegui and the infantry officers, under arrest. I 
entrusted the custody of the prisoners to a squadron and con­
tinued my march toward the Apure, intending to try them there. 
However, yielding to General Anzo&tegui'a pleas, to whom they 
had manifested how disgraceful it would be for them to arrive 
at Apure in that manner, I freed them.
During our march, Ranjel asked my permission to go 
occupy the city of Nutrias which was a few leagues away to 
our side. I gave it to him and turned two hundred men over 
to him. He did occupy it in effect; but the Indian Reyes 
Vargas, who was in that vicinity, arrived there also with a
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column of four hundred infantrymen. After a rough battle, 
Ranjel was defeated with very heavy losses. Thirteen of our 
chiefs and officers, all very courageous, were killed. One 
of them was the daring colonel Cuesta.
Ranjel succeeded in assembling fifty of his cavalrymen 
in the site of Caiman, and so at midnight he turned again on 
the enemy that was camped outside the city. He slaughtered 
a great number of them, but finally he was repelled. He 
crossed the Apure River the following day, and sent me a 
communique telling me of the disaster from the town of 
Setenta. 1 ordered him to stay there, gather the scattered 
men who had left Nutrias, and augment his forces with men 
from the towns of Mantecal and Rincdn Hondo.
1 arrived at Achaguas. Accompanied by my Guard, I 
went on to San Fernando where the Supreme Chief was. After 
I had been there two or three days. General Cedeno arrived.
He had been defeated by Morales in the Patos Lake and had 
lost all his infantry. Cedeno was extremely mortified by 
this disaster and attributed it to the little cooperation of 
the cavalry chiefs, particularly Colonel Aramendi. When 
these two met in the street they exchanged offensive words. 
Cedeno pulled out his sword to wound Aramendi, who was 
unarmed. The latter, in the manner of the llanos, knocked 
Cedeno on the ground. However, when Cedeno shouted and 
ordered his men to kill Aramendi, the latter started to run. 
Pursued by Colonel Fajardo and twenty-five lancers who were 
on foot, he came seeking refuge in my house. When he told
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me about the case, I took him under my protection for the 
moment. Then I took him myself to the Principal as a 
prisoner. The Liberator, informed of this disagreeable event, 
appointed a council of war to try Aramendi. Yielding to my 
entreaties, though, he decided to take him with him to 
Angostura that day (May 24) so that he could be tried there.
As they were about to embark, Aramendi escaped and remained 
hidden for some time until X took him in and offered him my 
personal guarantee.
I have related this event to show how much importance 
was attached to obedience in the army of Apure. In order to 
maintain it, even such a deserving officer as Colonel Ara­
mendi was not given special consideration.
After Cedeno's defeat in the Los Patos Lake, Morales 
sent a column of his troops to Guayabal, a town three leagues 
away from San Fernando. Immediately I ordered the cavalry 
Guard to cross the river and attack them by surprise. The 
latter carried out my order successfully on the night of May 
28, destroying the enemy and taking possession of the town 
again. This unexpected blow made Morales, who was in Cala­
bozo, retreat toward Sombrero. He thought that we were turn­
ing on him again. Instead, I ordered our men to abandon 
Guayabal so that I could concentrate my forces, organize the 
army of Apure, and herd and pasture the horses because these 
were the elements that gave us superiority over the enemy.
Historian Restrepo's observation that Cedeno and I 
should have concentrated our forces in Apure seems very just
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to me, for at this point it seemed that the campaign did not 
present advantages for those remnants of the army . ^ 9 I 
would have liked to have done this, but an order to do this 
would have had to come from the Supreme Chief and not from 
either one of us who, under his orders, were operating 
together.
When I accomplished the objective which I mentioned 
previously, I sent cavalry parties along different roads to 
accost the Royalists in the plains of Calabozo, San Carlos, 
and Barinas. The advantages achieved by these parties were 
great, for despite the swollen rivers and their consequent 
overflows across the plains, they were able to penetrate to 
the heart of enemy territory. Some of these parties, abusing 
the liberty given them to operate against the enemy at their 
discretion, committed excesses against peaceful citizens.
This was particularly true of the ones that patrolled the 
province of Barinas and the llanos of San Carlos, conse­
quently, I was forced to order them to retire to Apure. Some 
who had obtained good profits from the vandal-like excursions 
repeated them without my knowledge. X found myself in the 
position then of proclaiming a general order that threatened
^9The Colombian historian states* "In Cojede, PAez 
allowed his brilliant courage to be wasted by engaging in a 
battle with the Royalist Army, which was double his in size 
and more than triple in infantry; the result was to be 
expected— defeat. Finally, Cedeno, who could have saved the 
last remnants of the Republican army by going to the Apure, 
sacrificed them in 1*08 Patos, also engaging in a field battle. 
Restrepo, RevoluciOn de Reodblica de Colombia. II, 464-65.
358
with the death penalty those who went into enemy territory 
without my permission. In carrying out this order, I had to 
shoot four men— the famous commandant villasana, a very 
brave captain of the Guard called Garrido# a second lieu­
tenant, and a sergeant. Thus I succeeded in ending hostile 
actions against the peaceful citizens that lived in enemy 
territory.
In August of the same year of 1818, the troops that 
guarded San Fernando proclaimed an act appointing me General- 
in-Chief. They succeeded in getting other army corps in 
other places to follow their example. I was at my head­
quarters at Achaguas at the time, unaware of what was 
happening, when this act came into my hands. It was signed 
by all the army corps with the exception of the garrison at 
Achaguas and my Honor Guard. I was very surprised. Fearing 
that this might be the first step toward some disorderly end, 
I embarked for San Fernando immediately since it was obvious 
from the acts that the idea had originated here. Upon my 
arrival, I summoned all the chiefs and officers and asked 
them what had prompted a resolution which I did not approve 
and which they had no authority to draw. They answered that 
they had done this in the belief that they had the proper 
authority. They asked me then to overlook their error, for 
it was only evidence of their good intentions. They had had 
no desire to create confusion or disavow the authority of the 
Liberator. The chiefs and officers of the other divisions 
excused themselves with similar reasons. Thus, contrary to
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what had been feared, the existing order was not disturbed 
in the slightest.
When I was informed that the English Colonel Wilson 
had taken a very active part in drawing up this resolution,
I ordered him to leave for A n g o s t u r a . I  wanted him to pre­
sent himself to General Bolivar so that he could order him 
to another post. The Liberator, who embarked in San Fernando 
for Guayana on May 24, was in Angostura. He did not return 
to Apure until the beginning of the year 1819.
Had a real revolution against Bolivar occurred in 
Apure, would not Bolivar have stopped sending me resources of 
all kinds for the troops under my command from the time he 
arrived in Guayana? This fact alone is more than sufficient
20p&ez is referring here to Colonel Henry Wilson, who 
was authorized to raise the Second Venezuelan Hussars (Red 
Hussars). When Wilson was ordered to take Colonel Robert 
Skeene*s place as Lieutenant-Colonel of the First Hussars 
and let Skeene, who had been promoted to colonel, command 
the Second Venezuelan Hussars, he refused to accept this 
arrangement and decided to make himself responsible for the 
equipment of a regiment of his own. This is a prelude to 
his later action when he "tried to tamper with the loyalty 
of General PAez, suggesting that he shake off his allegiance 
to his superior officer and declare himself commander-in- 
chief . . . arranged a grand review at which he led the right 
of the line, parading his Englishmen in their gaudy new uni­
forms. After the review a proclamation was read and signed, 
declaring PAez captain-General of the army." Though PAez 
seemingly gave his consent to this act of disloyalty, he sent 
Wilson to Angostura with letters of recommendation to 
Bolivar. Wilson was immediately thrown into prison on his 
arrival there. He demanded a trial, but there were not 
enough British field officers to compose a courtt so he was 
dismissed from the army and allowed to escape from the for­
tress at Old Guayana where he was confined. When he left 
Venezuela, Wilson did all that he could to injure the cause 
he had so recently defended. Hasbrouck, Foreign Legionaries. 
47, 49, 58, 70, 72, 76-78, 371, 382.
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to refute the falsity with which Larrazabal comes out in his 
work when he deals with this event.21
No less unjust, Baralt [and Diaz] directs his [their] 
attack against the army of Apure, believing it to have been 
in revolt against Bolivar's authority. To prove this he 
[they] states that the dissenting Apurenos wanted to halt 
General Santander's march in Cariben, and that the latter 
was fortunate enough to get to the destined place only because 
his enemies were late in arriving at the ambush site.^ in 
order for everyone to give it its proper importance, 1 shall 
now relate the event to which Senores Baralt [and Diaz] 
allude exactly as it happened.
General Santander prepared to leave and carry out the 
mission that Bolivar had assigned to him. He wrote a letter 
to Colonel Pedro Fortul, who was in Guasdualito, telling him 
about the task that had been conferred on him and the 
resources that he carried to organize an army in C a s a n a r e . 2 ^
2 1 Larrazabal, Vida y  Correspondencia del Libertador. 
II, 160-61.
22Almost these exact words can be found in Baralt and 
Diaz, Roadmen de la Historia, I, 427-28.
21Pedro Fortul or Fortoul was born in Cdcuta in May 
of 1789. He joined the patriot ranks in 1810 as a Lieu­
tenant and by 1829 was a Division General. He served on the 
Staff of Operations in the North; Commandant of the militia 
Corps of cdcuta; second chief of the second cavalry line of 
Apure; second chief of the vanguard of the army of opera­
tions on New Granada; first chief of operations in the North 
(1619); and Commandant in Chief of the army of operations 
situated in Cdcuta (1822-24). He governed as Intendant and 
Commandant General of the Department of Boyacd for five years. 
Until 1820, he received no compensation of any sort for his
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He invited him and the other citizens of Granada, who were 
in Apure, to come join him. Among other things, the letter 
saidi "It is necessary for all of us Granadinos to unite in 
Casanare in order to free our country, and to knock down the 
pride of those malign, lazy Venezuelans.
I do not recall how this letter came into Colonel 
Miguel Antonio VAsquez1s hands. But he gave me the letter 
immediately. I was much alarmed by the words which I have 
just cited; consequently, I sent the letter to Bolivar. At 
the same time I ordered the then-Captain Laurencio Silva to 
go with a cavalry party to the mouth of the Meta and detain 
Santander. I wrote the latter and told him that some 
unfavorable news I had received from casanare demanded that 
he halt until the matter was cleared up. Silva got to where 
Santander was and gave him the letter. Santander halted, 
but he wrote asking that I grant him permission to go on, for 
even though the Royalists had made incursions in casanare, 
he was sure it could not have been more them as a simple
efforts. Since the Spaniards completely destroyed all his 
property and holdings, he was consequently destitute. He 
died in Cdcuta on January 5, 1837, still sick in his soul as 
a result of the poverty and misery to which he had subjected 
his beloved family in fighting for his country. Scarpetta 
and Vergara, Diccionario BioarAfico. 160-61.
2^This incident is mentioned in the Archivo Santander. 
24 vols. (BogotA, 1913-32), I-1I, 357-58. A copy of the 
letter is not included. This letter is not included either 
in Vicente Lecuna (ed.), cartas de Santander. 3 vols. 
(Caracas, 1942).
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threat since they had retreated immediately. The Liberator 
wrote me, too, and told me that informed of the contents of 
the letter, he authorized me to operate as 1 believed most 
prudent. Then X decided to let Santander go on.
From what I have just said, it is easily understood 
that I never disregarded the authority of the Supreme Chief.
I informed him of everything that came to my attention and 
always waited for his decision. It can also be seen that 
the step that I took here was not an ambush spread out for 
Santander, but a precautionary measure that I saw myself 
forced to adopt while Bolivar resolved this grave matter.
No one will think any the less of me for insisting on 
defending the army that I had the honor to command as many 
times as I might think it necessary, nor for insisting on 
proving that Colombia owes the triumph of its independence 
in great measure to that army. In effect, the troops of 
Casanare, composed of Granadines and Venezuelans, that con­
quered the obstinacy of the Apurenos in Palmarito, Mata de 
la Miel, Mantecal, and Yagual, and that later joined these 
in the action of Mucuritas, undoubtedly saved the patriot 
cause. What would have become of the patriots if the enemy 
had taken possession of the valuable resources of the Apure 
and marched against the forces that occupied some points of 
the province of Guayana and operated in other places? Did 
their leaders have sufficient resources to resist the veteran 
expeditionary troops had the latter had the devotion of the 
inhabitants of the llanos and possessed all the elements that
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these offer an army on campaign? Why would Morillo insist 
on concentrating all his attention, coming three times with 
all his forces, against the defendors of Apure? If I had 
not exerted myself so much in 1819 to keep from compromising 
the army I commanded in a field battle in order not to lose 
the infantry which was greatly inferior in numbers and in 
discipline to that of the enemy, what army would the patriots 
have used to go liberate New Granada?
It is not an exaggeration, then, to assert that the 
future of Colombia was being decided in Apure. If any of 
the battles already cited had been lost, it is very doubtful 
that the cause of independence would have triumphed.
Senor Restrepo, speaking of the guerilla chieftains 
that operated in different places in Venezuela, states that 
they operated as great lords of feudal times, with complete 
independence; and that it was slowly and with strong repug­
nance, particularly in the case of this writer, that they 
subjected themselves to the authority of the Supreme Chief. 
This historian forgets that there was no central government 
at that time. Necessity forced us, the military chiefs, to 
exercise an independent authority until Bolivar returned 
from abroad and asked us to acknowledge his authority as 
Supreme Chief.
Finally, in order to prove that order and subordina­
tion to authority were my principles, whether operating 
independently q t  under the orders of a chief, I will copy 
completely what the Liberator said at the Congress of
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Angostura. This can be seen in Volume One, page 195 in the 
Documentos de la Vida Pdblica del Libertadort25
General P&ez, who has saved the relics of New 
Granada, has the provinces of Barinas and Casanare 
under the protection of the arms of the Republic.
Both provinces have political and civil governors, 
and such organizations as circumstances will permit. 
Order, subordination, and good discipline reign in 
all parts there, and it does not even seem as if war 
agitates these beautiful provinces. They have 
recognized and given their oath of fielty to the 
supreme authority, and their magistrates deserve the 
confidence of the government.
25The correct title of this work is Coleccidn de
Documentos Relativos a la Vida Pflblica del Libertador de
Colombia y  del Perti, SimOn Bolivar, para servir a la_historia 
de la independencia Suramdricana. 21 vols. (Caracas, 1826-
1829). The rest of P&ez's citation is correct.
CHAPTER XI
Bolivar's Return to Angostura— Morillo Appears 
before San Fernando— Heroic Patriotism of the 
Inhabitants of this City— Interesting Incident 
in my Campaign Against Morillo— Battles Between 
my Forces and the Royalists— My Advice Concern­
ing the Plan of Operations to Adopt Against 
Morillo— Glorious Victory in Queseras del Medio—  
Flight of the Royalists— Bolivar's Proclamation to 
the Brave Men of Apure.
1819
Early in January of this year, the Liberator returned 
to San Juan de Payara.^ However, he had to return to Angos­
tura immediately in order to attend the opening of the 
Congress that was going to assemble there. He left me in 
command of the army and with the power to operate at my dis­
cretion in defending the Apure territory— an area which 
Morillo was threatening to invade with a strong army that 
had been organized for over two months at the site of 
Chorreron, two days' troop-travel time from San Fernando.
I had set up my headquarters in this location [San 
Fernando] shortly after Bolivar's departure, when Morillo
P&ez inserts the following footnote heret "He asked 
me at this time whether I feared that the events £ have 
previously mentioned might not have bad results. I answered
in the negative, for the authors of the plan had been
recalled. Convinced that it was not in their power to take
that step, they had begged me to forget what had occurred.
Then Bolivar was at peace.”
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appeared before that plaza with five thousand infantrymen 
and two thousand cavalrymen. All I had at my command then 
were four thousand men, including both infantrymen (recruits) 
and cavalrymen. Since this army of the Apure was the 
strongest one that the Venezuelan patriots had, I did not 
deem it prudent to expose it to forces that were superior 
not only in numbers, but in quality also. For this reason I 
decided to adopt another type of warfare— a war of movement, 
marches, and countermarches. 1 hoped in this manner to lead 
the enemy to the deserts of Cariben.
Having made this decision, I called a meeting of all 
the citizens of San Fernando. 1 told them of my decision to 
abandon the town and let the enemy cross the Apure and Arauca 
rivers without any opposition in order to lure them to the 
aforementioned-deserts. Those brave citizens accepted my 
decision unanimously and proposed that we reduce the city to 
ashes in order to prevent the enemy from using it as a very 
important military base of operations. They told me at this 
time also that they were all ready to set fire to their homes 
with their own hands when the need arose and then take arms 
and join the liberating army. This sublime resolution was 
carried out when the Royalist army appeared on the left bank 
of the river. Oh I Those were the times when there was a 
true love of liberty!
When Morillo saw the fires, he could do no less than 
confess the impossibility of subjecting peoples of such
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calibre.^ This action on the part of the citizens of San 
Fernando reveals once again that "the citizen who is inter­
ested in promoting the triumph of the cause for which the 
soldier is fighting, will not hesitate to make any sacri­
fice.
It occurs to me now to relate an interesting incident 
that occurred during this campaign. The Royalist army 
crossed the Apure River without opposition, and we retreated 
to the other side of the Arauca. When Morillo had his army 
ready the following day to march in search of us, I ordered 
four savage horses brought to the edge of his camp, approxi­
mately within rifle range. Since it was 10:00 p.m., I 
ordered my men to bind the horses 1 tails with rawhide or 
thongs and release them in the direction of the enemy camp 
while they simultaneously fired some shots. The horses 
bolted out furiously through the camp, and the Spaniards 
believed that a tremendous cavalry charge was upon them. 
Several corps started firing, and disorder spread throughout. 
Our horses wreaked greater havoc in their impetuous flight 
than did the two thousand oxen that Hannibal launched on the 
Roman camp. The Spaniards were not able to march the next 
day* In fact, they lost two or three days reorganizing
^Torrente in his account of this event does not note 
any such thought on Morillo's part. Rather, he mentions the 
exceptional bravery with which Morillo personally led his 
men in the attack of the burning city. Torrente, Historia 
de la Revolucidn. II, 516-17.
^This is P&ez's quotation.
their forces.
After this brief interval, Morillo continued to search 
for us. He encountered us at the Caujaral pass on the Arauca 
River. We had decided to resist his attack here, where we 
were entrenched with some artillery pieces. We exchanged 
uninterrupted fire for two days. Finally, the Spanish chief 
realized that he could not force our position, and so he 
headed toward the Marrereno pass. He arrived there at dawn 
on February 4. I had situated Commandant Fernando Figueredo 
with a squadron of riflemen here, approximately three or four 
leagues from my headquarters. Figueredo was attacked 
vigorously with artillery and inf sultry. Although he resisted 
with admirable daring, he was not able to prevent the Royal­
ists from crossing further down the river, a half-mile from 
the Marrereno pass, in six canoes which they had brought from 
Sam Fernando. When 1 learned from Figueredo that he was 
being attacked by the entire enemy army, I started marching 
with six hundred lancers to reinforce him. However, when I 
arrived, more than one thousand enemy infantrymen had already 
crossed the river.
At this point, when we had the enemy in a position 
where the river served as rearguard, X started to carry out 
my plan. I placed my infantry on Urbana Island, situated in 
the Orinoco River. The rest of the cavalry, the remounts, 
and the emigration from the neighboring towns, I located 
safely. Then X left with eight hundred men to search for the 
enemy. I encountered General [Francisco Tom&s] Morales with
369
three thousand men coming toward the farm at C a n a f i s t o l a . ^  
Realizing that this was not the entire enemy army, I attacked 
it. However, Morales, favored by the forest on the shore of 
the Arauca, started a retreat toward Caujaral which was 
about half-league's distance from Morillo and the rest of 
the army. Our attack now cost Morales dearly, for he lost 
the squadron that had been assigned to him for the purpose 
of getting cattle. He sent four of his men to tell Morillo 
of his predicament. The latter came to his aid with the 
rest of the army. Now 1 organized my eight hundred men into 
four parallel columns forming a square and started a retreat. 
However, this was only after issuing orders that if the 
enemy cavalry charged us, as I expected judging from the fact 
that they outnumbered us two to one, the two rear columns 
were to move forward, pass between the front two, and then 
flank out to the right and to the left. The remaining columns 
were to follow suit and engage the unsuspecting enemy forces 
face-to-face.
Morillo pursued us from 8x00 a.m. until 6x00 p.m.,
4p&ez refers here to Francisco Totn&s Morales who had 
been sent by General Morillo to Venezuela in 1816 to organize 
a Royalist force. Morillo gave Morales only a company of 
foot soldiers and a group of officers. With these and Boves' 
old warriors, Morales was to form two battalions of 1,200 
troops each— the Tercero del Rev and los Cazadores del Rev. 
According to Morillo, his name and influence in Venezuela 
were tremendous. It is true that Morales' arrival in 
Valencia frustrated Bolivar's attempt to disembark in Ocumare. 
Later he operated against P&ez in the Apure campaign.
Lecuna, Crdnica Razonada. I, 414; II, 264.
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almost alwayB at rifle-range distance. Even though his 
cavalry was numerically superior to ours, he never saw fit 
to engage it. We had only a light skirmish which was pro­
voked when Commandant Narciso Ldpez and a squadron of rifle­
men approached to fire from the rear.^ I ordered twenty-five 
men to charge him suddenly. This caught Ldpez so by sur­
prise, that he ordered his riflemen to dismount, even though 
their rifles did not have bayonets. He was saved only because 
our men did not carry out my orders to charge as a platoon.
Morillo spent that night in Congrial de Cunabiche, 
very close to the entrance of the Cariben desert. He did 
not press forward, revealing his tactical experience. He 
had been warned that he would not find any resources and in 
the event of a compulsory retreat, he would also have to 
combat the traps X planned to set at his rear flank.6 On 
the following night, he countermarched, recrossed the Arauca,
^Torrente refers to this as the campaign of the 
trapiche de la Gamarra. Noting a Royalist "victory," he lauds 
the heroism of the "coronel fflprir-ann don Narciso L6 pez. " 
Torrente, Historia de la RevoluciOn, XI, 519.
Narciso L6 pez was a Spanish squadron chief and Morales* 
subalternate. At one time he was charged with watching the 
coast of Chuao preventing Bolivar's possible disembarking.
He assisted actively and capably in Morillo's Apure campaign. 
Lecuna, Crdnica Razonada. I, 464, 473; II, 261-76, 280, 422.
This Narciso Ldpez is not to be confused with the 
Cuban filibusterer who operated in the 1850's. Further 
information on the Cuban Ldpez will be provided in Chapter 
XX, footnote 7, of this manuscript.
g
The Royalist historian agrees with P&ez's evaluation 
on this point. Torrente, Historia de la Revolucion. II, 520.
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and established his headquarters in the city of Achaguas. I 
pressed his retreat with my eight hundred men, and my guer­
rillas molested his front, flanks, and rear guard constantly. 
We took prisoners daily. Above all, we were successful in 
preventing the enemy from getting cattle easily for food 
rations.
One of the guerrilla groups composed of thirty men of 
the Guard, under the command of the untiring Aramendi, 
vigorously attacked the enemy cavalry as it crossed the 
Arauca River along the Caujaral pass. Despite the feats of 
marvel Aramendi performed during his successive charges, he 
was repelled. He lost twelve men, counting the dead and 
captured. Our enemy lost some men, too. Among them was 
Commandant Antonio Ramos who was wounded by a young soldier 
of the Guard called Juan Torralba.7 Torralba, who was being 
pursued by Ramos, had leaped off his horse, run him through 
with his lance, and taken the Spanish leader's horse. Mean­
while Commandant Juan G&mez, who had been ordered to operate 
between the towns of San Fernando and Guasimal, succeeded in
7Captain Juan Torralba or Torrealba joined the patriot 
army in 1813. When Boves subjugated the area to Spanish rule 
again in 1814, he emigrated with Urdaneta to New Granada. In 
1816 he joined the guerrillas in Casanare and went on to 
Apure where he fought with P&ez until 1821. Bolivar promoted 
him to cavalry captain in 1820, back-dating the commission to 
1819. He was Adjutant Major in Colonel Ranjel's Regiment of
"Valientes. 11 Torrealba served as Military Commissioner of 
Barinas and in 1823 became Tobacco Administrator in Barquisi- 
meto. He sided with P&ez and not Bolivar in the break-up of 
Gran Colombia. He died in Barquisimeto in 1854. D&vila, 
Diccionario BioarAfico. II, 312-13.
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destroying the squadron led by the Royalist Commandant Paloma 
near Guasimal as he collected foodstuffs to supply the plaza 
of San Fernando.8
Such was the state of the campaign when Bolivar 
arrived at my headquarters in Caujaral de Cunabiche at the 
end of March determined to seek out and attack the Royalists. 
Having assumed command of the infantry that was in Urbana 
and the rest of the cavalry, he asked me for information con­
cerning the numbers of the enemy army. I assured him that 
they mounted up to six thousand men.9 This was the reason I 
had not engaged all my forces in general combat. Instead I 
was keeping the enemy busy far away from Caracas in order to
give Urdaneta time to occupy that city with the fifteen
*
hundred men that Bolivar had placed at his disposal on the 
island of Margarita. If Morillo marched against them, it was
®There were many men by the name of Juan Gdmez in the 
wars for Venezuelan independence. P&ez does not give enough 
information to identify this one. There was no further infor­
mation available on the Royalist Commandant Paloma.
9PAez inserts the following footnote heret “The 
Liberator did not want to believe that the enemy had such 
strength. However, the European prisoners he had called 
before him gave him the same numbers that I had. He still 
refused to believe it. Asking them the number of battalions 
they had, he counted the troops which composed these, and 
thus ascertained that the enemy could not possibly have more 
than three thousand men. Later, when Bolivar had an inter­
view with Morillo, the latter confessed to him that during 
this time he had seven thousand men." Lecuna cites that on 
January 30 of 1619, Morillo reviewed his troops of six 
thousand two hundred men. Crdnica Razonada, II, 260.
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my intent then to pursue him with all the army.
Bolivar approved this plan, but he remarked that per­
haps we were too far from Morillo to overtake him when he 
marched on Urdaneta. We informed him then that if we got 
any closer with the entire army, the Spanish General could 
force us into battle. Although he agreed with my observa­
tions, he felt it was necessary for the army to cross the 
Arauca in order to expedite the pursuit of Morillo. We 
crossed at San Juan de Payara and then decided to march to 
Achaguas to attack Morillo.
Five leagues from Achaguas, we encountered Valencey's 
second battalion commanded by [jos6} Pereira and two hundred 
cavalrymen led by Narciso Ldpez at the Gamarra sugar mill, 
which was completely surrounded by forests.*0 Bolivar 
ordered four battalions to attack and dispatched them in less 
than fifteen minutes. The enemy, finding out through some 
prisoners that we still had a battalion and two thousand 
cavalrymen in reserve, retreated toward Achaguas. Bolivar 
then busied himself reuniting the scattered men, and later 
countermarched toward the Arauca bank.
The following day, when he learned that Morillo was 
going to attack us, Bolivar called me and asked my advice 
concerning the strategy to adopt. I was somewhat offended, 
for he had not heeded my previous observations. I simply
*°Commandant jos6 Pereira was the Royalist Commandant 
of the Pardos de Valencia. Lecuna, Crdnica Razonada. II,
181.
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told him that I was ready to follow him in whatever plan he 
might adopt, regardless of whether it had my approval. He 
was not satisfied with this; and as if to force me to give 
my opinion, he convoked all the chiefs in a war council. 
General [Carlos] Soublette stated that Bolivar had called 
the meeting with but one object in mind— to hear my 
opinion.H It now seemed foolhardy to me to withhold my 
advice any longer. I repeated then what I had told Bolivar 
previously. I added that we should do everything possible 
not to expose Guayana, for this was our only source of 
securing supplies from abroad; that we should try to con­
serve the infantry, for then Morillo could not march on this 
port as I was certain he wanted to do; and that above all, 
we should try to maintain the army intact for at least a 
year in order to inspire confidence in the patriots.
11-General Soublette was born Carlos Soublette in 
Caracas. He joined the independence army in 1810 and became 
General Miranda's Secretary and Aide in 1811. After the 
disaster of the Battle of La Puerta, he became Major General 
of the Palacios Division. Then he became second in command 
of Mac Gregor's army. He took part in the Junta de Angostura 
and helped to organize the government of the Republic. 
Soublette then took an army that had been victorious in such 
battles as Vargas and BoyacA to join PAez in the Apure region. 
He assisted in taking Caracas in 1821. As Vice-President of 
Venezuela, he activated the campaign of Coro, which he lost 
to Morales in 1822. This same year he served as civil and 
military chief of Venezuela. In 1826 he was Secretary of 
War and Navy in BogotA. When the separation came between 
Venezuela and Colombia in the Juntas of Caracas in November 
of 1829, Soublette followed PAez as his Secretary General. 
Later, he was PAez's Secretary of War and Navy. The people 
of Venezuela elected him to the Presidency in 1837. He died 
in Caracas on February 11, 1870. Scarpetta and Vergara, 
Diccionario BiogrAfico. pp. 201-202.
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After the conference, Bolivar, following the advice 
proffered at the meeting, ordered us to cross the Arauca 
River to avoid an encounter with the enemy. The following 
day, Morillo arrived on the left bank of this river. He made 
camp in Mata del Herradera, a mile further down from where 
we were. At 3i00 p.m. on that very day a cavalry officer 
called Vicente Camero crossed over to us and, before pre­
senting himself to the Supreme Chief, informed me that 
Morillo was planning to make me a prisoner. Morillo's 
strategy would be to attack me with his army as I harassed 
them as usual, separate me from my army, and then send two 
hundred select cavalrymen on his best horses to pursue and 
imprison m e .
At this point, I feel obliged to relate an event that 
occurred when the army began to cross the Arauca, for this 
helps to explain the hatred the Spanish chief had for me. I 
had left that morning very early with about nineteen com­
panions to take the offensive. The enemy had barely seen us 
when Morillo hurled all his cavalry against me. I divided 
my men into small sections. 1 ordered Aramendi, who was in 
charge of one of them, to fire, advance, and retreat, without 
pursuing his harassment. I supported him at the same time 
with the rest of the men. In one of those attacks and 
retreats, Aramendi and Commandant Mina found themselves in 
serious trouble, for they had penetrated too far into the 
enemy lines. Had I not hurried to help them personally, they 
would have been completely surrounded. It was then that the
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Royalists suspended the attack, having lost some cavalry.
Our only loss was a wounded horse. One can easily understand 
now why the Spanish General could not forgive this loss of 
face, and why he would be anxious to make me pay for it with 
interest. I would not be a bad captive for him.
After I heard the officer's account, I ran to see
Bolivar and related Morillo's plan to him. 1 told him that
if he permitted me to cross the river with a small number of
my men, 1 would attract the Royalist forces so that they
would come right in front of where we were. He could set an
ambush on the river bank, using the companies of infantrymen
and cavalry with all their artillery, and deal the Spaniards
a hard blow. I could charge head-on at the same time that
the ambushed forces attacked the enemy's flank. Bolivar
acceded to my wishes, and X crossed the river immediately
with one hundred and fifty men. At a gallop we headed toward
Morillo*s camp. The latter moved to execute his plan. We
kept him busy with frequent charges and retreats until we
led his forces right in front of the spot we had selected for
the ambush. Immediately, the cavalry division posted there
opened fire against the Royalists; however, this division was
not as strong as I had agreed with Bolivar that it should 
12be. Our situation was very difficult then, for the enemy
l-^ljecuna terms this an unjust recrimination of Bolivar 
by PAez. He states that the official bulletin dictated by 
Bolivar on that day reveals that the battle took place beyond 
where Bolivar's infantry was situated. Furthermore, he
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was corralling us on both sides with cavalry and was pursuing 
us relentlessly with rifle and cannon fire. Fortunately at 
this point the valiant Royalist commandant Don Narciso Lbpez 
inadvertently gave me the opportunity to take an advantageous 
offensive. This occurred when Ldpez preceded the infantry 
with his squadron of riflemen. I immediately ordered Com­
mandant Ronddn, one of those leaders in whom valor is a 
custom, and twenty men to charge at open lance and retreat 
post haste before the two divisions of the enemy cavalry 
fenced them in. After that, I wanted them to unite, return, 
and attack the enemy vigorously. Ronddn charged with the 
speed of lightning, and Ldpez imprudently dismounted with his 
riflemen. Ronddn killed some of Ldpez's men and was able to 
effect his retreat without being hemmed in. Then seeing 
that the two enemy cavalry sections had united, and the 
objective of Ronddn's attack fulfilled, I ordered my men to 
wheel around and attack with the spirit and courage they 
used in their most desperate moment.
It was now that the lance, arm of the heroes of 
antiquity, in the hands of my one hundred and fifty men, 
wreaked no less havoc than it did during Homer's times. It 
has become part of historical legend how three hundred 
Spartans, arms in hand and at the mouth of a narrow passage,
states that P&ez recrossed the Arauca at the mouth of Cancero 
and returned to camp the next day at seven in the morning, 
ample proof of the fact that the fighting had taken place 
far from the camp. Crdnica Razonada, II, 281-82.
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resisted until death the assaults of the armies of the King 
of Persia— armies so numerous that their arrows clouded the 
sun. it has also been related that one sole Roman disputed 
the passage of a bridge to an entire enemy army. Is not the 
action now executed by the one hundred and fifty patriots of 
Apure comparable to these feats7 Homer's heroes and the 
companions of Leonidas had but to deal with the personal 
valor of their adversaries. The Apurenos, on the other hand, 
with their bare arms, had to also battle that enemy element 
that Cervantes called a "diabolic invention, with which an 
infamous and cowardly arm, that perhaps trembles as the 
machinery goes into operation, cuts down and terminates in a 
moment the thoughts of life of someone who deserved to enjoy 
them many years."
As I saw Randdn gather so many laurels on the field 
of battle, I could do no less than exclaims "Bravo, Bravls- 
imo, Commandante." "General," he answered and alluded to my 
reprimand after the charge made on Ldpez a few days earlier, 
"General, thus fight the sons of the Alto Llano."
Everything contributed to giving that battle a quality 
of terrible sublimity. The night approached accompanied by 
its shadows. The dust raised by the horses of both sets of 
combatants mingled with the powder smoke. It all recalled 
the sublime exasperation of the impetuous Ajax when he begged 
the Gods to scatter the clouds so that he could fight the 
Greeks by the clear light of the sun.
The enemy cavalry fled. The infantry saved itself by
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taking refuge in the forest. The artillery left its pieces 
on the field. However, we could not see the latter because 
of the darkness of night. Finally, long before dawn, Morillo 
started a retreat toward Achaguas.
Bolivar and the rest of the army chiefs had witnessed 
the fray from across the river. Later he confessed to me 
that he had not been able to sleep that night for fear that 
I might have been killed. Yet on that very morning of April 
3, a few hours before Camero had come to me, Bolivar, with 
his characteristic impetuousness, had been most impatient 
with the army's state of inactivity and had wanted very much 
to enter into action.
"Patience, General," 1 said to him. "Behind a hill 
there is a plain. He who knows how to await the good he 
desires, does not take the road of losing patience the 
minute it does not arrive."
"PatienceI Patience 1" he answered me. "Many times 
there is as much laziness as weakness in allowing oneself to 
be directed by patience. How much of this virtue do we need 
to resist the bitter privations that we suffer— the sun 
blazing like fire itself; the wind, dust, and carbon; the 
meat from a thin bull, eaten without bread or salt; and as a 
complement, dirty water. If I do not desert, it is because 
I do not know where to go."
These temper fits on Bolivar's part were not brought 
on because his spirit failed him in adversity. Rather, they 
were only the result of the natural impatience possessed by
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men of impetuous character who wish to gather the fruits of 
their vigilance and fatigues as soon as possible. When we 
joined Bolivar after the battle, he gave the Cross of 
Liberators to the one hundred and fifty warriors and issued 
the following proclamation.
To the Brave Hen of the Army of Apure 
"Soldiers 1 You have just executed the most extra­
ordinary feat that the military history of nations cam cele­
brate. One hundred and fifty men, or rather one hundred and 
fifty heroes, guided by the dauntless General P&ez, deliber­
ately attacked Morillo's entire Spamish army head on. 
Artillery, infantry, cavalry, nothing has been too much for 
the enemy to use to defend itself from the one hundred and 
fifty companions of the very intrepid P&ez. The cavalry 
columns have succumbed to the blow of our lances; the 
infantry has searched for am asylum in the forest; the fire 
of their cannons has stopped before our horses. Only the 
shadows could have saved that army of vile tyramts from com­
plete and absolute destruction.
"Soldiers 1 What has been done is only a prelude to 
what you can do. Prepare yourselves for battle and rely on 
the victory that you carry implicit on the points of your 
lances and of your bayonets.
382
"Headquarters in the Potreritos Marrerenos, April 3,
1819.
Bolivar."^
This battle took place at Queseras del Medio. Morillo 
in his account calls it the Herradera. The Royalist his­
torian, Torrente, to make the defeat appear less shameful, 
states that ours were five hundred llaneros of gigantic 
stature and herculean musculature.^  Bolivar had the enemy's 
dead counted, and the number came close to five hundred. We 
had only two fatalities, Isidoro Mugica and first corporal 
Manuel Martinez. Our wounded included among others, Lieu­
tenant Colonel Manuel Arraiz, and Captains Francisco Antonio 
Salazar and Juan Santiago Torres.1 5 The width of these men's
i^This proclamation can also be found in Lecuna (ed.), 
Proclamas y  Discursos, 237.
14rorrente * s exact quotation is as follows i *'E1 
faccioso P&ez perdid una gran parte de su cdlebre quardia de 
honor. compuesta de 500 feroces llaneros de los mas aguerridos 
i  diestros en el. maneio del caballoi los realistas ouedaron 
sorprendidoa al examiner el campo de batalla. cubierto de 
cadaveres de figure gigantesca. i  de hercules musculature. 
Tales fueron las tropes vencidas en dicha Batalla." Historia 
de la Revolucidn. II, 519.
1 5 No biographical data can be found on Captains Sala­
zar and Torres. Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Arraiz was a 
native of Venezuela. His military career in these wars of 
independence is intimately linked with P&ez’s military cam­
paigns. He fought in Mata de la Miel, Mucuritas, Calabozo, 
Misidn de Abajo, semen, and Ortiz among other battles. His 
biographers list him as having been wounded on June 22, 1819 
at the Battle of la Cruz rather than at Queseras del Medio. 
Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario Bioqr&fico. p. 31.
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wounds and the fact that they were on the men's backs, 
revealed to us that they had been wounded by our own men in 
the confusion and darkness of the battle.
CHAPTER XII
Pursuit of Morillo— Encounter in "Sacra Familia"
— I March Against Morales— The Ambush in Caramacate 
— Bolivar Joins Me in Achaguas— March to Barinas—  
Bolivar Orders Me to March to Guasdualito to Arrest 
Nonato Pdrez— My Opinion About Marching to New 
Granada Instead of Going Toward Barinas— The Liberator 
Writes Me at Guasdualito— Joins Me at This Place—  
Marches to New Granada and I Remain Operating in the 
Apure— Action at La Cruz— Heroic Defense by the 
Spaniards— Penalties Suffered in the March to 
Achaguas— Capture of Eleven Royalist Ships— Occupa­
tion of the Apure by the Forces Under My Command in 
the Year 1820— Morillo Sends Commissioners to the 
Patriot Generals— Interview between Morillo and 
Bolivar in Santa Ana— Armistice— My Opinion About 
the Suspension of Hostilities— Morillo Embarks for 
Spain— Evaluation of Morillo's Campaigns.
1819-1820
When Morillo marched toward Achaguas, Bolivar immedi­
ately recrossed the Arauca and ordered Colonel Munoz and the 
Guard to follow him. The following day while we were marching 
westward on the left bank of the Arauca, we saw some distance 
from us, close to the Trujillo farm, a group of either people 
or animals on the plains. We could not distinguish beyond 
this because of the morning fog. Bolivar ordered a halt and 
sent me out to reconnoitre. I discovered an enemy squadron 
corralling cattle for the army stationed in the aforementioned 
farm. As I approached, the squadron retreated to rejoin the 
rest of the army. Discovering this, I hurried back to tell 
Bolivar. He resolved to fall back to the bank of the river
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and recross it again to avoid an encounter, for he thought 
it would be too risky. Since the Guard was away pursuing 
Morillo, and the rest of the cavalry under Ranjel and other 
leaders had gone to take Nutrias and operate behind Morillo, 
we did not have sufficient forces to oppose the enemy.
At the same time Morillo raised camp and continued 
retreating toward Achaguas. In so doing he escaped the sur­
prise ambush that the Guard had set the previous night in a 
mata next to the camp while the Royalist were eating.^
Munoz, the leader of the Guard, notified the rest of us of 
Morillo's movement and said that he would continue pursuing 
the latter. However, his communique arrived after we had 
recrossed the river and missed the favorable opportunity to 
finish off the Spanish army. Already demoralized by the last 
defeat in Queseras del Medio, this army would not have been 
able to resist us if we, assisted by the Guard, had attacked 
thent so we continued our march toward the West along the 
right bank of the Arauca to the "Caraballero” farm where we 
again forded the river. From there Bolivar went to Rincon 
Hondo. The Guard and I continued marching toward Achaguas.
My advance guards notified me then that Morillo had ordered 
a cavalry section and some infantry to herd cattle. I 
ordered a part of the Guard to attack them immediately. They 
encountered the Royalists in a place called "Sacra Familia"
Ip&ez footnotes this as followst "A mata is a portion 
of terrain populated with trees of only one specie.”
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where they forced them to abandon the animals they had 
already corralled. After a few losses the Royalists, aided 
by the thickets that covered the area, returned to Achaguas.
After the Guard rejoined us, we continued the march 
toward Achaguas. I had to interrupt this march, however, 
when I learned that Morillo was abandoning this city and 
heading toward the province of Barinas with his headquarters 
and part of the army, and that the rest of the forces under 
Morales ' s command were heading in the direction of San 
Fernando. I decided then to overtake Morales; but X was 
unable to do this despite all my efforts.
About 7i00 p.m. that day we captured a man from the 
Canary Isles who had stayed behind with some supplies. He 
informed me that the Royalist army was camped in that 
vicinity. Since that terrain was too wooded, X did not want 
to attack Morales there. Flanking his forces, I decided to 
set am ambush at the spring at Caramacate and attack him by 
surprise the next day as he passed.
We marched all night and arrived at this place. By 
dawn X haul begun to carry out my plan. I set my men in an 
ambush. A little ahead of the spring, I placed a company of 
riflemen with orders to fire as if wanting to dispute the 
enemy's passage. At this moment the men were to come sud­
denly out of ambush and try to cut the enemy in the center. 
With this stratagem I hoped to destroy a part of the Royalist 
army. I knew that a lack of infantry and the wooded terrain 
would keep me from destroying it completely.
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The enemy approached and would have surely fallen into 
our trap had not one of those errors which are so fatal in 
wars, occurred about a mile from us to frustrate our wise 
plans. The advance guard that led our munitions had stayed 
a little behind, and it was attacked by a squadron of our 
cavalry under the command of captain N. Sandoval who was 
looking over the area of the San Fernando plaza. He and the 
Guard both believed they had stumbled on part of the enemy 
army and fired on each other within sight of the enemy. The 
latter stopped to find out what was happening.
When I heard the shooting and was told that the 
advance guard had been taken prisoner, it did not seem pru­
dent to remain in ambush any longer. When I came out and 
saw the enemy nearby, I realized the fatal mistake which had 
victimized us. Because of this the Royalist army was able to 
continue its march with impunity. Still and all, it always 
bordered the forest until entering the plaza a league away.
Meanwhile I marched toward Achaguas where Bolivar 
arrived after ordering his infantry to Mantecal. From 
Achaguas we left together and headed toward Barinas. When 
the army was united in the farm of canafistola, next to the 
Setenta Pass where we were going to cross the Apure River, 
Bolivar ordered a halt. He commanded me to go to Guasdualito 
to arrest colonel Nonato P6 rez and to take charge of his 
forces, including over five hundred horses that he had 
pastured there.
The night before my departure I had a conference with
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Colonel Ranjel, and I told him that 1 did not approve of 
Bolivar's march to Barinas because we would not find 
resources there for an army which was already suffering 
scarcities of all kinds. Instead of going to Barinas, where 
Bolivar said that we would at least get tobacco to sell in 
Guayana and thus get some money, I thought that greater 
advantages could be gained if Bolivar directed his march to 
New Granada through Casanare. The plan seemed very good to 
Ranjel, and he begged me not to leave without telling the 
Supreme Chief about it. Even though I offered to do this, I 
did not, for I was still most reluctant to give Bolivar my 
opinion on plans and operations.
While I was in route to Guasdualito, Colonel Jacinto 
Lara arrived.2 He had been sent by General Santander to
2General Jacinto Lara was born in Carora in 1780. He 
joined the revolutionary forces in 1810 and participated 
actively in Miranda's campaign. When Venezuela was recon­
quered by Spain in 1812, he joined Nicolas Bricefto and 
together they went to Bolivar in Cticuta and there with one 
hundred and forty-three cavalry formed the nucleus of a Vene­
zuelan fighting force. They were defeated by the Spanish 
General Tizcar in Barinas in 1613. He escaped this attack 
miracuously and rejoined Briceno and General Marino. Later 
he fought with P&ez in the Battles of Los Cocos, San Fernando, 
and Mata de la Miel. He accompanied Santander in the Casa­
nare campaign on New Granada. In 1820 he took Santa Marta. 
Bolivar added him to his army, took him to the Battle of 
Bombona, and then joined him to General ValdAz who headed 
the first auxiliary Colombian Division to Peril. in 1824 he 
lost the Battle of Matara. Then he joined Sucre and com­
manded the reserve battalions in the Battle of Ayacucho.
With Sucre he entered La Paz in 1825. Although he was exiled 
from Perti in 1827 by Colonel Bustamente, he returned to serve 
it ably. Decorated with the Order of Liberator and medals of 
Liberators of Venezuela, BoyacA, Junin, and Ayacucho, he died 
in Barquisimeto in 1859. Scarpetta and Vergara, Dlccionario 
BioqrAfico, 251-53.
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inform the Liberator of the favorable results of his opera­
tions in Casanare and of the enthusiasm of the Granadines 
for the Independence Cause. A junta was convoked over which 
Bolivar presided. Its members were AnzoAtegui, Pedro LeOn 
Torres, Soublette, Ranjel, Iribarren, Pedro Briceno Mendez,
■J
Ambrosio Plaza, and Manrique. They unanimously approved
^General Pedro Ledn Torres was born in Carora in 1790. 
He joined the independence army in 1810 as a sublieutenant. 
General Monteverde imprisoned him in 1813, but he escaped and 
sought out Bolivar. He fought in the Battles of San Mateo, 
Maturln, La Puerta, Sombrero, SAmen, and Cojedes with aston­
ishing bravery. He was Bolivar's companion in the expedition 
of Los Cayos and in the glorious march of Ocumare. He stayed 
and fought with Pdez in Venezuela. In the Battle of Bombona, 
he received both the Order of the Liberator and his mortal 
wound. He died in 1822 in Yacuanquer, having been defeated 
only once {La Hogaza) in the thirty battles in which he fig­
ured prominently. Ibid.. 631-32.
General Pedro BriceHo Mfendez was born in Barinas and 
studied Philosophy and Law at the Universities of MArida and 
Caracas. He married Benigna Palacios, daughter of Juana 
Bolivar, the Liberator's sister. He joined Bolivar in CCicuta 
and served as his Secretary in the campaigns of 1813, 1814, 
and 1815. In 1816 he went in the expedition of Los Cayos 
and went on in Aguacates with MacGregor. In 1817 he was 
Piar's Secretary. He returned to Bolivar's service as a 
colonel and became Secretary of War and Navy in Angostura. 
Accompanying Bolivar in the Campaign of New Granada, he was 
one of those who signed the Treaty regulating war in 1820.
In 1823 he was promoted to General of Brigade and was Secre­
tary of War and Navy in BogotA until 1825 when he became 
Minister Plenipotentiary to the Congress of Panama. He was 
a Senator in Colombia in 1627, and in 1828 became PAez's 
Secretary and Intendant of Venezuela. In 1835 he became a 
Venezuelan Senator and died that same year in Curazao.
DAvila, Dlccionario BioqrAfico. I, 49-50.
General Ambrosio Plaza was born in BogotA in 1790. He 
joined the revolutionary cause and Bolivar in Cdcuta. With 
Bolivar he entered Trujillo in 1813 and was with him also in 
MArida when he announced his "war to the death." In 1814 he 
was victorious in BogotA. Later he was forced to emigrate 
and join PAez in the llanos where he fought at the Battles 
of Achaguas, Yagual, Barinas, and Canafistola among others.
He was killed at the Battle of Carabobo in 1821 while
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the plan of moving the campaign to New Granada.
The day after 1 got to Guasdualito, Ranjel came to me 
accompanied by Lieutenant Juan Jose Flores, later General 
and President of Ecuador, with a note from Bolivar, in his 
own handwriting. In this letter he told me that Ranjel had 
informed him of my opinion on the advantages of going to New 
Granada instead of heading toward Barinas. Since he approved 
of this idea, I was to wait for him in Guasdualito. There I 
could decide which of the two of us would be the leader to 
go to New Granada. If I went, he would go to the East to 
form an army against Caracas. If he were selected to go, 
then I was to remain in the Apure and safeguard it at all 
costs, even if all other areas were lost.
When Bolivar joined me in Guasdualito, I thanked him 
for the deference he had shown me in his letter, and I told 
him that then as always I was ready to approve and carry out 
whatever he decided. He told me that he thought it was 
better for him to go to New Granada, for he was better known 
there, and for me to stay in the Apure— an area, which as he 
had stated in his letter, it was necessary to preserve at 
all costs.
On June 4th Bolivar was already in the town of Arauca, 
and by the eleventh of the same month he had joined
attacking the retreating Spanish Valencey Division. His 
close friend and rival. General Cedeno, was also killed in 
this attack. Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario Biogr&fico. 
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Santander's division. In accordance with what we had agreed, 
I remained safeguarding the Apure with the special charge of 
diverting the enemy's attention along the road from San 
Camilo to Cdcuta, and to penetrate if possible as far as the 
valleys of this name. To do this it was necessary to destroy 
some strong guerrilla forces, which under the command of 
Commandant Silva, had taken shelter in Guaca. I directed my 
attention to this immediately, for it can easily be seen 
that it would be unwise to leave them behind me. I succeeded 
in dispersing these guerrillas; however, I could not destroy 
them completely since it was impossible for me to pursue 
them in those wooded areas that were inaccessible to our 
cavalry.
While I was in Guaca, I found out that the enemy had 
one place between Cticuta and San Cristobal that was fortified 
and garrisoned, called San Josesito. It was impossible to 
take this place, particularly with cavalry, because to reach 
it we would have to traverse twenty leagues of wooded area 
and clay pits that had no pasture for our horses. In view of 
these insurmountable obstacles,4 i decided to return to
4p&ez inserts the following footnote here. "Baralt 
says that I did not want to go to Cdcuta in accordance with 
the instructions that the Liberator had given m e . The reader 
has already seen the obstacles that prevented us from doing 
so. Furthermore, remember that Bolivar had recommended 
nothing as highly to me as safeguarding the Apure, which 
would have been abandoned if I insisted on committing the 
reckless undertaking of penetrating into the Valleys of 
Cdcuta." This quotation may be found in Baralt and Diaz, 
Resflmen de la Historia, II, 457.
392
Achaguas to organize an infantry and cavalry force with which 
to penetrate to Ouanare in the province of Barinas. Here 1 
proposed to prevent General La Torre from crossing to aid 
the Royalists of New Granada.
After organizing my forces, I started marching. At 
the Frio Pass, however, seeing the obstacles presented to us 
by the flooded plains and overflowing rivers, 1 ordered the 
infantry composed of Creoles and Englishmen to return to 
Achaguas. 1 headed toward Guanare with only the cavalry and 
left the city of Nutrias to one side, for I could not attack 
the plaza here without sufficient infantry forces. Before 
leaving I gave Colonel Aramendi orders to attack the capital 
of Barinas with the regiment of "La Muerte," to disperse or 
distract the forces he had defeated a few days earlier, and 
then to join me in Guanare.
On the seventeenth I continued my march along the 
road that leads to the town of La Cruz, which was the best 
one according to my guides, in order to enlist the guerrillas 
that operated in that area. After a march of three consecu­
tive days, without finding any provisions for our troops nor 
even a dry spot on which to rest, we camped on the evening 
of the nineteenth a league away from La Cruz. My spies 
informed me now that a column of three hundred and fifty 
infantrymen and some riflemen, under the command of Lieutenant 
Colonel [Juan] Duran, had just taken possession of the town. 
Their objective in doing this was many-foldt to defeat the 
guerrillas; to continue operations in those areas; to burn
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the town; to destroy the plantations; and to take the inhab­
itants prisoners to Nutrias.
I prepared immediately to attack this column. By 
dawn of the twenty-second, with the enemy unaware of our 
movements, we were at the edge of the town. While I was 
organizing the attack, one of my riflemen fired a shot acci­
dentally. In order not to give the Royalists time to prepare 
a defense, 1 ordered the Guard to advance immediately on the 
plaza. This could not be achieved without arousing the enemy 
forces. They had fortified themselves in the Church by the 
time the Guard got there, and easily repelled their attacks.
I charged with the rest of the forces as far as the corners 
of the plaza where the Church was located. My hussars 
entered the battle. When they had penetrated to the center 
of the plaza, I ordered the Guard to attack again. One 
hundred Royalist lancers from the Barinas regiment charged 
my hussars with bayonets and forced them to fall back to a 
corner of the plaza as the Ckiard penetrated to attack the 
Royalists from the rear. By an unfortunate coincidence, the 
lancers of Barinas were dressed in uniforms like those of my 
hussars. This deceived the Guard, particularly because the 
dense powder smoke prevented distinguishing objects clearly; 
consequently, they suspended the attack immediately. The 
Royalists then broke out with a terrible firing, and the 
Guard was forced to retreat. In this charge Colonel Urquiola 
and Captain Prado were among those killed. Several other 
officers and soldiers were wounded.
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The enemy, realizing that the Church did not offer 
them a very advantageous defense, abandoned it and took 
cover in a tiled house with a mud-wall fence that was about 
a block away from the Church. Here they rejected our 
repeated attacks. We would return to charge with such courage, 
that the officers even cut the balusters of the windows with 
their sabers and the soldiers strained themselves in knocking 
down the big door of the house. Exposed to the killing fire 
that the Royalists could discharge from their advantageous 
position, we had to suspend the attack on more than one 
occasion. In one of these attacks Captain Pedro Juan Gamarra 
was killed while penetrating through an opening formed 
between the fence and the walls of the house.^
The greater part of the Spanish officers had been 
killed or wounded by this time. These valiant men had been 
led by a corporal, a Venezuelan, who exhorted his companions 
to let themselves be killed rather than surrender to the 
enemies of the King. I realized then that it would be impos­
sible to penetrate there without the necessary tools to open 
a breacht so I gave orders to suspend the attack. I assured 
my men that by that very night we would be masters of the 
house. I placed four groups of unmounted hussars in the
^Captain Pedro Juan Gamarra enlisted in the indepen­
dence cause in 1816, joined P&ez, and participated actively 
in the Apure campaigns. He was promoted to the rank of 
Captain in 1818 and died heroically in 1819 at the Battle of 
La Cruz. D&vila, Diccionario Biogr&fico. I, 167.
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adjacent houses and ordered them to fire at the windows 
occupied by the Royalists. My men wrought great havoc on 
their defenders now, crowded together as they were in that 
narrow enclosure and obstructed by a multitude of cadavers.
At nightfall I organized my forces for the attack. 
Rather late, I had discovered a path that had escaped my 
observation during the morning assaults. We attacked the 
house at this spot and occupied it with little resistance.
The Commandant, thirty soldiers, and the heroic corporal 
escaped at the moment our men entered, guided by the ungrate­
ful American, Captain Yarza. We found only a multitude of 
cadavers and wounded men in the house. With reason the 
Spanish said in the communique they issued on this encounter 
that "that house was not defended by troops of the King, but 
by a sad hospital overflowing with blood." This capitulation 
was very favorable for us, however, for we took munitions and 
over two hundred stored rifles.
Our losses consisted of five officers, four sergeants, 
and two soldiers who were killed, and eleven officers and 
eighty-five soldiers who were wounded. Among the dead were 
the already-cited Colonel urquiola. Lieutenant colonel Navarro, 
Captain Pedro Juan Gamarra and Lieutenant Pedro GOmez.6 Among 
the wounded were Colonel Juan GOmez, Lieutenant Colonel 
Manuel Arraiz, Captain RamOn Esteves, Lieutenant Fructuoso
^Except for Pedro Juan Gamarra, no information is 
available on any of these men.
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Esteves and Second Lieutenants Romualdo Salas, Encarnacidn 
Castillo, Eusebio Ledesma, Julian Pena, LeOn Esteves, Pedro
7
Olivar and Juan Aspre.
General Torres, Colonel Ranjel, Colonel Munoz, and 
Lieutenant Colonel Laurencio Silva distinguished themselves 
for their daring and courage and were the first to assault 
the windows with their swords. Colonel [Francisco] Carmona, 
Lieutenant Colonel Jacinto Mirabal, and Lieutenant Tom&s 
Castej6n also distinguished themselves for their bravery.®
7 N o  further information was available on Captain Ramdn 
Esteves, Lieutenant Fructuoso Esteves, and Second Lieutenants 
Romualdo Salas, Encarnacidn Castillo, Eusebio Ledesma, Ledn 
Esteves, Pedro Olivar and Juan Aspre. Juli&n Pefia received a 
commission in the cavalry from the government of Gran Colombia 
in November of 1826, back-dating it to 1819. In 1826 he was 
stationed in Barinas and retired in 1830. DAvila, Diccionario 
Biogr&fico, II, 80.
®No further information is available on Lieutenant 
Colonel Jacinto Mirabal. Colonel Francisco Carmona was a 
native of Maturin. By 1812 he was fighting against the Royal­
ists in the Battle of Puerto Cabello. He fought with Marino 
and was at the victory of Bocachica in 1814. Displaying 
marked bravery, he was at the Battle of Carabobo. He was part 
of General Piar's Honor CAtard when Bolivar sent Cedeno to 
arrest the latter; Carmona allowed Piar to be captured only 
because he wanted to obey the Liberator's order. In 1819 he 
was one of the one hundred and fifty men selected by P&ez to 
cross the Arauca and defy Morillo's six thousand. He also 
fought in the Battles of Quesera del Medio and La Cruz. After 
liberating Ocana in 1820, Carmona went on to defeat the 
Spanish in the Santa Marta province. In 1830 he supported 
the movement in Santa Marta favoring Urdaneta as Commandant 
General of the liberating army. He was defeated by General 
Mosquera in 1841 during the Revolution of 1840. In 1853 he 
was assassinated in his home. Scarpetta and Vergara, 
Diccionario BioqrAfico. 89-91.
Lieutenant TomAs Castej6 n joined the revolutionary 
cause in 1814 and fought in the Apure campaigns. In 1819 he 
was promoted to Lieutenant and to Captain in 1830. In 1835 he 
fought against the Reformistas and retired in 1636. DAvila, 
Diccionario BioqrAfico. I, 77.
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The events that we have just related gives proof that 
the Royalist soldier did not slacken before danger. This 
was particularly true when they had leaders such as the one 
that resisted us in the town of La Cruz.
The forces under my command were weakened after this 
heated battle. and it was not possible for me to continue the 
march to Guanare. I decided then to retreat toward Achaguas 
and guard my wounded in such a manner that they would not be 
imprisoned by the enemy troops stationed at the plaza at 
Nutrias as we passed close to it. We had to endure great 
privations during this march, subsisting only on wild fruits, 
crossing flooded estuaries, and swimming across some deep 
ravines.
When we got to the town of Santa Catalina. I shipped 
the wounded to Achaguas. I crossed the Apure River by the 
Frio Pass and again established my headquarters in that city. 
On September 3 commandant Antonio Diaz joined me here with a 
fleet of gunboats.9 Knowing that the enemy had another
9Antonio Diaz was a naval captain and was born in Vene­
zuela. He fought in the Battle of Cartagena and the siege of
Puerto Cabello. In January of 1816 he left the Cayos with 
Bolivar to undertake the invasion of Venezuela. Later this 
year he helped board and capture the ships Intrepido and Rita. 
Assisting Admiral Bribn in 1817. he helped recapture the ships 
lost in Casacaima. He was victorious at the Battle of Guiria 
in 1818 and again in Pozuelos in 1819. His fame was well-
established after his victory at Apure Seco. He assisted
Bribn in the Magdalena campaign and was part of the brilliant 
squadron that took Santa Marta in 1820 and Cartagena in 1821. 
Later he assisted in securing the surrender of Maracaibo and 
Puerto cabello. He became Commandant General of Angostura in 
1824. Scarpetta and Vergara. Diccionario BioqrAfico. 130.
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squadron of eleven armed launches in the port of Nutrias 
ready to come down to join those in San Fernando, I ordered 
Diaz to locate his ships at the mouth of the Apure Seco and 
remain hidden there to make a surprise attack on the enemy 
fleet as it came down the river. Diaz did this on September 
30 in front of the town of Apurito. He won a complete victory, 
for he took possession of all eleven enemy ships. According 
to my further orders, Diaz then came down with his fleet to 
the mouth of the Portuguesa River to prevent any supplies 
from reaching the San Fernando plaza along this river or the 
Apure. While he was there, he was attacked by the enemy 
fleet from San Fernando. He routed this fleet to the point 
that the men thrust their launches on the left bank of the 
Portuguesa and defended the ships carrying the enemy infantry 
from land. Diaz then returned to Achaguas with the wounded.
The only fatality in this battle was Diaz1s second in com­
mand, Commandant M. Munoz.
Early in October, while I was in my Yagual Farm, Gen­
eral Soublette came to see me on his way to Angostura. He 
informed me that there were fifteen hundred recruits in 
Guasdualito under the command of Colonel Justo Briceno that 
the Liberator had ordered be placed under my c o m m a n d . X
10General Justo Bricefio was born in MArida in 1790.
He joined the revolutionary cause against the Spanish in 1810 
and emigrated to Trinidad in 1813. He fought with Marino in 
the Battles of Tucupedo, Lizania, Bocachico and Carabobo. He 
was forced to emigrate again, joined the Cayos expedition, 
and was named chief of the Cazadores battalion. He was
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ordered these to come down from Achaguas. With these 
recruits and others that were arriving continually from New 
Granada, we formed several battalions. After being dis­
ciplined in Apure, these battalions served to reinforce the 
Liberating army that was to operate west of Caracas when 1 
opened the campaign of 1820.
Almost all of the year 1820 was spent in enlisting and 
disciplining recruits and pasturing the horses. We also 
herded and castrated bulls and then pastured them in order 
to have a ready meat supply when the army opened the campaign. 
We also sent arms to New Granada. Despite our relative 
inactivity during this period, the army of Apure remained a 
permanent threat against the Royalists forces in Venezuela 
and thus prevented their union with those in New Granada.
The only movement made during this time was a march 
to Barinas in January. We ran into Bolivar on the way, for 
he was coming from New Granada headed toward Guayana. He 
spent one night with me, and I told him then that this march 
was solely a diversion. It would protect the guerrillas I 
had operating on the plains of Calabozo, San Carlos, and that 
very province, and at the same time offer my troops some
defeated in carupano and Aguacates in 1814; but he went on 
to fight victoriously in the Battles of carabobo, Cumbre de 
Valencia, and Puerto Cabello. Accompanying Valero, he was 
part of the auxiliary army to Perd. He opposed P&ez in the 
pronouncement of 1826, and in 1830 defended Bolivar's dic­
tatorship. In 1848 he defended the Monagas dictatorship and 
by 1865 was General in chief. He died in Caracas in 1868. 
Ibid., 63-64. DAvila, Diccionario BioorAfico. I, 51-52.
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movement and activity. Bolivar approved this and continued 
his march toward Guayana. I continued toward Barinas and 
occupied the city. After staying there a few days. I returned 
to Apure on the Nutrias road without encountering any diffi­
culty.
While I was in San Juan de Payara in August, Lieu­
tenant Colonel JalOn came to me. He had been commissioned by 
Morillo to propose a suspension of hostilities. I answered 
that my operations depended on orders from the government and 
that I was not authorized to enter into any sort of negotia­
tions with the enemy. Morillo then sent two commissioners,
Don Juan Clres and Don josd Domingo Duarte, to propose peace 
negotiations. The Congress replied on July 11, "That it was 
anxious to establish peace and would listen with pleasure to 
all the propositions made by the Spanish government if these 
had as their basis the acknowledgment of the sovereignty and 
independence of Colombia."
Commissioners were also sent to Bolivar. Since he was 
away, he delegated his power to Pedro Briceno Mgndez and to 
Urdaneta. These two openly refused to accept the proposition 
made to them to return to obedience to the King, despite all 
the guarantees that were offered Colombia. They also replied 
to the Spanish that the patriot leaders were deeply offended 
by the promise made to preserve their ranks in the Spanish 
army in return for helping effect a reconciliation with the 
old metropolis.
For the time being the negotiations failed to produce
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any results. A little later Bolivar wrote Morillo from Sam 
CristobAl on September 21, telling him that notwithstanding 
the harm that could befall the Republican forces in suspend­
ing hostilities, he had decided to enter negotiations for the 
armistice that he had proposed as long as Colombia was 
granted the guarantees and securities that she had a right to 
demand. Morillo, in a letter dated October 20 in San Carlos, 
answered by inviting Bolivar to enter the preliminary 
negotiations necessary to sign an armistice.
After having filled the thoughts of the reader with 
the terrible scenes of war, it is indeed pleasant to mention 
one of the most notable episodes of these times when passion 
ceded to reason and ended the horrors that had been committed 
as much by those who defended the sacred rights of the father­
land as by those who supported despotism. On November 21,
1820 the leaders of the belligerent forces, anxious to end 
the war of extermination with which they had horrified the 
world, concluded a treaty in Trujillo to regulate the conduct 
of the war according to the practices of civilized countries. 
They agreed to treat prisoners of war generously; to exchange 
them for others of equal rank and class; to respect the 
inhabitants of the towns occupied by military forces; and 
finally, to do all those things that civilized countries are 
apt to do during times of war. Among the articles it is 
noteworthy to call attention to the seventh, couched in these 
terms t "Since this war started because of differences of 
opinion with the combatants finding themselves allied by very
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close ties and relations and thus anxious to prevent as much 
bloodshed as possible, it is now established that the mili­
tary or employees who had previously served either of the 
two governments and who had deserted its banners and then 
enlisted on the other side, cannot be subject to capital 
punishment.— The same shall be understood with respect to 
the spies of one or the other side."
With the treaties of November 25th and 26th concluded, 
General Morillo invited the Liberator to a conference in the 
town of Santa Ana. Bolivar, accompanied by his staff, 
arrived and was received by the Spanish chief with every 
respect, offers of friendship, and professed admiration.
After ten years of horrors and hatred to the death, Spain 
and Colombia seemed to have reached a reconciliation that no 
one would have deemed possible. Spanish character, noble and 
generous always, did not belie itself in that conference 
between men who had fought like beasts in one hundred battle­
fields. All of the participants, setting aside inveterate 
hatreds, praised each other and cited with admiration the 
most glorious deeds performed by the enemy while they broke 
the bread of fraternity in a friendly banquet. General 
Morillo proposed that a monument be erected on that spot to 
recall that memorable day, and the Liberator embraced the idea 
with the enthusiasm with which he always viewed all acts of 
generosity. The first stone was laid, and both generals 
embraced. The officers that accompanied them followed suit.
At the banquet the Liberator toasted "the heroic
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tenacity of the combatants of both armies— their constancy, 
sufferings, and unequaled valor; the worthy men that despite 
the horrors of war sustained and defended their liberty; the 
wounded of both armies who manifested their intrepidness, 
their dignity, and their character.— Eternal hatred to those 
who desire bloodshed and will spill it unjustly.
General Morillo responded by saying: "May God punish
those who are not animated by the same sentiments of peace 
and friendship that we c u re ."  The Spanish General La Torre 
said to Bolivar, full of enthusiasm: "We shall descend
together to the hells in pursuit of tyrants."
History does not present a more beautiful or grandiose 
scene. Such a spectacle proves that the human heart, no 
matter how hard passions might make it, always maintains a 
remnant of sensitivity that needs only a simple act to reveal 
all its grandeur.
The historianCsl Baralt [and Diaz] state that some 
patriot chieftains disapproved of this armistice.^ since 
my silence now could include me in this group, I want to 
mention something in order to eliminate this possibility.
H-A copy of this toast made in Santa Ana on November 
27, 1820 may be found in Lecuna (ed.), Proclamas y  Discursos. 
253. P&ez omitted one phrase: "to those who died gloriously
defending their country or their glory."
l2Baralt and Diaz state that this armistice met with 
the disapproval of "almost all the chiefs that operated some 
distance from Bolivar's camp; was ill-received in Quayana 
although it produced great results." Restimen de la Historia. 
Ill, 270.
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When Bolivar passed by the Apure to attend the conference 
with Morillo, I presented him with a written plan in which I 
expressed that I felt prolonging the armistice as long as 
possible would give us additional time to discipline our 
troops well and receive armaments with which to organize a 
reserve army in New Granada. This would enable us to maintain 
control over this territory, which seemed to depend on the 
outcome of one sole battle. The patriots had lost it only 
after the defeat of their troops in Cachiri, while the Spanish 
lost it in the Battle of Boyac&.
Shortly after the celebration of the armistice on 
December 17, Morillo left for Spain despite the protests of 
the most prominent Royalists. He left the command of the 
expeditionary troops to General La Torre. The Spanish General 
had come to the realization that it was impossible to subju­
gate the so-called insurgents; consequently, he wanted to 
retire from the scene before events forced him to do so.
This was a prudent measure on the part of someone who could 
not have foreseen such an end!
Morillo had committed grave errors in his mission as 
pacificator. In adopting orders of extreme severity to sub­
jugate the country, he had alienated even the most indif­
ferent souls. He had been wrong also in looking disdainfully 
on those ill-advised soldiers who, under the orders of Boves 
and Monteverde, had wreaked disaster on their compatriots.
It would be unjust, however, to deny him the valor and 
audaciousness that he showed under all tests. He possessed
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a great constancy, military talent, and all those qualities 
needed to inspire faith and confidence in subordinates. 
Nevertheless, Morillo did not fail to make some military 
errors in his campaigns in Venezuela.^
The first of these errors was to have divided his army 
in San Fernando, after the action of Mucuritas. He sent La 
Torre with one part to Guayana and went himself with the 
other to the island of Margarita. This plan reveals more of 
an excessive confidence in his troops and disdain for those 
of the enemy, than the idea of attacking the two patriot 
strongholds simultaneously. Instead of dividing his army 
like this, Morillo should have led all his army personally 
to Guayana. There he sould have routed the Republicans and 
closed the canal by which they imported war materials from 
abroad as far as the interior of New Granada. Embarking from 
San Fernando, he could have arrived in Angostura within five 
or six days. If he had not had the number of ships there 
necessary to carry his army, he could have ordered the ones 
that were in Baul and Nutrias to come down.
l-^The Spanish historian Torrente expresses the opinion 
that the only grave error Morillo committed was to leave his 
command at a time when the expeditionary forces were strong 
and the cry "Morillo viveI" was sufficient to inspire such 
terror in the hearts of the patriots, that it could hold back 
the emigration from La Qiaira. Torrente states that Morillo 
should never have abandoned the American shore and forsaken 
his compatriots here and his King, for only he "could have 
prevented the loss of the dominions of Ultramar." Historia 
de la RevoluciOn. Ill, 115.
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At the end of the campaign of the year 1818, he should 
have gone immediately to Guayana instead of talcing winter 
quarters. He could have accomplished this with great ease, 
for the patriots at that time did not have an infantry with 
which to oppose his march. Thus he could have prevented the 
assembling of the Congress of Angostura— a congress that gave 
the independence cause the prestige of an already-established 
government with members gathered to deliberate freely and 
without any opposition.
The third mistake committed by the Expeditionary Gen­
eral was the vain hope of destroying the army under my command 
in the Apure with the idea of enlisting the insurgents in 
Guayana. I say vain because he should have had very much in 
mind the inconveniences with which he would have to struggle 
in a place where the numerical superiority of his troops 
would be worthless when pitted against the knowledge we had 
of the terrain and the resources it offered us to wage the 
war of movement which I have already mentioned.^
l^PAez footnotes this as follows. "I have omitted 
accounts of a multitude of disputed encounters that occurred 
before the armistice was signed between the Royalists and my 
guerrillas under the command of the valiant chiefs Rafael 
Rosales, Fernando Figueredo, Doreteo Hurtado, Comelio Munoz, 
Juan Gdmez, Valentin Cort6s, and Jos6 Ldpez, in the llanos 
of Calaboso, San Carlos, and Barinas.”
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CHAPTER XIII
End of the Armistice— My Sad March to Guanare to 
Rejoin the Liberator— General La Torre Sends Him 
a Flag of Truce— La Torre Anxious to Know if I 
Had Rejoined Bolivar— Countermarch to Carabobo—  
Glorious One Day's March in the Carabobo Llano.
1821
The occupation of Maracaibo by Urdaneta's troops, 
under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Jos6 Rafael Heras 
who had entered this plaza according to an agreement with 
its governor, the Venezuelan Francisco Delgado, promulgated 
the protest by the Royalist chief.^ Bolivar did not answer 
this protest in a satisfactory manner. Therefore, the hos­
tilities, which had been suspended by the celebrated armis­
tice of the previous year, would commence anew on April 28. 
All the leaders prepared for the new operations. I received
Colonel Rafael Heras was a native of Habana, Cuba.
He joined the Venezuelan independence cause as early as 1810. 
He emigrated when the first campaign failed. He returned to 
Venezuela and joined Bolivar in the campaign for Cticuta. In 
New Granada he fought at the Battle of Boyacft in 1819. In 
1821 he helped defeat General La Torre in the Battle of 
Carabobo. Heras was killed in the Battle of Hata de Juana 
de Avila in 1822. Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario 
Bioqr&fico. 216-17.
Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Delgado, a citizen of 
Maracaibo, was the Royalist Governor of the city who defected 
to the patriot side and proclaimed the independence of Vene­
zuela on January 26 and 29. When the city thus "spontaneously" 
declared for the Republic, Heras felt free to occupy Maracaibo, 
despite the truce. Madariaga, Bolivar. 385-86.
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orders from Bolivar to march with the army under my command 
and rejoin his headquarters in Guanaret so, on May 10 I left 
Achaguas with one thousand infantrymen, fifteen hundred 
cavalry, two thousand reserve horses and four thousand 
recruits. I crossed the Apure by the Enriquero Pass.
It is impossible to relate the grievances and hard­
ships evoked on us by marching with such a large herd. Every 
night the horses would escape in throngs, and we did not have 
sufficient men to stop them. Fortunately, since the horses 
had always been herded in droves in the pasture grounds, they 
would gallop together and this made it easier for us to follow 
them by their hoof prints in the sands. To make matters 
worse, the sands were very soft, for we were in the rainy 
season. These escapes occurred every night at eight, for 
once the marvelous instinct of those animals had discovered 
the possibility of escaping to their pasture grounds, they 
always redoubled their efforts at the same hour on the follow­
ing day. When my llaneros would finally capture them and 
rejoin us the following day, I would accelerate the march in 
order to rejoin Bolivar as soon as possible.
In the town of Tucupido I found out that Bolivar had 
moved on toward Araure, which La Torre had abandoned in order 
to fall back to San Carlos. He abandoned San Carlos also 
when he found out that Bolivar had occupied Araure, and 
finally retired to Carabobo where he proposed to give battle 
to the Republican troops.
Knowing that the Liberator had very little cavalry, I
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left the infantry under the command of Colonel Miguel 
Antonio v&squez and I went on ahead to San Carlos with the 
cavalry. Together we overtook the General-in-chief. After 
the infantry was assembled and ready to march. General La 
Torre sent a flag of truce to the Liberator. This flag was 
carried by the Spanish Colonel Churruca whom Bolivar, inviting 
me to accompany him, went out to receive in the town of 
Tinaco, four leagues away from San Carlos. Churruca's sup­
posed objective was to propose a new armistice, but his real 
one was to see whether I had rejoined Bolivar so that he 
would know whether to attack him immediately.
Churruca arrived at dinner time? consequently, before 
tending to the matter that had brought him to the Republican 
camp, Bolivar invited him to eat. During dinner the Spanish 
commissioner asked about me and Bolivar immediately intro­
duced me. After the dinner they went on to the conference, 
and Churruca stated that the purpose of his commission was to 
bring him La Torre's offer of a new armistice. During this 
armistice the Republican troops were to retire to the right 
bank of the Portuguesa River boundary and let this river 
serve as the dividing line between the two enemy armies.
Since this proposal was equivalent to demanding that we lose 
all the territory we had gained, Bolivar did not accept it. 
Churruca returned to La Torre's camp, notified him of the 
results of the interview, and told him that I had already 
joined forces with the Liberator.
As I have stated previously, the enemy had concentrated
its forces in Carabobo since early June after being expelled 
from San Carlos. From Carabobo they openly detached recon- 
noitering forces to Tinaquillo. We sent Lieutenant Colonel 
JosA Laurencio Silva against them, and he succeeded in 
capturing these forces after an encounter during which the 
Spanish Commander died. It was then that the enemy deemed 
it prudent to withdraw a detachment from the summits of 
Buenavista. Naturally, the patriot army occupied it subse­
quently, and from there we observed that the enemy was pre­
paring to prevent our descent to the plain. We continued our 
march. The first division, under my command, was composed 
of the British Battalion, the Bravos de Apure, and fifteen 
hundred horses. The second division consisted of a brigade 
of the Guard, the firing battalions, the Sacred squadron 
under the command of the intrepid Colonel Aramendi, and the 
BoyacA and Vargas Battalions, names which recall heroic 
deeds. General Cedeno, whom Bolivar called the bravest of 
the brave, was the leader of this second division. The third 
division, under the orders of the intrepid Colonel Plaza, was 
composed of the first brigade of the Guard, aided by the 
Battalions Rifles, Grenadiers, Vencedor en BoyacA, AnzoAtegui, 
and a cavalry regiment under the command of the courageous 
Colonel Rond6 n.
Everyone, officers and men alike, understood the 
importance of a decisive victory for our cause. Some of the 
braver men would tell their companions not to commit them­
selves too recklessly, as was their custom, nor to take
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foolish chances if they wanted to achieve the glory of sur­
viving the victory and finally seeing their patriotic desires 
fulfilled.
The Spanish army that awaited the patriots was com­
posed of the flower of the expeditionary troops. Their 
leaders had come to America after gathering many laurels on 
the battlefields of the Peninsula fighting heroicly against 
the armies of Napoleon. Knowing this, we continued our 
march full of enthusiasm and ignoring all past and present 
fatigues. We were determined to go out into the plain 
through the mouth of the narrow passage at the end of our 
path. When we saw its summits occupied by the Valencey and 
Barbasto Regiments, however, we turned toward the left flank 
with the intent of bending the enemy's right flank. We 
executed this movement despite heavy enemy artillery fire.
The Spanish general left the two aforementioned regi­
ments at the mouth of the narrow passage and came to challenge 
our descent into the valley with the rest of his army. To do 
this he occupied a small hill that rose at a small distance 
from the point Pica de la Mona through which we intended to 
enter the plain led by a guide that Bolivar had taken 
prisoner in Tinaquillo. The Apure Battalion vigorously 
resisted the enemy infantry fire while descending into the 
woods, crossed a riverlet, and maintained its fire until the 
British Legion arrived under the command of its gallant
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Colonel [Thomas] Farriar.^ These brave men, worthy com­
patriots of those who a few years before had fought with 
such serenity at Waterloo, stood their ground and endured 
the enemy fire until they got in battle line. The battle 
continued and when 1 saw that these men were already short 
of ammunition, I ordered them to charge with their bayonets. 
Subsequently, this British Legion, the Apure Battalion, and 
two rifle companies under the command of the heroic comman­
dant Heras, finally forced the enemy to abandon the hill and 
take a new position on a neighboring one to the rear. From 
here the Spanish sent their cavalry and the Reina Battalion 
against our left flank. I ordered Colonel VAzquez with the 
Chiefs of Staff^ and a company of the Honor Guard commanded 
by Captain Angel Bravo to face them.^ They were able to
^The name of this British officer is variously spelled 
as Ferrier, Ferrer, Farriar, and Farrar. Hasbrouck in his 
work on the foreign legionaries who fought in the wars for 
Spanish American independence prefers to list him as Colonel 
Thomas Ferriar. He succeeded Colonel Blosset as commander 
of the British Legion after the latter had been killed in a 
duel with colonel Power. Credited with being much more effi­
cient than his predecessor, Ferriar organized the British 
Legion to make a glorious stand at the Battle of Carabobo 
making it possible for the Bravos de Apure to reform and com­
plete the destruction of the Spanish battalions. Unfortu­
nately, Colonel Ferriar was mortally wounded in the first 
charge made by the Spanish. Hasbrouck, Foreign Legionaries. 
79, 138, 236, 241, 244, 372, 384.
^The author footnotes this as followsx "This was com­
posed of some thirty-four individuals, counting the chiefs 
and officers affiliated with them."
^Captain Juan Angel Bravo began as an enlisted man in 
the independence army in 1816. He became a sergeant in 1817, 
a lieutenant in 1819, and a captain in 1821. He fought in
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repel the enemy and continued fighting with the enemy cavalry 
at the rear. This officer, Bravo, fought with such bravery, 
that later the fourteen lance marks he had received in the 
encounter, without having been wounded, were visible on his 
uniform. This prompted the Liberator to remark that he 
deserved a uniform of gold.
The Royalist Valencey and Barbastro Battalions, seeing 
that the rest of the army was losing ground, abandoned their 
position in order to join the main body of their army. I 
hurried to propose that they surrender. I was accompanied 
by Colonel Plaza who had left his division and joined me out 
of a desire to take part personally in the skirmish. During 
the charge a bullet mortally wounded this very brave officer 
who ended his services here to the fatherland.
Reinforced by three hundred cavalrymen who came out 
from the highway, 1 charged the Barbastro Battalion and 
forced it to surrender. Immediately we attacked the Valencey 
Battalion, which was a short distance away and seeking pro­
tection in the carabobo Ravine. It resisted our attack. On 
this occasion I almost missed surviving until the victory, 
for I was suddenly seized by one of those terrible attacks 
that deprived me of my senses. During the heat of battle, I 
was in the midst of the enemy forces and would perhaps have 
been killed if Commandant Antonio Martinez, from the Morales
the following battiest Apurito, San Fernando, Calabozo, 
Queseras del Medio, carabobo, and Puerto Cabello. He died in 
Sam Fernando in 1643. DAvila, Dicclonario BioarAfico. I, 
47-48.
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cavalry, had not led me away.5 He seized the reins of my 
horse and mounted a patriot lieutenant by the name of 
Alejandro Salazar, alias Guadalupe, behind me to hold me in 
the saddle. Both carried me safely over to my s i d e . ®
At this time the valiant General Cedeno, inconsolable 
because he had not been able to enter the action with the 
troops under his command, advanced with a detachment of 
cavalry as far as a quarter of a mile in front of the ravine. 
When he reached the enemy and charged, he fell over dead 
from a bullet wound.
When 1 was coming to my senses, Bolivar joined me. In 
the midst of triumphal exclamation, he offered me the rank 
of General-in-Chief in Congress's name.
This was the glorious day at Carabobo. With its 
important results for the independence of Columbia, it may 
very well be compared to that of Yorktown for the United
5Cunninghame Graham mentions Antonio Martinez as a 
"Llanero from the town of Calabozo, though serving with the 
royalists." He also states that when Mirabal surrendered to 
P&ez later, he brought Martinez with him. P&ez pardoned him 
immediately, only to have Martinez lead a revolt against him 
in Calabozo the following year. P&ez, 188-89, 197, 200.
®PAez inserts this footnote heret "I still do not 
know what prompted Martinez to execute that unexpected and 
for me providential act. He was a llanero from Calabozo and 
had always served the Spanish since the time of Boves and 
was rightfully known as one of their deadliest lancers. He 
was with us the night after the action at Carabobo, but was 
gone from our camp by dawn. We will encounter him again 
later. 11
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States in North America .7 Bolivar in his proclamation said 
that the victory had confirmed the political birth of the
Q
Republic of Colombia and that*0
Only P&ez's division, composed of two infantry bat­
talions and fifteen hundred cavalry, of which only 
a few were able to fight, were sufficient to defeat 
the Spanish army in forty-five minutes. If all the 
independence army had been able to operate in that 
celebrated battle, hardly any of the enemy would have 
escaped. The independence of Colombia was sealed at 
Carabobo. The indomitable valor, the activity and 
intrepidness of General P&ez contributed beyond mea­
sure to the consummation of the very splendid victory.
Barely recovered from the attack I have mentioned, I 
spurred my infantry on to continue the pursuit; but Bolivar, 
knowing that our army had exhausted all its ammunition in 
the battle, ordered them to halt until the Rifle and 
Grenadier Battalions were ahead and could pursue the enemy. 
At this time a very heavy rain began to fall and made the 
sides of the ravine so very slippery, that we were not able 
to pursue the enemy with the speed we desired. It was only
7When Bolivar won the Battle of Carabobo on June 24, 
1821, Venezuela virtually became incorporated into Gran 
Colombia. Thus the results of this battle were far-reaching, 
for it secured the independence of both Venezuela and New 
Granada. In addition, it allowed the Liberator to turn his 
attentions to affairs further south in the continent. Mor6 n, 
History of Venezuela. 133-34. For a detailed account of the 
military tactics involved in the Battle of Carabobo, see 
Lecuna, Crdnica Razonada. Ill, 46-56.
®A careful search through Lecuna (ed.), Proclamas y  
Discursos. and both collections of documents pertinent to 
Simdn Bolivar's public life, Coleccidn de Documentos. and 
Blanco and Azpurda (eds.), Documentos Para la Hlstorla. have 
failed to reveal this quotation.
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because of this that the Valencey Battalion and the remains 
of the Spanish army were able to escape being made prisoners. 
Only fifty Republican cavalrymen and a few chiefs and offi­
cers who had left their divisions to take some part in the 
victory were able to pursue the enemy closely. Of these, 
several were wounded including the Portuguese Commandant,
Jos6 [Ignacio] de Lima .9 Colonel [Juan] Me11ado fell dead 
in the Barrera Ravine and so did Lieutenant Olivera in 
Tocuyito.1 0
9Colonel Jos€ Ignacio de Lima was born in Brazil to a 
rich and noble family. When his father was executed in 1817 
for having taken part in a revolutionary attempt at inde­
pendence, de Lima fled prison and went to Colombia. Incensed 
by the terrible deeds being committed by the Royalists under 
Figueroa in northern New Granada, he joined the revolutionary 
army and fought in the campaigns of New Granada and Vene­
zuela. In 1819 he accompanied Soublette when he moved the 
Irish Division to the Eastern part of Venezuela, and in 1822 
he commanded the Colombian forces in Maracaibo when they 
seized the Spanish sloop of war, the Marla Francisca. He 
went to North America to seek war materials for the war in 
Venezuela where he served as P&ez1s aide-de-camp. He was 
honored with the medals of Liberator of Venezuela, Cundina- 
marca, Boyaci, Puerto Cabello, and Carabobo. In 1831 he 
returned to his native country and remained there until his 
death. Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario Biogr&fico. 260-61.
l^No additional information is available on Lieutenant 
Olivera, Colonel Juan Mellados was born in Venezuela. From 
the very beginning of the outbreak of hostilities against 
Spanish control, he fought under P&ez’s command and was vic­
torious with him in the Battles of Estangues, Guasdualito, 
Palmarillo, Mata de la Miel, Achaguas, and Yagual. In 1819 
he participated in the famous Battle of Queseras del Medio 
and later in the Battle of BoyacA. On June 24th, 1821 he was 
killed while pursuing the fleeing Valencey Battalion in the 
famous Battle of Carabobo. Ibid., 315.
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Our cavalry was not able to overtake the enemy infan­
try corps because it was unable to cross the ravines.
Bolivar, seeing that the enemy was approaching the city of 
Valencia, ordered two hundred grenadiers to mount and over­
take the enemy forces that were marching off by files en 
route to Puerto Cabello. We exchanged firing in the corrals 
at the entrance of the streets of Valencia. Thinking that 
the fighting would be fierce in the heart of the city, X 
went on to the plaza. I found it entirely deserted. All 
the doors and windows of the houses were closed, and there 
was not a single person in sight we could ask what direction 
the enemy had taken.
While X was going down the street which I imagined 
led to Puerto Cabello, I saw citizen Don Pedro Guillen at an 
open window. He informed me that the other street parallel 
to the one we were on was the one leading to that plaza. So 
I followed this direction. A  little later, however. Colonel 
Diego Ibarra, Bolivar's aide-de-camp, came to inform me that 
the enemy was at the bridge that leads from Valencia to 
C a ra c a s . H  I turned back and in effect discovered a column
^Colonel Diego Ibarra was born in Guacara in 1798.
He was greatly devoted both to the cause of independence for 
his country and to Sim6 n Bolivar. He enlisted in the revo­
lutionary army in 1810 immediately after the outbreak of 
hostilities. in 1813 he joined Bolivar in his campaign in 
Venezuela. With Garcia de Sena in 1814, he fought in los 
Callejones. After the Battle of Araure he emigrated to 
Margarita in 1816. Later he took part in the Battles of 
BoyacA and Carabobo. In 1821 Bolivar sent him to Perti with 
important papers for San Martin. He returned to Guayaquil
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of hussars there. Two of them came forward and asked, "Who 
Goes." When we answered "the Fatherland," they fired on me 
and the group of officers that accompanied me. We charged 
those that were at the bridge, killed the two hussars who 
had just fired on us, and set all their comrades into a dis­
orderly flight. They fled over the road to Vigirima in the 
direction of Puerto cabello. Night fell about that time, 
and the Liberator ordered the pursuit of the enemy suspended.
The Royalist army, fatigued from the hurried march 
they had made from Carabobo, spent the night at the foot of 
the hill that was three leagues away from Valencia. On the 
following morning, the enemy forces began to ascend this hill 
and succeeded in entering the plaza of Puerto Cabello. On 
June 25 Bolivar left [Santiago] Marino, Chief of Staff, to 
head the troops in Valencia and marched with me and a
in 1823 with Bolivar and later fought in the Battle of Junin. 
Bolivar sent him to Venezuela to demand troops with which to 
aid PertS in its struggle for independence. P&ez later sent 
Ibarra to tell Bolivar of the uprising in Valencia in 1826. 
Ibarra remained Bolivar's aide-de-camp and was with the 
Liberator when he died in San Pedro. He was decorated with 
the medals of Liberator of Venezuela, junin, and Boyac&. 
After his death in Caracas in 1852, he was buried at the 
foot of Bolivar's gravesite. Ibid.. 229-30; DAvila, 
Diccionario Biogr&fico. I, 254-56.
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battalion toward C a r a c a s . W e  arrived at this city. It 
had been evacuated by [Colonel Jos6 ] Pereira on the night of 
June 29 after he heard about the defeat of the Royalists in 
Carabobo and about the proximity of the Liberator. ^ 3
Pereira, unable to disembark because of the lack of 
ships, pretended to leave by the coast of Sotavento for the
12General Santiago Marino was born on the island of 
Margarita in 1788 of a rich and illustrious family. When 
the revolution for independence broke out in 1810, he was in 
Caracas with the rank of sublieutenant in the Spanish army.
He resigned from this army, joined the revolutionary army, 
and was immediately given the rank of Captain. He fought so 
gallantly and brilliantly, that before Miranda's capitula­
tion he had attained the rank of colonel. He emigrated to 
Trinidad and from there along with Bermudez, Piar, and 
another forty-five men, he helped organize an expedition 
against the Spanish in 1813. These patriots defeated Boves 
in Bocachica. In 1814 Marino joined Bolivar in La Victoria.
As Bolivar's second in command, he fought at the first battle 
of Carabobo. He was defeated at the siege of La Puerta. In 
1816 he was named second Chief of the Army, and in 1817 he 
went to Bolivar's aid in Barcelona. He suffered two severe 
defeats in this same year at Cariaco and Cartipano. Bolivar 
appointed him Chief of the Oriente army in 1819. This same 
year he lent his support to the Congress of Angostura. Prom 
1822 to 1827 he ably assisted P&ez in governing the Vene­
zuelan territory. In 1827 in Queseras del Medio Bolivar pre­
sented Marino with a sword. When P&ez led Venezuela away 
from Gran Colombia, Marino accompanied him as Secretary of 
War and General-in-Chief. He retired from public service for 
a while but returned in 1848 to serve as Commandant General 
of Caracas. Marino died on September 4, 1654, in La Vic­
toria. Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario BiogrSfico. 294-96; 
Mor6 n, History of Venezuela. 133, 156-57.
l^Colonel Jos6 Pereira was the commander of the Spanish 
Battalion, Los Pardos de Valencia. He was chief of opera­
tions in Barcelona, and he defeated Bermudez's forces in the 
Calvario of Caracas. In 1821 he surrendered at La Guaira as 
a result of the defeat of the Spanish at Carabobo. Lecuna, 
Crdnica Razonada. II, 181,262, 365; III, 53, 55.
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town of Carayaca with the object of finding out if the 
Spanish squadron would come there to take him aboard. Since 
the squadron did not appear, he returned to La Guaira to 
gather strength there, always hoping that the ships from 
Puerto Cabello would help him. Finally he had to capitulate 
to the Liberator on July 4 when he saw that no Spanish vessel 
appeared at the p o r t . ^  The articles of his capitulation 
may be seen in Volume II of the Documentos de la Vida Pflblica 
del Libertador.^
My staff officers who died in this memorable battle 
included Colonel Ignacio Melean; Manuel Arraiz; Captain Juan 
Bruno; Lieutenant Pedro Camejo[a]; the Negro Primero; Lieu­
tenant Jose Maria Olivera; and Lieutenant Nicoles Arias. Of
14p&ez footnotes this as follows* "Torrente states* 
'When the French Admiral Jurien refused to admit the Royalist 
Troops on board by professing the strict neutrality he was 
forced to observe, he offered his mediation, nevertheless, so 
that an agreement could be reached between Pereira and 
Bolivar by which those soldiers would be given the freedom 
to choose between remaining in the service of the Republic 
or embarking for Puerto Cabello. Of the seven hundred 
negroes [sicl. mulatoes, and zambos of which the infantry 
was composed, only six embraced the first offer. This 
formed a strange contrast to the cavalry which was composed 
mainly of Europeans and vet had a greater number of individ­
uals abandon the banners of. the King, even though their total 
force did not reach seventy. 1 Among those six that Torrente 
says remained in the service of the Republic was that cor­
poral who had so heroicly resisted us in the city of La 
Cruz." This quotation may be found in Torrente, Historia de 
la RevoluciOn. Ill, 245.
l^The author refers again here to the ColecciOn de 
Documentos. The articles of capitulation may be found in 
Volume II, 299-301.
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all these men I recall Camejo, generally known then by the 
nickname of Negro Primero. with the greatest affection. A 
slave at one time, he had taken a great part in some of the 
events to which I have referred in the course of this narra­
tion. He had come to me when I had gone down to Achaguas 
after the Battle of Yagual. My soldiers from Apure recom­
mended that I take him into the army, for it was clear to 
them that he was a man of great valor and above all a very 
good lancer. His robust constitution recommended him highly 
to me. Shortly after talking with him, I noticed that he 
possessed the candidness of man in his primitive state and 
one of those likable personalities that quickly attracts the 
affection of those with whom they deal.
Camejo had been a slave of the proprietor citizen of 
Apure, Don Vicente Alfonso. The latter had placed him in 
the service of the King because the Negro's character, very 
jealous of its dignity, had frightened him. After the 
action of Araure he had become so disgusted with military 
service, that he fled to the Apure and had hidden there for 
some time until he came to me following the Battle of Yagual. 
After 1 admitted him to my ranks, he was always at my side 
and proved to be a most valuable acquisition. He gave such 
proofs of valor in all the embattled encounters we had with 
the enemy, that his own companions gave him the title of 
Negro Primero. They had great fun with him, for his home- 
spun humor and observations on all he witnessed kept their 
morale very high. Invariably they were seeking him out to
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give him new topics of conversation.
When Negro Primero heard that Bolivar was coming to 
join me in the Apure, he ardently begged everyone not to tell 
the Liberator that he had served in the Royalist army. This 
was enough to have the men tell Bolivar enthusiastically and 
immediately upon his arrival about the Negro and his anxiety 
to keep from him that he had been in the service of the King. 
Consequently, when Bolivar saw him for the first time, he 
went up to him affectionately and after congratulating him 
on his valor, asked him* "But whatever prompted you to serve 
in the ranks of our enemies?" The Negro looked at those 
around him as if he wanted to twist them for the indiscretion 
they had committed, and then said* "Sir, it was greed."
"What do you mean?" asked Bolivar.
"I had noticed," the Negro continued, "that everyone 
went to war without a shirt and without a peseta and later 
returned dressed in a very handsome uniform and with money 
in his pockets. Then, too, 1 wanted to go in search of my 
fortune and more than anything get three silver spurs— one 
for the Negro Mindola, another for Juan Rafael, and another 
one for me. The first battle we had with the patriots was 
the one at Araure. They had more than one thousand men, so 
1 told my friend Jos6 F€lix. We had many more men, and I 
begged to be given any weapon with which to fight, for I was 
certain we were going to win. When I thought the battle had 
ended, 1 got off my horse and went to remove a very handsome 
coat from a dead white man. At that instant the Commandant
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came screaming, Get on your horses 1 Why? I asked. Isn't 
this war ended? It most certainly was not ended, for there 
were so many men coming that it looked like a flock of vul­
tures ."
"What did you say then?" asked Bolivar.
"I wanted us to go out to pasture then. There was 
nothing left to do but flee, and I started running away on 
my mule. However, the blasted animal got tired on me, and I 
had to take to the woods on foot. The following day Jos6 
F61ix and I went to a ranch to see if we could get some food. 
When the owner found out that I was with Nafia's [yaflez] 
troops, he looked so hard at me, that it seemed best to flee 
and go to the Apure . 11
"They say," Bolivar interrupted him, "that you killed 
cattle there that did not belong to you."
"Naturally," he replied, "for if I hadn't, what would 
I have eaten? Finally the superintendent (for this is what 
he called me) came to the Apure, and he showed us what the 
fatherland was and that the diablocracia wasn't anything 
b a d . ^  since that time I've been serving the patriots."
Conversations such as these maintained in a language 
sui generis served to amuse Bolivar greatly. During our 
marches the Negro Primero was indeed a source of great dis­
traction and entertainment for us. He continued in my
^Obviously the illiterate Negro had confused the two 
words diahlo. meaning devil, and democracia. meaning 
democracy, and made one word out of the two of them.
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service, always distinguishing himself in all the most impor­
tant battles. The reader may have already seen his name 
among the heroes of Queseras del Medio.
The day before the Battle of Carabobo, which he said 
was going to be cisiva. he harangued his comrades and imi­
tated the language he had heard me use in similar cases.^
In order to infuse them with valor and confidence, he told 
them with the fervor of a Moor, that the doors of Heaven 
would open to the patriots that died on the battlefield, but 
would close to those who died fleeing from the enemy.
The day of the battle, at the first shots, he fell 
mortally wounded. News of this later produced a deep sorrow 
in all the army. When Bolivar heard about it, he considered 
it a misfortune and openly lamented the fact that he had 
been deprived of the pleasure of introducing this man in 
Caracas— a man whom he considered without equal in simplicity 
and particularly notable for the inimitable style in which 
he expressed his ideas.
J-7In this instance the Negro Primero had to mean 
decisiva or decisive.
CHAPTER XIV
My Return to Valencia— The Liberator Marches Toward 
New Granada— I Am Named Commandant of One of the 
Military Districts Into Which He Divided Venezuela—  
Operation of My Forces Against Some Royalist Chiefs 
— Morales Leaves Puerto Cabello, Disembarks at Some 
Points Along the Coast, and Finally is Forced to 
Return to that Port— The Royalists Leave Puerto 
Cabello and Head Toward Valencia— Destruction of a 
Royalist Division in Patanemo— I Lay siege to Puerto 
Cabello— Illnesses Force Me to Lift the Siege—  
General Calzada Takes Command of the Plaza.
1821-1822
Shortly after I had arrived in Caracas, Bolivar ordered 
me to return to Valencia to head the army. He stayed at the 
capital conferring with the Vice-President, General Soublette, 
about certain points of government and administration. Later 
he joined me in Valencia. Early in August he marched toward 
New Granada with some army corps, leaving Venezuela pro­
visionally divided into three military districts. I was named 
Commandant General of the one that was formed with the prov­
inces of Caracas, Carabobo, Barquisimeto, Barinas, and Apure.
Two hundred Creole cavalry from the Royalist forces 
defeated at Carabobo had gone to Puerto Cabello. They were 
joined there at the same time by none other than that famous 
chief of Boves' cavalry. Colonel Jos6 Alejo Mirabal, who had 
just returned from the Peninsula. La Torre gave Mirabal 
command of this Creole cavalry and named him commandant
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General of the Calabozo llanos with orders to operate at our 
rear. He augmented his forces not only with the soldiers 
that had escaped from Carabobo and were found scattered in 
those territories, but also with partisans of the King that 
he found there.
Alejo [Mirabal] left Puerto Cabello by Mor6 n and sur­
prised a detachment we had in Canoabo. He marched to the Pao 
de San Juan Bautista without meeting any opposition, for 
unfortunately the forces we sent to encounter him did not 
arrive at the right time at the place I had designated.
Alejo came out to the llano where, operating with the activity 
which was characteristic of him, he was able to increase his 
forces to five hundred cavalry. With these he beseiged 
Colonel Judas Tadeo Pinango who was in command in Calabozo.1 
Discovering that I had left Valencia with the Apure Guard 
and was approaching Calabozo, he lifted the siege and went
^General Judas Tado Pinango was born in Caracas. When 
Bolivar left Caracas in 1812 with a passport from Monteverde,
Piffango begged to accompany him and thus began his services 
to the independence cause. He fought in the Magdalena cam­
paign and in the Battle of Cticuta in 1813. He was victorious 
in the Battles of Barbula, Trincheras, Vijirima, Araure, and 
La Victoria but was defeated along with Urdaneta at Mucuchies. 
In 1815 he helped defend Cartagena and in 1821 fought at the 
second battle of Carabobo. He defeated Colonel Tello in 1822 
in Chipare but was later imprisoned by General Morales. When 
Puerto Cabello was assaulted by P&ez, Pinango was rescued and 
then helped in the pursuit of Cisneros. He supported P&ez in 
the separation of Venezuela from Gran Colombia and became 
chief of the Venezuelan troops. He was Killed in Caracas in 
1848 while trying to stifle a mutiny. Scarpetta and 
Vergara, Diccionario Bioqr&fico, 470-71.
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on to the town of Guardatinajas. I sent the Guard to pursue 
him and they surprised him and annihilated his men in the 
vicinity of that town. After wandering for some days, the 
military chief of the villa of Pao de San Juan Bautists sur­
rendered. ^
On my way to Valencia and near that city, I saw a man 
go by on foot. There was something suspicious about him* so 
I had him searched. We found a communique on him from Mira­
bal to Morales in which the former told the latter about the 
events that had forced him to present himself to the Repub­
lican authorities. Mirabal hoped by this stratagem to get 
near to Puerto Cabello and easily take refuge in this plaza 
if he did not receive aid beforehand. As soon as the com­
munique was read, I ordered Mirabal brought to my head­
quarters under heavy guard. When he tried to escape, accord­
ing to what Commandant of the Guard Guillermo Iribarren later 
told me, he was killed instantly by the sentinel that guarded 
him.
On November 1 of this year, 1821, Morales left Puerto 
Cabello and headed toward the shore with eight hundred men.
He embarked these on the frigate Liqera. Taking a brigantine 
and eight schooners also, he came close to Chichirivichi;
^The author adds this footnote here. "I sent a pardon 
for Commandant Antonio Martinez who had saved my life in 
Carabobo, for he had left Puerto Cabello with Mirabal. One 
of the latter's officers, by the nickname of Zainito, found 
Lt. V. Campero, who had the pardon, at the pass of the 
Guardatinajas River, took possession of the paper, tore it, 
and even killed Campero."
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but on the way he lost one of the schooners which was cap­
tured by the Colombia brigantine Vencedor. On the fourteenth 
at 10(00 a.m. this convoy appeared before Macuto, and on the 
afternoon of the fifteenth some of the ships approached the 
coast of Naiguat* but did not dare disembark. On the six­
teenth they headed leeward toward La Guaira, and on the 
eighteenth they returned to Catia and disembarked six hundred 
men. The latter went to Ocumare while the ships followed in 
the same direction carrying the rest of the forces. On the 
nineteenth the Commandant of the Valleys of Aragua came close 
to get them with a small column of militia. However, he was 
forced to retreat when he was attacked by superior forces in 
Trapiche. Morales, not daring to penetrate into the interior, 
reembarked and returned to Puerto Cabello.
Noting from the communiques I was constantly receiving 
that the Spanish squadron was heading toward the windward 
side, I left Valencia with a battalion to go to the aid of 
Caracas. While in that city I found out that the squadron 
was coming down toward Puerto Cabello. Without losing any 
time, I countermarched in the direction of Valencia. In 
Maracay I received a communique from colonel Manrique, whom 
I had left in charge in Valencia. He informed me that a 
column of five hundred men, under the command of Colonel 
[Basilio] Garcia, had left Puerto Cabello headed toward
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Valencia and was already in the town of N a g u a n a n g u a . ^ I 
ordered Manrique to evacuate the city and go to Guacara where 
I would join him immediately. My plan was to march from 
Guacara along the road to San Diego that leads to the foot 
of the hill. There I would cut short the Royalist retreat 
if they advanced as far as Valencia and destroy them with 
far superior forces. However, Garcia did not judge it 
prudent to march to Valencia and countermarched hurriedly 
toward Puerto Cabello.
Things remained like this until the month of April of 
1822 when I went with a battalion to the town of Patanemo to 
surprise a Royalist detachment there. 1 also wanted to get 
in touch with Commandant Renato Beluche, who was crossing 
windward from Puerto Cabello with two armed schooners, for I 
was already preparing to lay siege to the plaza.^ I managed
3The Spanish Colonel Basilio Garcia had been General 
Calzada's second in command in the Battle of Boyac&. He was 
in charge of the Spanish forces at the Battle of Bombon&. 
Lecuna, CrOnica Razonada, II, 351; III, 100.
^Renato Beluche was born in New Orleans in 1780. He 
was only seven when his father died leaving five children and 
a pregnant wife; consequently, Beluche went to sea at an early 
age and within a few years was part owner of two privateers 
sailing under letters of marque from Guadaloupe. In 1814 he 
was in Cartagena helping transport troops for the new Repub­
lic. For this service he was awarded the rank of naval 
lieutenant in the Cartagena navy. Beluche remained in this 
service for three years and reputedly destroyed more than a 
million dollars worth of Spanish shipping— particularly after 
the Battle of New Orleans when he and two hundred Baratarians 
raided Spanish shipping under letters of marque from Carta­
gena. In 1816 Beluche superceded Luis BriOn in command of 
the Los Cayos expedition during the attack on Spanish ships 
off the coast of Margarita. He now became a commodore in the
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to rout said detachment, and I continued my exploration as 
far as the town of Borburata without being able to talk to 
Beluche. From here I countermarched to Valencia along the 
same road I had come. Without losing time I followed the 
Cumbre road to go and lay siege to Puerto Cabello. 1 took 
possession of Pueblo Afuera. and I also immediately occupied 
Borburata. I laid siege to Mirador de Solano (La Vigia) and 
forced Captain Montero, who guarded it with a company, to 
s u r r e n d e r . 5 He had been communicating all my movements to 
the plaza by telegraph.®
Colombian Navy and helped P&ez seize Puerto Cabello in 1823. 
After the wars for South American independence were over, he 
became a Venezuelan citizen and continued to participate in 
turbulent episodes. He died at 79 and was buried in Puerto 
Cabello. jane L. de Grummond, The Baratarians and the 
Battle of New Orleans (Baton Rouge, 1961). 4, 5, 6 , 8 , 17, 
155, 156, 157. Williamson (De Grummond, ed.), Caracas Diary. 
1835-40, 127, 128, 164, 165.
®The author interjects this footnote. "The Spaniards 
shot this officer in Puerto Rico for having surrendered."
No other information is available on Captain Montero.
®PAez footnotes this as followsi "During the siege 1 
was forced to leave my troops in order to prevent the out­
break of a rebellion in the Apure caused by the indignation 
of the inhabitants over the tyrannical conduct of the gover­
nor, Miguel Guerrero. The latter had treacherously had the 
intrepid Aramendi assassinated, according to a declaration 
made by Cabaneiro, one of the accomplices. He had also had 
three officers shot because they censured this act, and 
finally had mistreated some good officers of the Guard and 
returned them handcuffed to my headquarters. My presence 
calmed everyone, and that province remained quiet."
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At the beginning of May the Valencey Battalion ven­
tured out of the plaza taut retreated after having lost many 
men. At this time La Torre had such few provisions, that he 
hurled more than two hundred persons, including women, 
children, and useless men, from the plaza. On June 2, how­
ever, he received foodstuffs brought by the Commander of the 
Spanish squadron, Don Angel Lataorde, in the frigate Ligera.7 
Laborde had managed to enter the port despite the opposition 
made by our small squadron.
During these circumstances General Soutalette, Minister 
of War, went to the province of Coro to inspect the opera­
tions of the forces commanded by Pinango. Following the 
event of Dabajuro, which forced him to retreat to Carora, he 
fought against Coro again .8 Morales did not wait for him 
this time, but emtaarhed instead on the Vela on June 16 and 
arrived in Puerto Cabello with the greater part of his troops 
to succeed La Torre in command of the army. The latter had 
been named Captain General of Puerto Rico.
7Angel Laborde was defeated by the patriot naval Com­
mander Padillo at Maracaibo in 1822. Lecuna, Crdnica 
Razonada. Ill, 287.
®Deepite the victories of the patriot forces in Vene­
zuela, it is interesting to note that the interior province 
of Coro had pronounced in favor of Spain. General Soublette 
had gone to Coro to reenlist its support in the patriot 
cause. On June 17, 1822 he was decisively defeated by 
Morales' forces at Dabajuro. Torrente, Historia de la 
RevoluciOn. Ill, 346-47.
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In the middle of June I suspended the siege of Puerto 
Cabello and retreated toward Valencia because my troops had 
been decimated to little over one thousand. Malignant 
fevers had taken the lives of the rest of the three thousand 
seventy-nine men with which I had started the siege of the 
plaza . 9
^The author includes this footnote at this point. 
"General Hilario LOpez, ex-president of New Granada, who com­
manded one thousand militia men from the valleys of Aragua in 
the next to the last siege of Puerto Cabello and who dis­
tinguished himself in many of his more risky operations, 
writes as follows in Volume I, page 127 of his Memoirsi "The 
unheard of efforts of General P&ez were insufficient to con­
strict the plaza or assault it. This chief hurled himself 
at it many times as if defying the most imminent dangers. At 
times he would dress as a common soldier and operate under 
the orders of a corporal against the fortification. Then 
again he would put on his magnificent uniform and station 
himself near the fort, coolly serving for long periods of 
time as a target for the good shots who defended it. At 
other times he would embark on a small ship and get in the 
most dangerous position. Our navy, composed of small ships, 
tried to resist the entrance of three Spanish ships that left 
Curazao to bring foodstuffs and could not prevent it, even 
when the plaza was at the point of surrendering due to lack 
of food.'
"'I again charge you,' Santander told me in a letter 
dated June 15, 1822 in Bogota, 'not to expose yourself need­
lessly to getting shot without cause. Your life is precious, 
and for the sake of your very honor you should prevent expos­
ing it unless there is a great and urgent necessity. . . .  Do 
not act in a crazy manner when there is no need. I say this 
for your actions in Puerto Cabello have been foolish ones 
born out of rashness. Without a navy we can accomplish 
nothing. I have known this for a long time, but not every­
one knows that I have not had the means nor the manner with 
which to acquire it.1"
The above citation from General Hilario Ldpez may be 
found in the Editorial edition of the Biblioteca Popular de 
Cultura Colombiana Publication of Memoirs. 2 vols. (Bogota, 
1942), I, 198-99. A  copy of the Santander letter cannot be 
found in the Archivo Santander or in Lecuna (ed.), Cartas de 
Santander.
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On August 10 Morales allowed himself to be seen at 
the top of the hill that descends to the plain of Naguanagua. 
At this time 1 was at Palito with the Anzo&tegui Battalion.
I had a little over two hundred cavalry and was waiting for 
the column of five hundred men under the command of the 
Royalist commandant, Don Simon Sicilia, that Morales had 
sent along the coast toward Puerto cabello. About three or 
four leagues in my rear, at a place called Agua Caliente, 1 
had left a militia battalion just in case Sicilia took that 
road. On the day following Morales' arrival at the hill, 
Sicilia defeated this militia. Then, to avoid an encounter 
with the troops that were coming from Palito along the trail 
called Miguija, Sicilia entered Puerto Cabello.
On the afternoon of this same day, I received the 
news of Morales' arrival at the hill. Immediately, I started 
marching with my forces. I went on ahead myself with fifty 
cavalrymen after sending a message to Valencia ordering them 
to send me immediately the five hundred recruits garrisoned 
there and the three hundred veteran grenadiers— all the forces 
that were in Valencia. My orders were carried out with the 
desired speed. At six o'clock on the morning of the 11th I 
had, in addition to my fifty cavalrymen, eight hundred 
infantrymen from Valencia.
At this very time. Morales was descending into the 
plain. When he completed his descent, he got ready to attack 
me and divided his forces into three columns. One column 
was composed of the Battalion Leales Corianes and marched
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toward my left flank. Another column of four hundred 
European riflemen under the command of Colonel [Manuel] 
Lorenzo marched on my right f l a n k . I n  the meantime Morales 
and the rest of his forces, which totaled two thousand men, 
approached me in front at regular pace. When I saw this 
operation, I detached one hundred veterans, one hundred 
militia men, and twenty-five cavalrymen under the command of 
the intrepid Colonel Ronddn and ordered them to attack the 
Leales Corianes. With the same number of forces under the 
command of the daring Colonel Mina, I ordered the enemy 
forces on my right a t t a c k e d . I  faced Morales with my 
remaining forces.
The first two enemy columns were defeated within a 
short time, for the charges made by my cavalry were innumer­
able, particularly on Lorenzo’s column. The latter was 
forced to form a square. Then our infantry, dispersed in 
guerrilla bands, ravaged its ranks to the point of forcing
^Colonel Manuel Lorenzo had been the Spanish Chief 
of Operation in Cardpano, Rio Caribe, Barquisimeto, and 
Yaracuiy. Lecuna, Crdnica Razonada. II, 422; III, 43, 46,
52.
^Colonel Juan Antonio Mina was born in Venezuela.
He fought nobly for the independence of his native country 
at the side of Colonel Francisco Aramendi and Colonel Cedeno. 
In 1821 Urdaneta appointed him Governor of the Province of 
Coro immediately after the Royalists abandoned it. With 
PAez, he helped defeat General Morales in Valencia in 1822. 
He also distinguished himself in 1829 in the Battle of 
Tarqui against the Peruvian invading army. Scarpetta and 
Vergara, Diccionario BiogrAfico. 327-28.
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them to take to the hills in a direction opposite to the one 
that Morales occupied. The column that attacked Ronddn dis­
persed when it was impossible to form a square. However, 
its scattered members were able to reunite with the center 
column which was already falling back also, mauled by the 
force that 1 personally directed against it. We followed in 
pursuit of the enemy up to the first two turns in the hill. 
Then it became prudent to turn back because the narrow pas­
sage offered the enemy strong positions. It was here that 
Commandant RondOn received a wound in his foot. Tetanus set 
in a few days later and the very brave and likable chief of 
our cavalry ended his glorious career. We also lost cavalry 
Captain Santos Garrido and cavalry Lieutenant Alvarez in 
this battle .^-2 All the veteran grenadier officers were 
wounded, but there were not many losses in the rank and file. 
The Royalists lost five hundred men counting the dead, wounded, 
and those taken prisoner.
An hour after the struggle, the AnzoAtegui Battalion 
arrived. The cavalry that 1 had left that very night on the 
road to Palito also arrived. It seems that the roughness of 
the terrain and the darkness of night had prevented them from 
making as hurried a march as was needed. Three or four days
^ 2No additional information was available on Lieuten­
ant Alvarez. Captain Santos Garrido participated in the 
Apure campaign as early as 1817. He was with Bolivar in the 
triumphal Battle of Carabobo in 1821. While helping to be- 
seige Puerto Cabello, Garrido was killed. DAvila,
Diccionario BiogrAfico. 182.
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later, the Minister of War, General Soublette, arrived with 
some of the corps he had in Coro. X was reinforced with 
these.
Morales remained on the hill ten or twelve days with­
out daring to come down. Undoubtedly, he was waiting for 
the results of a revolution that was to break out in the 
plains of Calabozo in favor of the King led by Commandant 
Antonio Martinez, my saviour in Carabobo. This rebellion 
did break out in the town of Guardatinajas, but it was 
immediately suppressed. Probably this was what finally 
decided Morales to retire to Puerto Cabello. He embarked 
from here on the 24th for Maracaibo and left the plaza under 
the command of General Don Sebasti&n de la Calzada. Morales 
disembarked in Cojoro and marched with his army, enlarged by 
some Indians, to the port of Sinamaica. There he forced the 
officer who commanded it to abandon it and occupied Maracaibo 
after the action of Salina Rica.
Baralt [and Diaz] state
Hardly had Morales found himself in control of 
Maracaibo when he issued a decree imposing the death 
sentence and confiscation of property on the foreigners 
that were found armed. Not content with this scanda­
lous infraction of the Treaty of Trujillo, he later 
declared many of its articles impossible to fulfill.
After several reclamations were made by the government 
of the Republic and the Commandant of the Anglo-American 
naval forces in the Antilles, P&ez ordered the Colom­
bian troops under his command to follow strictly the 
provisions of the treaty despite the enemy's flagrant 
violations. This was a noble and worthy act meritorious 
of the highest praise.
^ T h i s  citation may be found in Baralt and Diaz, 
Restimen de la Historia. II, 105-106.
437
When General [Lino de] Clemente, Commandant of Mara­
caibo, embarked for Betijoque, province of Trujillo, he 
specifically ordered the Governor of the Fortress of San 
Carlos, Colonel Natividad Villasmil, to remain in it without 
entering into negotiations of any kind with the en e m y . ^
14General Lino de Clemente, a native of Venezuela, 
attended the patriotic juntas in Caracas in 1809 and 1810 
and was one of the forty-four members of the Congress that 
declared Venezuelan independence on July 5, 1811. He fought 
in the Battles of Tenerife, Banco, Mompos, Ocana, Niquitao, 
Puerto cabello, Carabobo 10, and Rincdn de los Toros among 
others. In 1819 he was a member of the Congress of Angostura 
and in 1821 he participated in the taking of Cartagena. In
1821 also he was defeated by General Morales in Salinarica. 
Clemente was tried and exonerated for Villasmil*s delivery of 
San Carlos to General Morales. In 1826 he was Secretary of 
State and Intendant and Commandant General of Zulia.
Although he was married to one of Bolivar's sisters, he 
worked assiduously to assemble the junta in Caracas that led 
to the separation of Venezuela from Gran Colombia. Scarpetta 
and Vergara, Diccionario Biogr&fico. 107-108.
Colonel Natividad Villasmil (or sometimes listed as 
Villamil) was born in Maracaibo about 1788. He had become a 
member of the garrison guarding Maracaibo in 1805 and in 1812 
was implicated in the attempted revolt of this garrison. 
Imprisoned by the Governor of Maracaibo, Pedro Ruiz de Porras, 
he was sent to Puerto Cabello and then to Spain. He managed 
to escape from the latter and to go Habana where he was recap­
tured. When he was being shipped to Puerto Rico, a patriot 
corsair rescued him from this, and he was able to rejoin 
Bolivar in Haiti. He went with Bolivar to Margarita and there 
fought under Arismendi and F. E. Gbmez. When he got on the 
mainland again he fought with Colonel Rafael Jugo, Tom&s 
Montilia, and with Bolivar in the Apure. In 1822, while 
participating in the Maracaibo campaign and as Commandant of 
the San Carlos Fortress, he capitulated to General Morales, 
reportedly for the sum of five thousand dollars. Also in
1822 he suffered the defeat at Garabuija. In 1823 he found 
himself obliged to defend himself in the newspapers from the 
public censures heaped upon him as a result of these two 
defeats. Ibid.; D&vila, Diccionario Biogr&fico, 393-94.
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This cowardly chief, however, capitulated as soon as the 
first threat was made. He did not even offer the slightest 
resistance. Relying on the fact that the San Carlos Fortress 
was occupied by patriot forces, I marched with two thousand 
men to the province of Trujillo, hoping that perhaps the 
enemy squadron could not enter the lake. In that case it 
would be easy for me to cross it in the many small boats that 
were there. Then Morales and his army could not escape being 
imprisoned. However, when I reached Trujillo I got the news 
that the fortress had capitulated and that the Spanish fleet 
had entered Maracaibo.
I countermarched to Valencia and took a skilled sand­
bar pilot called Iribarren with me. I sent him on to General 
Soublette and told the latter that this pilot could take our 
fleet into the lake without risk. Soublette sent him out to 
the fleet and ordered its commander. General [josfi] Padilla, 
to carry out the operation. ^  It was executed with only the
15General Jos6 Padilla was born in Riochacha in 1778. 
Having joined the Spanish navy, he fought in the Battle of 
Trafalgar and was imprisoned for a while in England. Freed 
from there in 1808, he returned to Cartagena as a boatswain. 
There he contributed to the revolutionary movement of 1811.
In 1814 he took part in the naval action of Tolu. He was 
the brave defendor of Cartagena in 1813 and later was able to 
emigrate to Jamaica and join Bolivar in the Cayos expedition. 
Joining forces with Luis Bridn's squadron, he helped take 
Riohacha in 1820. With Montilla he helped defeat S&nchez 
Lima in Laguna Salada. In 1823 Padilla and Montilla occupied 
Santa Marta. His conduct of the naval Battle of Maracaibo, 
termed the "most daring naval enterprise of the wars for 
independence," was heroic. He was also victorious in the 
Punta de Palma campaign. In 1828 General Padilla was judged 
to be the cause for the revolutionary movement in
439
loss of one bergantine. The squadron then combined its 
movements with the land forces led by Colonel Manrique in 
the Puertos de Altagracia and attacked the Spanish led by 
Don Angel Laborde. The latter1s defeat decided the Maracaibo 
campaign.
Senor Restrepo mentions disagreements between 
Soublette and me during this period and accuses me of aspir­
ing to the position that this General held with the approval 
of all.16 t o resolve this, I will now copy the letter I
1 7wrote Vice-President Santander answering the unjust charge.
SR. BRIGADIER GENERAL FRANCISCO DE P. SANTANDER
Valencia, May 28, 1822
Esteemed Comrade and Friend:
I shall return the confidence with which you dis­
tinguished me in your treasured letter of this past 
February 15th answering mine of this past January 15th 
by frankly disclosing all my feelings. I wish that in 
this case, more than in any other, the human heart were 
necessarily candid. This is not to say that mine is 
not, but rather so that you and the world could easily 
believe that my expressions are sincere.
You told me that 'when you tenaciously refused to 
accept the vice-presidencv and complained of your lot.
Cartagena. He was shot on October 2 and thus ended "the 
precious life of the Colombian Nelson." Scarpetta and 
Vergara, Diccionario Biogr&fico. 421-22.
^Restrepo'a allegation may be found in the Josd 
Jacquin edition, Revolucidn de la Republica de Colombia. Ill, 
200.
^7This letter cannot be found in the Archivo Santander 
although several other letters written by P&ez to Santander 
appear.
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it. was because you saw in Venezuela a country 
devastated by war, scanty of resources. inhabited 
by peoples of a strange character that had repre­
sentatives in the upper eschelons accustomed to 
acting on their own, with discontent llaneros. 
that you despaired of being able to remedy so many 
evils. 1 If I had been near you at that time, I 
would have taken the liberty of assuring you that 
the strange character of the Venezuelans was to be 
the fertile fountain from which were to spring many 
blessings. The unquiet and resolute genius of the 
Venezuelans, in my opinion, is accompanied by much 
good judgment. The progress I have observed in the 
revolution has forced me to believe this, for the 
Venezuelans have been aware of their own best inter­
ests more them any other country. They believed they 
should separate from Spain, and for this objective 
they have sacrificed part of their will, part of 
their strength, their comfort, their properties, and 
even the love of their families. The people of 
Venezuela, like any other people, are incapable of 
discerning the justice or injustice that has served 
as basis for the law. This is reserved for philos­
ophers. However, they have known how to obey the 
laws, and this public moral is a great consolation for 
me, as it must be for you. I have convinced myself 
that Venezuela might suffer shortages, but it shall 
be the last to disturb the national tranquility.
You also told me in your letter that in order not 
to offend my delicacy and generosity you did not want 
to talk about the situation in which I find myself, 
following the path marked out for me by the pilot. My 
dear friend, I speak to you with all honesty. Nothing 
that you tell me offends me, not even the advice you 
give me, which is highly appreciated. What does offend 
me is the reason for your doing it. You have misunder­
stood what I have said. Senor Soublette. worthy and 
most honorable superintendent of Venezuela, is because 
of his talents, abilities. and political and military 
knowledge, the best man and perhaps the only one that 
you could have selected for the elevated and very sad 
destiny you have given him. I am very far from having 
been displeased even once while serving under his 
orders. On the contrary, an amiable leader such as h e . 
without pride. without any resentments toward m e . helps 
me to carry the enormous burden you have placed on my 
shoulders. I wish that you could enter my heart and, 
searching my innermost feelings, could be convinced and 
satisfied that £  have not aspired to be superintendent 
of these provinces. Rather I am heartily convinced 
that neither I nor mv friends would be capable of
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fulfilling this job with the prudence. tenacity. 
maturity, and dexterity with which Sefior Soublette 
is performing it for the general welfare of the 
people. Please do not think X beg you, not even for 
an instant, that e n w  or ambition could have entered 
mv heart. I do not sacrifice anything in obeying 
Senor Soublette's orders because I follow them with 
great pleasure. When I told you that I did nothing 
but follow the path pointed out by the pilot, it was 
only to reveal to you that in my character as Com­
mandant General of the army, I did not have the 
responsibility of guiding the war, but of marching and 
commanding the operations of the army where I was told.
1 thanked Heaven a thousand times because the 
government of the Republic had not chosen me for this 
task. To prove my truthfulness, I must add that in 
times of peace and tranquility when order is estab­
lished I would perhaps be flattered by the title of 
superintendent. Today I could not have accepted it, 
for I would not be able to surmount the many obstacles 
presented by politics nor find the strength to estab­
lish law and order. Soublette was the man needed in 
Venezuela for this purpose. and I repeat and will 
repeat a. thousand times that you were right in select­
ing him. If l have said something about him, it is 
what I_ would say to him in a friendly manner. It is 
because of my fierv temperament that I cannot keep 
some thoughts to myself, particularly when I. believe 
that expressing them might be of some value.
I well know how great and heavy the obligations are 
on me as Commandant General of the army. I try to ful­
fill them in the best possible manner, and I will do 
everything necessary on my part so that Colombia's 
armies will not fail to be triumphant because of lack 
of activity or interest. Other generals might have 
commanded and may be commanding armies without provi­
sions. I, too, have led them naked, and I believe that 
no other soldiers have suffered as much as those of 
Venezuela. Having been in war constantly, the country 
is devastated and without resources. If I have told 
you about this more ardently, it has been out of a 
desire to alleviate the privations. It did not mean 
that I will stop doing all that is necessary on my 
part to make the soldiers extraordinarily content and 
to console them and alleviate their fatigues.
You recommend very highly to me that I sacrifice my 
person, my goods, my rights, and my sentiments for my 
country. I do not know if it is as a result of. the 
rare character of the Venezuelans, or the frankness
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that is peculiar to me, that I am going to tell you 
everything that I am about to. 1 have not made any 
sacrifices for my country, and my country has made a 
thousand sacrifices for me. .1 have been one of those 
upper-eschelon representatives accustomed to acting 
on his own. 1 was placed in that elevated position 
by circumstances, and I left it of my own accord. The 
last day of my absolute command was the first day of 
my real contentment. Since then I have done what the 
governing leaders have wanted me to do, and my con­
science does not bother me for ever having failed to 
obey. I find myself now one of the happiest beings 
in the revolution. If anyone tends to believe that I 
have been insubordiante, my acts have belied this.
Few men have been given a more ample opportunity to 
testify what they are to the world. During all the 
time I commanded, I did not do one single thing that 
revealed ambition. I commanded a considerable corps 
of men without any laws other them my will. I 
engraved money and did everything that an absolute lord 
can do on his estates. Yet no traces can be found of 
my even having desired to perpetuate my name.
It would be in vain for me to spend time repeating 
my desires for order and tranquility. I have attained 
the rank of General-in-Chief and look upon this title 
as a wife looks upon the dress and jewels she puts on 
on her wedding day. Occupied as she is in the more 
important business of pleasing her husband, she 
sacrcely remembers them. Thus I barely remember the 
rank of general except to be of great use to my country, 
for my head is filled with the desire to destroy my 
enemies. If they were eiq>elled from the territory 
tomorrow, my sole ambition would be to govern and aug­
ment the properties my country has given me. I would 
very happily become a citizen even if this were not 
the mode or manner of representative governments. To 
leave a command by force is for someone who loves to 
command. I would leave a command because of my char­
acter and for my peace of mind.
My country has covered me with honors. It has more 
than recompensed me for the efforts I made for my own 
defense and independence. I leave to superior talents 
the task of establishing civil liberty and order. I am 
always quick to act like a soldier wherever I am sent. 
The less freedom I have in my command, the happier I am. 
While I was absolute, I triumphed over the enemy. I 
have ended this career with glory, and if I could now 
retire with the reputation I have, I would be a lucky 
mortal. I cannot rise any higher in the esteem of my 
fellow citizens, and I very much fear losing what I have
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acquired. It is only a sense of honor and the desire 
to repay my country that keep me in command. I will do 
everything possible not to be unworthy of its confidence 
and to certify to all my constancy, my obedience, and my 
gratitude.
Forgive me, my dear friend, for writing this long 
letter as proof of my desire to erase whatever slight 
unfavorable impression my letter of January 15 might 
have made on you. Receive it as proof of the esteem 
in which I hold you, for I do not want my cherished 
friends to think ill of me unjustly. Please always 
write me with frankness, for I appreciate it very much. 
If I am guilty of error, I believe I am docile enough 
to correct myself. If I am not, I will have the oppor­
tunity to remove the impressions that possibly the 
speed of the pen can project. I have taken too much 
time from a man who has as much to do as you.
Correct the country for u s . I know it is time now 
for you to leave this letter and return to arranging 
the great affairs of the Republic. Believe me to be 
sincerely your friend, and do not hold as insignifi­
cant someone who wants to prove to you that he had the 
honor of being your attentive servant and friend.
Jos6 A. PAez.
CHAPTER XV
Siege of Puerto Cabello— Ultimatum to Calzada—
His Reply— 1 Decide to Assault the Plaza— Dangerous 
Enterprise— Surrender of the Plaza and the Fort—  
Losses of the Royalists and Patriots.
1823
While I was in La Guaira getting provisions and 
materials for the siege of Puerto Cabello, I very secretly 
wrote the Commandant of the Plaza, Don Sebastian de la 
Calzada, on September 17 and urged him to lay down his arms 
in order to avoid useless bloodshed. Furthermore, I offered 
him twenty-five thousand pesos for the expenses that might 
be incurred by his departure from the plaza. I also wrote 
the Spaniard, Don Jacinto Iztueta, a man whom 1 knew was not 
very happy with the Royalists.1 X selected two prisoners to 
take these letters. Without removing their handcuffs, I set 
sail with these prisoners in the corvette Urica. I dis­
patched them from Ocumare in a canoe to Puerto Cabello, 
instructing them to present themselves to the Spanish leader
1Jacinto Xztueta was a native of Biscay. In 1811 he 
was an enthusiastic supporter of the "banner of Castilla."
He later was imprisoned at Puerto Cabello because he was an 
ardent Royalist. Parra P6 rez, Historia de la Primera Repfl- 
blica. II, 83, 278, 339, 348.
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as escapees from -the prisons of La Guaira.
Calzada did not delay long in answering me, secretly 
also. He told me that his honor and military responsibility 
did not permit him to take the step 1 proposed to him, and 
he ended by saying that he had resolved to defend the plaza 
until the bitter end. Consequently, I went ahead then and 
beseiged the port, for 1 saw that it was impossible to con- 
quer the bold obstinacy of the enemy in any other manner.
The plaza at Puerto Cabello was divided in two sec­
tions. The first section, called Pueblo Interior, formed a 
peninsula that by means of an isthmus joined the town called 
Pueblo Afuera. The latter town originated in said isthmus 
and extended toward the continent. The interior town was 
separated from the exterior by a canal that ran from the sea 
to the heart of the bay. This canal bathed its waters at the 
foot of the battery called Estacada, which with a battery at 
the East called Principe and another at the West called 
Princesa. defended the plaza on the South. On the East the 
enemy had a battery called Picavo or ConstituciOn which was 
set up at the edge of town across from the extensive planta­
tion of mangrove trees that were on that side of the bay.
^P&ez footnotes this as follows. "On one occasion I 
had to leave temporarily in order to go to Valencia to ask 
for food provisions, which were very scarce. The inhabitants 
of this city, always most generous with their country and 
with me, not only gave me the necessary provisions, but in 
addition anything that could serve to please the troops 
during the fatigues of the siege."
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On the North, the plaza had no other defense than the battery 
of Corito and the fortress of San Felipe. The latter were 
constructed in front of an island situated on the mouth of 
the canal that forms the entrance to the port. The mouth of 
this canal was closed by a chain that stretched between the 
aforementioned fortifications. All these points were per­
fectly mounted with cannons. From the Corito battery ran a 
rampart to the south until it joined the Principe, but this 
had no artillery. The exterior part of the town was in front 
of the Estacada and behind a clear space of about two hundred 
and fifty yards. In front of this part of the town and 
coming from within, there was an established, fortified line, 
defended on the West by a fort which was situated at the 
mouth of the San Est6 ban River and along a canal in front of 
Calle Real [Royal Street] of the inner town. From there to 
the East the line curved to leave the path free for fires 
from the Princesa.
Even under the sure fire of the enemy's excellent 
artillery, I started trying to mount artillery on the 
Trincherdn battery. On October 7 we took possession of this 
battery, situated at the edge of the mangrove plantation, and 
placed a twenty-four pounder. The Royalist Lieutenant Don 
Pedro Calderon came in a long, narrow, armed canoe along 
the narrow passage formed by the mangroves and the Trincherdn 
battery at the foot of the hill, and he prevented us from 
bringing our materials of war from the port at Borburata. 
Later he had to retreat from here with great losses. From
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then on the path was clear for us to aim the other batteries 
against the plaza.
On the eighth the San Luis battery was mounted west 
of TrincherOn. it offered the advantage of giving us greater 
protection for the war materials coming from Borburata. On 
the twelfth we were successful in constructing a battery in 
Cocos which dominated the mouth of the river and kept those 
besieged from coming out and getting water. It also enabled 
us to attack the fort. The enemy took advantage of the fire 
that resulted from this battery when a grenade exploded and 
attempted to come out. This attempt was repelled by Captain 
Laureano LOpez, and the enemy was forced to return to the 
plaza.3
West of the Cocos battery we placed a mortar and set 
up the batteries of Royal Street against the canal on the
3General Laureano LOpez was born in Popay&n and was 
the brother of General J. H. LOpez. He was with the Republi­
cans that General Narino led in the brilliant campaign of the 
South and thus fought in the Battles of Palacio and Calibio. 
In 1815 he was victorious in the Battle of Palo. He was 
defeated in the Battle of Cuchilla del Tambo and later fell 
prisoner in the Battle of Las Cruces. The Spanish forced 
him to serve as a soldier in their ranks then until the 
Battle of BoyacA in 1819 when he was rescued. He fought at 
the second Battle of Carabobo under PAez with such distinc­
tion , that PAez later selected him as one of the captains to 
lead the assault on Puerto Cabello. He was wounded in this 
attack and received a special commendation. In 1826 he was 
promoted to Sergeant Major and ten years later he attained 
the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. By 1851 Ldpez had become a 
General. He died in PopayAn in 1852. Scarpetta and Vergara, 
Diccionario BioarAfico. 272.
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outside line. Rebote battery was to confront Princesa and 
some launches that the Royalist had posted in the mangrove 
plantation. We had already come so close to the walls, that 
we had opened a breach in the fort and in the masthead. The 
enemy had good workmen, however, and they repaired the dam­
ages received during the day at night. By now the enemy 
force that had occupied the Mirador de Solano had capitulated. 
This point now served us as it had the enemy before— as a 
lookout point from which to observe the interior of the 
besieged plaza.
The story which I am going to relate now is what made 
me hope we could take the plaza by assault. Every morning 
we found human footprints on the beach on the way to 
Borburate. I posted men there and was successful in having 
them surprise a Negro who waded in that terrain, covered with 
water, in the dark of night. This Negro told me that he was 
called Juli&n, was Don Jacinto Iztueta's slave, and that he 
had left the plaza with orders to observe our position. I 
set him free to return to the plaza, and 1 presented him 
with some gifts. Charging him to say nothing of what had 
occurred that night, I told him that he would never be pre­
vented from returning to the plaza so long as he promised 
that he would always come to me. After he had come and gone 
many times, I was finally able to win the Negro over to my 
side. 1 had him stay with us and finally persuaded him to 
show me the weak point at the mangrove plantation through 
which he was wont to make his nightly excursions. I sent
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three officers— Captain Marcelo Gdmez, Lieutenant Juan 
Albornoz, and JosA FernAndez— to accompany him one night.^ 
They returned within two hours and reported they had gotten 
close to land without ever having left shallow water.
Having twice proposed to Calzada to enter an agreement 
to prevent further bloodshed. I finally sent him an ultimatum 
to surrender the plaza and gave him twenty-four hours to 
decide. If he refused to capitulate. I threatened to take 
the plaza by force and knife the entire garrison. When the 
twenty-four hours elapsed, he answered me saying that the
Captain Marcelo Gdmez was born in Guasdualito about 
1795 and became a citizen of Achaguas. He enlisted as a 
soldier in Commandant Olmedilla's cavalry. In 1814 he was 
with Garcia Sena in the defeat at Barinas, but in 1815 he 
participated with Olmedilla at the victory in Guasdualito.
He helped defeat Calzada in Chire while serving under General 
Ricaurte in 1815. By 1816 Gdmez had joined PAez in Palmarito 
and was promoted to corporal. While serving under PAez, he 
was wounded at the Battle of Barinas and promoted later to 
the rank of Lieutenant. He served under Bolivar in the 
Battles of Canafistola and Gamarra in 1819. He was again 
promoted, this time to captain, and fought at the second 
Battle of Carabobo. In 1822 he participated in the siege of 
Puerto Cabello. He became a member of the Lanceros de la 
Victoria and served in this regiment until 1827. In 1831 he 
campaigned in the Alto Llano. DAvila, Diccionario BioqrAfico.
I, 192-93.
Juan Ignacio Albornoz was born in Barcelona, Vene­
zuela. In 1814 he was a lieutenant and in 1817 helped defend 
the fort at Barcelona. He was in New Granada in 1819 and in 
1821 fought at the Battle of Carabobo. He participated in 
the siege of Puerto Cabello in 1823. Albornoz was killed in 
1835 while fighting against the Reformistas. Ibid., 6 .
JosA FernAndez was a citizen of Caracas. In 1822 he 
attained the rank of Sublieutenant in the Granderos de la 
CXiardia. He participated in the siege of Puerto Cabello. 
Ibid., 143.
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plaza was defended by old soldiers who knew how to fulfill 
their duty and were resolved as a last resort to follow the 
glorious examples of Sagunto and Numancia. If fate allowed 
me to penetrate those walls, they would follow my orders 
although they expected that I would not want to stain the 
lustre of my sword by an act worthy of the times of the bar­
barians .
When the group that had gone for conference left the 
plaza, the troops lined up along the walls and challenged us 
with great huzzas to come run them through with a knife. It 
was then that I decided to enter the plaza on the side of 
the mangrove plantation. In order that the enemy would not 
believe that we were going to carry out immediately the 
threat we had made to Calzada, I put five hundred men to 
digging ditches during the night. I thus twisted the course 
of the river so that the besieged enemy would believe that I 
was thinking only of lengthening the siege and not of assault­
ing the walls of the plaza for the time being. On this 
occasion I miraculously escaped with my life, for while 
inspecting the work very early that morning, a cannon ball 
hit the pile of sand I was standing on with such force, that 
it hurled me violently into the ditch. However, I was not 
hurt at all.
Almost certain that the enemy did not suspect that I 
was ready to assault, I ordered all our guns to start firing 
at five in the morning and not stop until I sent a counter
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order. My intention was to call the enemy's attention to 
the front and tire him so we could catch him unprepared that 
night. Then I assembled my troops and ordered them to dis­
robe, keeping only their weapons.
On the night of November 7 at ten o'clock, four 
hundred men from the Anzo&tegui battalion and one hundred 
lancers were moved from Alcabala under the orders of Manuel 
Cala and Lieutenant Colonel Jos6 Andres Elorza and com­
missioned to assault in the following order.^
First, Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Farfan was to take 
possession of the batteries Princesa and Principe with two 
companies under the command of Captain Francisco DomlnguesCz]
5No further information is available on Manuel Cala. 
Lieutenant Colonel Jos6 Andres Elorza was born in San Felipe 
el Fuerte. As a lieutenant in 1813 he served under Colonel 
Olmedilla in the attack on Pedroza. He became ill and was 
taken prisoner. Managing to escape, he joined Garcia de 
Sena and participated in the unfortunate siege of Barinas in 
1814. He then emigrated to M 6 rida. Serving under Captain 
Ranjel, he was victorious at the Battle of Bailadores. In 
1815 he was in Casanare with Olmedilla and General Ricaurte. 
From 1816 on he served under PAez and fought at the Battles 
of Yagual, Achaguas, Nutrias, and San Fernando. In 1817 he 
participated in the triumph at Mucuritas. He suffered the 
defeats at Cojedes and Ortiz. By 1819 he had become a Lieu­
tenant Colonel and in 1821 at the Battle of Carabobo he com­
manded a cavalry column. He fought brilliantly at the siege 
of Puerto Cabello and in 1823 campaigned in Riohacha at the 
head of the Dragones de Venezuela. He attained the rank of 
Colonel in 1826. Elorza died in Achaguas. Ibid., 123-24.
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and fifty lancers under the command of Captain Pedro Rojas.® 
On hearing the first firing, they were to charge hurriedly 
on the ramparts and bastions without giving the enemy time 
to bring out artillery pieces to repel them.
Second, a company under the command of Captain 
Laureano Ldpez and twenty-five lancers under the orders of 
Captain Juan JosA MArida were to occupy the dock.7 Captain 
Joaquin PArez with his company was to take over the battery 
at Corito. Captain Gabriel Guevara with another company was 
to attack the battery ConstituciQn. Lieutenant colonel JosA 
de Lima with twenty-five lancers was to occupy the door of
^Colonel Francisco Farfan was born in Ecuador. He 
fought under PAez in the Battles of Mata de la Miel, Yagual, 
Achaguas, Mucuritas, Los Cocos, and Queseras del Medio. 
Serving under Bolivar, he was victorious at Paya, Gameza, and 
Vargas. In 1819 he fought at the Battle of BoyacA and later 
at the Battle of Carabobo. In 1823, serving under PAez, he 
helped in the siege of Puerto Cabello. Later the same year 
he helped in the Pasto campaign. Bolivar named him Minister 
of the Superior Military Court in 1826. Scarpetta and 
Vergara, Diccionario BiogrAfico. 149.
Captain Francisco Dominguez was born in CumanA. He 
started his services to his country in 1811 in Angostura. He 
was wounded while fighting at the Battle of Barinitas. Later, 
he was taken prisoner while attempting to occupy Margarita.
He escaped and fought under PAez1s orders at the Battle of 
Carabobo in 1821 and later participated in the siege of 
Puerto Cabello. Ibid.. 133.
Captain Pedro Rojas was also born in CumanA and joined 
the independence cause as early as 1811. He fought at the 
Battles of Bocas del pao, CumanA, Barcelona, Aragua, Cara­
bobo, and Puerto Cabello. Ibid.. 537.
7Captain Juan josA MArida was born in El Tinaco and 
was a merchant. Although he had been in the revolutionary 
army much earlier, the first written record available con­
cerning his activities in battle start with the Battle of 
Carabobo in 1821. He also participated in the siege of 
Puerto Cabello in 1823. He died in El Tinaco in 1841.
DAvila, Diccionario BiogrAfico. I, 364.
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the Estacada. This was the point where the force which 
covered the outside line could enter the plaza. The company 
of riflemen under Captain Valentin Reyes along with Mayor 
Cala was to form the reserve.8 The launches I had posted in 
Borburata were to fake an attack on the dock of the plaza.
There will be some who will consider this risky opera­
tion rash. We must take into account, however, that rashness 
in war ceases to be imprudent, no matter how risky the under­
taking, when one is certain the enemy is unprepared for an 
unexpected blow and thus virtually assured of success.
We spent four hours crossing the mangrove plantation 
with water up to our chests, walking on very muddy terrain, 
and without being seen— thanks to the dark of the night. We 
passed so close to Princesa battery, that we heard the guards 
exclaim over the great numbers of "fish" that were agitating 
the water that night. We also passed very close to the prow 
of the battle corvette Bailen, and we were successful in not
8Captain Valentin Reyes was born on the island of 
Margarita in 1803. He joined the independence cause in 1815 
in Margarita and under Arismendi's command fought in the 
Battles of Guacuco, Caranta, and the Fort of Santa Rosa. In 
1816 he went to the mainland with Bolivar. He then fought 
under Mac Gregor as first sergeant, in 1817 he participated 
in the fruitless assault on Angostura. He was with Marino 
in 1818 in Cariaco and in 1819 became a Lieutenant. He went 
to New Granada in 1820 and returned with Bolivar in 1820.
He fought at the second Battle of carabobo as a Captain. 
Under P&ez's orders, he helped beseige Puerto Cabello. In 
1829 Reyes was promoted to Commandant. He died in the 
cholera epidemic of 1856 in his estate at Tamanavere. Ibid.. 
II, 157-58.
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being seen by the Spanish launches patrolling the bay.
The attack was made. As was to be eaqpected, it had 
the best possible results. The enemy forces defended them­
selves with desperation until they saw the futility of all 
resistance. They had been forced to fight face-to-face and 
had been unable to retreat to the fortress, thanks to the 
precautions I had taken. With the plaza occupied, the 
exterior line was attacked by a company from the Battalion 
of Grenadiers that I had left stationed there to deceive the 
enemy. This line was forced to surrender.
At dawn two priests came and told me that General 
Calzada had taken refuge in a church and wanted to surrender 
to me personally. I went to see him immediately. He con­
gratulated me for having "sealed my glories" (these were his 
words) with such a risky operation, and then he surrendered 
his sword. I thanked him, took him by the arm, and led him 
to drink coffee at the house he had occupied during the siege.
While I was on the side of the plaza that faces the 
fortress and a trumpeteer was sounding the truce, four cannon 
grape shots were fired from the fortress, killing one of my 
sergeants. However, when the enemy soldiers heard the 
trumpet announcing the truce, they raised a white flag and 
suspended the firing. Almost immediately I heard a terrible 
explosion. I turned my head to where the dense smoke was 
rising and realized that the enemy had blown up the war cor­
vette Bailen anchored in the bay. 1 manifested my indigna­
tion at such an act to Calzada. He attributed it to the
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rashness of the Commandant of the fortress, Colonel Don 
Manuel Carrera y Colina, and offered to write him ordering 
him to cease all hostilities as long as the garrison of the 
plaza and its chief were at the mercy of the conqueror.®
That Commandant responded that if General Calzada were a 
prisoner, he was forced to cease recognizing his authority 
as his superior officer. 1 returned Calzada's sword to him 
then and sent him to the fortress. He wrote me from there 
shortly afterwards telling me that Carrera had recognized 
his authority on seeing him free, and that in his name he 
invited me to lunch with him at the fortress. Always con­
fiding in Castilian chivalry, I went to that fort. I was 
received with military honors and with all the gallant 
courtesy that X could esq>ect from such valiant adversaries.
While we were having lunch, the soldiers who had sur­
rendered in the Mirador de Solano came befc :e me and told me 
that they were still being tried. I interceded on their 
behalf, but since they always presented the argument of the 
need for severity in military discipline, I asked for the 
dispatches on the matter. With a brusqueness which the 
Spanish leaders forgave me because of my good intentions, I 
put them in my pocket. 1 then returned to the plaza where 
we entered into negotiations which ended with a most generous 
surrender.
^Torrente mentions that Carrera y Colina in his com­
munications with General P&ez had "assured an honorable 
surrender." Historla de la Revolucidn. H I ,  440.
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The historian[s] Baralt [and Diaz] after telling 
briefly about the previous acts, conclude with these words *1 0
Thus succumbed Puerto Cabello, the last precinct 
that still held Spanish weapons in the vast territory 
that lay between the Guayaquil River and the magnifi­
cent delta of the Orinoco. HERE ENDS THE WAR OP 
INDEPENDENCE. Henceforth the weapons of the republic 
will not be used except against bands of robbers, 
which the peninsular tenacity armed and nourished for 
some time, or in aiding sister towns outside its 
boundaries in the conquest of their rights.
The Royalist losses on this occasion amounted to one 
hundred and fifty-six dead, fifty-six wounded, and fifty-six 
officers and five hundred and thirty-nine soldiers taXen 
prisoner. This included the fort garrison. We had only ten 
dead and thirty-five wounded. Captains Sebasti&n Taborda 
and Marcelo GOmez, in addition to the ones already cited, 
distinguished themselves. The patriots seized sixty pieces 
of every type of artillery without counting the dismounted 
cannons, six hundred and twenty guns, three thousand hundred­
weights of powder, six cannon launches, and a multitude of 
military and naval implements.
l°This citation is in Baralt and Diaz, Roadmen de la 
Historia. Ill, 114-15.
CHAPTER XVI
Efforts of the Patriots to Get Aid from the European 
Powers and from the United States— Sympathy of the 
English and American Peoples for the Cause of South 
American Independence— Recognition of Colombia—  
Brief Reflections on the Monroe Doctrine— Congress 
of Panam&.
1822
When the drama of the Colombian revolution ended 
following the capture of Puerto Cabello, the new Republic 
believed itself to have the right to be recognized as an inde 
pendent nation by European powers and the United States. 
During our struggle with Spain, friends of liberty in both 
hemispheres had contented themselves with giving sterile 
signs of sympathy for the South American patriots, and 
despite our efforts, we were never able to get the assistance 
of any foreign power. When in 1804 Colonel W. [William S.] 
Smith and Mr. [Samuel] Ogden of New York placed the two cor­
vettes Leandro and Emperador with rifles, ammunition, and two 
hundred volunteers at Miranda's disposal, we received the 
first foreign aid.^
^The author is referring here to Colonel William S. 
Smith, who was ex-President John Adams's son-in-law and an 
Inspector or Collector of Customs, and Mr. Samuel Ogden, who 
was a New York merchant. They assisted Miranda in outfitting 
this filibustering expedition in 1806 in New York apparently
457
456
In 1810 the junta of Caracas had commissioned Senores 
Luis Ldpez MAndez and Simfin Bolivar to secure a treaty 
obtaining Great Britain's help .2 They were not able to get 
it because the interests of that nation were identified then 
with those of Spain in the fight against Bonaparte. That 
same year this junta also sent Telesforo Orea and Vicente 
Bolivar to the United States to interest this nation in the 
struggle Colombia was sustaining for her independence.3 The
with the tacit consent of President Thomas Jefferson and 
Secretary of State James Madison. Lemly, Bolivar. 6 .
2Don Luis Ldpez M&ndez was the financial agent for the 
Caracas government in London and perhaps a prototype of the 
South American financial agent of those days. He was profuse 
in his promises to the British soldiers coming to fight for 
Venezuelan independence regardless of whether he intended or 
was capable of implementing these promises. Cunninghame 
Graham, PAez. 152-53, 169.
3Telesforo Orea or de Orea and Juan Vicente Bolivar, 
the Liberator's brother, arrived in Baltimore on June 5, 1810. 
They were cordially, though not officially, received by Dr. 
Thornton, a close friend of President James Madison. Later 
they were received by Secretary of State Robert Smith, and 
still later by the President. Although Smith did not accept 
Juan Vicente Bolivar's credentials, he expressed his enthus­
iasm for Venezuelan independence. Juan Vicente did not wait 
for a later appointment with Smith and left immediately for 
Philadelphia to see the Spanish Minister there, Don Luis de 
Onis, and negotiate an agreement. The plan he offered the 
latter was moderate, for he was willing to leave the constitu­
tional status of Venezuela unaltered if complete equality 
were granted in office-holding to Creoles and Spaniards and 
if Creoles were given a share in the economic administration 
of the country. Orea, who had left for Caracas when Juan 
Vicente Bolivar went to Philadelphia, returned now with the 
authority to oust Juan Vicente. Onis reported to his govern­
ment now that Juan Vicente told himi "that instead of an 
agreeable answer, he had received letters from his brother 
and friends to the effect that he was being superseded by 
Don Telesforo de Orea, born in Tenerife, one of those lenaves 
without good blood or property, who are leading the
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North American people gave then, as always, signs of sym­
pathy for our cause; however, they were unable to get the 
federal government to depart from the policy of neutrality 
which it maintained in foreign affairs. Despite this 
failure, Manuel Palacio [Fajardo] was sent to Washington in 
1812 to inform the President that the peoples of New Granada 
could no longer support themselves alone in the unequal 
battle which they had started against d e s p o t i s m . 4 The
revolution, and that the people shout for his head and the 
confiscation of his property which is the largest in the 
country, only because he had negotiated with me. 1 saw his 
brother's original letters in which he advises him to leave 
for Europe and on no account return to Caracas." By 1811, 
Simdn Bolivar had been able to free Juan Vicente's property 
and allow him to return and report on his mission. In July 
of 1811 the latter perished at sea during a storm off the 
Bermudas while he was returning home. Madariaga, Bolivar. 
154-55, 161-63.
Manuel Palacio Fajardo was born in Mijagual, Vene­
zuela, in 1784 to a wealthy and patriotic family. He 
finished his studies in law and medicine at the University 
of Santa F6 de Bogota. When the cry for independence broke 
out in Caracas, Palacio flew back to his country. He was 
immediately elected to the first Congress which met in 1811 
and to membership in the Sociedad Patriotica. His speeches 
and actions in this Congress were brilliant. Joining arms 
with Miranda, he counseled the higher governmental echelons.
In 1812 he emigrated to Cundinamarca and there was charged 
with the commission to obtain arms in the United States and 
Europe. He failed to get any assistance in the United States. 
Acting on Mr. Serrurier's (French minister in Washington) 
recommendation, he went to Paris in 1813 to seek aid from 
Napoleon. Palacio Fajardo was negotiating with Napoleon's 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Duke de Bassano, when the 
Battle of Leipzig occurred (October, 1813) which spelled 
Napoleon's defeat, in 1817 he wrote and had published in 
English a most significant work entitled Outline of the 
Revolution in Spanish America (London, 1817). In 1818 he was 
named Secretary of State of the Angostura government. He 
died on March 8 , 1819 in Angostura just as he was putting all 
his enormous talents into play for his country's benefit. 
Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario Bioqr&fico. 427-28;
460
government, in Washington gave that emissary this responses 
"That although the United States had no alliance and was at 
peace with Spain and thus unable to help the patriots, as 
inhabitants of the same continent, they still hoped that our 
efforts would be successful." This emissary lost hope of 
securing help from the cabinet in Washington and went to the 
French minister in that city, Mr. Serrurier.^ The latter 
advised him to go see Napoleon; however, when Napoleon seemed 
best disposed to second the efforts of the South American 
patriots, the Battle of Leipsig occurred and forced him to 
think only of defending his territory from invasion by the 
Allies.
In 1815 the Senate of New Granada sent Pedro Gual to 
Washington.6 The following year Bolivar sent General Lino
Caracciolo Parra P6rez, Una Misidn Diplomatica ante Napoleon 
en 1813 (Caracas, 1953), 7-89.
^Mr. Serrurier (sometimes spelled Serurier) was sup­
posed to try to get the secret support of the American federal 
government for the insurgents. He also offered to send on to 
Paris whatever communications the Republican government needed 
to send. Parra P£rez, Historia de la Primera Republica, II, 
217, 219, 222.
6Dr. Pedro Gaul was born in Venezuela. He took part 
in the revolutionary junta in Caracas in 1810, and in 1814 he 
helped assemble an electoral college to revise the constitu­
tion. After helping to defend Cartagena in 1813, he was 
forced to emigrate to Jamaica. He returned in 1819 to Vene­
zuela and was of great help to Bolivar in the task of govern­
ing the country. He became one of Bolivar's Finance Ministers 
and later became Secretary of State. He retired from public 
service in 1830 and dedicated himself to the practice of law 
in BogotA. He broke his prolonged retirement only twicet 
the first time to fulfill a diplomatic mission for Ecuador 
in Spain in 1842 pertaining to the settlement of the war
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Clemente, for he believed that the government of the United 
States would be more disposed to lend its powerful help to 
aid Colombian independence now that an expedition was being 
armed in Louisiana in favor of the Mexican patriots. Presi­
dent Madison, faithful to the traditional policies of his 
predecessors of maintaining the strictest neutrality in the 
affairs of other countries and of not forming entangling 
alliances, ordered that expedition to be dissolved by procla­
mation in December of that year. This was also authorized 
by Congress and prohibited American citizens from selling 
war ships to subjects of any foreign belligerent power.
Despite this, the people of the United States did not 
cease to manifest their sympathies for the South American 
patriots. In 1818 the legislature of Kentucky, inspired by 
the eminent orator H[enry] Clay, invited the federal govern­
ment to recognize the independence of the Hispanic-American
debt and negotiating a treaty for commerce and navigation; 
the second time to assume the Presidency of Venezuela only 
temporarily in 1861. PAez, who was his Minister of War and 
Navy then, tried to negotiate with the Federalists. Gual 
disapproved of this action and asked P&ez to resign his 
ministry. It was then that the commander of the garrison 
stationed in Caracas asked Gual to resign, arrested him, and 
proclaimed P&ez the dictator. Gual was forced into exile 
in Ecuador where he died in Guayaquil in 1862. Scarpetta 
and Vergara, Diccionario Bioar&fico, 199-200. Harold A. 
Bierck, Jr., Vida Pdblica dfi. Q&D. Pedro Gual (Caracas, 1947), 
11-569.
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countries.7 Now arms and munitions were sent secretly from 
the United States.
The names of colonel [William] Duane, Lord Holland, 
and Sir Robert Wilson must be recorded here .8 Later they 
were worthy of receiving a tribute of thanks from the 
Colombian Congress for the interest they manifested in favor 
of the independence cause.
In his message to the Congress of the United States 
in December, 1819, President Monroe, the reputed author of 
the doctrine by this name, said that the South American 
struggle was of great interest to the United States. However, 
he added that he considered it of great importance to the
7The author interjects this footnote at this point. 
"This is the same man who later as Secretary of State gave 
the instructions to the commissioners to the Congress of 
Panama that I shall copy later." For a detailed account of 
the life of Clay see Calvin Colton, The Life and Times of 
Henry Clay. 2 vols. (New York, 1846).
8No further information was available on Lord Holland. 
Colonel William Duane was an American who was sent to Colombia
in 1822 to settle claims against the Colombia government,
among which was the Jacob Idler claim. After completing his 
mission, he wrote &  Visit to Colombia in the Years 1822 and 
1823 (Philadelphia, 1826), Jane L. DeGrummond, "The Jacob 
Idler Claim Against Venezuela, 1817-1890," The Hispanic 
American Historical Review. XXXIV (May, 1954), 131-57.
Sir Robert Wilson was a General in the British Army.
He sent his third son, Captain Belford Hinton Wilson, to
Colombia and asked Bolivar to appoint him to his staff as his 
aide. Young Wilson served Bolivar well and faithfully, and 
the latter attested to this in his will. Sir Wilson pro­
nounced an eulogy on Bolivar in Parliament and later was 
voted a thanks from the Venezuelan Congress for his efforts 
in promoting the cause of independence. Hasbrouck, Foreign 
Legionaries. 335, 392, 394.
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national character and morality to prevent any violation of 
the laws of neutrality.
We owed the English people some help in the unequal 
struggle we maintained against the metropolis. During the 
year 1817, six ships left England carrying seven hundred and 
twenty men recruited by Colonels [Robert] S. Keene fsic. 
Skeene], [Belford H . ] Wilson, [Gustavus] Hippisley, [Donald] 
Campbell, [J. A.] Gillmore [sic, Gilmour] and [Donald] Mac 
Donald rsic. Me Donald] . 9 Despite the fact that part of the
9Colonel Robert Skeene was a retired Lieutenant Colonel 
in the British Cavalry. He temporarily accepted the rank of 
Brigadier General in the First Venezuelan Hussars. Ibid., 48.
The Wilson P4ez refers to here is Colonel Belford 
Hinton Wilson (see Footnote 8 in this Chapter). He was 
educated at Westminster and Sandhurst and joined Bolivar just 
in time to be present at the Battle of Junln. In 1824 he was 
granted a leave for health reasons, but he returned in time 
to make his remarkable ride carrying the Bolivian constitu­
tion to Sucre. The latter feat won him his promotion to 
Colonel. Wilson remained with Bolivar until his death in 
1830. In 1832 he was appointed British Consul General in 
PertL, and in 1849 he was given a similar post in Venezuela. 
Ibid., 334, 335.
Colonel Gustavus Hippisley was appointed a Colonel in 
the First Venezuelan Hussars. With Lbpez M£ndez's encourage­
ment and backing, he agreed to complete the organization of 
the First Venezuelan Lancers and receive an appointment as 
Brigadier General in return. In December of 1817 he left 
England with thirty officers and one hundred and sixty non­
commissioned officers on the Emerald. By 1818 this regiment 
had been so reduced by sickness, resignations, and desertions, 
that Colonel Hippisley was able to crowd them all on board 
the Tiger and sail for the Orinoco. After his arrival at 
Angostura, he and Colonel Wilson consolidated the remnants of 
their regiments in one brigade known as the "British Brigade." 
Then Hippisley received orders to join Bolivar at San Fer­
nando de Apure where he encountered the wild confusion of 
the Republican army retreating before Morillo's Spanish 
forces. Colonel Hippisley's men deserted him now due to the 
poverty, hardships, and privations. It seems L6 pez M 6 ndez 
had not been able to fulfill any of his promises regarding
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troops that arrived in 1818 succumbed to the inclemency of 
the climate, General [John] D 'evereux [sic, D'EvereauxJ,
pay, housing, and rations. When he saw that the patriot 
treasury could not give his men and officers better rations 
and pay, Hippisley resigned. When he arrived in London, he 
ordered Lbpez M 6 ndez arrested for non-payment of the debt due 
him by the Republic of Venezuela. He also spread many 
calumnies against Bolivar. Ibid.. 47, 48, 55, 58, 67, 70,
72, 73, 74, 75, 371.
Colonel Donald Campbell was appointed Colonel of a 
rifle regiment by LOpez M 6 ndez*s "factory of colonels." He 
was an experienced infantry officer and was so efficient, 
that he was one of the first to embark his regiment on a ship 
he had chartered from his brother. Feeling that the other 
colonels were his brothers-in-arms, he generously offered to 
wait for Colonel Hippisley and finally embarked along with 
the latter on the Dawson with thirty-seven officers and 
almost two hundred non-commissioned officers. When this regi­
ment arrived in the West Indies, it dispersed because of 
desertions and resignations. Yellow fever added to the chaos. 
When Colonel Campbell's son, Duncan, died from this fever, he 
himself resigned and sailed for home. Ibid., 49, 50, 53, 58, 
69.
Colonel J. A. Gilmour was appointed Colonel of an 
artillery brigade and sailed in 1817 on the Britannia accom­
panied by ten officers and eighty non-commissioned officers. 
When he realized that guns were not forthcoming due to lack 
of funds, he was forced to disband the organization. This 
did not daunt his loyalty to the patriot cause, however, and 
he later helped Bolivar assemble an artillery brigade on the 
island of Margarita. Ibid.. 49, 58, 6 8 , 78, 118-19.
Colonel Donald Me Donald had been commissioned by 
L6 pez M4ndez to recruit the First Venezuelan Lancers. He 
had been so impatient to get to the scene of action, though, 
that he sailed before his regiment was fully organized and 
left its completion to Colonel Hippisley. In reality, Me 
Donald had hoped to obtain a higher rank by arriving early 
and reporting to Bolivar as an independent volunteer. He 
was prevented from achieving this when he was forced to put 
into port at the Madeiras by a severe storm. There he and 
his men left a trail of riot and disorder. When they finally 
arrived at the Danish Island of St. Thomas, Me Donald boasted 
so loudly about his anti-Spanish feeling, that the Governor 
of that island, fearing reprisals from the Spanish Governor 
of Puerto Rico, ordered his ship, the Two Friends. expelled. 
The Captain slipped away one night and left Me Donald and his 
men on shore. Then captain Lane, an American, offered to 
convoy Me Donald as far as Amelia Island where he could
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justly called the Lafayette of South America, during the next 
year organized a legion of one thousand seven hundred and 
twenty-nine Irishmen for the service of Colombia.1° Before
report to MacGregor. He finally arrived in Angostura in 1819 
on board the ship Grace. While ascending the Orinoco River, 
Me Donald's incorrigible vanity induced him to put on his 
elaborate uniform for a boat excursion ashore. A party of 
Indians mistook his magnificent uniform as belonging to the 
Royalists, shot arrows at him, and killed him. Ibid., 47,
6 6 , 81, 159-62, 163.
^General John D'Evereaux was born in Ireland, but he 
had become a citizen of the United States after he was exiled 
from his native land as a result of the part he had taken in 
the uprising of 1798. He had been introduced to Bolivar in 
Cartagena while employed as supercargo of a vessel loading at 
this port, and he offered to raise an Irish Legion of five 
thousand men for the Liberator and also provide the requisite 
arms, ammunition, and military stores. In return for this, 
he wanted to be given a command with the rank of General of 
Division and to be paid one hundred and seventy-five dollars 
for each soldier he brought to Venezuela. When these con­
ditions were granted, he returned to Dublin with the rank of 
Major General and started issuing commissions in the Irish 
Legion. D'Evereaux left for the New World months after his 
Legion had departed and reached Venezuela. Since he had 
made no provisions for this Legion, the men suffered untold 
hardships on the island of Margarita. Consequently, they 
defected and General D'Evereaux spent months trying to find 
his "orphan legion." While he was at Ctlcuta he managed to 
pick a quarrel with General Antonio Narino, the Vice-Presi­
dent, over a supposed insult to General English’s widow. 
Narino ordered D'Evereaux confined to a dungeon. In 1821 he 
was honorably acquitted by a Congressional committee of 
inquiry and confirmed in his rank of Major General by Bolivar. 
The Liberator even absolved him from any blame in the matter 
of the defection of the Irish. D'Evereaux remained in the 
service of the Colombian army for two more years. In 1823 
he was appointed Colombian envoy extraordinary to the courts 
of northern Europe. While traveling in Italy for his health 
in 1825, he was arrested by the Austrian authorities for his 
role in the South American revolutions. He was eventually 
released by Mettemich on the request of the Duke of Welling­
ton. Returning to the United States then, he lived on a 
pension from the Venezuelan government until his death in 
1854. D'Evereaux was then buried at the National Pantheon 
at Caracas. Ironically, this man who never took part in a
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leaving with his troops, D'Evereux [sic, D'Evereaux] attended 
a banquet that his friends gave for him in Dublin and there 
he said he believed he was serving his country while fighting 
in the provinces of South America, a "land blessed by God and 
damned by man, prodigious in all that nature can concede; 
but wasted during centuries by the most frightening tyranny 
that ever hurt or humiliated humanity." This same year. 
Colonel [George] Elsom [sic, Elsam] and [James T.] English 
also recruited two thousand and two individuals in Europe, 
among which were three hundred G e r m a n s . A t  the same time
single engagement with the Irish Legion and whose sole con­
nection with this group lay in organizing it as a speculation 
from which he made a considerable profit, has been char­
acterized as the "Lafayette of South America." Ibid., 137, 
164, 165-67, 168, 170, 172, 186, 187, 257, 379, 384, 395,
401.
^Colonel George Elsam was authorized by Bolivar to 
recruit one thousand men in London. For this he was to be 
paid fifty pounds sterling for every mam he lamded in South 
America and receive the rank of colonel. Elsaun found recruit­
ing a relatively easy matter, for at this time the Allied 
armies had been withdrawn from France and Belgium and many 
regiments had been demobilized, thus leaving England full of 
discharged soldiers. He also enlisted many Germ am veterans 
of the Napoleonic wars. As soon as the men were recruited 
and vessels were secured. Colonel Elsaun sent them to Vene­
zuela. He arrived there himself in April of 1819 with one 
hundred amd ninety-two more men, raising the total number of 
his commamd to seven hundred men. Unfortunately, Elsaun was 
not able to lead this force in battle, for he died soon after 
landing. Ibid.. 83, 85, 105, 112, 113, 115, 119.
Colonel James T. English had been authorized also by 
Bolivar to recruit soldiers in Englamd under the same con­
ditions as colonel Elsaun with reference to payment, except 
that his rank was to be that of Brigadier General. He made 
especially alluring offers to both officers amd enlisted men, 
promising them more pay, land gramts, amd bonuses. Thus he 
orgamized the British Legion. On April 7, 1819 General 
English arrived at Margarita. There General Urdaneta claimed
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the Scotch General Mac Gregor brought six hundred men and
Colonel [FrancisT Meceroni [sic, Maceroni] another three
12hundred. * we suppose that these British leaders were not 
moved by a spirit of avaricious ambition to abandon their 
country to fight in favor of a people oppressed on the Ameri­
can continent, but rather by the ambition of military glory, 
an affinity for new and dangerous adventures, and that 
passion for excitement which makes the Englishman seem like 
a crazy man sometimes and a hero at others.
Some years after the independence of Colombia was won. 
Lord Byron left the peace of the cities to go fight in the 
mountains of Greece for a people who, like the South Ameri­
cans, wanted to win their independence. It is easy to 
understand why a Pole, as a lyric Italian says in speaking
that the promises English had made his men were impossible 
for the Republic to fulfill and that the Colonel knew that 
when he made these promises. When his officers and men 
mutinied,General English ordered the lash to be used on the 
leaders and the men to be drilled in the hot sun six hours a 
day. When General Urdaneta would not attack Agua Santa, he 
assumed charge and responsibility and led the attack. Colonel 
English was defeated and even his own men blamed him for this 
disastrous defeat. Shortly afterwards, probably due to the 
disgrace and remorse, he was sent back to Margarita and died 
there of a fever. Ibid., 82, 105, 112, 113, 115, 117, 124, 
128, 129, 164, 171, 173, 382, 384.
^Colonel Francis Maceroni was an international soldier 
of fortune who assisted Jos6 Maria del Real, the diplomatic 
agent from New Granada, in recruiting soldiers in England.
It was reported that for a sufficiently large amount of money, 
he would bestow the baton of Field Marshall. Ibid.. 139, 
143-45, 148-49, 150.
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of his compatriots servi si ma oqnor frementi. will fight
13wherever an oppressed people raise the standard of liberty. 
However, it is not easy to understand why an Englishman, who 
finds all the happiness a citizen can aspire to in his 
country, will abandon it to aid oppressed people.^ This 
can only be attributed to the noble character, determined and 
adventuresome, of the descendants of that King whom they 
called the Lion Hearted. I am happy to have the opportunity 
now to pay tribute on my country's behalf to the valiant 
champions of the British Legion and the Battalion of Carabobo. 
At this same time, I want to openly express my deep admira­
tion for the English people to whom the world owes the belief 
that it is possible for people to guide their own destenies 
and to whom in addition humanity is in debt for many philan­
thropic institutions that honor them in the highest degree.
After the capture of Puerto Cabello, on December 9, 
1823, the first minister that the United States sent to
*3The Italian phrase means "serve me yourself, 
please."
l^asbrouck does not find it hard to understand why 
the English left their country to fight elsewhere. After the 
Battle of Waterloo, the reduction in the English army and 
navy left literally thousands unemployed; consequently, 
Hasbrouck states that "recruiting was a relatively easy 
matter; for just at this time the allied armies had been with­
drawn from France and Belgium, many regiments had been demo­
bilized, and London, Liverpool, Manchester, Dublin amd Brus­
sels were full of discharged soldiers, yearning for the free 
companionships of the army, and eager for a renewal of their 
lives of adventures." Foreign Legionaries. 105,
469
Colombia, Mr. [Richard C.] Anderson, finally arrived in 
Bogota.1 5 On October 3, 1824 the first treaty between these 
two countries was signed. France and England had already 
sent their representatives.
The peoples of South America, who counted on the inter 
vention of the United States or felt that at least these 
States would be obligated openly to facilitate means with 
which to resist their European enemies, must not give much 
value to the acts I have related. This is because of that 
doctrine which they say President Monroe proclaimed in one 
of his messages. If we did not see this doctrine invoked by 
the North Americans relative to the Mexican Empire, we would 
deem it unjust and unreasonable to exact from them the semi- 
quixotic sacrifice of peace and exposure to the perils of war 
in order to defend another nation threatened by a foreign 
power.
This Monroe Doctrine seems to have been interpreted in 
two very different manners. For some, it represents a sup­
posed right that a nation has of not letting another one take 
possession of a territory that in case of a question of 
ownership should belong to no one but her. For others.
15Richard c. Anderson presented his credentials to 
Santander on December 17. He brought instructions to nego­
tiate a treaty of commerce in which the Colombian government 
tried to include a compulsory arbitration clause that the 
American government rejected. Madariaga, Bolivar. 494, 551. 
Dexter Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine. 1823-1826 (Cambridge, 
1927), 185.
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undoubtedly more generous, it is the holy alliance of the 
American peoples against the unjust pretensions of a league 
of European governments. However, history does not present 
but one sole example of this principle being put into prac­
tice from the times of Monroe until those of President 
[Andrew] Johnson.^-®
The idea behind that doctrine would have been great, 
indeed sublime, if it had been accepted more actively than it 
has been until now, and if it had been formulated in the 
following manner. It could have been a League of all the 
Hispanic-American Republics dedicated to opposing all foreign 
attempts to reestablish their monarchical reign in countries 
where they had been defeated. These Republics could also 
have pledged their sacred respect to the territorial bound­
aries in America so that none could extend their limits at 
another’s expense except by a transfer of property made in a 
national congress. In this manner an American equilibrium 
could be maintained, and no one would ever have accused the 
noble eagle of the North unjustly of being the most voracious 
of the birds of prey.
The peoples of South America with adjacent territories 
or common interests would have formed alliances in case of
^6PAez refers here to the pressure put by the United 
States on France immediately after the Civil War to get out 
of Mexico. Arthur P. Whitaker, The Western Hemisphere Ideat 
Its Rise and Decline (New York, 1954), 66-67, 74.
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danger without being forced by any doctrine. After all, 
this has been and always will be the policy of wise govern­
ments. In this same manner, no one can prevent distant 
peoples from manifesting their sympathies for any cause in 
which they have no further interest them that which is 
awakened by community of origin or similarity of political 
institutions.
It is easy to understand why the United States could 
not look with indifference at the consolidation of an imperial 
government within the confines of her territory. For the same 
reason Spain could not ignore the establishment of a Repub­
lic adjoining the Pyrrenes, nor another France on this side 
of the La Mancha Canal, and England could not tolerate the 
Fenians in Ireland. Perhaps the time has come when the 
United States has to put into practice the so-called Monroe 
Doctrine, not out of respect to the republican ideal which 
they represent in America, but out of consideration for the 
inconveniences to its political existence that the nearness 
of a government whose principles are not analagous to theirs 
could bring.
In case of danger, the South American Republics should 
not rely on anything but their own strength and at the most, 
the assistance of their neighbor if it suits its interests. 
Nearly all of these countries have long coastlines. If they 
want to be prepared to resist foreign aggression, they must 
fortify their ports well and try to form a fleet to help 
defend them.
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When the so-called Holy Alliance was formed in Europe 
to secure the thrones and defend the religious principles 
which they proclaimed, the emancipated peoples of America 
believed their independence was threatened. It was natural 
for Spain to seek allies to reestablish her dominion in 
America, even though she might be forced to divide her terri­
tories with them. From this surged Bolivar's great idea of 
forming an American confederation in order to pit a Holy 
Alliance of the American Republics against the one of the 
European Kings. This confederation considered Spanish con­
trol over the islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico as a threat to 
the life of the new Republics. Consequently, these same 
Republics planned to use their combined efforts to free them 
from the Hispanic yoke.
A plan was already in existence by 1825 in Mexico to 
assemble an expedition in Florida, if the united States per­
mitted it, destined to free Cuba. The United States, Mexico, 
Colombia, Buenos Aires, Perti, Chile, and Santo Domingo were 
to contribute men and ships for this purpose. Unfortunately, 
the plan did not materialize beyond being a threat to Spain. 
More successful was Bolivar's proposal to gather representa­
tives from all the American nations on the isthmus of Panam& 
— "Center of the globe which looks at Asia on one side and at 
Africa and Europe on the other." The United States was 
invited to send delegates to that assembly, and the govern­
ment in Washington accepted the invitation, naming Seflores
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Richard C. Anderson and John Sergeant as commissioners.^
The instructions given these men reveal the great prudence 
with which this great nation has always acted in serious 
matters, and the good faith and respect it holds for the 
nations with which it lives in peace. The advice that the 
United States gave all the commissioners and the instructions 
given its own were as follows.
The Congress of PanamA finally assembled. Its results
l^It is interesting to note that President Adams 
appointed these two men amidst many objections from Congress, 
including that he was trying to involve the United States 
in an entangling alliance. While the Jacksonian Democrats 
filibustered in their attempt to discredit Adams' adminis­
tration, Congress delayed this PanamA mission so long that 
it became futile. One of the American delegates died on the 
way to the conference, and the other arrived after it was 
over. Ibid., 38, 41-42. Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine. 
204-22.
18The author included a translation of the general 
instructions given Anderson and Sergeant. These are omitted 
because a copy of the original instructions may be found in 
Henry Clay, Spanish America. Observations on the Instruc­
tions Given by the President of the United States of America 
to the Representatives of that Republic, at the congress 
Held at Panamfr. in 1826: on the Conduct of M r . Poinsett.
Minister of the United States in Mexico; and Generally on 
our Relations with Spanish America: with a copy of the 
Instructions (London, 1829), 28-65.
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may be seen in what I copy from the work of the historian 
[Cesar] Cantu.1 9
The Americans, inexperienced in public affairs, 
jealous of a liberty that they still were not 
familiar with and thus ignoring all the prudence it 
requires, and unable to tolerate a social state 
that would harness loose passions, could arrive at 
nothing.
The North Americans attended this Congress, but 
did not take part in its deliberations. Chile was 
agitated by internal turbulence. Buenos Aires 
rejected the idea of the convention. Perd, or rather 
Bolivia, was still not recognized as an independent 
State. Paraguay was isolated. Brazil, having 
declared its freedom in a different manner, was not 
invited to attend. Thus only the delegates from 
Mexico, Guatemala, Colombia, and Perd swore to main­
tain the perpetual federation; a popular, repre­
sentative, and federal type republic; and a constitu­
tion similar to that of the United States, except 
that it did not grant religious tolerance.
I was in this part of my Memoirs when the diplomatic 
correspondence about French intervention in Mexico between 
the eminent statesmen Mr. [William H.] Seward and the Minister 
of France, Mr. [Edmond] Druyn [sic. Drouyn] de Lhuys, was 
made p u b l i c . I  cannot resist the desire to insert an
IQ . . .X7Cesar Cantu was born in Bnvio, Italy on December 5, 
1804 and died in Milan in 1895. He was a historian, philos­
opher, and poet who had embraced an ecclesiastical career 
which he abandoned before he was ordained. When his father 
died, he took over the task of supporting his large family of 
ten children. At seventeen he was already a grammar profes­
sor. In 1836 he started publishing his monumental storia 
Universale, which he finished in 1847 with a total of thirty- 
two volumes. Although Cantu wrote many other works on diverse 
subjects, this is his most famous work. A Spanish translation 
of Storia Universale by Fern&ndez Cuesta was published in 
Barcelona. It is from this translation that P&ez is undoubt­
edly quoting. Enciclopedia Universal Ilustrada. XI, 279-81.
^ A c c o r d i n g  to Frederick Bancroft* "One of the 
striking facts connected with the negotiations about
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extract from a document that is so precious to American 
interests. It states as follows in the section that refers 
to the Monroe Doctrine and the accusations which have been 
directed against Mexico for the anarchy which has reigned in 
the country since its independence.
Wherever the peoples of a country have established 
and subjected themselves voluntarily to a monarchical 
institution of their own choice, free from all foreign 
coercion or intervention, like in Brazil today or 
Mexico in 1822, the United States shall not refuse to 
maintain relations with these governments nor try to 
topple over such institutions by means of propaganda, 
force, or intrigue. On the other hand, if a nation 
has established republican and domestic institutions 
similar to ours, the United States shall maintain in 
their favor that no foreign nation can legally inter­
vene by force to subvert these Republican institutions 
and establish those of an opposite character. . . .
Mr. Druyn [sic. Drouyn] de Lhuys maintains that 
Maximilian's government is undergoing the fate that 
is very common to new powers, particularly since it has 
the misfortune of having to endure the consequences of 
the discords produced under the previous government.
Mr. Druyn [sic. Drouyn] de Lhuys manifests that this 
misfortune and this fate are in effect the misfor­
tune and fate of governments that have not encountered 
armed competitors and that have enjoyed an authority 
during peace without any opposition. He allegates 
that revolutions and civil wars are the natural state 
in Mexico. He also insists that the opposition made 
by some military caudillos against the establishment 
of an empire under Maximilian is only a natural result 
of the same lack of discipline and the same continua­
tion of anarchy which have victimized those who have 
preceded him in the government of Mexico.
intervention in Mexico is that the Monroe Doctrine, though 
constantly appealed to at the time by the sensational news­
papers and politicians, seems not once to have been mentioned 
in any official dispatch from the United States government. 
France violated the doctrine continuously for five years.
But Seward knew that it was no part of international law."
The Life of William H. Seward. 2 vols. (New York, 1900),
II, 441.
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It is not the intent, nor would it matter to the 
character of the United States, to deny that Mexico 
has been the theatre for factions and internal wars 
for a long time. The United States confesses this 
with sorrow, so much more sincerely because Mexico's 
experience has been painful not only to its own people, 
but unfortunately served as a pernicious influence in 
other nations. On the other hand, the United States 
would be unjust and would not be living up to the 
friendship professed for Mexico if it dragged its past 
calamities before these people or invoked or approved 
the infliction of a punishment for its political errors 
by a foreign nation. The people of Mexico and their 
status have peculiarities that are undoubtedly well 
understood by France. At the beginning of this century 
they saw themselves forced by convictions which humanity 
cannot but respect, to defeat a foreign monarchical 
government which they deemed incompatible with their 
well-being and growth. They saw themselves forced at 
the same time by convictions which the world must 
respect, to test the establishment of Republican 
institutions without the complete experience, practical 
education, and usage which would necessarily assure the 
success of these American institutions and ideas. They 
had African slavery, colonial institutions, and eccle­
siastical monopolies. They shared the first one with 
the United States, while we were happily exempt from 
the others.
We cannot deny that the anarchy in Mexico which Mr. 
Druyn [sic. Drouyn] de Lhuys complains of was necessary 
and even wisely tolerated in the efforts made to estab­
lish a sure base for full Republican liberty. I do not 
know if we can expect France to agree with us in this 
viewpoint which in our opinion mitigates the errors, 
misfortunes, and calamities of Mexico. However it may 
be, we return again to the opinion we hold that no 
foreign power can legally intervene in trials such as 
those of Mexico, or that, under the pretext of wanting 
to correct these errors, be able to deprive the people 
of their natural right to domestic and Republican 
liberty. All the damages and wrongs that Mexico has 
committed against any other State have already been 
severely punished by the consequences that legitimately 
followed their commission.
Nations are not authorized to correct each other's 
errors except when it is necessary to avoid or unravel 
a wrong that is very dear to them. If one power has 
the right to intervene in another to establish order, 
constituting itself the judge of the occasion, then 
each State has the same right of intervening in the
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affairs of other and being the only judge of the time 
and occasion. In this manner, carrying the principle 
of intervention to its practical end, all sovereignty 
and independence would come to be uncertain and false 
and so would all peace and international friendship.
Everyone has to admire the diplomatic tact and good 
faith with which this document handles the issue of having 
the United States declare the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine. 
Fortunate is the nation that can rely on men Lilce the one 
who drafted this interesting document!
I shall end the chapter by translating what ex-presi- 
dent [James'] Buchanan has published on Mr. [George} canning's 
plan to oppose the projects of the Holy Alliance which 
resulted in President Monroe's celebrated message.
21pAez's translation of what President James Buchanan 
wrote relative to Mr. George Canning's plan is being omitted 
because the original may be found in a section on the origin, 
history, and nature of the Monroe Doctrine included in James 
Buchanan, Mr. Buchanan1s Administration on the Eve of the 
Rebellion (New York. 1866), 276-83.
CHAPTER XVII
Triumphal March from Puerto Cabello to Caracas—  
Congress Orders the Drafting of Fifty Thousand 
Men— Revolutionary Movement in Petare— Claims of 
Captain Dupotet of the French Navy— My Replies—  
My Proclamation Abolishing the Edict of the 
Assembly.
1824-1825
On December 1, after leaving the plaza of Puerto 
Cabello under the command of General [Juan3 Escalona,
M a r i n o B e r m d d e z ,  and I left Puerto Cabello and headed toward 
C a r a c a s . 2 in the towns we passed along the way, we were
-^The author interjected the following footnote here. 
“This general had accompanied me during the siege. However, 
when Bermtidez came with reinforcements from Maracaibo, he 
sent MarifSo to Caracas and La Guaira to bring a corvette that 
was at the latter port and to ask General Soublette for re­
sources with which to continue the siege. Marino arrived 
two days after the plaza was taken."
2General Juan Escalona was born in Venezuela and was 
an untiring champion of the independence cause. He figured 
prominently in the early juntas in Caracas and in the battles 
against Monteverde. In July of 1811 he was a member of the 
Congress that signed the Declaration of independence. When 
Monteverde took over Caracas after his treaty with Miranda, 
Escalona joined Marino and accompanied him in the Oriente 
campaign. In 1814 he was with Marifio at the formidable 
Battle of Bocachico. He was in Valencia when it was beseiged 
by Boves amd later fought bravely at the Battles of BogotA, 
Chire, and Caflafistola. In 1819 he was a member of the Con­
gress of Angostura and Governor of Coro. In 1824, in PAez's 
absence, he was chief of Puerto Cabello. By 1826 he was 
Intendant of Caracas amd later Commissioner of the Departments 
of Venezuela and Apure. Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario 
BioorAfico. 140.
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received with extraordinary demonstrations of enthusiasm and 
joy. The capture of the plaza that had been believed almost 
impregnable, produced this great glee, for the Royalista had 
occupied it since the year XII [1812'] without the Republicans 
being able to wrest it from them. This spot, Santander said, 
seemed enchanted and gave the uninformed a false idea of the 
Republic's s trength.
At the end of 1823, the fear still existed that 
Spanish obstinacy, relying on the co-operation of the parti­
sans of the old regime who had remained in the country, would 
still try to reconquer the territory. Congress then had to 
take some precautionary security measures such as granting 
extraordinary powers to the chiefs of the departments. The 
Executive authorized them to expel the Royalists from the 
territory of Venezuela in the event of an outside invasion 
or any armed commotion in any of the provinces.
Nothing noteworthy occurred in the Republic during the 
year 1824 if we exclude the pursuit of those isolated parties 
that in the name of Royalism, such as the bandits of Calabria, 
committed major atrocities without being caught. Knowing 
the pathless terrains and hidden mountain paths, they eluded 
the pursuing Republican troops or resisted them from such 
advantageous positions, that it was almost impossible to 
attack them.
These bandit parties founded their hopes on the 
promises made to them in the press by the raging Royalist 
and unworthy Venezuelan who had taken refuge in Puerto Rico,
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Don Jos£ Domingo Dlaz.^ He told them that a formidable 
expedition would arrive soon at the Venezuelan coast. The 
principle leaders of these bands were Jos4 DioniBio Cisneros, 
Juan Centeno, and Doroteo H e r r e r a . 4 All of these officers 
had distinguished themselves in the Royalist ranks and after 
the Battle of Carabobo captained guerillas supporting the 
"Catholic Monarch" in the Tuy Valleys and in the Districts 
of Guarenas, Petare, and Guires. The most notable among them 
was Cisneros, the Fra-Diavolo of Venezuela. He had been a 
sergeant in Morales'a troops amd had assembled a band of 
thieves, claiming that a religious man from Caracas ordered 
him to make "war on all whites and acknowledge only Santander
3Don Jos£ Domingo Diaz has the reputation of being one 
of Simdn Bolivar's severest critics. The letters he wrote 
and published in Puerto Rico chastized the Liberator so 
vehemently, that the latter suffered some loss of prestige. 
Diaz was also the author of Memoriae de la Rebelli6 n en 
Caracas (Madrid, 1829). In this work he confessed that in 
the beginning the Republican Government was not interested 
in persecuting or killing the Spaniards. In this same work, 
he greatly exaggerated the strength and number of Boves' 
troops. Lecuna, Crdnica Razonada. I, 69, 71-80, 283, 342-67. 
Torrente, Historia de la Revolucidn. Ill, 569.
4jos6 Dionisio Cisneros is listed by the Spanish his­
torian Torrente as am Indian who led the Royalist forces in 
the area of Santa Lucia, Charallave, and La Guaira de Para- 
cotes. Historia de la RevoluciOn, III, 569.
Juan Celestino Centeno was the Commandant of the 
Royalist forces in the Guires area. Torrente mentions him 
as a pardo of quality. He had been an infantry Captain and 
Commandant of Arms in the town of Valle de Pascua until the 
revolutionists occupied that territory in 1821. In 1824 he 
became the Royalist Commandant of the Lealtad Battalion and 
was promoted to Colonel. Ibid.. 572.
Doroteo Herrera was also a pardo. He was named Com­
mander of the Lanceros squadron which was composed of two 
hundred and thirty men armed with lances. Ibid.. 572-73.
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as the true defendor of the Spanish throne" (Torrente).^ 
Further on in this narrative we will have occasion to deal
with these bandits again.
When the war ended, it was necessary to dismiss a 
great part of the troops that had served under my orders. 
Since the treasury of the Republic was unable to pay these 
men in coin, they were given instead, according to their rank, 
a certain number of cavalry horses and cattle taken from the 
confiscated Royalist herds. The men receiving these had to 
themselves take possession of the animals that had been given
in payment for their services. From this arose great dis­
orders which Senor Restrepo has not hesitated to label as 
armed robbery.6 Cattle were slaughtered in such great num­
bers for their hides and fat, that the llaneros constructed 
barricades at the gates of the corrals with their skeletons. 
Truthfully, there were times when those herding the cattle 
resorted to violence in order to take possession of unbranded 
cattle belonging to some farmers. These disturbances, a 
result of an Imprudent amd thoughtless governmental order, 
forced me to take certain measures, such as forming overnight 
camps which under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Facundo 
Mirabal quickly put an end to the disturbances and re­
established order in the Apure territory.
5 Ibid.. 580-81.
6Restrepo, Revolucidn de la Republica de Colombia.
Ill, 413-14.
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On May 6 , 1824 Congress ordered the drafting of fifty 
thousand men, for rumors were spreading that the European 
Holy Alliance was threatening to destroy the independence of 
the new States. Congress was also considering sending troops 
to Perti where the Liberator urgently needed help to free that 
country from the considerable Spanish forces occupying it. 
Consequently on August 20, I sent a division of two thousand 
six hundred and forty-four men under the command of colonel 
Jos4 Gregorio Monagas from Puerto Cabello destined for 
Perti.7
The need for supporting troops outside the territory 
of the State and the fears of a new Spanish expedition made 
it necessary for the Vice-President of the Republic, General 
Santander, to order a general draft of all the citizens for 
the purpose of forming a militia corps or filling those
^Colonel Jos4 Gregorio Monagas was born in Maturln in 
1795 and was General Josd Tadeo Monagas's brother. He en­
listed his efforts in the revolutionary movement in 1810 and 
fought his first battle against the Royalists in March of 
1813 at Maturln against Fern&ndez de la Hoz. He was destined 
to fight here again in May of the same year against General 
Monteverde and in October and December of 1814 against General 
Morales. He also fought in the Battles of Bocachica, Arado,
La Puerta, Carabobo, and Urica. Governor Gorrino, Colonel 
Ldpez, and Generals Morales, Morillo, and La^Torre felt his 
military strength in the Battles of Carraqueno, Alacran, 
Juncal, Calabozo, and S6 men. After independence was won, 
Monagas put up his sword until the movements of 1831 and 1836 
when he came out in their support. In 1646 he was a can­
didate for the Presidency of Venezuela but was defeated; how­
ever, he was elected to this high office in 1854. This very 
year he had Congress declare all the slaves free. In 1858 
his enemies had him imprisoned in Puerto Cabello where he 
died of natural causes. Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario 
Biogr&fico, 336-37.
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already established. This decree was not well received, and 
it fell my lot as Commandant General of the Departments of 
Caracas and Apure to enforce it. To my detriment, I had to 
carry this out despite the observations of the recorder and 
the Municipality of Caracas.
The Intendant of Venezuela, General Juan Escalona, 
offered me his assistance in carrying out the governmental 
measure. I called the citizens together so that they would 
agree to the draft. Only a few came, and I was forced to 
convene them again on January 6 . Since they did not obey the 
decree even then, perhaps encouraged by the leniency with 
which I proceeded, I was forced to send small detachments 
from the Anzodtegui and Apure Battalions to bring the 
citizens they found in the streets to the convent of San 
Francisco. Escalona offered to enforce enlistment on these. 
It was then 1 suspended the order I had given previously.
The following day, the Intendant, pretending to be a jealous 
defender of the rights of the people, wrote to the Executive 
denouncing as abusive the measures I had taken to carry out 
the governmental orders. The Municipality of Caracas ex­
pressed similar complaints. From this was born the accusa­
tion against me that I shall deal with in one of the 
following chapters.
On December 6 , 1825 a revolutionary movement of doubt­
ful character broke out in the village of Petare, two 
leagues away from the capital. The anxiety which is habitual 
among some people of always fearing caste revolutions found
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an opportune occasion in this act for increasing the value 
of money. This was the significance later given to the 
tumult of Petare. Since the capital and its tribunals were 
alarmed, they sent a commission composed of Colonel (then) 
Diego Ibarra and Dr. Cristobal Mendoza, Minister of the 
Superior Court, to Maracai where I was and asked me to go to 
Caracas.8 Carried away by their unfounded fears, they 
imagined that there was a conspiracy of great ramifications, 
and they wanted to be supported by my presence during the 
proceedings and different judicial inquiries which had 
already been started. I went, and I called a meeting of 
twelve persons, selected for their knowledge in judicial 
matters, to examine the dispatch and give me their opinion 
on what I should do. These men told me that it was not a 
clear case of conspiracy, and that therefore it would be
8Don Cristobal Mendoza was born in the city of Tru­
jillo, Venezuela in 1772. He was an intellectual who 
embraced the ideals of the revolution as soon as it broke 
out in 1810. He was a member of the Supreme Junta, the Fed­
eral Congress, and of the Triumvirate that represented the 
Executive Power of Venezuela. In 1812 he was forced to emi­
grate to Santa F6 . Later the same year Bolivar named him 
Governor of the Province of Cdcuta. in 1814 he presided 
over the junta at Caracas that judged Bolivar's conduct.
Also in 1814, he was forced to emigrate to Jamaica. There 
he wrote under the pseudonym of Un Patriots. In 1821 Dr. 
Mendoza returned to Caracas and was elected Minister of the 
Supreme Court. P&ez's political movement of 1826 did not 
meet with his approval or support. He died in Caracas in 
1829, an impoverished man. it is interesting to note that in 
addition to his political career. Dr. Mendoza fathered six­
teen children. Ibid., 318-19.
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wiser not to give it great importance. Realizing that the 
event was not really of the magnitude imagined and that it 
had assumed its gravity from unjust warnings, 1 also con* 
vinced myself of the need of preventing our society from 
being deeply perturbed by the indefinite prosecution of a 
lawsuit that was assuming such an alarming character. In 
order to do this, I removed the lawsuit to a superior court, 
which I was able to do in my capacity as Commandant General 
of the Department. Militarily, I ended the affair by 
punishing only three of the principal offenders and thus 
left ineffective the actions involving a great number of 
persons.
Immediately after I issued a proclamation on December 
21 in which 1 announced how I had evaluated the event. 1 
revealed my conviction that the evil character and magnitude 
attributed to this revolution stemmed from fearful suspicions. 
I stated that patriotism was invoked at times in a torturous 
manner, amd that the public tramquility could not only be 
disturbed by the enemies of the State, but also by the exag­
geration of spontaneous fears. Also, I let it be known that 
my authority would not take into account a person1s rank if 
I were forced to use this authority. Finally I sealed the 
matter with a general and absolute pardon to end the anxiety 
of all those who were afraid, and I signed it on the follow­
ing day, December 22. With this, confidence was restored 
and the capital breathed easily once more. (Both of these 
acts may be found in Volume 6 on pages 107 and 109 of the
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ColecciOn de Documentoa Relativo a la Vida Ptkblica del 
Libertador.)9 Thus ended the alarming Petare revolution.
Had it been handled by tribunals, it could have enveloped 
the country in hatreds and persecutions and carried many 
citizens to the gallows.
Despite the prudence with which 1 proceeded in this 
affair, a deputy from Caracas, Dr. Jos£ Antonio P£rez, wanted 
to accuse me before the Senate. Because of this, I directed 
the following address to the Executive Power of the Republic.
MOST EXCELLENT SENOR VICE PRESIDENT:
I know from a respectable source that Dr. Jos6 
Antonio P&rez, deputy from Caracas, has moved in the 
House of Representatives that 1^ be accused before the 
Senate for having declared Venezuela under martial 
law: and with reference to the occurrence at Petare,
stated that 1 was dominated bv a faction from Caracas. 
as if to prove by this that I did not take all the mea­
sures required out of consideration for the declared 
faction. This is an atrocious, unpardonable insult 
which can only be aborted by the most vehement passions 
and which holds out as most important that I consider 
the least. This is especially so when one considers 
that the lawsuit was conducted according to the govern­
mental decrees of the Military Commandant of Caracas 
and in which all persons who participated in that event 
appeared. Truthfully, there was not a person there I 
knew and by whom it is supposed I was dominated. This 
proposition was supported by the other deputies of the 
same province, except for Dr. Osio.
When a deputy advances such a bold proposition in 
Congress as to accuse me before the nation just a few 
minutes after I contributed, along with my conrades in 
arms, to its independence in the best way I could, let 
us go beyond the ingratitude surrounding this act to 
examine the motive for the honorable Dr. P6rez's 
accusation.
^This citation may be found as the author states.
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In the first place, it should be noted that this 
measure has been found strange only when I put it 
into practice. It has never been opposed by any 
member of the government during the very recent times 
when these very departments and others in the Republic 
have been placed under martial law and when we generals 
of a superior rank have obeyed those of an inferior 
rank. However, it seems that the ways of military men 
are appreciated only in times of dangers, and found 
annoying when these dangers are no longer feared.
The insults made to a man in public life resulting 
from an administration are not the kind directed to a 
private individual. In the latter case generosity or 
scorn can take place, but in the former case it is not 
possible to put their vindication aside according to 
the laws that govern us.
I can at least pay my gratitude to the majority of 
Congress that set aside Senor Pferez'a proposition. 
However, I cannot continue being worthy of the confi­
dence of the public and of the government unless this 
matter is made known with all the dignity which is due 
the government itself and a General of the Republic 
who does not have the slightest reason for concealing 
even the least imputation. This is to be considered 
even less if attention is paid to the fact that 
governments should act on qualified events and not on 
invectives or conjectures, for then no citizen will be 
able to depend on his individual security.
I shall not cite persons nor singular events. I 
invoke the testimony of the departments in which this 
measure was necessary, and I challenge my adversary to 
present one single person before me that was molested 
by the military during the period about which we are 
speaking. On the contrary, there are some who grasped 
it as a refuge from the civil authority. How much blood 
would have been shed in the capital of Caracas if I had 
followed the advice of some men of letters and of those 
who, unaccustomed to fight against the enemy on the 
field of honor, seek this fight from across their desks 
in the midst of peace, wanting to avenge personal 
injuries under the sacred pretext of the public cause.
Senor P4rez should prove the reasons he has had to 
accuse me before Congress, and name the faction to 
which he refers. If he has enough data to do so in a 
legal argument, I will submit myself to the law. Other­
wise, I want a public testimony exonorating me from the 
accusation. While a decision is pending, I ask the 
government to relieve me from the office of Commandant
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General of the Department of Venezuela and from the 
task of directing the war, where I frequently find 
obstacles which oppose the reverence due its very 
authority. It must be well understood that it will 
not be sufficient for the Executive Power alone to 
show itself satisfied with my procedures.
I beg Your Excellency to take this matter through 
all the channels of law, keeping in mind that I am 
determined not to yield in anything I have expounded.
God keep Your Excellency many years.
p Ae z
Achaguas, March 28, 1825.
The response I received to the above address is the 
one that follows*
OFFICE OF THE NAVY AND WAR-CENTRAL DEPARTMENT
Palace of the Government in Bogota 
June 7, 1825 —  XV
To the Most Excellent Senor General in Chief, Jos6 A.
P&ez.
I have had the honor to answer in the government 
office Your Excellency's letter dated in Achaguas this 
past March 28, where you ask to be removed from the 
office of Commandant General of Venezuela and that of 
conducting the war which has been entrusted to you 
because of the motion made by the honorable Deputy Jos6 
Antonio P4rez to the House of Representatives proposing 
that Your Excellency be accused before the Senate for 
having declared the Department under your command under 
martial law and for other declarations that arose out 
of the occurrence in Petare. You demand legal proof, 
or in its stead, a public testimony which will put Your 
Excellency's conduct in this instance out in the open.
I have received orders to answer Your Excellency as 
followst 'Article 66 of the Constitution is opposed to 
the very worthy General P&ez's entreaty and just as 
this chief should rest easy in the judgment he owes the 
Executive Power, he should also be satisfied by the fact 
that in this case the House of Representatives rejected 
Deputy P6rez's motion. This proves that it did not 
find it just and that consequently the conduct of the 
Commandant General of Venezuela is believed to be
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according to the law and circumstances.' I enclose 
the above resolution from the Executive Power in 
answer to Your Excellency's entreaty.
God keep Your Excellency, etc.
PEDRO GUAL.
On January 10, 1825 a French squadron presented itself 
before Puerto Cabello. It was composed of a frigate of sixty, 
two schooner brigs, and a schooner. It was under the command 
of navy Captain Dupotet. He had barely sounded the depths 
of the water, when he sent a communique to the naval Com­
mandant General of this port asking him for satisfaction in 
the name of Admiral Julien, who was Commandant at this time 
of the French Antilles. This was to be for the supposed 
insult he said had been given in front of Portobelo by the 
Commandant of the frigate Venezuela to the Commandant of the 
French schooner Gazelle, forcing the latter to send an 
officer on board. ' In addition, this Admiral demanded the 
return of all the cargo of the merchant corvette Urania that 
had been captured with Spanish goods on board by the captains 
of the corsairs Poli-Hampton and Centella.
The tone in which this Captain formulated these unjust 
claims, addressing subordinates rather than the government 
of the Republic, together with the violation of our coastal 
area by those foreigners, even after satisfactory answers 
were made by the naval Commandant General of Puerto Cabello, 
made me exceedingly angry. As commandant General of the 
Department of Venezuela, I demanded an explanation from the 
chief of the French squadron. With the dignity warranted by
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the occasion, I reminded him that the Venezuelans had the 
constancy necessary to defend their rights when foreigners 
did not know how to respect them.
The Frenchman left the coast of Ocumare free. Since 
he directed these unjust claims later to the supreme govern­
ment of the Republic, the latter answered him in almost the 
same terms that I had at the beginning.
Prior to this event, the Spanish Captain Don jos£ del 
Cotarro had presented himself in La Guaira in order to turn 
over the brigantine Roma Libre to the Colombian government.
He had become disgusted seeing that the constitutional system 
in Spain had been defeated and that the absolute regime had 
been reinstated. He brought a cargo of Negroes on his ship, 
and they were freed immediately.
After citing the above events, Restrepo states
As much because of the combined attack by France 
and Spain that had been feared in Venezuela, as because 
of some movements that were perceived in Baruta and 
Tucupido, in the Sombrero and in other points in that 
section of the Republic, it was feared that the peace 
could be disturbed. Commandant General P&ez was 
authorized, consequently, with extraordinary powers by 
the National Executive dating from the early days of 
this year— an authorization that was later amplified 
on March 17 in accord and with the consent of Congress.
It was believed, not without sufficient reasons, that 
a considerable part of the territory of Colombia, far 
from the center which occupied such an advanced posi­
tion and which contained so many elements of discord, 
would be unable to remain quiet unless there was a 
strong and immediate power to keep a vigil in preserving 
order. However, the frequent declaration of extra­
ordinary powers, and the ability of said departments to
iORevolucidn de la. Republica de Colombia. Ill, 457-58.
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declare martial law, made the Venezuelan lover of 
liberty angry despite the good use that General 
P&ez made of the extensive power conferred on him.
The decree mentioned dated March 17 was a reason 
for avoiding the clamors of the municipality of 
Caracas, which addressed the House of Representa­
tives to complain against the Executive Power.
While this step did not produce consequences, it 
increased the discontent against the central govern­
ment at a time when it still did not possess the 
necessary strength because of its newness and because 
it had barely been recognized. (Page 457, Volume 3, 
History of Colombia.)
On March 8, 1825 I issued a proclamation in which I 
gave an account of all these events, and of the interior 
state of the Republic. In it I revealed the reasons that 
had compelled me to declare the Departments of Venezuela and 
Apure under martial law at a time when the Republic was 
threatened by an invasion of two thousand men which the 
Peninsula thought to send against Colombia and which had 
already been assembled on the Canary Isles. The proclama­
tion states thus:
Jos6 Antonio P&ez, one of the liberators of 
Colombia, decorated with the Medal of Puerto Cabello, 
General-in-Chief of the armies of the Republic, Com­
mandant General of the Department of Venezuela, and 
Director of War in the Departments of Venezuela and 
Apure, etc., etc.
Although the inhabitants of the departments where 
I direct the war surely are not unaware of the reasons 
that led me to declare martial law, according to the 
edict of November 29 of the past year, 1 find the need 
very much in accordance with the principles that govern 
us to express, although succintly, the reasons for 
adopting these measures, just as there are reasons 
now to rescind them.
News that had been verified by different sources 
that there was a foreign expedition in the Antilles 
was sufficient cause, if not to imagine that the 
designs on the part of that government were completely
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hostile, at least to call the attention of the mili­
tary authorities who were charged with the defense 
of the Departments of the Republic. The news from 
Spain that some forces were set aside to go to America, 
and the fact that there were war ships in Habana were 
sufficient in themselves to merit some precautionary 
measures.
A movement that took place just a short time ago in 
the vicinity of the capital of Venezuela confirmed the 
need for martial law. The need for measures to stop 
the progress of the Guires faction demanded that a 
military government exist during the time it was being 
destroyed. Some domestic arrangements pertaining to 
the formation of am armed force encountered obstacles 
in the diversity of jurisdiction. It was for these 
reasons that it was believed necessary to declare the 
Departments of Venezuela and Apure under martial law. 
Fortunately, circumstances have changed and now permit 
the reestablishment of affairs to the state in which 
they should be in accordance with the laws of the 
Republic.
Some debates with the chief of a French naval force 
have made known the care given to certain claims with 
respect to its commerce until now. According to the 
last communications, to these are added the securities 
of the general government of the Republic. The opera­
tions of our adversaries by themselves did not demand 
great efforts until now. However, this does not mean 
they are looked upon with indifference by those 
entrusted with the security of this territory.
The occurrence near the capital, which has been men­
tioned, ended happily as all have seen it as an absurd 
project. There were not any persons involved in it in 
any state who were capable of causing the government 
anxiety. Had there been any, though, they could have 
been deterred by the good conduct of the existing 
military authorities.
By virtue of this, I have deemed it convenient to 
abolish, as I do abolish in the present decree, the 
measure I adopted for the previously-cited month of 
November, of declaring the Departments of Venezuela and 
Apure under martial law, which was verified then 
according to Articles 1 and 5 of the decree of August 15, 
1824.
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The military authorities of Venezuela and Apure 
shall publish and fulfill the present order.
Achaguas, March 8, 1825 — XV.
JOSE ANTONIO PAEZ.
FRANCISCO CARABANO, Secretary.
CHAPTER XVIII
Accusation Before the Colombian Senate— General 
Santander's Apparent Duplicity— The Saddest Period 
of My Public Life— Pronouncement of the Venezuelan 
Municipalities— The Towns Become Anxious for Reforms 
— Assembly in the Convent of San Francisco de 
Caracas.
1826
When a nation such as ours has won its independence, 
three types of actors are wont to appear on the political 
scene. The first type includes those who with sword or pen 
fought for the fatherland during the struggle and aspire to 
collect the prize for their efforts and fatigues, for not 
all men are satisfied as were Cincinatus and Washington with 
posthumus glory and the appreciation of generations. It is 
very common to find this type among those who had been 
caudillos in the military armies, and who in peace time still 
maintained the severity of character that became habitual 
while commanding the armies. These men very quickly alienated 
the will of the people who regarded them as little tyrants 
aspiring to rule them.
The second type is composed of those men who took no 
part in the fighting but still aspired later to occupy high 
positions in the government of the nation. To attain these 
positions, they constitute themselves as censors of the
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government, denouncing the faults of those who direct public 
affairs, and slandering those who served the country during 
its most destitute times.
To the third type belong those who adhere to the old 
order of things. Of them it may be said that it was only 
sheer force that made them accept the change. Vengefully, 
they strive to prove with their conduct how little society 
has gained from the new organization given to it.
These were the elements that already composed the 
Colombian people when the old rulers were expelled from the 
country. The person in charge of directing internal policy 
would have to deal with them.
The exaggerated enthusiasm of some men also serves 
sometimes as an obstacle to the peaceful march of society
which needs the union of all its members to organize in a
stable manner, and to carry out the necessary reforms. These 
individuals imprudently go forth proclaiming flattering 
theories that the people accept with enthusiasm, for these 
flatter their passions. From this stems the fact that anarchy 
is wont to follow the conquest of independence. It is in 
vain to preach the modus in rebus. for a new country is like
an individual in his youtht it disdains the lessons of the
past until, at the cost of innumerable evils, it acquires an 
esqjerience it pays for very dearly.
After 1814 and 1815, when the Republican governments 
were dissolved in Venezuela and New Granada after the dis­
asters suffered by the patriots, forces had been raised in
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these two territories to combat the common enemy. The chiefs, 
forced by circumstances, had acted independently, for there 
was no central government. When the patriots were conquered 
in one province, they would go fight the Royalists in another. 
Here they would unite their forces with those operating in 
that territory out of a spirit of patriotism and not because 
of any governmental order. Venezuela and New Granada for 
their mutual interest lent each other aid. However, the 
thought of uniting the two territories under one sole autho­
rity did not come about until December 17, 1819 when the 
Venezuelan Congress proclaimed the Republic of Colombia.
Its constitution was adopted later by another Congress that 
met in Cdcuta on August 30, 1821 and recognized a supreme 
government.
The vast extent of Colombian territory, the very diffi­
cult communications between the provinces and the central 
government that was established in Bogota, and the jealousies 
and rivalries between the Venezuelans and the New Granadans, 
all indicated that the Republic of Colombia would have a very 
ephemeral existence. In this period that we are dealing with 
now, the symptoms of an inevitable separation were already 
being felt--a separation that sooner or later would have to 
be carried out without anyone being able to stop it.
I have already stated earlier that as a result of the 
measures I took to fulfill the urgent governmental draft 
orders, the Municipality of Caracas accused me of having 
exceeded my authority by using violent measures. Letters
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were sent from that city to its deputies in Bogota. Hie 
latter created a terrible scandal in the House [of Repre­
sentatives]. The clergyman [juan Nepomuceno] Azuero 
figured among my principle enemies in this instance while 
Doctors Osio and Arvelo defended m e . 1 One of the latter pro­
posed that the Executive ask immediately for information on 
the happenings in Caracas, and for the provisions that I 
might have dictated on this affair. When this proposal was 
approved, the President of the House sent am official letter 
to General Santander, Vice-President in charge of the Execu­
tive, asking for this information. However, anxious to
^No additional information was available on Doctors 
Osio and Arvelo.
Juan Nepomuceno Azuero was born in Socorro in Febru­
ary of 1780. He studied at the Colejios del Rosario and the 
Seminary of Bogota where he got his orders to serve as a 
priest in the town of Guanare in the Orients llanos. Here 
he won the hatred of the Spanish Governor Bobadilla for his 
love of the Indians and his attempts to help civilize them.
In 1809 he became parish priest at Anapoima. He allowed his 
republican and independent ideas to be known and consequently 
was recalled to Bogota and imprisoned by both the ecclesiasti­
cal and political authorities. While in Bogota, however, he 
was still instrumental in formulating the revolution which 
broke out July 20, 1810. On this day when he saw that the 
people were not enthusiastically supporting the independence 
movement out of fear of Viceroy Amar, believing him to be 
sacred and holy, he forced him to go to the top of one of 
the public buildings and showed him to be the human being he 
really was. When Morillo was back in power, Azuero fled and 
did not return until after the Battle of Boyaca in 1819.
Then for twenty years he served as a member of the national 
Congresses. He was once elected to serve as the Bishop of 
Antioquia, but he refused this post. He died on July 1,
1857. Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario Biografico. 35.
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mediate the affair further, or so General Santander told me 
in one of his letters, he did not give the information as 
quickly as my accusors wanted it. In the meantime a very 
strong representation from the Municipality of Caracas, 
directed to the House, arrived; and information was once 
again demanded from the Executive. The latter then had to 
manifest to the House on February 19, "that there was no 
clear evidence that I had ordered houses to be leveled or 
those who refused to be drafted fired upon; that it was not 
an infringement of the law to force lazy citizens to obey a 
government order as long as they were not mistreated or 
forcibly pulled from their homes; and that the accusor had 
not proven that I had ordered the excesses on which the 
accusation was based."
The Executive further stated;
The case requires prudence at all cost today more 
than ever; the common enemies can invade us, for they 
have the means. Venezuela has an infinite number of 
points of easy access* and the Spanish frequently plan 
to attack, counting on the fact that there are suffi­
cient numbers in their favor. The immigrants who have 
lost their properties come from that territory; and 
some enemy guerrillas concert their efforts to multiply 
our difficulties and to occupy our attention. In 
these circumstances, if the enemy had the assurance of 
not finding General P&ez at the head of the Republican 
army of Venezuela, their invasion could be quick and 
their success less doubtful. General P&ez enjoys an 
unquestionable reputation as a soldier; and the enemy, 
because of this, fears him and has half the battle lost. 
I do not want to infer by this that we should sacrifice 
our laws and rights as citizens for the convenience of 
maintaining a general in the Venezuelan army who, 
although of military value, obstructs the march of the 
legal regime. No, indeed; we must save our laws and 
save our rights as citizens; but let us not sacrifice a 
citizen without the corresponding evidence--especially
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a citizen worthy of public esteem. Our first obliga­
tion is to save ourselves from the Spanish knife, and 
the honorable House knows how many sacrifices are made 
or should be made on the altars of our physical exis­
tence.
Despite everything, the House admitted the accusation. 
Then the matter was taken before the Senate which vacillated 
the first days on whether to continue the case or wait for 
the documents that the Executive offered for its briefing. 
Meanwhile a letter was received in the Senate from the Secre­
tary of the House asking for complete copies of the official 
letters from the Intendant of Caracas, Escalona. These were 
remitted.
In a letter dated May 10 of that year Santander told 
me as follows:^
My opinion gathered from everyone with whom I have 
talked to about the matter, including your very enemies, 
was that the accusation was light and that new proofs 
must be awaited, for the personal security and honor of 
a citizen, whosoever it might be, should not be at the 
mercy of such destructive information. The President 
of the Senate and Colonel Pinango seem to be very much 
against you* so despite the fact that four Senators 
worked to defer the matter, the accusation was admitted 
on the terms you may have seen. According to what they 
have told me, this is all that has occurred. I can 
assure you that justice, perhaps even more them friend­
ship, has made me take the prudent path I have followed, 
for if I had not seen the faults they proclaimed in your 
procedure and later found them to be so, 1 would have 
been the first to speak out against you out of love for 
the laws and for public vengeance. I have had a declara­
tion taken from old Gdmez here, which is good, and I 
have sent it to the commission familiar with the cause.
I know you have already risen above this event with the
^What the author cites here are excerpts from a letter 
which Santander wrote him from Bogota on the date cited. A 
copy of the entire letter may be found in Archivo Santander. 
XIII-XIV, 322-24.
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same serenity with which you have faced death in 
battles. I am certain that you will come out vic­
torious, and I would be willing to bet my life on it.
The Senate will have many new members this coming 
year, and those members who do remain, although they 
may have voted to admit the accusation, are not 
malicious men anxious to ruin you. In part these men 
have proceeded as instigated by the vigorous declama­
tions of almost all the deputies from Caracas, for a 
good man is easy to deceive and advise.
I have told you to bring many documents from Caracas 
to belie the imputations of the accusation. You do not 
need a lawyer here, for you will find all the means 
necessary for making a victorious defense. After obtain­
ing the absolution, there will be time to make an ener­
getic, but moderate, manifesto of your conduct, under 
the constitutional regime, concerning the origin of 
this persecution, your submission to the laws you have 
defended with your sword, and all the rest that shall 
occur then. These steps will honor you as much or more 
than the glories you have known how to exact from your 
enemies. Nothing you could do could lose you as com­
pletely as any act of disobedience to the Senate. The 
latter would be a blot that would stain your reputation 
eternally. I cannot think you capable of such pro­
cedure. I judge you as I do because I know your 
character and your heart, and I will be responsible for 
your submission to anything that emanates from the 
'constituted authorities.'
Almost at this same time, on July 15, General Santander 
wrote Bolivar the confidential letter which may be seen on 
page 210, Volume 6 of the Documentos de la Vida Pdblica del 
Libertador.^ This letter was directed entirely to making 
the most unjust charges against me. Perhaps he believed he 
was fulfilling his duty when he committed an injustice out 
of misinformation. Unfortunately, this is an error rather 
frequent in rulers subject, as are all men, to the falli­
bility of their judgments.
3This letter, referring to P&ez1s "scandalous and in 
subordinate conduct," may be found as the author states in 
Coleccidn de Documentos.
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When I saw that [Francisco!] Soto and other Representa­
tives and Senators who were considered Santander’s echoes in 
both houses were decidedly against me, 1 felt 1 had a strong 
argument to accuse Santander of not proceeding with the jus­
tice he professed in his letters.^ if Santander had expressed 
one sole word in good faith against what they were doing, not 
only would they not have taken sides against me, but they 
would have been for me. This is especially so when in my 
way of thinking Santander was obligated to be on my side, 
for the accusation against me stemmed from the actions I 
took to execute his own decree of the Rules of the Militias
^Francisco Soto was born in 1789 in Cticuta. He 
received his law degree in March of 1807. While a law stu­
dent he had become an ardent Republican and joined the revo­
lutionary movement in 1810. In 1813 he presented himself to 
Bolivar as a soldier. The Liberator immediately added him 
to his staff as secretary and sent him to Tunja to ask Con­
gressional permission to follow the army to Venezuela. In 
1815 he was Lieutenant Governor of El Soccorro. During the 
emigration after Spanish reoccupation, Soto remained sick 
and abandoned the Guasdualito. There the Spanish General La 
Torre, though knowing Soto's affiliation with the revolution, 
had him treated and cured by his personal physician. He 
subsequently served as Secretary in the staff of colonel 
Galea, J. A. Romero, and Ramdn N. P6 rez. In 1819 he was 
named Governor of Pamplona, and he served with the justice 
and wisdom for which he was well known. He was subsequently 
elected to be a member of the Congresses of 1823, 1824, 1825, 
and 1826. Later he was Attorney General in the Cundinamarca 
Tribunal. He opposed Bolivar's dictatorship and was exiled 
until 1830. He then became Governor of Pamplona again and 
opposed Urdaneta's dictatorship. In 1832 and 1837 he served 
as Secretary of State and as member of Congress again in 
1838 and 1839. Favoring amnesty for the revolutionists of 
1839, he was imprisoned. He was freed by Generals Mosquera 
and Herrin and returned to Cdcuta in 1842. Soto died on 
February 1, 1845. Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario 
BiogrAfico. 598-600.
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which had encountered opposition in Caracas and which he had 
not suspended despite the fact that Congress had passed a 
law organizing the militia on a different basis.
Well then, my desire to execute this decree by using 
armed patrols on the streets to catch the recalcitrants was 
nothing more or less than what was done in Bogota every 
Sunday in Santander's very presence without it scandalizing 
him or anyone else, and without it appearing as a violation 
of public liberties and the rights of the peoples to congress. 
Naturally, he should have used all his influence to protect 
the provisions made by a chief who had done nothing more than
obey him. Far from having this reasoning, he added insult to
injury by naming Escalona, my accuser, to succeed me. 
According to statute, he should not have even been in the 
running for this post when other older generals, of higher 
rank, still had no positions. I was deeply hurt by this 
imprudent measure. Despite the support I could count on in 
my Department to reject such humiliation, 1 acknowledged my 
successor on April 29.
I enter a period now that is painful for me— a period 
of memories that still torment me and that I wish 1 could 
erase from the book of my life. 1 say this despite the fact
that 1 did all that could be asked of an honest man after he
has committed a fault, and that is to sacrifice his pride on 
the altars of justice and confess to the whole world, without 
making excuses, the error he committed during some hasty 
moments. I said this very thing in 1837. During the
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Colombian period, I always held high and dangerous positions, 
experiencing along with the Nation the uncertainties and 
anxieties of trial and error. But my heart and my will 
always belonged to my country, although my understanding was 
subjected, as is that of all men, to mistakes and deceits—  
mine were understandably so considering that from the occupa­
tion and isolation of the llanos I came into a theater of 
scenes absolutely unknown to me. What do the theories of 
revolutions and the complicated science of politics have in 
common with the simple occupations of the shepherd?
In 1837 I told the Venezuelans as follows.
I have committed a thousand errors whose painful 
sensations have been mitigated by the indulgence of 
my compatriots. The events of 1826 to which an unjust 
accusation against me in the Colombian Senate and an 
even worse interpretation by others led me, still fill 
me with bitterness and repentance. The desire to 
separate Venezuela from the centralization of Colombia 
was already widespread, and the occurrence of Valencia 
seconded by other cities was the first step toward the 
great change that was finally verified later. This 
separation was indicated by acts emanating from some 
corporations and by the press which is the vehicle of 
public opinion. The protest of the illustrious Munici­
pality of Caracas on swearing in the Constitution of 
1821, and the newspapers in 1824 and 1825 had prepared 
those events which enveloped me like a weak straw in 
the impetuous winds of a hurricane. The horror of civil 
war, my love for order, and the happiness of my country 
made me submit those events for the consideration of the 
Liberator of Colombia. Thus I showed myself willing to 
be the victim and to sacrifice my life and honor before 
allowing one drop of blood to be shed for my cause.
The Liberator heard my pleas, realized that his 
country was bordering a precipice, and flew to inter­
pose his art of government and his powerful influence 
to save it. His presence reestablished public confidence, 
and somewhat calmed those desires for separation.
There were no complaints or persecutions, and I sub­
mitted myself happily to obeying the decrees he issued.
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and to the system which seemed necessary to rule the 
Republic of Colombia. My authority was extended to 
other departments, and all of their inhabitants are 
witnesses to the conciliatory spirit which guided my 
administration. Everyone has seen the principles 1 
professed and delivered in my Manifesto of February 7, 
1829.
Let us return now to the deplorable events which have 
caused me so much bitterness and which 1 lament now before 
my fellow citizens. On the very night that General Escalona 
assumed command, disorders of different kinds by various 
parties were committed in Valencia. Among these appeared 
Royalists, who perhaps only sought a pretext to confuse the 
public tranquility in support of their ideas.
On April 27, 1826 several citizens had asked the 
Municipality of Valencia to suspend the order that took my 
command away. That body called the lawyers of the city to 
consult with them on this proposal which they felt, if carried 
out, could occasion disturbances and insurrections. One of 
these lawyers. Doctor Miguel Pena, with two others, proposed: 
"That there was no legal measure which could suspend the 
execution of the order and that not even the Executive itself 
could do so without openly infringing the C o n s t i t u t i o n . rhe
5Dr. Miguel Pefla was born in Valencia, Venezuela, on 
September 29, 1781. In 1807 he was Reporter for the Audiencia 
of Caracas and later an aide to a prominent English lawyer in 
Trinidad. In 1811 he returned to Caracas to join the Patrio­
tic Society in this capital. He became Miranda's Assessor 
and the latter named him Governor of La Guaira. He was serv­
ing in this post when General Miranda was imprisoned. In 
1814 he helped Escalona defend Valencia. In 1821 he was a 
member of the Congress of Cticuta. From 1821 until 1825 he 
served as President of the Supreme Court. The Senate
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Municipality agreed then that 1 be told the following!
. . . that they felt genuine sorrow knowing that an 
accusation had been admitted against me: that they
were certain 1 would justify myself completely: that
the entire territory was convinced of the punctuality 
and exactness with which I had discharged my obliga­
tions, winning the confidence, respect, and friendship 
of all: and that if there were need to leave the
Department in order to obey the laws, they would be 
consoled by seeing me absolved satisfactorily again.
In order that the fears they had shown before would 
seem well-founded, those who were not satisfied with such a 
declaration resorted to murder. They killed two poor indi­
viduals who had not played any role in the events that were 
being debated, and tossed their bodies at the door of the 
Municipal Building. There were many individuals here anxious 
to know the final result of the affair, when the Governor of 
the Province, Fernando Penalver, demanded that Colonel 
Francisco Barabaho, Commandant of the troops of the city, 
order the military men who were in the building to declare
suspended him from this post when he refused to sign the death 
sentence for Colonel Infante. Pena returned to Venezuela 
after its separation from Colombia, and here he was elected 
Secretary of the Interior. He became President of the Con­
gress of Valencia in 1833. Pena died in Valencia on February 
8 , 1833. Ibid.. 450.
Madariaga evaluates Pefia as follows: "He was a mulatto
himself who, as civil Governor of La Guaira, had contrived 
with Bolivar to deliver Miranda to the Spaniards; inconstant 
in his allegiance during the early days of the Republic; and 
known to have made money to the detriment of the State by 
speculating with the sum of 500,000 pesos the Government had 
entrusted to him to convey from Bogota to Caracas." Bolivar. 
524.
506
themselves in favor of the movement.6 Carabano sent them to 
their quarters, and then those who were there came tumul­
tously to my house and carried me on their shoulders before 
the Municipality.
It is necessary to have been under similar circum­
stances to understand the difficult position in which a public 
man finds himself when the people run to him begging him to 
head a movement he believes just and reasonable. Knowledge
^General Fernando Penalver was born in Piritti in 1765. 
While living in Valencia, he was chiefly responsible for 
having the Municipal Council here recognize the revolutionary 
junta of Caracas. He then became a member of the First Con­
stitutional Congress and signed the July 5 Declaration of 
Independence. In 1812 he was imprisoned by General Monteverde 
first in La Guaira and then in Puerto Cabello. He escaped 
from here after Bolivar's triumph after the first Battle of 
Carabobo. He was forced to emigrate in 1814 and unable to 
return until 1817. It was then that he brought the first 
printing press to Guayana and thus quickly helped spread the 
ideals of freedom. He was named Intendant and then went with 
General Vergara to London to seek aid. In 1821 he was Presi­
dent of the Congress of Cticuta, and by 1826 he was Governor 
of the Province of Carabobo. He was elected Senator to the 
Venezuelan Congress in 1831. Unfortunately, Pefialver was 
unable to finish his term, for he died in May of 1831. 
Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario Bioqr&fico. 452-53.
General Francisco Carabano was born in CumanA, Vene­
zuela. He was with Bolivar in the Jamaican exile and later 
followed him back to Venezuela to fight in the Battles of 
Quebrada Honda and Alacr&n under Mac Gregor. He also fought 
under General Piar at Juncal and San Felix. He was Chief of 
Staff in Valencia in 1826. In 1827 Bolivar promoted Carabano 
to the rank of General and in 1829 he was a representative to 
the Constitutent Congress of Venezuela. By 1830 he was 
Secretary of War and Navy. While serving as Chief of Opera­
tions in 1848, Carabafio was assassinated. Ibid., 85-66. 
DAvila, Diccionario BiogrAfico. I, 6 8 .
507
vacillates between the obedience owed the laws and the 
established principles, and the fear of the great harm which 
might result if the people take the responsibility of the 
act on themselves. Meanwhile there is no time to think. The 
people get impatient, shout, and invoke the most sacred senti­
ments. The public man, without even realizing what he is 
doing, yields and allows himself to be carried by the waves 
as an inert body that floats on top of a tempestuous ocean.
In a fatal moment for me, I reassumed the command that 
had been suspended so unjustly. With the first step taken, 
it was necessary to follow through with the error committed.
The Municipality of Valencia invited the other cities of
Venezuela to approve the movement she had initiated so that 
all together they could express the great motives which had 
made my replacement in command necessary— a command I should 
keep to maintain order and public tranquility until the 
Liberator returned and the great Convention met in 1831. 
However, they felt this Convention should be held sooner in 
view of the difficulties that had come to the Republic. Even 
the Municipality of Caracas, which had shown itself so hos­
tile to me previously, adhered to the Valencia Act, and I 
found myself invested with the supreme civil and military 
authority. It was then I directed the following proclama­
tion to the provinces.
The peoples' free vote has entrusted me with command
of the army and the civil administration. Aside from
my own situation, only the future of the country has 
called my attention. Our enemies were congratulating 
each other, and they thought we were in their power
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once again. They are mistaken, for they shall find 
us ready as always to repel them.
Our own preservation is the supreme law. It is 
what has dictated the measures we have adopted which 
are contained in the municipal acts. The press will 
notify the public concerning everything. Meanwhile it 
should be enough to know that the present laws are 
binding and that all the guarantees will be respected.
In a word, everything that is not against the step we 
have taken will continue as before.
The people were afflicted by a bad administration 
and were anxious for a remedy to their evils. This 
very reason gives us an occasion, and we are taking 
advantage of it by seeking the remedy in the constitu­
tion itself. We are determined to speed up the meeting 
of the great convention which was announced for the 
year [18]31. The Liberator President will be our 
arbiter and mediator, and he will not be deaf to the 
clamor of his compatriots.
Our peculiar situation places us in need of arming 
ourselves. Threatened externally by our common enemies, 
while subject to the machinations of egoism, we would 
be foolish not to assume a practical attitude.
The power you have entrusted in me is not to be 
used to oppress you, but rather to protect you and 
assure your liberty. I will always consult the opinion 
of sensible men and will carry out their wise delibera­
tions .
General Headquarters in Caracas, May 19, 1826.
J. A. PAEZ.
The Executive in Bogota declared "that the occurrence 
that took place in Valencia on April 30 was a true armed 
insurrection," and General Bermddez, Commandant General of 
the Department of Orinoco, at first took a hostile attitude 
toward the movement and did not act in these circumstances 
with any greater prudence and or caution than was to be 
expected from his impetuous and excessively violent nature. 
However, Bolivar was not of the same opinion as the Executive.
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His Secretary General, Jos6 G. P£rez, informed the Munici­
pality of Guayaquil when acknowledging receipt of the Act of 
July 6 as follows.'
Even though His Excellency has not yet officially 
received an account of the events occurring in 
Valencia in the last days of April in order to form a 
just concept of their character and nature, privately 
he has been told by respectable individuals that these 
have not caused a mutiny in the Colombian pact. That 
part of the Republic wants a reform made in the Con­
stitution, and the very leader who is in command of the 
army. General P&ez, has received a provisory commission 
to do this until Your Excellency returns to Colombia—  
and only with the latter express condition has it been 
conferred. This general has proclaimed that the 
Liberator's name is written across his heart, and that 
his spirit calls to him in every sigh. We do not 
expect further steps nor revolutionary measures to be 
taken. On the contrary, we can surmise that all will 
remain as it is until Your Excellency arrives.
Guayaquil also desires reform in the agreement with­
out breaking the ties uniting it to Colombia.
The reasons expounded are grave and powerful and 
shall be carefully considered by the national repre­
sentation.
His Excellency the Liberator professed his political 
ideals in the constitution presented to Bolivia. In it
7General Josfi Gabriel P4rez was born in Caracas. In 
1814 he joined Bolivar in the exodus to Oriente and hence­
forward accompanied the Liberator. He participated in the 
seizure of Bogota in 1815. He emigrated to the Antilles and 
in 1816 was part of Bolivar's Haitian expedition. In 1819 
he campaigned in BoyacA as Bolivar's Adjutant General. 
Returning to Venezuela in 1820, he signed along with Sucre 
and BriceAo M 6 ndez, the armistice and treaty with Morillo 
regulating the conduct of the war. From 1822 until 1826 he 
served as Bolivar's Secretary General. Ill health forced him 
to leave this post, but he did accept the job as Superior 
Chief of the Department of the South later in 1926. He dis­
agreed with Santander over Bolivar's dictatorship. In 1828 
he died suddenly while taking a thermal bath. Ibid.. II, 
98-99.
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all the origins and general and particular rights of 
the people are entrusted, and in it the guarantee of 
a government with the most unlimited liberty has been 
collected in the most convenient manner. A greater 
summary of social and individual security will never 
be achieved under any other political system.
God guard V.S.I. many years.
JOSE G. PEREZ
The people began to talk about reforming the constitu­
tion and requesting that the Great Convention meet earlier.
The federal system was recommended by many as the most con­
venient form of government for the people, and as the only 
one capable of saving the Republic from the anarchy which 
threatened it. Puerto Cabello on August 8 proclaimed the 
federation, and its example was quickly followed by Maracaibo, 
Aragua, Cumani, and finally Quito and Guayaquil, located at 
Colombia's other extreme.
Anarchy threatened on all parts. Some were in favor 
of adopting the Bolivian code. Others wanted a decentraliza­
tion of the government without breaking up the Republic.
Still others favored the establishment of a monarchy. Then 
there were those who were ready to resort to arms to carry 
out any of these movements.
A junta was convoked in Caracas, and on October 5 and 
this junta agreed to adopt a popular representative federal 
system of government. It also agreed to have the deputies 
of the municipalities of the province meet on November 1 to 
select the representatives to be sent to the Congress so 
that when the Great Convention met, they could agree on what 
reforms to make.
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On November 7 another meeting was held in the Convent 
of San Francisco in Caracas, since its members hesitated in 
malting their decision and since I had already been called to 
this reunion. I proposed that if the will of the people was 
to constitute themselves and support the constitution with 
their blood, those present were to show this by raising their 
hands. In this manner the will of the majority was known.
On the thirteenth of the same month I issued a decree 
designating December 10 as the meeting day for the electoral 
colleges in the respective provinces, and January 10 of the 
following year as the installation date for the constituent 
body in Valencia. This decree is as follows:
JOSE ANTONIO PAEZ, CIVIL AND MILITARY CHIEF OF 
THE STATE OF VENEZUELA, ET CETERA. ET CETERA.
In order to fulfill punctually the deliberations of 
the great popular assembly held in the Convent of San 
Francisco of this city on the seventh of this month, 
whose basic premise it is to create a nation of Vene­
zuela, and supporting the constitution which shall be 
given it by their legitimate representatives if neces­
sary, I come to decree and do decree the following:
Article 1. The electoral colleges existing now shall 
meet in the capital cities of their respective provinces 
on the following December 10. In case of death, absence, 
or physical impediment of any of the electors, the sub­
stitute or substitutes will fill the post.
Article 2. When the electoral colleges meet, they 
shall proceed to elect a double number of deputies 
from which they will select those for the Congress of 
BogotA so that the constituent body will be as numerous 
as possible. The elections for the deputies will be 
arranged as is presently done in the Constitution of 
Colombia, except that no senators will be named.
Article 3. In order that the election of these 
deputies be freer and so that enlightenment may be 
united with whatever other good qualities cam be found
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within the state for such an important office, indi­
viduals from Colombia may be elected even if they are 
not natives or citizens of the province holding the 
election as long as they possess the other require­
ments stipulated by the Constitution of Colombia.
Article 4. Those who have an absolute plurality of 
votes will be deputies, and the electoral college it­
self shall give them the credentials to present to the 
constituent Congress of the State of Venezuela. These 
credentials should contain a special clause stating 
that they were elected and named to assist the con­
stituent Congress of the State of Venezuela and to 
frame its Constitution on the basis of a popular repre­
sentative federal government. The President and 
Secretary of the aforementioned electoral college will 
authorize said credentials, and for this ceremony it 
shall have the full faith and credit that is required 
by law for such acts.
Article 5. All the elected deputies shall be in the 
city of Valencia by this January 10th with their cor­
responding credentials. Those not present on the 
appointed day without having qualified some physical 
impediment in due form, will be immediately liable for 
the punishment by an irremissible fine of two hundred 
pesos which shall be applied to the expenses of the 
Congress and which will not be charged to the con­
stituents .
Article 6 . The electoral college of the Province of 
Carabobo before dissolving will name a commission of 
five of its members to check the credentials of the 
first five deputies that arrive. Later these five will 
form a junta to check the credentials of the other 
deputies as they arrive.
Article 7. The Constituent Congress of the State of 
Venezuela should be installed on January 15 of the 
incoming year, with the attendance of at least four- 
fifths of its members. The civil and military chief of 
said State will install it. Immediately after. Congress 
shall proceed to elect a President and Vice-President 
from among its members and two Secretaries who may be 
non-members.
Article 8 . The meals for these deputies should come 
out of the same funds which provided them for the Con­
gress of Bogota, providing naturally for those taken on 
the trips both coming and going, at the rate of a peso 
a league. The rate for meals during the length of the 
sessions should be three pesos daily.
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Article 9. All persons, without any exceptions, 
who directly or indirectly oppose the Acts prior to 
the elections, the elections themselves, or the ful­
fillment of any of the Articles in this decree, shall 
be judged and punished as a traitor to the country.
Article 10. Let the Secretary communicate this 
decree to the intendant of the state for its fulfill­
ment and circulation among those whom it concerns.
Issued in the city of Caracas, November 13, 1826.—
XVI of independence.
JOSE ANTONIO PAEZ.
New difficulties arose from this measure, and I found 
it necessary to enforce the decree. Puerto Cabello, as we 
have seen before, had declared in favor of the federation, 
and on the 2 1 st pronounced against the above-mentioned system. 
I had to send troops to reduce the battalion of grenadiers 
that guarded the plaza to obedience. They had been led by 
Captain of the Navy, Sebasti&n Boguier.
Fighting the different factions incessantly, repress­
ing the excitement of the towns anxious for reforms until I 
no longer could, it was my intent to maintain peace and order 
until the Liberator came and put an end to the discords with 
his presence. This is what I told him in the following 
official letter.8
8 The author inserted a letter he wrote to Bolivar from 
Caracas on May 24, 1826. He also included a private letter 
he wrote the Liberator on May 25, 1826, and letters he re­
ceived from Bolivar on May 20, 1826 and August 8 , 1826. These 
letters have been omitted because they do not add substan­
tially to the text and because copies may be found in Blanco 
and Azpurda (eds.), Documentos para la Hiatoria. X, 336-40, 
529-31; Coleccldn de Documentos. VI, 85.
CHAPTER XIX
The Liberator's Arrival in Venezuela— Our Cordial 
Meeting— Decrees and Proclamations— Triumphal 
Entry into Caracas— Gift to the Liberator in this 
Capital— The Liberator's Return to BogotA— Advice 
He Gave Me Before Leaving.
1827
On September 4 the Liberator left Lima. After stopping 
over in Guayaquil, he arrived in Bogota on November 14. Here 
without changing any of the ministers who tried to resign, he 
declared himself reinvested with the extraordinary powers 
that the country's state demanded, threatened as it was by 
civil war and a foreign invasion. After also making other 
provisions that the public economy required, he left for 
Maracaibo and arrived there on December 16. Then he issued 
a proclamation that brought the different parties to an agree­
ment .
As soon as I knew that the Liberator was in Bogota, I 
issued the following proclamation.
VENEZUELANS t
Our troubles have ceased, for the Liberator heard our 
cries from the heart of Perti and has flown to our aid.
His heart is all Venezuelan and all Caraqueno, and so 
he brings you the greatness of his name, his immense 
services, and his powerful influence as pledges of his 
affection for your security and your union. As soon 
as his native soil called him to give his consolation 
as a citizen, he tore himself away from the dictatorship
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that demanded his services in a foreign country.
Our brother, our friend comes now with open arms 
to hold us close. The country’s most illustrious 
son, Venezuela's glory and first hero as a result of 
his military feats, returns out of the purest affec­
tion to see his old comrades-in-arms and the places 
where monuments to his glory stand. He comes for 
our benefit and not to destroy the civil and military 
authority he has received from the peoples he comes 
to help us with his counsel, his wisdom, and his con- 
sumate experience to perfect the work of the reforms.
Prepare yourselves to receive as does the arid land, 
the rich dew that brings so many benefits, for the 
latter are going to exceed your hopes. Bolivar was 
great up to the point of admirations from now on 
Venezuela owes him deification. Yield to the purest 
pleasure without any fear. I am authorized to promise 
you this. If you want still more, your guarantees 
shall be my life, my honor, and my very blood. Let 
contentment, jubilation, and pleasure reign. Vene­
zuelans, forget your troubless the great Bolivar is 
with us.
Issued at General Headquarters in Valencia on Decem­
ber 15, 1826.
JOSE ANTONIO PAEZ.
The last day of the tremendous year of 1826 the 
Liberator arrived in Puerto Cabello.*- In the following
^-PAez inserts this footnote here. "Bolivar was 
detained at Puerto Cabello for the following reason. Colonel 
[William] Ferguson who came in a hostile attitude along the 
West, sent Doctor Pefla and Colonel JosA Hilario Cistiago as 
prisoners to Trujillo where General Urdaneta was. X had com­
missioned Cistiago to find Bolivar and inform him that I was 
waiting for him in Valencia. In the Araure Villa Ferguson 
wanted Colonel Cala and his column of five hundred men to 
surrender to him and demanded the same of Commandant Domingo 
Hern&ndez and his column of eight hundred men in San Carlos. 
These pretensions, which were resisted, alarmed Bolivar as 
well as me. In similar circumstances. General Silva arrived 
in Valencia as a prisoner. Cornelio Mufioz was sending him 
to me from Apure, where Bolivar had sent him from Cdcuta to 
settle the differences between the Apureftos and the citizens 
of Mantecal who had revolted with Echazu under Miguel 
Guerrero's orders. I immediately sent Silva to Puerto
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decree, issued on January 1, 1827, he confirmed my title and 
authority as civil and military chief.
REPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA
SimOn Bolivar, Liberator President, Et cetera. Et 
cetera
Consideringi First, that Venezuela's situation is 
mutually calamitous for the parties that are fighting; 
second, that I am authorized to save the country by 
extraordinary powers and the national vote; third, 
that domestic peace is everyone's well-being and the 
Republic's glory, I decreet
First. No one shall be persecuted nor judged by the 
actions, speeches, or opinions that were made or held 
in favor of the reforms.
Cabello to assure Bolivar that we were all ready to receive 
him with open arms, but that the hostile acts Ferguson had 
committed made us fear that he would not be a peacefully 
inclined. 11
No further information was available on colonel 
Cistiago, colonel Cala, Commandant Domingo HernAndez, and 
Echazu.
Colonel William Ferguson had left a minor position 
with a firm in Demerara to enlist as a drummer-boy in the 
British Battalion of the Lower Apure. He was captured and 
imprisoned by the Royalists for fourteen months at Puerto 
Cabello. When he managed to escape, he made his way to 
Margarita Island and joined the Irish Legion. He became 
General Montilla's aide and fought at Rio Hacha, Magdalena, 
and Cartagena. Later he fought at the Battles of Bombona, 
Junln, and Ayacucho. On one occasion he was tried for breach 
of discipline and sentenced to be shot; however, on the 
appeal of the Captain of a British man-of-war he was restored 
to his command. From 1824 until his death, he was on the 
Liberator's personal staff. One of his most important mis­
sions was to carry the new Bolivian constitution to Sucre at 
Chuquisaca. He accomplished this exhausting feat of covering 
eighteen hundred miles leading across the higher Andes in 
nineteen days. In 1828 Colonel Ferguson was killed while 
protecting Bolivar from a band of assassins that attacked 
the President's Palace in Bogota. Hasbrouck, Foreign 
Legionaries. 262, 279, 296, 333-34.
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Second. The person, goods, and jobs of those 
compromised in the cause of the reforms are 
guaranteed without exception.
Third. General-in-Chief Jos£ Antonio P&ez is 
to remain in control of the civil and military 
authority as Superior Chief of Venezuela with all 
its corresponding powers. General-in-chief Santiago 
Marino shall be the Intendant and Commandant General 
of Maturin.
Fourth. Immediately after notification of this 
decree, my authority as President of the Republic 
shall be acknowledged and obeyed.
Fifth. All hostile acts committed after notifica­
tion of this decree shall be judged as guilty by the 
State and punished according to the laws.
Sixth. The Great National Convention shall be 
convoked according to the December 19 Decree to 
decide the fate of the Republic.
Issued at the Liberator's General Headquarters in 
Puerto Cabello on January 1, 1827— XVII of Independence 
— Signed by my hand, sealed with the Republic's seal, 
and countersigned^by the Secretary of State and General 
of my office— SIMON BOLIVAR— By the Liberator Presi­
dent, the Secretary of State and His Excellency's 
General, J. R[AFAEL] REVENGA.2
2Jose Rafael Revenga was born in Cosejo, Venezuela on 
December 24, 1781. In 1810 the Caracas Revolutionary Junta 
sent him to the United States to seek aid. By 1815 he was 
Bolivar's secretary in the Magdalena campaign. He emigrated 
to Jamaica with Bolivar. From here the Liberator sent him 
back to the United States to win sympathy for the Venezuelan 
cause. In 1819 he became Bolivar's Secretary General in the 
campaigns of Venezuela and New Granada. Later he went to 
Spain to negotiate for peace. On his return he became Boli­
var's Secretary of Foreign Affairs. He accompanied the 
Liberator to Venezuela in 1826. In 1828 he was promoted to 
Counselor of State. Because of his opposition to Venezuelan 
separation from Colombia, he was exiled in 1829. This exile 
was ended in 1844, and he immediately returned to govern­
mental duties. He became a member of Congress, Director of 
the Bank, and eventually President Monagas' Secretary. He 
died in Caracas in 1852. Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario 
BioarAfico. 506-507.
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Then I issued the following decree.
REPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA
JOSlS ANTONIO P&EZ, SUPERIOR CIVIL AND MILITARY CHIEF OF
VENEZUELA, ET CETERA
I promised the Venezuelan towns in my proclamation 
of this past December 15 to guarantee with my life, 
honor, and blood, that His Excellency the Liberator 
would come with open arms to clasp us to his heart; 
to bring us peace and reestablish confidence; to calm 
our domestic dissensions with his authority, influence, 
and power? and to work toward perfecting our lot and 
future well being. Since I received at midnight last 
night the January 1 Decree, issued by His Excellency 
at his General Headquarters in Puerto Cabello, I come 
to decree and do decree the following?
1. Let the decree he announced by proclamation with 
the due pomp and solemnity. This decree is exactly as 
followsi (Said decree copied.)
2. From this moment forward. His Excellency the 
Liberator's authority in his capacity as President of 
the Republic will be completely acknowledged and 
recognized. The previous decree shall be fulfilled 
entirely.
3. Since His Excellency the Liberator President in 
his December 19th Decree issued in Maracaibo ordered 
the Great National Convention to meet in Caracas and 
take care of the reforms warn ted by the people and 
determine the fate of the Republic, my December 13 
Decree ordering the assembling of the Venezuelan repre­
sentation in Valencia is revoked.
4. Since the National Congress decreed triumphal 
honors for His Excellency the Liberator President when 
he returned from Perd to the heart of the country and 
since furthermore it is a sweet and sacred duty for 
Venezuela to pay homage to her most illustrious son, 
the towns along his path should prepare to receive him 
with majestic pomp, according to a ceremony used in 
ancient times to demonstrate the national gratitude 
justly due the heroes and founders of liberty.
5. This present decree must be printed and circu­
lated by the Secretary among all the civil and military 
authorities so that it may be observed and executed
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punctually. These authorities must have it published 
by proclamation in all the cantons, towns, and places 
in their respective provinces.
Issued at General Headquarters in Valencia on 
January 2, 1827 —  XVII.
JOSE ANTONIO PAEZ. 
Jos£ Nunez Caceres, Secretary General.
Then I manifested to Bolivar my desire to see my con­
duct vindicated. For this purpose, I asked him to form a 
tribunal to evaluate the charge made against me. My letter 
to him was as follows.3
General Headquarters 
Valencia, January 3, 1827
TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE LIBERATOR PRESIDENT OF
COLOMBIA, ET CETERA
Most Excellent Seffor:
When on April 25 of this past year I received the 
order from the Supreme Executive Power announcing my 
suspension as Commandant General of this Department 
and naming General Juan de Escalona my successor, I 
quickly and blindly resigned and had the army acknowl­
edge the appointed successor. From that moment on I 
begem to prepare for my march to Bogota where I was to 
suffer the judgment of the tribunal that was to eval­
uate my cause. This is an act that cannot be doubted, 
for it rests on irrefutable documents. Furthermore, 
the series of posterior events prove their authen­
ticity. My march to the capital of the Republic was 
the spark that fell on the riverlet of gunpowder that 
created the explosion of April 30, and it is from it 
that my slanderers have inferred that the political 
reaction that started on this date had no other origin 
nor any other objective than my desire not to account 
to the nation about my public conduct as commandant 
General. This is not the opportune time to spend my­
self refuting arbitrary imputations. I have consulted
3A copy of this letter may be found in Blanco and 
Azpurda (eds.), Documentos Para la Historia, XI, 79.
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my conscience and it has left me at peace concerning 
the sinister intentions that injustice and ingrati­
tude attribute to me. I foresaw at these turbulent 
times that a time of peace would come when, quieting 
the cry of exalted passions, I could give the nation 
an exact account of how I fulfilled my duty. It was 
for this reason that in a manifesto which I issued 
concerning the execution of the decree from the Execu­
tive Power for the drafting of militias I said to the 
whole world: That X did not fear the judgment of the
nation nor of impartial men; that on the contrary, if 
someday 1 were free from the commitments which tie me 
to Venezuela. X  would glory in being judged by the 
manner in which X  fulfilled mv duties in the Commandancv 
General, prior to this past April 30. and I would resign 
myself happily to whatever sentence the judges imposed 
on m e .
I think, most Excellent Senor, that this happy time 
has arrived. Your Excellency's authority as President 
of the Republic is recognized in Venezuela. 1 saved 
this very authority for Your Excellency the same day 
that I swore never again to obey the government of 
Bogota. Since Your Excellency has assumed the respon­
sibility for directing the Republic, order, tranquility, 
and confidence have been reborn. Then, it is my first 
duty to beg Your Excellency to immediately name the 
judges or tribunal who are going to try my case. This 
case had not been annulled, but rather postponed until 
a calmer time, which now has happily arrived for the 
entire Republic under Your Excellency's command. I 
would not be satisfied to continue exercising the supreme 
authority in Venezuela which Your Excellency bestowed on 
me in this decree of the first of this month without 
first giving this public testimony of my obedience and 
submission to the laws.
God keep Your Excellency, et cetera.
JOSE ANTONIO PAEZ.
The Liberator's Secretary General sent me the follow­
ing official letter from Puerto Cabello.4
4Ibid., 79-80.
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General Headquarters
Puerto Cabello, January 3, 1827
TO HIS EXCELLENCY GENERAL IN CHIEF J. A. PAEZ, SUPREME 
CHIEF OF VENEZUELA, ET CETERA
Sefiori
The Liberator has just jubilantly received Your 
Excellency's submission to the government of the 
Republic. With this illustrious testimony of your 
dedication to Colombia and your respect for the laws,
Your Excellency has culminated the measure of your own 
glory and national happiness. The Liberator told mei 
General P&ez saved the Republic yesterday and has given 
it new life. Gathering Colombia1s remains.5 General 
PAez has preserved the country1s plank which had ship­
wrecked because of the disasters of the war, the con­
vulsions of nature. and internal dissensions. He 
exposed his life valiantly in one hundred battles to 
free the people who, reassuminq their sovereignty, have 
issued their fundamental laws. These are the laws that 
have been offended: these are the people who owe him
gratitude and admiration. Today he has given us domestic 
peace. Instead of listening to complaints and laments, 
let us go like Scipio to thank the heavens for having 
destroyed the enemies of the Republic. Only the voice 
of iov and the sentiment of generosity should speak on 
this day. Far from being guilty. General PAez is the 
saviour of the country.
His Excellency then orders me to tell Your Excellency 
that in keeping with the decree of day before yesterday, 
no one in Venezuela shall be considered guilty because 
of the reforms. All judgment on what is past is a viola­
tion of a sacred law guaranteeing everyone's health.
Respectfully I am Your Excellency's most obedient 
servant.— Secretary of State and the Liberator's General. 
— J. R. REVENGA.
Knowing that the Liberator was coming from Puerto
5The author interjects this footnote. "The Liberator 
refers here to the reunion in Trinidad de Arichuna under my 
protection of what remained of Venezuela and New Granada 
after Boves's and Monteverde's troops, the Caracas earthquake, 
the dissensions in Cartagena, and the loss of New Granada 
seemed to have dealt the death blow to the patriot cause."
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to Valencia where I was, I set out to meet him on January 4. 
We met at the foot of the Naguanagua Cerro. We embraced 
cordially® and entered Valencia together in the midst of the 
rejoicings of the people who gathered to receive us. 1 
immediately ordered the veteran and militia troops that 
lined the road to file off in front of the Liberator and 
retire to their homes or quarters.
Then I issued the following proclamation to the Vene­
zuelans t
JOSfi ANTONIO PAEZ, SUPREME CIVIL AND MILITARY CHIEF 
OF VENEZUELA, ET CETERA
VENEZUELANS *
Venezuela's days of grandeur will mark day before 
yesterday as one of its most fortunate periods. The 
Liberator President arrived at the foot of the Puerto 
Cabello Cerro at two o'clock in the afternoon with out­
stretched arms to communicate his love for his comrades 
in arms and for all Venezuela. This embrace was con­
secrated with the holy oil of all the virtues, and the 
furies of poisonous discord fled terrified to bury 
themselves in the eternal abyss of oblivion. The soil 
that witnessed this new scene, almost as if it were 
alive, has changed itself into a monument which will 
exceed the pyramids and obelisks in grandeur and dura­
tion* it will recall to posterity not the haughtiness 
of the conquistadores, but the sublime work of patriotism, 
civilization, and friendship.
Venezuelans* the Liberator made his triumphal entry
6F4ez inserts this footnote* "I recall an incident 
here which gave Bolivar the opportunity to reveal that genius 
of his which was always ready in opportune circumstances. 
After embracing, the guards of the swords we were wearing got 
so entangled, that it took us some time to disentangle them. 
During this time, Bolivar was smiling and telling me, as a 
Roman General would have done in similar circumstances*
'This is a good omen. General, revealing the fate which will 
befall us in the future.’1'
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into this city at five in the afternoon, and the 
Republic's destinies already rest on his robust 
shoulders. His star guides itj it is a sun of new 
creation that enlivens the land that saw his birth 
with its rays.
Venezuelans! I have fulfilled my promises. The 
genius for good is amongst you, and he has placed your 
fate in his hands. I guaranteed you that your rights 
would not be violated, and the Great Convention will 
be convoked immediately. In it you will be able to 
exercise the great acts of your sovereign will* in it 
you will give your liberty firm and sure guarantees.
All of these benefits are the recompense for your 
heroic conduct* glory belongs to you, gratitude to me.
General Headquarters in Valencia on January 5, 1827.—  
XVII.
JOS& ANTONIO PAEZ.
I must confess that the unlacing of these events were 
not completely sufficient to tranquilize my soul, and I 
eagerly awaited the opportunity to give my country a public 
testimony of my disinterested conduct. As a result, I asked 
the Liberator President, first by word and later by letter, 
for permission to leave Venezuela for whatever time he deemed 
convenient. Even with my limited discernment, I could see 
that the country would be disturbed again because of the con­
flict between its interests and the state of public opinion.
I wanted to be away so that this upheaval which I foresaw 
could not be attributed to me. However, my desires were in 
vain, for the Liberator refused my pleas. I remained in an 
uncertain and compromised position.
Even the most short-sighted political calculation was 
sufficient to show that Venezuela's separation was indicated 
from the time of Colombia's origin. Venezuela still did not
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have a government strengthened by time. On the contrary, 
the one that existed had been created under the influence of 
the necessities of war and with only the guarantee of arms, 
and with the people being even unable to discuss their inter­
ests or balance their institutions between their real con­
venience in the course of peace and a lasting tranquility.
The constitution did not offer all the freedom and guarantees 
which the citizens desired, and because of it the magistrates 
were able to abuse their power (Article 128). Finally, the 
rehearsal period was flourishing and the prominent man of 
the nation, General Bolivar himself, was not in accord with 
the established regime. Everything coincided to prepare us 
for a general confusion: so when the Convention of Ocana in
1828 declared the reform of the constitution necessary, and 
thus announced its instability, the catastrophe was already 
inevitable.
Despite all of this, order was maintained under the 
regime of an organic decree that the Liberator issued and by 
announcing the convocation of a constituent Congress in 
Colombia. All my desires and all my efforts then were 
reduced to maintaining peace in the departments that were 
under my command. The extraordinary powers that had been 
given to me were used only to prevent anarchy from devouring 
us. 1 remind my fellow citizens of my conduct during those 
times of differences among the Colombians and when, for even 
greater misfortune, the war with Perd broke out. I flatter 
myself with the approval given my behavior in the difficult
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position in which I was placed. I can always take pride in 
having respected the freedom and all the guarantees of the 
Venezuelans.
Bolivar and I went on together to Caracas where we 
were received with the same marked enthusiasm that was in 
evidence in all the towns along the way. The Liberator's 
entrance into Caracas was truly triumphant. Everyone jubi­
lantly acclaimed Fortune1s First-born, the Creator of three 
Republics, and the Genius of War and Peace who came armed 
with the olive branch from the Temple of the Sun to give new 
life to the country. This municipality had deputized indi­
viduals from its midst to go out and meet him in Victoria and 
accompany us to the capital. We entered the latter under 
arches which. although not comparable to the sumptuous marble 
ones that a proud Rome elevated to Traian. nor to those 
which the humiliation of those conquered built against their 
wishes for the fortunate conauistadores. were a thousand 
times more demonstrative o f  affection and gratitude. These 
arches were offered from the heart and had been built from 
yellow palms and green willows, beautified with bows of 
ribbon and tri-colored streamers on which were written 
eulogies to the hero. Everything which the enthusiasm of a 
people can invent to give visible signs of joy and love was 
presented before the illustrious caudillo. It was truly a 
republican fiesta, as was ascertained by the presence of the 
flags of all the new Republics intermingled with the starred 
banner of the eagle of the North. The multitude pressed
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around the elegantly adorned carriage that had been given 
the Liberator and in which, at his insistence, I took a
7
seat.
We entered the cathedral where a solemn Te Deum was 
sung, and then we went to the house that had been prepared 
previously for the honored guest. Here a select committee 
awaited him. In order that all those ceremonies would more 
effectively recall the times of Republican Rome, fifteen 
young girls, richly attired and symbolizing civic and war 
virtues, came out then to receive the Liberator. They pre­
sented him with two crowns of unwithering laurel, one for 
the triumph obtained over tyranny and another for the one he 
had attained by preventing civil war. On accepting these 
the Liberator saidt “Senores, two beauties have presented 
me these crowns, symbols of victoryt I value them more than 
my heart, but I must be permitted to dispose of them justly." 
And with the generosity which was proverbial in him, he 
placed one on my temples8 and dedicated the other one to the 
illustrious people of Colombia.
Meanwhile delightful music filled the air, and young
7This carriage had been given to Bolivar by Jacob 
Idler, a Philadelphia merchant who had been supplying the 
Venezuelan government with guns. Idler himself is supposed 
to have led the two horses pulling the carriage. DeGrummond, 
“The Jacob Idler Claim,“ The Hispanic American Historical 
Review. XXXIV (May, 1954), 131-57.
®The author footnotes this as followsi “Larraz&bal 
does not mention this event."
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Caracas girls in chorus sang hymns to the Liberator of the 
country. First, they presented him with Colombia's flag with 
these wordsi This flag shall be an eternal monument of the 
heroism, the constancy, the valor, and the courage with which 
you placed it in the temple of glorv. Colombia, united by 
the strong ring of vour name. receives new life with vour 
presence. Then they presented him with the Peruvian flag 
with these words: y o u  broke the sceptre that Pizarro built.
and you tore the Lion of Castile to pieces by putting the 
Hvdra of discord in chains. Your modesty exalts you on the 
peaks of Chimborazo, while this flag waves in Perfl under its 
shadow. Finally, the young girl that held the Bolivian flag 
placed it in the hands of the founder of that Republic saying: 
With the resplendent brilliance of vour skills you have 
eclipsed the Father of Lights whom the Incas adored. Bolivia 
boasts vour name and owes its liberty and good fortune to 
vour pen. The Liberator then took the pennants which were 
inscribed with the military and civic virtues from the young 
girl's hands. The one which had written Disinterest on it 
he gave to General [Fernando del] Toro; Honesty, to Don 
Critobal Mendozai Politics, to Great Britain: Generosity, to 
Caracas: Valor, to me: and Constancy, he reserved for
himself. 9
^General Fernando del Toro was born in Caracas to one 
of its most illustrious families. He showed an early pre­
dilection for an army career: so his family sent him to
Spain to get schooled in it. He quickly became a member of
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The Municipality prepared an evening meal in the 
Judicial Building during which tributes of appreciation and 
admiration for the Liberator were renewed. The gifts, the 
fiestas, the same throngs of citizens continued wherever 
Bolivar appeared on the following day. A temple was built 
in the plaza during the night which was crowned with statues 
alluding to the music and songs which would be sung in it. 
Then on the thirteenth, the Municipality gave a splendid 
banquet which was attended by two hundred of its most select 
citizens. When it came my turn to propose a toast, 1 said 
the following.
Senores,: Permit me to express a sentiment of
pride. I cannot contain it within my heart, for it 
is a noble pride. Senoresi the Liberator has culmi­
nated the measure of his favors, of my glory, and even 
that of his power. He cannot give me any more, for he 
has given me the sword that has freed a world.*0 If
the Spanish Royal Guards and rose to the rank of Colonel.
With Bolivar, he witnessed Napoleon's coronation in Paris and 
later went with Bolivar to Italy. He returned to Spain to 
help free her from the French yoke. When he returned to Car­
acas in 1809, however, he quickly identified with his com­
patriots and resigned from the Spanish army. He was immedi­
ately named military Governor of Caracas and later its repre­
sentative to the first Venezuelan Congress. When Venezuela 
yielded to Monteverde in 1812, Toro was forced to take refuge 
on the island of Trinidad. Here for ten years he suffered 
all types of hardships and privations. After the victory at 
Carabobo in 1821, he returned to Caracas a veritable skeleton. 
He died in 1823, still one of Bolivar's most intimate and 
cherished friends. Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario 
BiogrAfico. 622-23.
10p&ez footnotes this as followsi "On his arrival in 
Caracas, Bolivar presented me with a sword; a beautiful lance 
with gold engravings; two magnificent Peruvian horses; and a 
luxurious dressing-table case to use during military cam­
paigns ."
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Frederick’s sword, which did nothing more than defend 
his inheritance and usurp a foreign one, could be a 
priceless present for the sovereign of Europe, then 
what can I say when 1 hold in my power the sword which 
represents terror for tyrants, the sword that redeemed 
humanity? Among earthly gifts, has there ever been one, 
or could there ever be one, of equal value? Bolivar 
himself can give me no more. And what use shall I make 
of this sword? How can I preserve its laurels, its 
glories, and its unique honor? It centuplicates my 
duties and requires strengths from me that only Bolivar 
possesses. It confuses me. This sword that has re­
deemed mankind!
But in my hands it will be no more than Bolivar's 
sword: his will shall direct it while my arm wields it.
I will die one hundred times and shed all my blood 
rather than allow this sword to leave my hand or spill 
the blood of those which up to now it has helped to 
free. Fellow citizens, Bolivar's sword is in my hands* 
for you and for him I shall carry it until eternity.
Toast the inviolability of this oath with me.
The Municipality's Attorney General, referring to 
Bolivar's gift, saidi "I toast, then, the inviolability of 
this monument established between the people and their 
Liberator, and the fact that the sword and the lance donated 
by this Venezuelan Achilles shall be used only to defend the 
rights of the people."
A beautiful ten-year-old girl, called Maria de la Paz 
and the daughter of Senor Joaquin Caraballo and Senora 
Romualda Rubi, gave a gracious elocution directed to the 
Liberator and placed a palm in his hands and a crown of 
laurel on his temples. The Liberator duly answered: he gave
the palm to the army and thrust the crown symbolizing triumph 
and power to the people.
In summary, let me say that the individual citizens 
and the entire town gave the Liberator the greatest and most
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spontaneous proofs of appreciation that any hero has ever 
received. More details concerning these gifts may be seen 
on page 27 in Volume 9 of the Documentos de la Vida PQblica 
del Libertador.^
From Caracas I left for Apure, accompanied by Colonel 
Jos€ Felix Blanco, who later became a general, to get fifteen 
hundred cavalrymen to put down their arms. They had refused 
to do this until they had seen how Bolivar would deal with 
me. I achieved my objective simply by appearing there.
Close to the time when the Liberator was due to leave 
for New Granada, where General Santander was beginning to 
show his hostility, he told me in a private conversation that 
he believed the separation of Venezuela and Colombia to be 
already inevitable. Expecting that I would be named the 
first President of the new Republic, he advised me a thousand 
and one times that once the separation was effected, I should 
oppose the adoption of the federal system with all my influ­
ence. In his opinion this system was synonymous with dis­
order and dissolution. He recommended the Bolivian con­
stitution highly to me. He also requested me to divide the 
debt, the territory, and the army after the separation was 
made. Then he would come to live in Venezuela; however, if 
the federal system were adopted, he would not even stay as a 
spectator.
iiThese details may be found as the author states in 
Coleccidn de Documentos.
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When the Liberator left for New Granada, I issued the 
following proclamation to the Venezuelans.
VENEZUELANS t
Your good fortune is as certain now as your prudence 
is necessary. The hero that through rough paths has 
always led us across the dangers up to the peaks of 
glory, came to our soil heeding our call. He has heard 
first hand our complaints against the corrupt adminis­
tration of the governmentt he has felt our hurtsj and 
he has felt the pain of our situation vividly. New 
agitations in the southern part of Colombian territory 
hastened his sensible farewell. In the last moments of 
his honorable visit, he left in his proclamation an 
illustrious proof that his sublime soul is devoured by 
the most ardent desires to foster the prosperity of the 
soil where he was b o m .
Venezuelans: Nearly all the departments have en­
trusted their fate to the great mem who, with his genius 
and valor, has freed us from oppression. General 
Bolivar's power, influence, and name have been invoked 
to reform the institutions and calm the discord. Their 
invocation shall not be in vain. He has offered to use 
all his efforts to convoke the convention: here your
rights will be treated with dignity and circumspection. 
From the wisdom of this sovereign corps will come the 
guaranteed results of your stability, peace, and 
happiness.
Meanwhile, I have remained in charge with extraordi­
nary powers to carry out and execute the existing laws 
and decree issued by the Liberator. In such a dangerous 
office I dare recommend union to you as the basis for 
order: reason, prudence and duty force me to pawn all
my zeal and authority to keep Venezuela on the same 
footing it was entrusted to me. Yes, Venezuelans, you 
who have always seen me as your compatriot and your 
friend, should give me the opportunity to congratulate 
myself and you when our days of contentment and joy 
arrive for having fulfilled my duties without bitterness, 
convinced that only the criminal has felt the weight of 
the law.
General Headquarters in Mocundo, July 16, 1827.— XVII.
J. A. PAEZ.
CHAPTER XX
CUBA
One of the main things that the Liberator talked to 
me about in 1827 concerned liberating Cuba and Puerto Rico.
He thought, and rightfully so, that while the Spaniards still 
possessed the best of the Antilles, they would have a very 
rich arsenal at their disposal. After all, the remnants of 
the immense power that Spain had just lost on the American 
continent were now assembled on these islands. The Spaniards 
could threaten Colombia in particular, for her coasts were 
open to all attacks and invited expeditions that would be 
easy to carry out.
Cuba1s geographic location and the fact that she was 
the meeting place for all those who had emigrated from the 
continent when they could not reconcile themselves to the 
new order of things which the revolution had established, 
caused Bolivar much concern about the stability of the Repub­
lican governments. This was all the more so because the 
sharp instinct of that profound politician already saw his 
work crumbling as a result of the anger of one party and the 
towns' lack of preparation for his new institutions. If to 
these misgivings were to be added the check Spain would have 
on us while she possessed Cuba, taking advantage of every
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available opportunity to help the discontent and agitate 
internal discords, it could be deduced logically that to 
free Cuba and Puerto Rico was not only a part of the task of 
independence, but also the most certain and perhaps the only 
guarantee we could have against such a tenacious nation— a 
courageous and daring nation whose caudillos were tormented 
by the idea of having lost after a good fight. Even the 
powerful aid of the natives who in great part and throughout 
the continent were their faithful allies had not been suf­
ficient to help them keep the extensive dominion over which 
the sovereigns of Castille and Aragon had not seen the sun 
set during the centuries of prosperity which the blindeBt 
fortune had heaped on them with full hands.
Another reason, to my knowledge, inspired Bolivar to 
organize the expedition to liberate Cuba and Puerto Rico from 
Spanish controls Colombia possessed an army that was inured 
to war and was composed almost entirely of men who were 
accustomed to camp life. These men were sons of combat, good 
only under military discipline, and incapable of leading a 
life other than the military— a life that is made dear by 
habit and whose very disappointments are flattering to the 
imagination of the man who has lost fear. This is a dangerous 
life for society after victory has canceled the need for the 
sword and it becomes necessary to hang it up so that the 
quiet citizen shall not have to fear military domination 
which, after the tyranny of the revolutions, is the worst of 
all tyrannies.
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It was impossible to maintain Colombia's army, which 
had leveled Spain's power in the Atlantic on the plains of 
Carabobo and had forever broken the Viceroy's sceptre in the 
Pacific at Junln and Ayacucho, for this nation still did not 
have a Treasury and its customs resented the evils of 
colonialism. Even more than the latter, it resented the 
reaction produced by the victory that had broken, it is true, 
the chains of slavery, but which in no way had formed the 
doubly strong chains of the law which binds the citizen to 
his word as much as the other maintains him immobile under 
the weight of iron. In a word, the army was a threat to 
public tranquility, and Bolivar knew that this would be the 
case until the intelligence and knowledge of the people 
advanced to the point when civilian life would become a 
habit. This was an arduous enterprise which could not be 
accomplished in one day, especially following a period of 
revolutions and war which are the worst school in which to 
learn social virtues.
Bolivar's expedition was justified in everyone's 
opinion. In the eyes of the warrior, it was right to com­
plete his conquest. To the politician, it was right to free 
a society that was beginning to constitute itself from danger. 
For the philosopher, sufficient justification would be found 
in the benefits that populations akin to ours would reap 
when their prosperity would be boundless after the locks were 
broken with which Spain unfortunately suffocated the progress 
of her colonies.
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The Liberator's plan consisted of sending me (begging 
the person's pardon who made Sucre chief of the expedition 
when he was four thousand leagues away fulfilling the task 
of the presidency of Bolivia) of sending me, I repeat, with 
ten thousand infantrymen and a thousand cavalry to embark on 
the Colombian fleet, which was capable of confronting the 
forces that the Spaniards had in the heart of Mexico. We 
were to dash over to one of the many magnificent ports, 
hidden to the world in the Pearl of the Antilles because of 
the suspicions of the Spanish governors, but known to all 
those considering military disembarkation on that beautiful 
island. That we would take the island was a certainty. 
Neither the Liberator, who ordered the undertaking, nor I, 
who was to carry it out, ever doubted the success of the 
expedition once our ships had arrived at the harbor that had 
been selected. In the first place, we relied on the numbers 
and valor of our soldiers to whom the Spaniards could never 
be invincible, and for whom (I shall say it plainly) it had 
become habit to conquer the Spaniards. The type of troops 
forming the expedition guaranteed a certain success even if 
the natives did not help but just a little. This help would 
be not so much with men, whom they would always give us but 
which we did not really need, but with material aids, with 
food provisions, with advice, and with those other countless 
ways in which a friendly people can efficaciously lend a 
hand to an invading army.
We also relied on Mexico's promise to lend us very
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effective help. Anyone wanting to find data on this matter 
pertaining to Mexico may consult the RecopilaciOn de Leves 
compiled by the lawyer, Don Basilio Josfe Arrilaga. The most 
important documents on this matter may be found in this work 
— especially the law of May 12, 1828 in which "the departure 
of national troops to wage war in Cuba or other points 
dependent on the Spanish government was permitted." This 
law was circulated that very day by the Secretary of War and 
published by proclamation on the twenty-fourth. In the year 
[18]23, the Secretary of War, Senor Pedraza, had authorized 
Don Pedro de Rojas to license privateers and to reach an 
understanding with the inhabitants of Cuba for the purpose 
of fomenting the revolution. This revolution, known on the 
island by the name Soles de Bolivar, failed because of the 
reasons which we shall partially see later on.^
Once the island of Cuba was taken according to the 
Liberator's plans, his fiery heart would not be content with 
the conquest alone. By force, all the inhabitants of the 
island and those of Puerto Rico would be free without any 
exceptions. It goes without saying that among these would be 
included the unfortunate Africans who still suffered the sum 
of human misfortunes. To think that we would have thought
^The Soles de Bolivar, or Soles y  Ravos de Bolivar 
which was its complete name, was the principal revolutionary 
organization in Cuba working for independence. Literally 
meaning the "Suns and Rays of Bolivar," it functioned chiefly 
during 1823. Charles E. Chapman, A History of the Cuban 
Republic (New York, 1927), 32.
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it feasible or logical to free a country and then leave a 
part of its inhabitants sunk in servitude, is an absurdity 
which the Liberator of Colombia would never have incurred. 
With the free Negroes, the Liberator told me, I was to 
immediately form an army and transport it to Spain to aid 
the Liberal Party. This would be to show Colombia's great­
ness and to ask for the official recognition of those who 
wanted the ideals of the century placed on Ferdinand's throne.
At this moment I do not know if it would have been 
possible to realize all of Bolivar's plans. 1 give my word 
as a soldier that at the time they seemed possible to fulfill 
to me, and that I embraced his thought with the joy and the 
blind enthusiasm with which I had become accustomed to con­
quering always. 1 do not believe that any of my companions 
either doubted the possibility of conquering the Spaniards 
simply because the terrain of our common struggles would vary. 
As for me, I already pictured myself in the precinct of El 
Morro dictating the law to a Captain General from Castile 
just as I had had the good fortune of dictating to Calzada, 
successor of the valiant and gentlemanly La Torre, at Puerto 
Cabello.
The Liberator, persistent in this idea as in all the 
great concepts that sprang forth from his ardent imagination, 
without taking the time to rest his mind when he ended the 
campaign of Perd, directed his attention immediately to the 
independence of Cuba. It was then that he wrote me the two 
letters that I shall copy below. They are precious documents
538
to me in more than one sense, and reveal that when he com­
municated his plan in 1827, he had been preparing to fulfill 
it for some time.
The first letter states as f o l l o w s . ^
La Paz, August 30, 1825.
My Dear General:
You who have done so much for the glory and peace 
of Venezuela will not fail to do the last thing that 
is lacking to keep our beloved country completely 
fortunate. You who know the state of affairs there 
better than anyone else because you are living them, 
will know how important the service we are going to 
render Colombia is to her. 1 shall render this 
service by sending a brilliant division from the 
troops we have in Peril, and you by taking the greatest 
care to preserve it in this state, placing it in the 
healthiest atmosphere, and in short, looking on these 
men as your most beloved children.
The Junin Battalion, which is one of the best corps 
on foot, now marches under the command of Colonel 
Ortega, a very good officer, and so does [Ramdn] 
Escobar's squadron of grenadiers on horseback with 
which you are now familiar.3 The Junin is magnifi­
cent, and it has a thousand four hundred squares, 
and the squadron that has two hundred is second to none 
in its class. I find it excusable to recommend this 
division, which shall render us such an immense 
service, to you again, my dear General.
1 am affectionately yours.
BOLIVAR
In the other letter he is even more explicit although 
he does not mention the true objective for which the troops
2A copy of this letter may be found in Blanco and 
Azpurha (eds.), Documentos Para La Historia. X, 125.
^RamOn Escobar was a brilliant cavalry leader who 
attained the rank of Colonel after his role in the Battles 
of Junin and Ayacucho. He also took part in the Battle of 
Carabobo. Lecuna, Crdnica Razonada. I, 158; III, 47.
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are destined. This was demanded by the prudence with which 
it was necessary to proceed in this matter.
This letter states as follows.4
Potosi, October 16, 1825.
My Dear Generals
I have received your valuable letter of March 29 
in Achaguas with pleasure. Thank you, my dear General, 
for your congratulations on the successes of the lib­
erating army of Pertt.
By my previous letters, you might have seen that 
one thousand six hundred men have marched to Venezuela; 
that an equal number will march within three months; 
and that probably next year I shall go taking six 
thousand men. I assure you that every day X am more 
and more determined to execute this operation from 
which Colombia could derive an immense benefit.
I have written General Santander and proposed you 
as Intendant in Venezuela. I do not doubt that he will 
fulfill a duty on which the happiness of our beloved 
country certainly depends. To tell the truth, X do not 
know another person who is better suited to command it 
them you. You are one of its liberators and have so 
many rights to its gratitude. I expect that you will 
not excuse yourself from accepting this task.
Affairs progress very nicely around here, and we 
have nothing to fear. The Chuquisaca Assembly has 
recessed after naming the commissioners who must 
negotiate with Buenos Aires, Pertl, and Colombia, for 
the recognition of the Republic of Bolivar.
Consider me always, my dear General, your most 
affectionate, heart-felt friend.
BOLIVAR.
Bolivar was the perfect man to carry out what he 
repeatedly recommended to me, and he would have carried it
4A copy of this letter is to be found in Blanco and 
Azpurda (eds.), Documentos Para la Historia. X, 125.
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out had it not been for a complication of circumstances 
which conspired against our final and grandiose project and 
struck it down. The first unfortunate circumstance was 
[colonel Jose] Bustamente's uprising in Perd which forced 
the troops which were descending the Andes for the expedition 
against Cuba to countermarch.^ The uprising urgently required 
the presence of these troops on the Colombian frontier, which 
was ungratefully invaded, if 1 may be permitted to say so.
From that moment on, Cuba was not thought of again, for 
internal needs were such, that they hardly afforded the 
opportunity to take care of them from moment to moment.
These needs interlaced themselves and succeeded themselves 
with such rapidity, that even Bolivar's genius and his 
untiring perseverance were barely sufficient to accommodate 
them.
Bolivar encountered another very grave obstacle, and 
one that was most unexpected for us considering that the 
project should have been opposed by the Spaniards only. The 
Washington government, I say it with sorrow, earnestly 
opposed the independence of Cuba. They gave as their reason,
^Colonel Jose Bustamante had fought in 1824 at the 
Battles of Junin, Matard, and Ayacucho. After Bolivar had 
liberated Perd from the Spanish, he left Bustamente as Chief 
of Staff of the third Colombian division he was leaving in 
Perd. In 1827 Colonel Bustamente led the majority of 
Granadino Captains and subalterns to oust the Venezuelan com­
manding officers and declared against any attempts at dicta­
torship. This was one of the factors leading to Bolivar's 
declaration of war on Perd, which ended victoriously for the 
Colombians in 1829. Madariaga, Bolivar. 545, 547, 550. Henao 
and Arrubla, History of Colombia. 394, 406-407.
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among others, one which Hispanic American nations should
always remember, and that was that:&
. . . no power, not even Spain itself, has in such a 
variety of forms, so deep an interest in its (Cuba's) 
future fortunes, whatever they may happen to be, as 
the United States . . . for ourselves (the Anglo- 
Americans) we desire no change in the possession or 
political condition of that island; and that we could 
not, with indifference, see it transferred from Spain, 
to any other European power. We are unwilling to see 
its transfer or annexation to either of the new 
American States.
These words, which spelled death for our project, were 
written by Henry Clay himself. His character, as well as 
that of the administration which his talents served, clearly 
warned us at the very least to forego any idea contrary to 
the convenience which the United States derived from the 
continuation of Spanish power in Cuba. The United States 
spoke so explicitly then, that it is so surprising to see 
how anyone later could sacrifice himself to secure the inde­
pendence of this island without counting first on the consent 
and unanimous cooperation of its inhabitants. 1 pointed this 
out to the unfortunate General Don Narciso LOpez, to whom I 
spoke with all the loyalty with which his courage inspired 
me, for he had been one of the first Spanish warriors in the
6This quotation was extracted from Henry Clay's 
instructions to the commissioners at the Congress of PanamA. 
Spanish America. 52-53.
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battles fought on the Venezuelan plains.7
With this painful incident ended, let us return to 
the principle question regarding the policy of the united 
States with respect to Cuba.** Allow me to refer the reader 
to the instructions which Mr. Clay gave in 1828 to the com­
missioners he sent to the Congress of Panama and which I
7General Don Narciso Ldpez was a native of Venezuela 
who had risen to the rank of General in the Spanish army 
because of the services rendered to the mother country in the 
Wars of Independence in Venezuela. He took up residence in 
Cuba, married there, and became devoted to the interests of 
the Cuban people. Being a man of liberalist tendencies, he 
finally resolved to promote a revolt against the tyranny of 
Spanish rule. He did not want a free Cuba, however, for he 
feared it might become a Negro Republic like Haiti. Instead 
he wanted Cuba annexed to the United States, and he was en­
couraged in this thought by the Southern states who provided 
him with arms and ammunition. He set the date for the revolt 
on June 24, 1848. This proved to be an abortive attempt that 
resulted in failure. LOpez returned to the United States and 
organized smother expedition which left for Cuba in the 
spring of 1850 with a force of nearly six hundred men, mostly 
Americans. After winning a preliminary victory, Ldpez re­
embarked his forces, for the Creoles were not anxious for 
annexation to the United States. In April of 1851 L6 pez had 
another expedition ready, but the United States government 
discovered the plot and kept him from sailing. In August, 
however, Ldpez left for Cuba with four hundred men, again 
mostly American. He was defeated, captured, and executed 
this time. Facing death bravely on the scaffold, Ldpez 
became the martyr and rallying point for Cuban independence. 
Chapman, History of the Cuban Republic, 35-39. For a more 
detailed account of Narciso L6 pez and his activities see 
Herminio Portell Vila, Narciso Ldpez y  au Epoca. 2 vols. 
(Habana, 1930); Robert Granville Caldwell, The Ldpez Expedi­
tions to Cuba, 1848-1851 (Princeton, 1912).
®For early relations of the United States and Cuba see 
Whitaker, The Western Hemisphere Idea. Later relations be­
tween these two countries are detailed in Basil Rauch, 
American Interest in Cubat 1848-1855 (New York, 1948).
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will copy completely in this chapter. 9
The objective of the negotiations between the United 
States and Russia mentioned in the instructions was to induce 
the Emperor of Russia to intervene with the Spanish govern­
ment to secure its consent for the immediate cessation of 
hostilities between her Catholic Majesty and her former 
colonies. The principal argument the Minister was to use 
was the great possibility that Spain would lose not only her 
continental possessions, but also the islands of Cuba and 
Puerto Rico which the free Republics would attack. He was 
to make it obvious later that the war on Spain's part would 
become defensive instead of offensive and that because of 
Colombia’s and Mexico’s position, a swarm of corsairs would 
not only destroy Spanish commerce on the Gulf of Mexico and 
sea of the Antilles, but also along the coast of the Penin­
sula. After adding that the preservation of Cuba and Puerto 
Rico deserved every consideration and should satisfy a reason­
able ambition, he was to further propound the following.^
Q
7The year 1828 which the author cites in this instance 
is incorrect, for the congress of Panama met in 1826 and Henry 
Clay issued his instructions to the commissioners that same 
year. The author’s translated version of these instructions 
has been omitted because the original may be found in Clay, 
Spanish America. 52-58.
lOp&ez’s translation of the letter of instructions 
from Henry Clay, Secretary of State, to Henry Middleton,
United States Minister to Russia, has been omitted because 
the original may be found in William R. Manning, Diplomatic 
Correspondence of the United States Concerning the Indepen­
dence of the Latin American Nations. 3 vols (New York,
1925), I, 244-50.
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I relate all this that has occurred without any desire 
other than to have everything known. This is without hatred 
for Spain, for X learned to love her people while fighting 
her noble and valiant sons. This is also without rancor,
God deliver me, for the United States whose hospitality I 
have delightfully enjoyed during the last years of my life. 
Finally, this is without any further interest in Cuba than 
that of presenting the events and the tendencies of the 
government of that period under its true light.
Since I am as interested now as I always was in what 
concerns Cuba, I assumed the task of scanning the documents 
on the history of this island while writing this chapter.^-1 
I wanted to investigate the reasons why, when all the Spanish 
colonies unanimously raised the cry of emancipation against 
the mother country, Cuba and Puerto Rico did not echo this 
cry. The only reason X could come up with was that one or 
the other island was always the arsenal where Spain kept all 
the arms used to subjugate those of us who were fighting, 
relying only on the justice of our cause.
On July 17, 1808 Cuba received news from Spain which 
gave occasion in other points of Spanish America for the 
formation of juntas as had been done in several cities of 
the Peninsula. The MarquAs de Someruelos governed the
U p A e z 's role in the independence of Cuba is explored 
in more detail in J. A. Cova, P&ez y  la independencia de 
Cuba (Habana, 1959), 13-31.
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1 2island at the time. When he saw himself forced to permit 
the publication of this news, he firmly opposed the forma­
tion of juntas, and in order to avoid the complications which 
would be brought by a free discussion of the state of affairs 
in Spain, he recognized the Supreme Junta of Seville as 
legitimate. By means of this coup d *etat Someruelos ended 
all the difficulties. The people directed their attention 
then to the pursuit of the French, for there were many 
naturalized citizens on the island, especially ex-colonials 
from Santo Domingo, who had emigrated to Cuba with their 
fortunes as they fled from that theatre of revolutionary 
horrors.
During Someruelos's rule, the Spanish cortes mani­
fested its plans to emancipate the slaves in Cuba and Puerto 
Rico. This measure greatly alarmed the inhabitants of these 
islands, for they believed that not only were their lives 
and haciendas threatened, but also the future of the white 
race. Their fears were not unfounded, for there were riots
12>rhe Marqufis de Someruelos replaced the Conde de 
Santa Clara as Captain General of Cuba in March of 1799 at a 
time when Spain feared a war with the United States and 
wanted a younger, more vigorous military man in command of 
the Pearl of the Antilles. When the threat of war subsided, 
Someruelos allowed the return of commerce between Cuba and 
North America and was instrumental in getting the mother 
country to liberalize her policy on the monopoly of trade. 
Although General James Wilkinson characterized Someruelos 
as "extremely feminine in his exterior and of feeble intel­
lect," he successfully fulfilled his charge of temporarily 
preserving Cuba for Spain. Herminio Portell Vila, Historia 
de Cuba. 4 vols. (Habana, 1938), 1, 129, 154.
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in several sugar and coffee plantations about that time. A 
conspiracy was even discovered which was led by the Negro 
Aponte. His name is still used on the island to recall the 
perversity of an individual. It is easy to understand how 
these well-founded fears, promoted by having to deal with a 
race which had received terrible instructions from acts 
verified on a neighboring island, could work in such a manner 
on the soul of the Cubans so as to make them consider any 
revolutionary movement as dangerous. Even if it could grant 
them their own independence, such a movement could also 
serve to awaken a spirit of insurrection in the slaves. It 
had already been proven that the slaves did have a very pro­
nounced tendency in this direction. Nevertheless, the youth 
of the island, who were not wont to circumscribe themselves 
within the limits of prudence, could not remain indifferent. 
They saw the laurels that the independents gathered in other 
places and the proof of their valor in the decimated troops 
which arrived in Habana from costa Firme after they had 
turned over the fortresses that they defended to the so- 
called insurgents. Consequently, secret societies were 
formed. The outstanding one among them was the one called 
Soles de Bolivar. Its name reveals that Bolivar was the 
saint and sign of the conspirators. The infamy of a son of 
Cuba exposed the conspiracy to General Don Dionisio Vives,
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and thus the revolutionary spirit was suffocated for the time 
being.^
In 1825 several Cubans, who had emigrated from their 
country, had organized a patriotic junta in Mexico which 
decided to send a commission to Bolivar to encourage him to 
undertake attacking the Spanish power in the Antilles. The 
Liberator embraced the project with the greatest enthusiasm, 
and the reader has already seen that it was not his fault 
that his plans encountered invincible obstacles. These 
Cuban patriots had directed the following representation to 
the Mexican congress. This is an unedited document which I 
owe to the generosity of a son of Cuba whose name has figured 
in the latest revolutionary plans.
SENORES VOTERS OF THE CHAMBERS OF DEPUTIES
AND SENATORS:
The individuals, some natives of the island of Cuba 
and others Mexican citizens, who subscribe to this
^General Francisco Dionisio Vives was the Spanish 
Captain General of Cuba from 1823 until May 15, 1832. While 
a stern governor, he did not play the part of a despot and 
always sought the support of the wealthy Creole class. In 
1823 and 1824, aided by his spies, he did suppress an insur­
rection inspired and led by the revolutionary society known 
as El Aguila Negra, or the Black Eagle. Consequently in 
1825 he was given unlimited dictatorial powers. Since Mexico 
had conspired against Spanish occupation of Cuba, General 
Vives sent a military expedition against Mexico in 1828. He 
fully expected the Mexicans to join his soldiers and was 
very much surprised when his expedition was forced to sur­
render. William F. Johnson, The History of Cuba. 5 vols. 
(New York, 1920), II, 343-64. Philip S. Foner, A History of 
Cuba and its Relations with the united States. 2 vols. (New
York, 1962), I, 104, 118-19, 120, 121, 122, 151, 175-76.
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petition are all interested in the happiness of both 
countries. They address the Mexican General Congress, 
full of the sacred enthusiasm which the love of liberty 
inspires, with the following exposition!
When as the result of the heroic efforts of the 
Americans, the entire new continent finds itself free 
from foreign domination, and especially when the towns 
oppressed by the Spaniard have completely shaken the 
chains of that barbarous government, the unfortunate 
island of Cuba, important and precious part of America, 
still finds itself today bent under the terrible yoke 
of that ferocious enemy of all liberty. In these cir­
cumstances the sons of Cuba, though always united in 
desires with their brothers of the continent, but still 
isolated in all other senses, have no other recourse 
but to wait for the Mexican or Colombian nation to 
deliver them their freedom or to pledge themselves to 
the desperate course of insurrection which in the midst 
of such a heterogeneous population could lead to very 
doubtful results. In the midst of the effervescense 
which the desire of being free produces in the public 
spirit of that island, a resolution or a party has not 
yet been adopted. Consequently, those most enthusiastic 
for independence or those who could most easily do so, 
have left their native soil to seek aid where they 
believed they had reasons to expect it— close to a power­
ful nation whose interest should impel her to lend a 
hand to a people who must necessarily be its ally in all 
things and who will fight in the vanguard for the 
security of both. Mutual interest and convenience 
demand that the Mexican Republic rush to the aid of the 
island of Cuba and assist her to get out of the state 
of degradation and slavery in which it is maintained by 
the common enemy of the Americas. This state is due 
more to force of habit and other particular circum­
stances them to moral influence; due more to the inertia 
that is natural in all towns enjoying certain commodities 
because of the acquiescence of the inhabitants to the 
system in effect which dishonors their country; in a 
word, due only to that natural inclination of man to 
maintain himself in a state of peace while sacrificing 
even his liberty and most precious rights if the results 
of a sudden upheaval can be dismal. But this state of 
peace has ceased to be natural now to the island of Cuba. 
Her inhabitants are now aware of the sanctity of their 
rights. They are surrounded everywhere by brilliant 
examples of heroism, and they are taught by the practical 
lessons of the many free peoples with whom they are in 
close contact. In complete contrast, they find them­
selves under a government whose very name spells degra­
dation in the sight of cultured peoples. Every day they
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are deprived more and more of the commercial relations 
which constitute their riches and fortune, and they 
find themselves without confidence because of the fear 
produced by a nearby revolution. Finally, they are 
impelled by the forces of enlightenment and civilization 
to search for a system more in accord with their 
interests and their new necessities. They are already 
at the point of staging a revolution which without the 
protection of a friendly nation can end dismally for 
our unfortunate brothers. If supported and directed 
by this Republic, this revolution could lead to the 
complete triumph of liberty and independence for the 
island.
These, senores, are not vain theories nor assertions 
founded only on sterile wishes and desires. They are 
true axioms extracted from the nature of society and 
from the circumstances in which events have placed the 
island of Cuba. He appeal to the judgment of the true 
Mexican patriots, to that of the deputies and senators 
who have had the glory of seeing the birth, growth and 
triumph of their country's freedom. Is there a Mexican 
heart that has not been irresistibly drawn to the cause 
of independence? Is there one (Mexican) that did not 
ardently desire the destruction of the Spanish govern­
ment and did not proclaim the triumph of the nation's 
arms? Still, the inevitable disorder of the revolution 
dissuaded some: fear of an unfortunate end daunted
others: lack of organization alienated many: and
certain decorous jobs or commitments held back the 
others. And who would not have wanted an organized 
force to appear then and organize the new order of things 
by extinguishing the fatal discord and untying the sons 
of the country under the nation's banner? Then a voice 
would have been heard from Dolores to YucatAn, and the 
year Ten would have seen the portents of the year 
Twenty-One realized. How much blood, how many disasters 
would have been spared the country1 Its prosperity 
would have continued in the place of the hatreds, the 
killings, the ruins, and the vices produced by a civil 
war. To what degree of riches, abuiidance, and civiliza­
tion the great Mexican people could have been elevated! 
Apply these considerations, senores* to the island of 
Cuba in its present state. Everything points out that 
a revolution is impending in that country: everything
stimulates and precipitates it. Shall the Mexican 
nation stand by indifferently while a part of the 
American soil inundates itself in a blood to which it 
is closely bound by so many ties of friendship and kin­
ship? Shall the congress of a free people look on coolly 
without extending a helping hand while a friendly and 
sister country submerges itself in the gulf of misfortunes 
which threaten it? We do not speak only to your hearts.
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senores. We direct ourselves to your reason, and 
we argue with those who oppose favoring the Cubans.
We know that governments do not decide to act as 
individuals do many times, for the sentiment of com­
passion and the desire to favor the unfortunate are 
not the qualities which establish the policy of 
nations. This very consideration stimulates us to 
ask the Mexican government for the aid that we seek. 
Yes, senores, the interests of the Republic are com­
mitted to tnose of the island of Cuba, for as long as 
the latter is not independent, Mexico's future cannot 
be absolutely assured. Recall. sefiores. where the 
first point of support for the conouistadores was.
Then think about where the basis for the hopes of the 
Spanish government lies today, and do not forget why 
the Fort of Ulua is in the hands of the enemy. Con­
sider also the position of this beautiful island at 
the mouth of the Gulf of Mexico, and that it is in 
contact with one of the more important States of the 
federation. Remember that commercial nations watch 
over the destinies of the modern Tiro, and that the 
London of America, that rich Habana, shall have a 
powerful influence on the future of the states of the 
new continent: that a terrible crisis could place
this island under the control of a race of men that 
for the misfortune of humanity could enter into social 
relations with civilized peoples. The domination of 
these men in the Antilles could influence the des­
tinies of all America in a disadvantageous manner. 
Senores, are not these weighty considerations suf­
ficient to incline you to order an expedition to the 
island? What reflections could possibly oppose the 
irresistible reasons which we have just expounded?
The Liberator Bolivar and the congress of Colombia 
decided with less powerful motives and having less 
chances of success, to order a liberating army to the 
other part of Ecuador to redeem their brothers in Perd 
from the oppressive force of another veteran army that 
was very sure of itself because of its victories and 
the influence these gave it. Nothing can detain the 
tutelar genius of South America: it flies to new
triumphs and crosses rivers, seas, and mountains which 
are inaccessible to less patriotic men: it conquers
seemingly insurmountable obstacles. The credit of a 
nation that has yet to recuperate from its closest mis­
fortunes is pawned. Soldiers, officers, and generals 
whose arms are still tired of fighting, who have not 
recuperated from the fatigues of the past war, whose 
wounds have not yet healed, rush to another soil to 
fight for their brothers * freedom, to redeem them from 
oppression, and to aid them during their times of 
anguish. And what shall we say of the efforts of the
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peoples of Chile and Buenos Aires for -the same objec­
tive? Neither distance, nor the sacred obligation of 
attending to their own defense, nor the shortage of 
resources keeps them from coining to shake hands across 
the Andes with their Colombian brothers in order to 
free the oppressed Peruvians.
In modern Greece, the inhabitants of Morea and 
Peloponeso fight with one hand to defend their soil 
from the barbarians, and with the other hand they send 
aid to the islands of the Archipelago. While fighting 
on the continent, they simultaneously aid the Cretans 
and the Rhodians to shake their oppressors' yoke.—
These are not examples taken from ancient history and 
acts that have come to us disfigured and whose applica­
tion is inexact the greater part of the time. These 
are events which have just occurred and which are still 
happening before our very eyesi they are events which 
are in the nature of society and result from the sympathy 
of principles, equality of opinions, and uniformity of 
sentiments and interests. What reasons can justify the 
apathy and indifference of Mexico with respect to the 
island of Cuba? The former is a warring nation that 
is full of the sentiments of freedom and which has just 
established its independence by having united only its 
valiant sons. It also has greater resources than any 
of the other States, and a burning desire to propagate 
liberal ideas while enjoying an imperturbable peace 
and tranquility. What obstacles can such a nation 
find to prevent it from helping a people that have 
expressed in whatever manner is possible to them a 
desire to be independent— a people that have announced 
everywhere that they are only awaiting some assistance 
in order to build on the ruins of the present government 
another national one which would be in accordance with 
the enlightenments of the century? Spanish despotism 
is already stuffing itself on innumerable victims, for 
the prisons are now filled with patriots. The sons of 
Cubanacan are already dispersed through foreign lands 
fleeing from persecution while families sob silently for 
the absence, banishment, or imprisonment of the son, 
brother, husband, or father.14 Espionage engenders
^Cubanacan, which was the Indian name for the island 
of Cuba, became the name of the island's first proclaimed 
Republic. This Cubanacan Republic was proclaimed sometime in 
the summer, probably in August, of 1823, by a native of 
Habana, Jos4 Francisco Lemus. The "conspiracy” as the Spanish 
Captain General Vives termed it, was short-lived, for Lemus 
was captured and the movement collapsed. Foner, History of 
Cuba. I, 112-14.
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distrust, and terror in all classes of society pro­
ducing confusion, disorder, fears, and anxieties.
This is the state of the people that ask for our pro­
tection and aid— people who shall perhaps be unfor­
tunate for many centuries if you do not run to their 
aid but which could shortly attain an enviable pros­
perity if you decree their salvation.
The destinies of two great countries rests in your 
hands, Fathers of the country. The fate of many gene­
rations of a country that has half a million free men 
depends on you. To enable the deputies and senators 
to talk and vote knowledgably on this important 
question, we enclose the documents that we have been 
able to get relative to it. Among other things, what 
the Attorney General says about the celebrated con­
spiracy of this past year of 1824 is noteworthy. We 
call Congress's attention to the following wordst The 
Attorney General is convinced that those who appear 
here as the conspirators of the association known as 
the Soles y. Ravos (he speaks of juntas by this name 
whose objective it was to promote independence) are 
not alone, for the evil has spread and diffused itself 
all through the Island just as an over-flowing river 
spreads over many fields along its path. This idea is 
borne out by the incidents which have occurred in 
these last days proceeding from Hanaban and the sur­
rounding area. This phrase in the Attorney General's 
opinion in all its context shows that the sons of the 
island of Cuba, instead of being far removed from 
knowing the noble American cause, were straining to 
place themselves on an equal footing with their 
brothers of the continent. There is valor, there is 
patriotism in those inhabitants, but there are also 
obstacles opposing the attainment of the undertaking 
— obstacles of such nature, which when considered well 
almost appear insurmountable. In short, senores, the 
considerable numbers of slaves anxious for the freedom 
of which they are deprived by a misfortune, if you 
wish but inevitable in actuality, serves as a bridle 
to hold back the nacent efforts of the patriots who 
are opposed by the double force represented by an 
established government and this relatively inert mass. 
The state of tranquility which the proprietors enjoy 
under the present system makes the despotism tolerable. 
It is an exchange for not being exposed to the terrible 
convulsions experienced by a neighboring island whose 
history forms an episode corresponding to the revolu­
tion of France, its metropolis. It is the fear, then, 
on the part of the owners of rustic farms of seeing 
themselves ruined by the uprising of their slaves and 
deprived of their means of living added to the con­
sideration on the part of others that a revolution of
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this nature, instead of being advantageous to the 
Creoles and even to the rest of the Americas, could 
on the contrary be very prejudicial, that keeps them 
in a state of uncertainty which will in the end be 
sadder than their very fears. Listen to the reasons.
The Spanish government loses its moral force on 
the island of Cuba more and more each day; consequently 
its physical resources are weakened. This decadence 
of the present government in that country is caused by 
the opposition, corresponding that of Madrid, to the 
progress of civilization and more particularly to the 
inevitable tendency which former Spanish colonies have 
to secure their emancipation. From this point on it 
is just a step to having the present Administration 
lose its vigor and energy and then to establishing a 
balance of power and of influence between it and the 
party in favor of independence. Furthermore, since 
public opinion gives impetus to public affairs, it 
alone is not sufficient to contain the disorders pro­
duced by anarchy. It may come to pass that the Spanish 
government will be reduced to nullity, and when there 
is not another one to take its place after all means 
of power have been weakened and all social ties 
relaxed, a third force which although unorganized 
still has all the elements necessary to an intimate 
union, shall instinctively take possession of public 
power and give a completely different impetus and 
direction to the revolution. Let us not forget the 
events of Santo Domingo which resulted chiefly from 
France's oscillations and the state of nullity in 
which the government of this island found itself. The 
Creoles were not sufficiently strong to superimpose 
themselves on the metropolis, and the metropolis had 
lost its power to contain the slaves. Both became the 
victims of the united force created by those who could 
not choose by system but only by the instinct possessed 
by all men to seek their liberty.
These are the circumstances in which the largest 
island of the Archipelago close to Mexico finds itselft 
these are the risks which threaten Cubanacan. Trade 
between that country and this one, the political rela­
tions that naturally should start with independence, 
the elucidation, the liberty, the culture of our 
fathers— all these are threatened and all are in danger 
if the revolution takes on the horrible aspect which 
we have announced because the Mexican nation did not 
send a force capable of raising the flag of indepen­
dence some place on the island and calling all her sons. 
Then the Cuban patriots who are sighing today and 
waiting for their brothers of the continent on their 
beaches will fly to unite under the wings of the
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invincible Eagle. Spanish pride will then receive 
its last blow and be forced to retreat and concen­
trate on the Peninsula! then all the Americans will 
be able to join in singing about the complete triumph 
of our independence and write hymns to liberty.
Habana could serve as the center for the new amateurs 
of Columbus's continent. From the assemblies meeting 
here shall come decrees that will honor the cause of 
humanity, which is today the cause of all Americans.
The ships of the Republics shall sail freely on our 
seas, and the flags of friendly nations shall be 
respected. There shall be peace, abundance, and pros­
perity. The ships that arrive at the most celebrated 
ports of this powerful nation will cease to fear 
encountering an enemy who with the opprobium of its 
heroism dares to maintain itself before and within 
sight of its shores. The plaque of pirates which 
infest the Mexican Gulf will disappear forever. 
Everything shall change. The names of the Mexican 
heroes will be diffused with those of the liberators 
of the island and stir up memories of gratitude even 
in the most remote generations.
Let your votes join with those of the inhabitants 
of the island of Cuba to move the Mexican Congress to 
take a stand which will place it on a plane with that 
of the liberators of peoples and of that celebrated 
monarch of Sicily who as a reward for his victories 
in defeating one hundred and fifty thousand Cartha­
ginians imposed as a condition for peace that both 
enemies cease offering their first-born sons as 
sacrifices to their gods.
— -Antonio Abad Yznaga, Lorenzo Zabala, Jos6 Antonio 
Mozo, Joaquin Casares y Armas, Manuel Gaul, Jos6 
Antonio de Echavarri, Jos6 Teurbe Tolon, Antonio 
Vald£z.
The South American people looked upon the cause of 
liberty for Cuba with such enthusiasm, that after the cele­
brated Battle of Ayacucho, according to what General Sucre 
wrote me from Chuquisaca on April 27, 1826, the army offered 
itself to the government for the purpose of liberating 
Habana. According to that chief, however, the government 
answered only by giving its thanks. This may have been 
because it lacked the pecuniary means to sustain a new
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campaign or because it may not have been convenient to 
Colombia's interests to enter into a new dispute which might 
prove embarrassing.
The fact is that Bolivar was afraid to give any pub­
licity to such a worthy undertaking which required great
ISpAez inserts this letter as a footnote here.
Chuquisaca, April 27, 1826
My Dear Generalt
After the Battle of Ayacucho I had the pleasure of 
writing you to inform you that the final outcome of the cam­
paign of Perd was victory, and to thank you in the name of 
the conquering army for the efforts that you made in Vene­
zuela to assist us. Even though this aid did not arrive in 
time, it still had merit, for we consider the efficacy with 
which you prepared it and the good intentions you held for 
the glorious success of your comrades in this country who were 
committed to the most noble cause.
I have not received an answer from you, and I do not 
know if it is because my letter did not arrive; because yours 
was lost in the return mail as has happened many times; or 
because you have not written. In any case, I write this to 
greet you again and reiterate my feelings.
Recently, from Ayacucho, our array offered itself to 
the government for the purpose of liberating Habana. Whether 
it was because there was not the pecuniary means to sustain a 
new campaign, or because it is not convenient to Colombia's 
interests to enter in a dispute which might prove embarras­
sing, the government answered only by giving its thanks. Our 
army's morale is excellent as a result of the discipline, 
order, system, and above all, the national and military 
spirit which doubles its strength. It would be capable of 
any undertaking worthy of arms.
I have seen in the newspapers that you, continuing 
your distinguished services to the country, maintain good 
order in Venezuela. I owe and render you my gratitude for 
this great service to this land which is so beloved to me.
Please, my esteemed General, accept the sentiments of 
affection and consideration with which I am your very atten­
tive and obedient servant.
A. de Sucre
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caution and major prudence. It would truly have been gran­
diose and worthy of the American revolution if the conquering 
army from Ayacucho, composed of troops from all the South 
American countries, could have ended its career of triumphs 
after having seized the territory on which Pizarro had 
planted in other times the proud flag of the castles and 
lions, by seizing the most precious of the jewels in the 
Castilian crown. Only those people who have not dealt inti­
mately with the multitude of the sons of Cuba who come in 
the summer months to these States to breathe the vivifying 
atmosphere of democracy, can believe that the Cubans are well 
satisfied and content with Spanish domination and that they 
are satisfied only with the material prosperity made possible 
for them by the agricultural riches from the soil of their 
country which is exhuberant in valuable and precious produc­
tions. In past epochs I have seen wealthy men from that 
island generously offer their treasures for liberating 
expeditions. I have seen and still am seeing youths with 
talent and a good future, who eat the bitter bread of emigra­
tion kneaded with the sweat of their brows, form patriotic 
juntas without freeing themselves from the ridicule with 
which the positivists look upon all those who begin under­
takings which they do not believe can be carried to a 
successful end without the cooperation of those who have 
pecuniary resources at their disposal. None of this is 
sufficient cause for the Cuban patriots to cease working with 
faith and enthusiasm for the liberty of their unfortunate
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country. Similar to the sons of the unhappy Polonius, they 
form associations in foreign countries to echo before the 
liberal world the sighs and laments of their comrades who 
live under the colonial yoke. They say and repeat every 
instant, addressing their country, Mfosti tu men bella o. 
almen piu forte. " ^
There is no doubt that the hour of redemption shall 
come for Cuba, whether it is as a result of the efforts of 
her own sons or due to the aid lent them by any foreign 
nation with which Spain undertakes a prolonged war. Cuba is 
like an Achilles1 heel for Spain, the vulnerable part of its 
body. If the government that reigns in the Peninsula were 
not so jealous of what it calls national pride, and if it 
would sacrifice the interest and glory of seeing their race 
perpetually and solidly established on the American continent 
to this vain sentiment, Spain could leave the Cubans in free 
possession of the land on which they were born. Limited to 
her geographical boundaries, Spain could then reconquer the 
Strait by occupying Gibraltar and the opposite coasts of 
Africa. Spain then, in truth, would not possess dominions 
on which the sun never sets, but in its stead it could set 
the law down to all the nations whose ships plow the valuable 
arm of the sea which bathes the coasts of three continents 
of the ancient world.
As for the Cubans, in the midst of their present
^®*'If only you were less beautiful or at least 
stronger."
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misfortunes, let them seek consolation from the future lot 
which shall befall them as a free and independent nation. 
Tutored by the inconveniences and evils with which the people 
of the same race that preceded them in the conquest of inde­
pendence have had to struggle, they can avoid making the 
same mistakes committed by those who today are atoning pain­
fully. Let the Cubans try to keep the last day of Spanish 
domination from becoming the first of a reign of anarchy and 
internal dissensions. Let them keep the first mistakes we 
made after attaining our independence before them so that 
they do not forget to avoid them. Let them remember the 
faults we committed, the excesses and defects of our failures, 
and thus they will be able to implant the basis of their 
future well-being along with their declaration of inde­
pendence .
The inhabitants of Cuba shall have in common with us 
the evils that follow the Spanish colonial system. In order 
that they do not imitate us in those evils which we ourselves 
created, do not let them be blinded by theories which promise 
more than they cam give. Do not let them ever adhere to the 
political composition which kills, but rather adhere to the 
political spirit which vivifies. Let them remember that the 
social body is similar to the humamt sometimes its afflic­
tions are healed by a simple topical application applied in 
time while at other times it is necessary to cure the evil 
with hot irons so that the venomous virus cam not be innocu- 
lated into the canals of vitality. And do not ever let them
559
forget that a people cannot be free as long as they maintain 
slaves in their midst.
l^PAez inserts this footnote. "This opinion is not 
new to me. Besides being an axiomatic truth, I put it into 
practice when 1 commanded in Apure as chief in 1816. Many 
of the slaves became valiant officers later who distinguished 
themselves in the army.— Later I tried to extirpate slavery 
in Venezuela. The proprietors opposed me in 1826, in 1830, 
and in 1847. With one pretext or another they never accepted 
an act of justice which would benefit all.
See the following notes I wrote for a delegation to 
the Congress of 1848.
If Venezuela's birth as a nation demanded to be marked 
with an act of kindness, another act of justice would have 
been no less noteworthy. When the entire Republic breathes 
freedom, when it has proclaimed the rights of men, and when 
it has declared that no man can be the property of another, 
to permit slavery is to contradict oneself in one's own 
principles and to conflict with one’s own acts and undermine 
one of the principle basis upon which the social edifice 
should be built. With these foundations, Congress should 
solicit a small loan of money outside the country to redeem 
the slaves and indemnify their owners as is provided for in 
the Constitution in Article 208. The law which Congress 
could dictate on this important event could no doubt be 
received in Venezuela as well as in foreign countries watch­
ing us, as the wisest and the most philanthropic. This would 
be because it would give the Republic an infinity of citizens 
which now do not belong to society but instead are the prop­
erty of a few.--Man as a free being cannot be the property of 
another. No obstacles should be placed in the way of the 
innocent exercise of his faculties nor should he be deprived 
of the great prerogative of his freedom. Slavery in Vene­
zuela should be excluded from the midst of properties. I 
have the good fortune of being one of the liberators of my 
country, and 1 would descend to the sepulchre painfully if I 
were not inclined to cooperate with seeing to it that justice 
is well distributed. But in order that we cam see how we can 
exercise this justice without harming the interests which 
represent the future of the families supporting themselves 
on the work of slaves, let us compare two equal capital sums, 
one invested in slaves and the other placed on interest rates.
$15,000. Capital placed at an interest rate of 12% 
annually, which is the rate generally paid in this country, 
would give a profit of . . . $1,800.
$15,000. Capital invested in slaves, according to the 
following manifestations, would only produce . . . $1,400
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Fortunately for Cuba she has neither impenetrable 
jungles nor territories which cover vast horizons. Therefore.
Difference against the capital invested in slaves 
. . .  $400 .
MANIFESTATIONS 
With the capital mentioned, fifty slaves would be 
bought at $300.
These slaves, according to the customs already estab­
lished in this country, would only work two hundred days in 
the year, for out of the 364 says. 164 must be subtracted in
the following manneri
For Saturdays and Sundays..........104
For feast days.................  20
For sicknesses, escapes, et
cetera............................. 40
164
The two hundred days of work at two reales libres 
daily would be $2,500.
Ordinary expenses such as clothing, medicines, medical 
aid, et cetera, should be deducted at the rate of $10.00 
each . . . $500.
The value of two slaves which, according to all prob­
abilities would die yearly or become useless, must also be
deducted if only at 4 %............. 600 SI. 100
$1,400
This manifestations shows that the money invested in 
slave proportions a notable loss when compared to that placed 
at common interest rates. If we remember also that one 
capital is perishable and the other perpetual. the great 
void that still remains in this comparison will be seen.
The $10.00 of yearly expenses calculated to each
slave is figured as followsi
A small cloak for women.........................  $1.00
Twelve yards of hair cue at two reales......... 3.00
A hat...............................................  4.00
Medical aid at the rate of $150 a year for 
one doctor amounts to this rate per
slave............................................ 3.00
Food, nurse, et cetera...........................  5.00
$10.00
The presupposed dress differs much from that provided
by law.
There are about twenty thousand slaves in Venezuela 
which at two hundred dollars (medium terms) would represent 
$4,000,000. What incalculable advantages the circulation of 
such a quantity of money would bring to the country1
Keep in mind also that the proprietors can lose the 
greater part of the capital employed in slaves in an epidemic, 
and that that loss cannot be repaired easily, not only in
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it would not be possible for rebel parties to find shelter—  
parties which to the tune of patriotism live off sacking the 
towns. Neither shall they have space for their cavalry 
forays which are organized by caudillos who reveal, in all 
its horror, the European who has regressed to a barbaric 
state in the pampas of the Southern hemisphere. Those topog­
raphical accidents which 1 consider as the best means of 
defense in my country against a foreign nation, would present 
to an emancipated Cuba the same evils we have had to fight 
since we expelled our foreign oppressors. Due to her geo­
graphic position, Cuba will be safe from any aggression from 
an outside enemy if she dedicates a great part of her trea­
sury to defending her coast and establishing a fleet that 
someday would be worthy of the honorary title of Tiro del 
Nuevo Mundo.
1 pray that I do not die before witnessing the repeti­
tion on the fields of Cuba of the scenes I had the glory of
terms of hands for work, but in terms of credit in the market 
where the landowner buys the goods urgently needed on his 
properties.
The political events of [18]48 did not permit me to 
present the ideas 1 have outlined in these notes before Con­
gress . "
The figures P&ez gives in this account do not check 
out correctly. This may be due to some type of printing or 
typographical error.
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seeing on the plains of my c o u n t r y . I  know that in one of 
the departments of the island there are inhabitants who need 
only to exchange the javelin of the cow-boy for the lance of 
the soldier in order to attain the fame of the Venezuelan 
llanero.
l®The author footnotes this as follows. "Humboldt in 
his Voyages to the Equinoctial Regions states that in 1800 
in Turmero there was a reunion of the nation's militia. Only 
its appearance announced that the peace in those valleys had 
not been interrupted for centuries. The Captain General, 
hoping to give a new impetus to the military spirit, had 
ordered extensive exercises. The Turmero Battalion in a 
simulated battle had fired upon that of La Victoria. Our 
host, a Lieutenant in the local militia, did not tire of 
describing the danger of this action to us. '1 have seen my­
self. ' he told me. 'surrounded by rifles that could explode 
at any moments they have kept me in the sun for four hours 
without even permitting my slaves to hold an umbrella over my 
head.4 How rapidly even the most peaceful peoples take to 
the customs of Warl I smiled then at a timidity that was 
manifested with such candor. Twelve years later those very 
valleys of Aragua. those same quiet plains of La Victoria and 
Turmero. the narrow passage of La Cabrera and the fertile 
shores of the lake of Valencia, came to be the scene of the 
most bloody and cruel combat between the natives and the 
soldiers of the metropolis." This quotation may be found in 
Humboldt. Viaie a las Reqiones Eauinoxiales del Nuevo 
Contlnente. Ill, 84.
CHAPTER XXI
Royalist Conspiracies— Coronado and the Castillos 
— Conspiracy in Barinas— Mutiny in Angostura—
Persuit and Extermination of the Rebel Parties.
1827-1828
The historian[s] Baralt [and Diaz], after relating the 
end of the affairs which had been agitating other sections of 
Colombia, state in speaking about Venezuelai "When the agita­
tions and restlessness were calmed on one front (Ecuador), 
such commotions, open violence, and wars broke out on other 
fronts, that it seemed as if the disturbing elements had met 
and agreed at the same time but with diverse means, to 
lacerate the country purposely in order to distribute the 
pieces among themselves.'*1 In effect, the Royalist conspira­
tors did plot. They were animated by proclamations and 
excited by many partisans of the king who had remained in the 
country, appearing to submit themselves to the new order of 
things. I believed it opportune to take precautionary mea­
sures. At the same time that I seized persons involved in 
the plot, such as friars Ravelo and Garcia, I sent my forces 
against several separate parties that had rebelled at
^ h i s  quotation may be found in Baralt and Diaz, 
Resdmen de la Historia, II, 351.
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different points. Offering a pardon to the guilty by means 
of a proclamation, I succeeded in getting more than four 
hundred individuals to lay down their arms. Perhaps misinter­
preting the leniency with which I had treated the rebels in 
CumanA, Pedro Coronado, who had been given a prison sentence 
because of his incendiary writings, placed himself at the 
head of one hundred and fifty men to resist the authorities 
who had pronounced sentence against him. 1 sent his brother 
Bonifacio and Colonel Ramdn Burgos to deal with him and make
him understand the grave consequences which would follow his
( o
rash actions. Thus 1 was able to get Coronado to abandon 
his projects and present himself to me.
On October 24 of this year I was writing the Liberatort 
"The country marches along the path that His Excellency the 
Liberator tracedi towns have gotten used to the execution 
of your decrees, order reigns everywhere. I have some basis 
on which to found my hopes that the situation will remain 
unchanged until the sought-after and happy time arrives when
2No additional information is available on Bonifacio 
or Pedro Coronado.
Ramdn Burgos was born in Guanare. He was a law 
student when the revolution broke out in 1810. He left his 
studies to enlist as a soldier in Caracas. By 1813, after 
fighting at the Battles of Barbula, Puerto Cabello, and 
Araure, he had attained the rank of Lieutenant. In 1814 he 
was at San Carlos and emigrated from there as a Captain. He 
went on to fight at Apurito, Barinas, and Carabobo and rose 
to the rank of Colonel in 1827. Burgos served as Commandant 
of Arms at MArida, CumanA, and Barinas. He retired from 
military service in 1831. DAvila, Diccionario BioarAfico.
I, 54-55.
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the Great Convention dictates the reforms."3
A conspiracy was uncovered in Barinas on October 19 
in which the partisans of the Spaniards were involved. Among 
them were many individuals of color who planned to promote 
disturbances to steal and sack the national coffers and be­
head some citizens. The Governor Commandant of Arms. Jos4 
Ignacio Pulido, declared the province under martial law and 
started investigations to punish the guilty.^ This con­
spiracy was suffocated in its origin, which dealt a good 
blow to the deluded Royalists who proposed to sustain the 
Spanish flag in a district of Coro, commanded by militia 
Captain candelario Olivares.5 The citizens of the Coro 
District, who during other times had shown themselves so 
favorably inclined to the Royalist cause, in this instance 
rendered the country the service of exterminating the rebels
3A copy of this letter does not appear either in the 
Coleccidn de Documentos or Blanco and Azpurda (eds.),
Documentos Para la Historia.
^General Jose Ignacio Pulido was born in 1795 in Bravos. 
He joined the patriot army in 1814 and took part in the siege 
of Carabobo in 1815. Then he emigrated to Los Cayos. From 
1818 to 1820 he fought unceasingly against the Royalists at 
Calabozo, La Puerta, Sombrero, Gamarra, and Cticuta. He 
served with distinction from 1822 to 1626 as Commandant of 
Arms in the Orinoco Department, rapidly extinguishing the 
conspiracy of 1827. Pulido died in Barinas on January 28,
1868. Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario BioarAfico. 489-90.
5Restrepo mentions Olivares and states that he pro­
claimed in favor of the King in the canton of San Luis. 
Revolucidn de la Repflblica de Colombia, IV, 70.
566
who pretended to revive the already-extinguished spirit of 
adhesion to the old metropolis.
The Liberator had commissioned Colonel Jos6 Fdlix 
Blanco, who later became a general,** to be intendant of the 
province of Guayana. He was to set ceiling prices to end the 
scandalous contraband there, and to execute some of the 
Liberator's decrees relative to the prohibition of the 
exportation of mules, to sales taxes, to patents, and to 
maritime customs. To execute any order in which a man of 
character and tenacity is needed, there was no one better 
suited than Colonel Blanco. Thus when he arrived in Angos­
tura he proposed to act in keeping with the confidence that 
the Liberator had placed in him. Blanco's inflexible con­
duct was in great contrast to the weakness shown by General 
jos6 Manuel Olivares, Governor of the province. Therefore,
6The author interjects this footnote. "I transcribe 
here with pleasure what El. Federalista of Caracas said about 
this veteran of the independence wars on April 19, 1866. 
'Blanco, the almost secular soul who received the revolution 
of 1810, was already full of the echoes of the tempest of 
1789. Strong, honest, a patriot of all epochs; as credulous 
in liberty and in the happy future of America at eighty as 
he would have been with the ardors of his youth.'
"General Blanco, after his great services to the 
country that gave him birth, has had the patriotic idea of 
publishing a reformed edition of Documentos de la Vida 
Pdblica del Libertador. Let God grant that this undertaking, 
started in other times by eminent men who were interested in 
spreading knowledge concerning the history of Colombia to 
the world, be finished now."
The correct title of the work by Blanco is Documentos 
P ara la Historia de la Vida Pflblica del Libertador de 
Colombia, Parti y  Bolivia.
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it is not strange that the inhabitants became displeased 
very quickly with the newly-arrived intendant, whose mission 
it was to end the illicit markets.
On the night of October 28 a group of men leveled the 
Intendant1 a house, asking for his and the Governor's removal, 
for it was the latter1s duty to maintain the Liberator1s 
Commissioner in office. A great part of the population 
mutinied, and in an act drafted in assembly the following 
day, they removed colonel Blanco from his post. They accused 
him of having committed repeated acts of despotism and 
revealing himself to be General Santander's enemy, who then 
exercised the executive power. They were no less severe on 
the political Governor of the province, General Olivares, 
for they also removed him from command. The Intendant pre­
sented himself before the revolutionary authorities. He was 
first sent to prison and later sent to the capital by way of 
Apure and Barinas. Fortunately, this mutiny only had the 
character of a personal animosity against the person of 
Intendant Blanco. Consequently, when General Jos6 Laurencio 
Silva was appointed Governor of the province, everything 
became calm again.
With Coronado removed from the rebellion he had 
stirred up, his comrades the Castillos continued to abuse 
the conciliatory measures I had adopted to avoid the shedding
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of blood.7 They remained armed and attacked the troops that 
Generals Mar iff o, Bermddez, and Monagas commanded. They re­
sisted them for six months and committed all sorts of 
excesses. Not even because of this was less clemency shown 
the rebels. As a result some reported to be pardoned, but 
it still did not conquer the rebels1 obstinacy. However, 
Commandant Juan de Dios Manzaneque and his forces defeated 
the rebel elements on February 8 , 1828, and took possession 
of all the means they had used to maintain themselves until 
then on the mountain ridge.
The rebel leaders, Francisco Villareal and Jos£ del 
Rosario Farias, and their comrades resorted to the govern­
ment's clemency. It promised them complete obliteration of 
the past if they retired to the life of peaceful citizens.
In another chapter I shall deal with the other 
Royalist parties that circulated during these very times in 
the territories and spread consternation among the peaceful 
inhabitants.
7The Castillo brothers were Isidoro, Luis, and Rosario. 
Restrepo states that they had a party of seventy armed men. 
Revolucidn de la Republica de Colombia. IV, 70-71.
CHAPTER XXII
Persecution of Several Royalist Parties— Arrival 
of Spanish Lieutenant Colonel [jos£ Antonio]
Ariz&balo to Head Them— His Pursuit by the Troops 
Under My Command— ArizAbalo's capitulation—  
Instructions Which General La Torre had Given Him.
1827-28-29
The parties of bandits under the Royalist banner that 
scoured the Venezuelan territory, committing all sorts of 
excesses, kept the troops of the Republic in continuous move­
ment. It was impossible to exterminate these hordes, for 
they took refuge in the mountains and inaccessible places, 
and there challenged the numerically superior forces sent 
against them. The citizens in the rural towns, afraid of 
the damages these bandits could and did inflict on their 
farms, not only failed to help the government persecute them, 
but instead served as their spies and kept them informed of 
the measures taken which were designed to surprise them in 
their dens.
Don Jos6 Domingo Diaz, from Puerto Rico, exaggerated 
all these acts to the King of Spain in an effort to prove to 
him how easy it would be to reconquer the countries of the 
mainland if an expeditionary army or at least some officers 
were sent out to lead the parties that still defended the 
rights of His Catholic Majesty in the American territory.
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Spain was not without those who would undertake the enter­
prise of fomenting a movement in Colombia in favor of the 
King. It was with such an objective that Lieutenant Colonel 
Jos« ArizAbalo disembarked in La Guaira.^ He was a native 
of Vizcaya, but had been taken to Caracas at the age of 
seveni so his family and interests were in that city. The 
revolution had barely started against the metropolis, when 
ArizAbalo joined the Royalist ranks. He rose to the rank of 
Lieutenant Colonel in the infantry and Commandant of artil­
lery. and he was commanding the fort at Barra de Maracaibo 
when he had to abandon the country as a result of Morales1
josA Antonio ArizAbalo had been a Lieutenant Colonel 
in the Spanish army and had fought admirably in the Royalist 
army in Venezuela until 1823 when he was forced to yield his 
command of La Barra Castle in Maracaibo by Morales's capitu­
lation to the revolutionaries. He was well known for his 
devotion to the Spanish monarch and his adversion to the 
revolution. Despite this, since ArizAbalo's family lived in 
Caracas, for he had come to Venezuela when he was seven years 
old, he was permitted reentry into Venezuela in 1826. When 
Bolivar found out in 1827 how vast ArizAbalo's knowledge of 
artillery was, he offered him the rank of Colonel in the 
patriot army and complete command of artillery in the Caracas 
province. ArizAbalo asked for six months to consider the 
proposition. Bolivar, confident that he could be won over to 
the patriot cause, gave him free conduct and passage in 
Venezuela. ArizAbalo used these to help foment and cement a 
general Royalist conspiracy in Venezuela. He even secured 
the approval and a promise of assistance from the Captain 
General of Puerto Rico to reestablish Spanish control on the 
mainland. In September of 1828 he started an implacable war 
against the patriots which lasted until June of 1829. When 
ArizAbalo finally surrendered to PAez, he had only one hun­
dred and eighty-three men left. He had to return to Spain, 
but even on this trip back to his homeland he refused to 
acknowledge the rebel flag that flew over the ship on which 
he was sailing. Torrente, Historia de la Revolucidn. Ill, 
566-602.
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capitulation. He promised not to take arms again against 
the Republic of Colombia. In January of 1827 he presented 
himself to Bolivar in Caracas. The latter, aware of 
ArizAbalo's profound knowledge in the field of artillery, 
offered him the rank of Colonel and command of the artillery 
in the entire province of Caracas. "He listened with plea­
sure, " said Torrente, "to the propositions which offered him 
the opportunity of cementing his noble plans without obstacle; 
and answering these with simulated urbanity, he asked for six 
months in which to make up his mind, certain that said time 
would be sufficient to give the cry of death against the dis­
loyal Venezuelans."^
Such a generous reception and such indiscreet proofs 
of confidence in his feigned good faith facilitated the 
Royalist penetration into the territory. It also enabled 
ArizAbalo to establish relations with the guerrillas Centeno, 
Ooroteo, Inocencio [Rodriguez], and Cisneros, who commanded 
the parties I have already mentioned.3 All of them, except 
the latter, revealed themselves ready to recognize him as 
chief. Then ArizAbalo sent emissaries to General La Torre, 
who commanded in Puerto Rico, asking him to grant him in His 
Majesty's name, the appointment as chief of the Royalist
2lbld.. 568.
3Inocencio Rodriguez was an Indian who had served as 
a Captain in the Queen's Battalion since 1814. He was named 
second in command of the Lealtad Battalion. Ibid., 572.
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forces operating on the mainland. He also asked for aid in 
arms, and asserted that he would quickly assemble a respect­
able army. La Torre sent him the title he requested, 
including a sheet of instructions which will be seen at the 
end of this chapter. To encourage him further. La Torre 
promised that on October 27 of that same year Spanish ships 
carrying the assistance he demanded would arrive at the Vene­
zuelan coasts. ArizAbalo immediately went to be acknowledged 
as chief of the previously-cited guerrillas. All submitted 
themselves to him except JosA Dionisio Cisneros who. accus­
tomed to working advantageously on his own recognizance and 
at his own risk, showed himself very jealous of the authority 
he exercised over his subordinates.
Centeno, who was chief of the parties that existed in 
Los Guires. placed nine hundred men under ArizAbalo's orders. 
With the assistance of Captain Tazon 1 a two nephews who 
assembled the discontent people from the Camatagua neighbor­
hoods. he very quickly added another four hundred men to that 
number. "Even the married men," says the infamous Torrente 
impudently, "abandoned their wives and sons, and the old for­
got the torpidness of their limbs to participate in the glory 
of being the defendors of Altar and Throne. 114 With false­
hoods such as these, the King of Spain was deceived into 
thinking that America had been lost against the will of 
America itself 1
4Ibid.. 571.
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To arm all these people well, ArizAbalo demanded that, 
the Governor of Puerto Rico hasten sending the ships which 
he had promised. He advised him to disembark the troops at 
Rio Chico, where it would be easy for him to go and get them.
The first encounters between our forces and those 
parties of bandits were of little importance. In Punteral 
on September 7 they surprised forty-five patriots and impris­
oned them. Torrente states: "This first encounter sustained
by ArizAbalo had the good result which was the best portent 
of the happy ending awaiting an undertaking which could not 
but be protected by the God of the armies, from Whom the 
purity of the intentions of those pledged in it was not
* C
h i d d e n . i t  is noteworthy to copy Torrente*s words to bring 
them to the attention of those who have not read the work of 
this venal writer. He calls the system of the Spanish con­
stitution ominous, and defends the rights of that monarch 
who is so detested in Spain itself. He did not hesitate to 
slander the most eminent American patriots to win the approval 
of that despot who trampled underneath his feet the sacred 
rights of the generous Spanish public that had given him so 
many proofs of love and loyalty.
When all the parties were finally assembled, ArizAbalo 
dedicated himself to organizing them and naming Juan 
Celestino Centeno, Inocencio Rodriguez, and Doroteo Herrera 
as their leaders. Then he selected six hundred men to go to
5Ibid.. 572.
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the Tamanaco Mountains to till the soil and gather resources 
for the parties of men that he had left along different 
routes to fight the so-called insurgents.
In the town of Lezama, where he routed the small force 
of one hundred and seventy men that guarded it, Ariz&balo pro­
claimed the King's government and had the Spanish flag 
blessed— a flag which he thought would wave over the other 
towns they planned to overrun. However, two days later he 
was forced to evacuate Lezama when he found out about the 
troops we had sent against him. He then went to Maicarita 
and from there dispatched parties in different directions.
He himself stayed at the head of the three hundred and sixty 
men with which he surprised Colonel Ldpez1s column while the 
latter was going through a narrow passage.
With the intent of going to Rio Chico, where the 
Spanish ships loaded with supplies sent from Puerto Rico 
were to arrive, Ariz&balo interned himself in the very dense 
Tamanaco Mountains. There he discovered that Centeno had 
been defeated in Macairita. Joining Inocencio Rodriguez and 
later Doroteo Herrera, he determined to make even greater 
efforts until the ships arrived with the promised assistance. 
Despite his persevering efforts, he was not able to get 
Cisneros to join forces with him. That barbarian even 
refused to give the wounded the aid they asked for, alleging 
"that he beheaded his soldiers who had the misfortune of 
finding themselves in a similar situation so that they would 
not reveal their hiding places if they fell into the
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enemies' hands."
Finally, I shall conclude by saying that: ArizAbalo, 
pursued and accosted on all parts, and knowing that General 
Laborde had left the Rio Chico waters with his ships, saw 
himself forced to capitulate in the Tamanaco Mountains, 
following the example of his Lieutenants Centeno and Doroteo 
Herrera. He was encouraged in this decision because nothing 
indicated to him that the Royalists had won any triumphs in 
the interior of the territory, and because perhaps now he 
believed that those parties who called themselves Royalists 
were only bands of robbers.
INSTRUCTIONS
For His Majesty1 a Chief of Arms in Venezuela, regarding 
the organization. discipline. and conduct that the 
corps that are created should observe themselves and 
with the towns they occupy and return to the true 
government.
Organize all the parties possible, and those which 
exist already, giving them the denominations of bat- 
talions when they exceed four hundred men and squadrons 
when they exceed two hundred men. Their commandants 
shall be proven members of the infantry and cavalry.
With the companies divided, captains, subaltern officers, 
and other ranks shall be named. These shall be given 
the proper commission titles.
You shall call the officers of the King that there 
might be in the country so that they will organize 
districts and place themselves in them or other mili­
tary jobs.
As soon as possible you will organize the corps under 
the method prescribed by Royal ordinances.
You shall inspire the chiefs with the due order, 
discipline, and subordination, telling them that their 
services shall be advantageously rewarded.
Any chief or officer that comes over with enemy
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troops and armaments shall be kept in his rank and 
his services used without prejudicing other rewards, 
depending on the merit and importance of his union 
with the Loyalist ranks.
As long as the army you organize is divided into 
battalions and squadrons, it will be very advantageous 
when in service. It shall be easier to manage and 
much more useful in military undertakings.
You must impress on your men that just as the 
soldier must be terrible against his enemy in war, if 
the latter surrenders, generosity must shine in him 
as the proper attribute of courage.
The soldiers must be humane with the towns and 
attract its citizens by gentleness and good treatment. 
They should treat them as brothers and not censure 
them nor mention their previous conduct. In this 
manner they will win gratitude for their services 
and admiration for their skills and fidelity.
The Chief of Arms or the Commandant who operates 
the retailing of provisions and supplies shall try by 
means of proclamations to show the towns that are 
occupied, that the objective of his troops is to 
unite the territory of His Majesty's soft and paternal 
government, to destroy the revolutionary anarchy of 
the Republic, to protect the citizens' life and prop­
erties, to thrust out the tyrants and reestablish 
that happy state the inhabitants enjoyed in 1609, and 
to return the enjoyment of the calm, both in property 
and justice, which has been wrested from them by the 
stupid, the infamous, the ignorant, and the traitors.
They shall make apparent to them that His Majesty 
has pardoned all the past deviations up to this point, 
and that no accusation made out of vengeance shall be 
accepted. Each individual will also be able to keep 
and enjoy the goods he has secured legitimately. 
Resentment will have no place. Finally each word 
given by the Chief of Arms on every one of these 
points shall be infallible in its fulfillment.
All acts of treason committed after the entrance 
of the Royalist troops will be punished immediately 
and militarily, maintaining the ordinance rules in so 
far as circumstances permit.
Try to annoy the towns as little as possible, keep­
ing an account and reason of what they supply with the 
proper explanations and formality.
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In all towns in which His Majesty's arms enter, 
the corresponding authorities will be reestablished 
on the same footing on which they were found in 1809. 
Try to give these appointments to persons of most 
notable wisdom and conduct. All public offices and 
the Lieutenants Lord Chief Justice will be established 
for now in conjunction with the military command 
because it will be more convenient in this interim 
period when we are proceeding toward pacification.
In this manner the Royal service will be faster.
The civilian employees will be provisionally estab­
lished in the same manner. In case these officers 
are presented to property owners, the time they ful­
fill these will be especially meritorious for them.
The Royal Treasury shall be placed in clean, 
economical, and trustworthy hands, for this branch 
holds the key for the opportune and quick recovery of 
debts and has the ability to cover the public's needs 
without tasking the neighborhood.
An urban militia and its officers shall be organ­
ized in all the towns to maintain good order and 
police the internal security. These shall be kept 
armed and disciplined.
The following should serve as the basis for pacifi­
cation! 1, to manifest that His Majesty's arms know 
no parties, resentments, offenses, or vengeances, with 
its objective being the true pacification of the 
country; 2 , to guarantee the peace of the territory 
and the security of all the citizens and the property 
each one has legally acquired; 3, to show that, just 
as no value will be placed on what transpired during 
the unfortunate times of the revolution in which the 
provinces have been, they will severely and quickly 
punish new crimes of this type which may be perpe­
trated and to which ingrates may deliver themselves;
4, to grant an armistice under these principles which 
will be fulfilled with the greatest religious punc­
tiliousness; 5, to provide jobs and duties to the 
persons who maintain the good will of the towns because 
of their moderation, knowledge, wisdom, and uncensur- 
able conduct; 6 , to place everything in the order in 
which it was in 1809; 7, to maintain through the sup­
porting hand of the press the publication of past 
misfortunes and differences during the time of the 
revolution and that which has succeeded it, and the 
state of ruin to which the rebels have driven the 
provinces, forcing agriculture, commerce, and industry 
to disappear, and burdening the towns with enormous 
taxes and chains worse than those used by the sultans
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to make their slaves suffer. Show that from the 
prosperous state enjoyed by all the continent in 
that period, they have hurriedly reduced it to 
nothingness by destroying their capitals, scaring 
away their citizens, and placing them in the lament­
able situation in which they now find themselves.
Duly impress the multitude with the number of domine­
ering persons that have been created and their 
insulting ostentation and insufferable pride while the 
people groan in misery; that the happiness they pro­
claimed had only their own sordid interest as an 
objective and to these they have sacrificed many 
victims and destroyed great quantities of riches.
Remind the people that this sad state of affairs 
should be compared with what they had before the revo­
lution. Present them with cases, events, and the 
settlement that would be made in the taxes, removing 
the onerous contributions, poll tax, and other unknown 
charges with which they attempted to cover their 
thefts, wastes, and foreign debts. Finally, combat the 
enemy victoriously with the help of the press and dis­
cover where public opinion should be augmented, for it 
is because of it that the present evils exist which 
have promoted the ignorance with which they have com­
manded, the barbaric procedures, the scandalous attempts, 
the unjust treason, and the horror which the memory of 
the revolutionary government must evoke.
The ecclesiastic state must be respected, and the 
just considerations corresponding its individuals must 
be maintained. They shall have great weight in forming 
public opinion because of the advice given privately, 
publicly, and from the pulpit.
With the parties organized under these principles 
and conducting themselves accordingly, the happiest 
success of the undertakings can be assured. The 
desired pacification will be achieved, and for these 
services, whether they are verified separately or 
collectively, these parties shall be rewarded in every 
case as soldiers. Their leaders shall also be rewarded 
in keeping with the political policy they manifest in 
favor of good order and in the manner in which they 
preserve it.
The Commandant General shall give the Captaincy 
General of all the operations an account for now. He 
will communicate the details, will make known the 
services of his subordinates and those of the organiza­
tion he established. This instruction shall serve him 
provisionally until he gets the Royal approval, which
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will be given him to observe by using the powers 
which His Majesty has invested in this government. 
Puerto Rico, June 30, 1827.
------ Miguel de la Torre.
CHAPTER XXIII
State of Colombia When the Ocana Convention was 
Convoked— The Military Party— General Padilla-- 
Installation of the Convention— My Communique to 
the Representatives from the Town of Ocana--My 
Opinion with Regard to the First Tasks of the 
Convention— Dissolution of the Convention—  
Bolivar Dictator— I Recognize the Liberator as 
Supreme Chief— Proclamations— Conspiracy of 
September 25— My Letter to the Liberator— My 
Measures in Venezuela.
1828
The towns anxiously awaited the reforms needed by the 
Constitution which had reigned until then. In reality they 
could not truly expect anything flattering or favorable in 
view of the hostility of the parties into which the Republic 
was divided and in view of the passions which dominated many 
of the men that had placed themselves at the head of the so- 
called liberal group. The military hoped to see the services 
they had rendered their country rewarded with interest. They 
also wanted their rights and exemptions preserved and to 
have the State pay them their claims. To achieve these 
objectives they wanted a strong government established and 
headed by an individual belonging to their class. The 
demagogues that admired the events of the French Revolution 
of '96 and proposed the federal constitution of the United 
States of North America as a model, preached to the towns in
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the pompous names of liberty and national sovereignty, 
theories that could not be realized in a nation still in its 
infancy and very ill disposed by customs and education toward 
a form of government created for well-educated people that 
held these theories traditionally. Finally, the men who were 
deeply aware of the country's needs and who feared the evils 
which had already been glimpsed, favored the establishment 
of a government founded on a solid basis. To give them 
unity, they wanted the Liberator who represented good in the 
country, to place himself at the head of the Republic until 
the government was consolidated and the country free of all 
fear of foreign invasion and of the disturbances promoted by 
internal factions. Then it would be possible to proceed to 
try to give the nation institutions suitable to its nature, 
to its customs, to its antecedents, and to its true needs, 
and which above all, would guarantee its future.
The Liberator was displeased at seeing Colombia 
divided into factions which seemed to await only an oppor­
tune moment to destroy her. Having already lost by virtue 
of long experience the illusions of his volcanic genius and 
the poetic imagination which had been formed during the early 
years of the revolution, he needed to rest. He was already 
exhausted by the fatigues and anxieties suffered in the 
marches and in the battlefields; consequently, he witnessed 
the agitation of the parties and had no faith whatever in 
the movement that was going to begin. He had become con­
vinced that "those who worked for independence had plowed the
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seas," and called the country "an immense desert peopled by
beasts desirous of devouring each o t h e r , H e  also said that
"a very difficult thing had been attempted in Colombia, which 
was to conquer the country with a very liberal constitution 
and to make free, wise, and prudent men out of slaves, for­
getting that we had learned much wretchedness from our 
owners the Spaniards and from our comrades the slaves. " 2
Thus Bolivar awaited the promised reforms with a painful
skepticism. It was only out of love for the fatherland and 
a sentiment of duty, or as he himself said, in order not to 
desert himself, that he was still on the political scene.
^This quotation is taken from a letter Bolivar wrote 
General Juan Josd Flores on November 9, 1830. Lecuna (ed.). 
Cartas del Libertador. IX, 376.
2P&ez inserts part of the following letter the 
Liberator wrote to him. "I am in the South now very busy 
fighting the enemies of Perd. who are very strong and most 
capable of overrunning everything. We have sent six thousand 
more men from the other American States here. Even with this 
force it is still more difficult to conquer the enemy due to 
the many difficulties presented by Perd in waging war. The 
government and people of Lima call me to go command them. I 
know there is much difficulty (here the manuscript is not 
legible), but I will go if Congress permits me in order to 
keep Colombia from entering a new war in this instance. 
Generals Valdes and Sucre are commanding our troops. The 
other Allied Generals are very good leaders, but they do not 
understand each other because of rivalries, jealousies, and 
other miseries we have learned from the Spaniards and our 
comrades the slaves. The kings and generals of Europe under­
stand each other perfectly because they have been born free 
while we, although being equal in everything, cannot recon­
cile ourselves with each other.
Letter from the Liberator, dated in Guayaquil, May 29,
1823."
A copy of this letter may be found in ibid.. Ill,
195-96.
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For my part, I did not want to belong to any politi­
cal party other than the peoples1, nor to defend any cause 
other than the one they adopted. Peace and domestic tran­
quility are the most invaluable benefits of society, and I 
proposed to maintain both unless the irresistible force of 
events and the need of defending the country's well being 
and honor demanded that I alter my course. Not trusting my 
own judgment and afraid of making a mistake in the difficult 
position in which I had been placed by a generous fortune 
and by the vote of the people and the will of the Liberator,
1 gathered around me the most able counselors available. I 
selected them from among the men who because of their 
patriotism, love of order, talents, and virtues seemed to me 
then, and justly so, to be the most intelligent and honest 
representatives of the people.
On March 13, by means of a decree, the Liberator, 
aware of the dangers threatening peace and order in Colombia, 
reinvested himself with the supreme power of the Republic in 
all its departments, excepting the district of Ocana where 
the Great Convention was to be held. When the election of 
the deputies for that assembly began, the Santander party 
unfurled its greatest activity to get individuals known for 
their animosity against Bolivar and a Unitarian elected. 
Venezuelan communities filed acts asking that Bolivar remain 
in command and that the Convention be given no further powers 
than to deal with matters of local interest and of little 
importance. Meanwhile, the deputies who had arrived at
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Ocafia began to qualify the elections. They refused to admit 
Dr. Miguel Pefia under the pretext that the case against him 
for the misapplication of public funds was still pending.
The municipal council of Valencia protested against this 
insult proffered its deputy, and while doing this directed 
incriminations against Santander, accusing him of the same 
guilt with which Pena was charged. The Liberator tried to
defend the latter, but his arguments were to no availt so
3he substituted Dr. Osio in his place.
From this point on the military party began to show 
itself entirely too arrogant in its pretensions. It came to
3PAez footnotes this as follows. "The historians of 
Colombia seem to have conspired to present Doctor Miguel 
Pefia as an intriguer appearing on the political scene after 
Colombia had already attained her independence. All who knew 
this illustrious Venezuelan, can do no less than to acknowl­
edge the political tact which made him worthy of occupying 
distinguished posts in the nation's councils. During the 
colonial government he served the office of Reporter of 
Judicial Causes in the Audiencia for nearly three years, a 
laborious task which greatly weakened his health. Almost the 
greater part of the year XII he spent in the forests, fleeing 
from Monteverde and suffering unaccustomed fears and labours. 
During the years XIII and XIV he contributed important 
services to his country. In the year XIV Boves imprisoned 
him in Valencia, and then he had to suffer great penalties 
with cruel uncertainties about the fate that might befall 
him in the clutches of that fierce caudillo. He escaped from 
the prison disguised as a priest, and then he owed his salva­
tion to a spirited lady patriot, Vicenta Rodriguez, who 
allowed him to take refuge in her home. From there he went 
to the Alto Llano to join General Tadeo Monagas and served in 
his ranks for some time until he retreated to the island of 
Trinidad. From this island he left to attend the Congress of 
Cdcuta where he distinguished himself for his eloquence and 
ability. In the year 1821 he worked unceasingly, despite 
his delicate health, during the sessions of the Congress of 
Cticuta. The severity of his character, and perhaps the envy 
which his talents aroused caused the good faith of his pro­
cedures to be questioned more than once."
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such a point, that General Padilla asked the Ocana deputies 
in an exposition to tend to the needs of those who had dis­
tinguished themselves in military campaigns, for he con­
sidered them very worthy of compensation and special privi­
leges.^ if padilla found any officers who opposed said 
exposition and refused to sign it, he resorted to action, 
threatening peaceful citizens and showing himself ready to 
sustain his pretensions through forceful means. Knowing 
about these events, General Mariano Monti11a marched from
^For early information on General Jos6 Padilla see 
footnote 15 in Chapter XIV of this manuscript. It is 
important to note at this point that Padilla's men had not 
been paid for some time, and that PAez's judgment of him is 
rather harsh. The incidents which PAez describes subse­
quently seemed to have stemmed from a personal rivalry 
between two protagonistsi Padilla, who was a Granadine, a 
zambo, and a Santanderist; and Monti11a, who was a Venezue­
lan, a white, and a Bolivarist. Both were vying for con­
trol of Cartagena while neither actually held command; how­
ever, Montilla held a secret order from Bolivar authorizing 
him to take over the civil and military command of the 
department in case of emergency. This is exactly what 
Montilla did when Padilla forced General JosA Montes to 
resign. Padilla aroused the colored populace and had himself 
proclaimed civil and military chief. Realizing Montilla held 
the real power, he retreated to Mompox and wrote his own 
version of the episode to Bolivar. When Padilla returned to 
Cartagena, Montilla had him arrested. When he was freed from 
his prison by Santanderist artillery men and Colonel Bolivar 
was killed, it is not certain that he was at all responsible. 
Nevertheless, Padilla was tried and judged guilty of this 
affair and the Cartagena insurrection. It is generally felt 
that his judicial murder was inexcusable. Madariaga, Bolivar. 
523, 528, 529, 543, 555, 556, 557, 559, 567, 571, 573, 574.
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Turbaco to Cartagena where Padilla had promoted his dis­
orders.5 Those who did not approve of the seditious plans 
joined Montilla, and finally Padilla was forced to embark on 
March 8 to Tolu. There he interned himself to seek partisans 
in the heart of the Republic. From Mompox he wrote Dr. 
Francisco Soto, who was then the Director of the Deputies 
who had already assembled in Ocaha, and painted the events 
that had occurred in Cartagena with the colors that plagued 
his heated imagination. Soto, in the deputies1 name, wanted 
to send him a tribute of thanks for his zeal in favor of 
public order. observance of laws. and the security of the
5General Mariano Montilla was born in Caracas on 
September 8 , 1782. In 1799 he was a bodyguard for the Prince 
of Peace during the war between Spain and Portugal. He was 
wounded and returned to Caracas in 1808 where he helped to 
organize the revolutionary juntas of 1809 and 1810. He was 
with Bolivar when General Miranda was arrested. In 1814 he 
helped defend La Victoria and fought at San Mateo and 
Bocachica. In 1815 he defended Cartagena from Morillo and 
was forced to withdraw in the Battle of Bahia and seek 
refuge in the United States. By 1819 he was able to join 
General urdaneta in Margarita as chief of Staff. In this 
year also he prevented the Royalist, Saint Just, from assas­
sinating Urdaneta. He left Margarita in 1820 with twelve 
hundred soldiers from the Irish Legion and took Rio Hacha. 
When the Irish rebelled, he was forced to send them to Ja­
maica and follow suit himself by joining Brion's squadron. 
Failing in an attempt to besiege Cartagena, he later attended 
the first Venezuela Congress in 1821 and saw the "creation" 
of Colombia. He besieged Cartagena again and this time with 
his one hundred and eighty-seven soldiers was victorious over 
its eight hundred defenders. In 1828 Montilla put an end to 
the Padilla insurrection. He was Chief in Santa Marta in 
1830 and ordered Bolivar's funeral. (The Liberator 1s remains 
were later moved and entombed in 1842 in Caracas.) In 1831 
General Montilla defended Cartagena against General Luque and 
forced him into exile. Then he became Venezuela's first 
Minister to Europe and made treaties with England. He died 
in Caracas in 1851. Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario 
BioarAfico. 343-45.
587
convention; but he finally consoled himself by answering 
Padilla that the delegation had seen with appreciation the 
sentiments of respect for the Great Convention that Padilla 
manifested in the document he had sent. From this document, 
it was very clear to that assembly that his objective was 
not to deal impartially with the state of Colombia, but 
rather to head a faction that wanted to take possession of 
the Republic and govern it according to the ideas and plans 
they had formulated beforehand.
Finally, on April 9 the Convention was installed with 
only sixty-four members present out of the one hundred and 
eight which were to represent all the Republic. From the 
first session, signs of great animosity against the person 
of the Liberator were evident, despite the fact that the 
provisional president, Francisco Soto, said in his opening 
speech that "no altars should be raised in the temple of the 
fatherland, but rather sepulchres should be opened to bury 
discord."
I was very much surprised by the Liberator's proclama­
tion, dated in Bogota on March 3, in which he called the 
Convention the hope of the country. In it he also stated 
that the legislators, that is to say the Congress, should be 
praised for having started to remedy our weaknesses, complying 
with the public will. This was after all Venezuela had 
declared that body unable to convoke the Convention then, 
basing itself on the very letter of the Constitution that 
deferred it until the year XXXI; and that then only the
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Liberator, because of the acclamation of the majority of the 
towns and to avoid greater evils, would be able to convoke 
it. In the proclamation it was also stated that the dele­
gates would fill the nation with confidence. This was after 
all of Venezuela had protested against the nullity of the 
Convention basing itself first, on the unconstitutional 
manner of convocation by Congress; second, on what was 
vicious in the ordinance as much because of its origin as 
because of the doctrines it contained which destroyed equality 
of representation by excluding the right of suffrage as well 
as that of being elected to a portion of citizens whom the 
constitution did not exclude; and third, for many other rea­
sons that have been published extensively in the newspapers.^ 
In my letter of April 10 to the Liberator I stated:
"If the Ocana convention makes a mockery of your hopes and 
decrees the subdivision of Colombia, we will have to obey 
its resolution, for by the contents of your proclamation, 
you have sanctioned it beforehand. In the same manner, the
^P&ez was not alone in this evaluation of the Ocana 
Convention. Henao and Arubla state: "But there human weak­
ness was even greater and passions fed the blaze which was 
to consume everything . . .  the convention had scarcely begun 
its serious deliberations when army officers, magistrates, 
and corporations, all with one accord and as if obeying the 
same impulse, pronounced themselves against the reforms they 
had solicited, and now urged that Bolivar continue his abso­
lute rule. Some desired that the convention, turning aside 
from its constitutional mission, should limit itself to the 
passage of unimportant laws; . . . and in some of the new 
petitions it was even revealed that Bolivar was given author­
ity to dissolve the Convention. In brief, it was a sad page 
in our history." History of Colombia. 397.
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Colombians who do not belong to New Granada become rebels.
How many dangers I see in these contradictions 11,7
The Liberator's recommendations that a firm and power­
ful government be adopted, because this is what the country 
was crying for, were interpreted as the desires of ambition. 
These gave a basis for Santander's partisans to consider the 
Republic in danger of becoming the victim of a monarchical 
tyranny. The first sessions of the convention were very 
heated. Exaltation by the Federalists made pale that of the 
Jacobines of the French Revolution, whom it seems they had 
set up as their model.
Obeying the wishes of the municipalities in my Depart­
ment, those of the militia corps, and those of the greater 
part of the military chiefs and men of letters in Venezuela,
I proposed that our opinion be to centralize the power and 
place the supreme command of the State in the Liberator's 
hands. The people would call him to this task by unanimous 
acclamation until the time when the independence of the 
nation and tranquillity of the government could implant the 
form of government that would be acceptable to the general 
public. This, more or less, was also the opinion of the 
departments in Central and Southern Colombia.
The following communication that I directed to the
7A copy of this letter is not included in Blanco and 
Azpurda (eds.), Documentos Para la Historia.
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people's representatives in the national Convention is of
O
vital importance to me.
HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE GREAT CONVENTIONt
A sacred duty places me in the position of bringing 
to the attention of the convention a legalized testi­
mony sent to me by several representatives from the 
civilian and military corporations and the heads of 
families and respectable property owners in these de­
partments , showing the desires that motivate them in 
the present crisis during which the independence of 
the Republic is threatened by internal factions and 
incursions by the enemy, and which would place it on 
the border of ruin if the tasks of the Convention are 
not limited to the centralization of its power and to 
placing the supreme command of the State to which the 
towns have elected him by unanimous acclamation in the 
hands of the Liberator President until such a time as 
when the independence of the nation and tranquillity of 
the territory is assured, and a form of government 
acceptable to the general public can be established*
On relaying the wishes of these inhabitants to this 
honorable corporation, I feel possessed with the noble 
enthusiasm which inspired the motivation for their 
petitions. These are supported by the general and 
we1 1 -pronounced clamor of some people who, after the 
immense sacrifices made to win their independence from 
foreign domination, and wasting their blood in battles, 
have reason to fear that the work of their heroism and 
the anxieties of their supporters will be annulled.
They are made fearful by positive acts that convince 
one that in no other time since the establishment of 
the Republic, has there been such a danger of becoming 
the captive of a foreign power or of a devastating 
anarchy. Aided by the weak institutions for which the 
people are not ready, they fear being led into a polit­
ical dissolution fomented by insidious parties.
Finally they have the experience of eighteen years in 
their favor, during which time they have witnessed 
during the last seven years the demoralization, dis­
order, and imperium of all vices as the only fruits of 
the Constitution of Cdcuta.
I shall present with difficulty an unfinished picture 
of the condition in which these departments find
8 a copy of this proclamation may be found in ibid., 
XXI, 223-24.
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themselves. The spirit of sedition is disseminated 
everywhere, and arms in hand it disturbs the public 
tranquillity at each step and keeps the provinces in 
continuous agitation. It may be said that there is not 
a department that maintains the calm which is needed to 
accept the reforms that are not adapted to the strong 
repression of crimes and the firm support of inde­
pendence. Spain has observed these political dissen­
sions, and her agents stir up the discord and circu­
late incendiary papers belittling the Liberator's 
moral force as the sole means of subjecting the 
country to her domination. During these moments of 
anguish, an expedition appears at our coasts which will 
gain advantages while the towns tear themselves apart 
in internal war— advantages which it could not attain 
if a vigorous government were directing the nation's 
efforts, and the man who has given it life were at the 
head of public affairs to make it respected, to con­
solidate its vacillating existence, to regenerate the 
morale, and to, in a word, save it from its ultimate 
end.
It is this honorable corporation's turn now to 
fathom the country's true interests and to provide 
accordingly the remedy for so many evils. The forms 
of government should be adapted to the places that are 
going to receive them and not the latter to themi 
this sublime truth, which is proven now more than ever, 
will enable the Convention to see that while brilliant 
theories dazzle momentarily, they are the sad danger 
which serve as a sepulchre for men and actions. I 
have no doubt that the Deputies who compose this 
honorable corporation will consult the means of pre­
serving their dearest interests. If sight is lost of 
this painful picture on which the unanimous opinion of 
the people is based and the salvation of the State is 
risked in the disasters of anarchy, I shall not answer 
to the nation for the sad consequences which will follow.
Caracas, March 15, 1828.— XVIII.
The Superior Chief,
JosA A. P&ez.
Deputies to the Convention looked upon all these 
esqpositions with the utmost disdain, and decided to proceed 
with the plans they had formulated beforehand. All agreed 
that the Constitution should be reformed; however, when a
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proposal was made to adopt the federal system, it was 
rejected toy a majority of forty-four votes against thirty- 
two. Then l proposed that the government of Colombia unite 
its three powers. Dr. Azuero drafted a constitution which 
was named for him and which, without consulting local inter­
ests of the Colombian sections, divided Colombia into twenty 
departments. Each one was to have its respective assembly to 
take care of local interests. In this Constitution, the 
executive lost all its power.
When the Liberator informed me from Bucaramanga about 
these early works of the Convention, I answered him in the 
following manner on May 15.9
I imagine that Colombia is at the edge of a preci­
pice and that in such a state, she will owe her salva­
tion not to theories, but to the combined calculations 
of a superior genius. These shall be calculations born 
out of the circumstances, not daughters of these same 
theories, and similar to those of a general who in a 
battlefield moves his troops as the enemy attacks him 
in directions not foreseen in his general campaign 
plan. I see Colombia rushing to that very precipice, 
with her fatal destiny guiding her uncertain steps, 
and discovering a considerable number of her children 
at a distance planting flowers on her tomb and pre­
paring her funeral. I also see her turning her face to 
her most beloved children and asking them for support 
and protection in a penetrating voice. Finally. I see 
Colombia, mv dear General, fix her eves on you— on you 
who are her father, her creator. and to whom she owes 
the glory of her name— and ask you with painful cries 
to save her, to wrest her from the hands of her enemies 
and from those of her more ungrateful sons, and place 
her at the point that your sword signaled out to her in 
the llanura of Apure and on the battlefields of Vargas 
and BoyacA. . . . Witness, then, Colombia actually 
fixing her languid sight on you, asking you on bended 
knees to save her at any cost, and that as if she had 
never existed, place her at the level you had pointed
9 A copy of this letter may be found in ibid.. 224-25.
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out when you traced her boundaries with your sword 
in the luxuriant forests of Orinoco. The clamors 
are the cries of the people who call you their father 
and governor. In my opinion, you cannot disengage 
yourself from the people without becoming responsible 
for their future repose. The majority of them is 
sovereign. If you seek legitimacy in the representa­
tion of a revolutionary assembly, divided as it is by 
passions and agitated by individual interests, you will 
only find that anarchy which will fall on the country, 
on liberty, on independence, and on you yourself.
On this same date the Liberator was writing the follow­
ing lines to General Lino Clemente.10
You must know that the Convention has decreed a 
central government and agreed to preserve the Con­
stitution with few alterations. This is to say that 
after so many contentions for reforms, we remain as 
we were before or perhaps even worse. They expect 
many things; but I do not share the same hope, con­
sequently, I have decided to go to Venezuela and 
contribute to the happiness of my poor country.
Herrera came from Ocana, and the Great Convention 
wrote to me sending me Venezuela's representations, 
adding that it did so because it was in charge of 
maintaining public order. This is to say that the 
representations have disturbed it. and I do not know 
what to do or say about this state of affairs. I 
sent Herrera back to Ocana with my latest ideas; but, 
regardless of whether they accept these or not, I plan 
to continue my march to try with the aid of my friends 
to save our poor country.
This was Colombia's epitaph written by its Liberator.
I was of the opinion that the Republic should be 
divided into three great sections, leaving each one with the 
rudiments of its economy, and concentrating on the force that 
would give life and movement to the political body in order 
that the extremities could receive the respective warmth
copy of this letter may be found in Lecuna (ed.). 
Cartas del Libertador. VII, 254. PAez erred in citing May
15 as the date Bolivar wrote this letter, for it was written 
on May 4.
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that was owed them. Xn my opinion, what could calm down all 
the factions and unite them at one point was a strong govern­
ment in the center of the Republic, with the power to do 
good and repress the abuses of those entrusted with the 
administration of justice; a small representative body in 
each one of the sections to promote the municipal and 
economic laws according to each one's character; and a small 
senate in each one also whose members were to be selected by 
strict judgment, knowledge, and unstainable patriotism, to 
enforce these laws, prior to the Executive's report. The 
latter group would simultaneously serve as a governmental 
council. Above all, what seemed most necessary to me if we 
wanted to avoid the evils caused by past legislatures and 
the debts which suffocated the Republic, was to formulate 
codes to remove the complication of the laws. In the case 
of assembling a congress, for only four or five-year periods 
for the purpose of remaking or amending the laws, only those 
that the Executive deemed suitable should be sanctioned. 
Experience had taught me that the government which we should 
adopt should be the simplest and most vigorous one in order 
to repress the insolence of the riotous people in the towns 
who were accustomed to obey by force or disobey by habit.
Deputy Dr. JosA Maria Castillo [i Rada] proposed that 
the Liberator go to OcaHa and settle the differences between 
the deputies; however, without even permitting a discussion
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on this, the greater part of them refused this proposal. ^
It was then that the Bolivians, seeing their voices suffo­
cated by an insulting majority which, according to them, 
made a great to-do over their triumph, decided to leave Ocana 
in order not to sanction by their presence what they believed 
would be the country's ruin. They carried this decision out 
on June 10, and they published a manifesto in the province 
of Santa Cruz which explained the reasons that had forced 
them to take such a step. On June 13 the Intendant of 
Cundinamarca, General Pedro Antonio [sic. Alcantara] HerrAn, 
called a meeting of heads of families in Bogota to discuss
1 1 Jos« Maria del Castillo i Rada was born in Carta­
gena on December 21, 1776, and embraced the Republican cause 
in 1810. By 1813 he was Governor of Tunja, and in 1814 he 
served temporarily as the Executive Power in New Granada.
He went into hiding with the arrival of Morillo and his 
troops in 1814, but figured prominently again in national 
affairs after the Battle of BoyacA in 1819. He became a 
member of the Congress of Ctlcuta and conflicted with Bolivar 
when he himself refused to accept the Vice-Presidency of the 
nation, for he felt the time was not ripe yet for a civilian 
to assume this office. However, he was responsible for 
getting Santander named Vice-President and then served as 
his Secretary of State from 1821 until 1828 when he left to 
attend the Ocaha Convention. Later he became President of 
the Council of Ministers that Bolivar created. In reality 
this post amounted to being Vice-President of the Republic. 
When he died on February 23, 1825, he was so poor that his 
former students from the Colegio del Rosario, where he had 
taught and lectured on political economic theories, had to 
pay for his funeral. Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario 
BiogrAfico. 99-100. Lecuna and Bierck (eds.), Selected 
Writings. II, 545, 687, 700, 715.
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the state of the Republic. ^  From here came an act which 
discredited the Convention( revoked the powers given the 
Deputies, and entrusted the Liberator with the supreme 
command. Consequently, the Liberator entered Bogota on June 
24 in the midst of the people's hurrahs and acclamations.
Believing the Republic in great danger, the same heroic 
means were resorted to that the Roman Republic adopted when­
ever it became necessary to prevent evils and impede dis­
orders. Bolivar was given dictatorial power which he was to 
maintain until the national representation could meet and 
attempt to write the constitution which the state of the 
country demanded. This measure was held in very bad esteem 
by the party that called itself Liberal. Henceforth, the 
Brutuses and Cassiuses began to sharpen the daggers they
^General Pedro Alcantara HerrAn was born in Bogota 
in 1800. He joined the patriot army in 1814 and fought at 
the Battle of Cuchilla del Tambo where he was captured and 
imprisoned. When he managed to free himself in 1821, he re­
joined the patriots. From 1821 to 1823, he fought in the 
Southern campaign; from 1824 to 1825, in the Peruvian cam­
paign; from 1839 to 1841, in the Northern campaign; from 
1841 to 1842, in the Magdalena campaign; and in 1854 and 
1859, in the Guaranda campaign. He fought with exceptional 
bravery in the Battles of Junin and Ayacucho. In 1828, while 
serving as Intendant of Cundimarca, he assembled the junta 
in Bogota which dissolved the Ocafla Convention and gave 
Bolivar extraordinary powers. During the Northern campaign 
against the revolutionaries, HerrAn was elected President of 
New Granada, but he resigned his post after only two months 
in order to continue his campaign against the revolutionaries. 
After he defeated the insurgents, he resumed charge of the 
government. In addition to the Presidency, he served his 
country as Minister to Washington, Senator, Secretary of War, 
and General-in-Chief of the armies. He died in Bogota on 
April 26, 1872. Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario BioarAfico. 
221-22. Henao and Arubla, History of Colombia. 444-46, 471, 
478, 479, 481.
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thought to sink in the heart of the one that had given them 
a country and whom they accused of harboring the same pro­
jects as the conqueror of Pompey.
On September 21# I swore to recognize Bolivar as 
supreme chief of Colombia before Archbishop RamOn Ignacio 
Mendez. I did this in the great plaza before the people.
The municipalities, tribunals, military chiefs, and the army, 
which assembled came close to six thousand men, all took the 
same oath. Then I delivered the following oration to the 
town.
Caraquenosi
Transported by joy, I come to guarantee with the 
most sacred religious ties, my sincere and heart-felt 
wishes. You were the first who, seeing our country 
close to its ruin, searched for the remedy to its 
grave ills in the person of the American hero, illus­
trious because of his deeds, more illustrious because 
of his geniusi your fortunate election conferred the 
supreme magistracy on Colombia's first soldier.
Familiar with victory, he will always carry us to 
triumpht privileged by nature with an admirable dis­
position for reason, he shall make our Republic united, 
stable, and blessed.
Caraquenosi The Liberator heard your call and came 
from PerO. Your echoes were repeated when the Great 
Convention wanted to deviate the national opinion. If 
he seemed indifferent to your ardent desires then, it 
was to get to know better with the calm of prudence, if 
passions had been mixed with your pure zeal. Quickly 
you came to him from all parts— South, Central, and 
North— and knew that his great virtues would revitalize 
ours. Bogota, the capital, made the most solemn invoca­
tion, charging him exclusively with the destinies of the 
country. The Liberator received with indulgence the 
weight of such a grave charge, offering his energetic 
services to save his own work.
To such a laudable objective, you have repeated 
your cries in acts subscribed to by the municipalities 
and heads of families. I have brought this to his atten­
tion. The vote of the nation is uniform! he is
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proclaimed supreme chief of the Republic with limit­
less powers to do good.
Such an elevated magistracy demands our respect and 
our obedience. Listen attentively to what I offer: 
on my part, I recognize General simdn Bolivar as 
supreme and exclusive chief of the Republic of Colombia, 
and I promise under oath to obey, guard, and execute 
the decrees that he dispatches as the Republic's laws. 
Heaven, a witness to my oath, will reward the fidelity 
with which I fulfill my promise.
Caraquenos: Live peacefully: let unity be the
guarantee of your tranquillity. Under a respectable 
government, the country will very quickly forget its 
troubles.
That very afternoon, in the Marte Camp there were 
assembled six thousand soldiers; ten thousand spectators of 
all classes, ages, and conditions; and multitudes of hand­
somely-dressed ladies. Then I delivered the following oration 
to the troops.
Soldiers 1 Your lances pulled Colombia out of 
nothingness, glory promulgated its name on earth, and 
the Almighty inscribed it on the tablet of life.
Soldiers 1 An insulted Spain returns again to invade 
the sacred soil of your fatherland: it wants to domi­
nate its illustrious conquerors. Let her come: the
son of glory presides over us: the vanguard is mine.
Those bayonets shall severely punish her stubborn­
ness. Even our cadavers will serve as a barricade to 
her ambition.
Comrades 1 What will Spain bring to our land? Chiefs 
and soldiers fatigued from imploring your clemency. That 
flag that you have trampled on so many times, will it 
come to dominate Colombia? Before this happens, the sun 
will fail to shed its light on America: before this
happens, let death snatch every living thing. When 
nothing exists, neither shall tyrants.
Determination was that indispensable at that time when, with
the departments threatened by the Spanish, it was necessary
to recognize the Chief of State after the Convention was
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dissolved and the Constitution of Cttcuta had fallen into 
ridicule.
After receiving the Liberator’s communication of 
August 26, which was the organic decree that was to serve as 
Colombia’s provisional constitution, and his proclamation to 
the Colombians in which he tried to simplify and abridge the 
essential principles of the government, I had them published 
in the capital with the proper solemnity. I also had them 
circulated among the other authorities so that they could 
follow suit. Many were sorry that the Liberator had by-passed 
the power that the towns had conferred on him in order to 
constitute them in the most analagous manner in keeping with 
their habits and interests. I saw a positive evil in the 
proximity of the convocation of the national representation, 
even if it did not get to meet. This was because the towns 
were resting quietly now, blindly confiding in the complete 
authority with which they had invested Bolivar. They were 
all dedicated now to their own undertakings, and public 
confidence was being restored once again. No one thought now 
about forms of government while under the protection of the 
chief to whom they had entrusted their lot. Now in view of 
the decree, public richess and speculations of all kind had 
to necessarily suffer, if not a retrogression, at least a 
paralization.
With regard to my taking charge of the Prefecture of 
N, l told the Liberator that I would endure the pain of 
renouncing it, for I could not give the very detailed
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attention demanded by the public taxes. No good could come 
to the government or to the country by my assuming such a 
heavy charge.
Meanwhile, the Liberator's enemies were plotting con­
spiracies to treacherously assassinate him. The leaders were 
Juan Francisco Arganil, Agustin Horment, both French, and 
the Venezuelan Pedro C a r u j o . T h e  conspiracy was to break 
out October 28, on Saint Simdn's Day. The Liberator could 
have been assassinated in a ride he made to the town of 
Soacha accompanied by very few men. General Santander knew 
about the plan and opposed it; however, he failed to notify 
the Liberator of the danger that threatened him. Finally, 
the government got the news that a conspiracy was being 
hatched and precautionary measures were taken. These alarmed 
the conspirators and decided them to act on the night of 
September 25. Relying on the artillery corps, a few assas­
sins headed toward the Liberator's house, surprised the 
guard, forced the doors open, and went to the room where they 
thought he was then. Not finding him, for he had already
l^No additional information was available on Juan 
Francisco Arganil. Madariaga has this to say about the other 
two conspirators] “The leaders of the conspiracy were a 
Frenchman aged 29, Augustin Horment, and a Venezuelan officer, 
Carujo. This Carujo was a man of some parts, a linguist, and 
a mathematician. He was then Cdrdoba's teacher in French, 
English, and military topography. He was an ardent repub­
lican and seems to have been the moving spirit behind the 
plot." Bolivar, 569. Pedro Carujo obtained a commutation 
of his death sentence by revealing the names of the other 
conspirators. Henao andArrubla, History of Colombia. 404.
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jumped out through a window and was hiding on the banks of a 
stream, the assassins satisfied their rage by knifing 
Bolivar's p i llow.^ Bolivar's aide-de-camp, [Diego] Andres 
Ibarra, was wounded when he defended the entrance to his 
chief's room on the steps, and the faithful Ferguson was 
killed by a bullet fired by the infamous Carujo. General 
Urdaneta then placed himself at the head of the troops he 
was able to assemble, pursued the rebels, and imprisoned 
those who were not killed by the government troops. From 
where he was hiding, the Liberator heard one of the parties 
of the valiant and faithful Vargas Battalion announce the 
defeat of the conspirators. He joined them, appeared in the 
public plaza, and was received with great signs of jubilation 
by the troops and the multitude congregated there.
A tribunal was named under General Urdaneta*s presi­
dency to punish criminals. The death penalty was quickly 
pronounced against General Padilla. Freed from the prison 
in which he had been placed, Padilla had witnessed the
■^P&ez omits the role played by Manuel S&enz in this 
instance. Bolivar's first impulse had been not to flee, but 
rather to defend himself from the intruders. "When he heard 
the turmoil, he grasped his sword and pistol and started to 
oppose the invaders who were violating the sanctity of his 
apartments, but from this hazardous attempt he was fortu­
nately dissuaded by Manuel S&enz, a native of Quito and a 
woman of rare beauty, intelligence and valor, ostensibly his 
housekeeper but said to have been his mistress. Showing him 
the balcony which gave upon the side street and entreating 
him not to waste precious moments but escape while it was 
yet possible, she then turned her attention to the intruders, 
whom she endeavored to delay." Lemly, Bolivar. 347-48.
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treacherous assassination of his guard. Colonel jos6 
Bolivar. ^ 5 Dr. Azuero and many other conspirators were also 
given the death penalty. Carujo was pardoned in exchange 
for an impeachment. The severity of the law was also pro­
nounced against General Santander who knew about the con­
spirators ' plans .1 6
Well now, what would have resulted if the assassins 
had succeeded in their perverse intent? When Caesar was 
killed after it had been only suspected that he wanted to 
exchange his crown of laurel for the crown of a dictator, 
his Lieutenant Mark Anthony had picked up the dictator's 
bloody tunic and, showing it to the people, claimed vengeance 
against the assassins. The crime was punished and Octavius 
was able after the Battle of Actium to place the crown of the
^Colonel Bolivar was not kin to the Liberator. 
Madariaga gives this account of his assassination. "Mean­
while a party of artillery men had leapt over the wall be­
tween their barracks and the yard of the building where 
Padilla was imprisoned under the custody of Colonel Jos6 
Bolivar. Suddenly Padilla heard Colonel Bolivar shouti 
'General, X am being killed . 1 Colonel Bolivar, naked, was 
endeavouring to shelter himself behind Padilla while the 
soldiers and the officer threatened to kill Padilla if he 
stood in the way. Colonel Bolivar was seized, dragged down 
and shot dead." Bolivar. 571.
^ G e n e r a l  Santander was tried and actually sentenced 
to death for his role in the conspiracy. However, since it 
could not be definitely proven that he had taken part in the 
affair, the council of government commuted his sentence to 
banishment. Bolivar accepted this decisions so Santander 
was imprisoned at Bocachica for a few months until he was 
allowed to proceed to Europe. Henao and Arrubla, History of 
Colombia. 404.
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Caesars on his forehead without any opposition. In Colombia 
there would not have been lacking those who would have 
followed Mark Anthony's example in demanding vengeance for 
the death of their chief, and blood would have been shed in 
torrents. The hatreds between Venezuelans and Granadines 
would have been carried to the point of cruelty. If the 
common enemy would have taken advantage then of such favor­
able moments, who knows if in the end the work of so much 
heroism, of so many labors, and of so much bloodshed, would 
have been lost.
Bolivar's death would have been the horrible murder 
of someone who was due reverence. It would have been 
terrible in its consequences, and fatal for all factions.
It might have even been the ruin of the very institutions 
they wanted to consolidate with his death. Those crimes of 
exaggerated Republicanism, which perhaps admired pagan 
antiquity and rejected Christian civilization, have never 
produced the results that its perpetrators proposed.
It was not very long ago that a theatre actor, a 
fanatical admirer of Brutus, while in the midst of a numerous 
gathering that rejoiced in the return to peace of a country 
that had been desolated by a terrible four-year conflict, 
assassinated one of the most innocent men who had led the 
destinies of a nation. Brandishing a homicidal arm before 
the terrified multitude, he exclaimed with theatrical
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entonation: "Sic semper tyrannis. " ^ 7 What results did he
achieve? He gave the victim a martyr's crown, brought 
unanimous disapproval on himself, and increased the catalogue 
of crimes with an execrable name.
When I received the notices of the horrible attempt 
of September 25, I wrote Bolivar the following letter.^"®
TO THE MOST EXCELLENT SENOR LIBERATOR PRESIDENT
Valencia, October 30, 1828.
My very beloved General and Friend:
It would have been impossible to imagine that there 
would be room in the heart of even the most perverse 
Colombian to commit such a great crime as that pro­
posed by the conspiracy of September 25 which broke 
out in that city against your life and the existence 
of the Republic. The assassins marked their first 
steps with blood, and in their fury did not search but 
for victims whose horror would diminish the iniquity 
of their black infamy. From the first moments, they 
let the character of their contrivance be known: 
they proposed to destroy you in order to annihilate 
later all your party, talent, valor, and patriotism.
What a sad and at the same time happy eventI The 
criminals have been discovered and you have been 
saved. The country is preserved in your person, and 
the evils shall be remedied. What punishment can be 
sufficient for the ferocious ones who conceived and 
perpetrated such an enormous attempt? Justice should 
leave it to indignation to exercise its rage for some 
moments. You have worked more effectively and have 
sent them to be judged. We should expect justice to 
be severe until society is well satisfied. How many 
evils Colombia would have experienced if you had 
perished at the hands of your enemies!— Well, let them 
suffer these without any mercy. Blood would have
17"Thus always to tyrants." These were the words 
uttered by John Wilkes Booth When he assassinated Abraham 
Lincoln.
18A copy of this letter may be found in Blanco and 
Azpurda (eds.), Documentos Para la Historia. XIII, 153-55.
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flowed in torrents, and reorganization would have been 
impossible; therefore, their blood should not remain 
within their veins, nor should there be enough of them 
left so that they can assemble again to conspire. If 
there is any conspirator in this country and he is 
discovered, he will pay with the same penalty that the 
enemies of the country d o .
In my previous letter I spoke to you about the 
motives which had forced me to proceed against General 
Gdmez as a seditious person. Because of what you tell 
me in your esteemed letter of the 30th of this past 
month, I see that my judgment was not wrong: I am
determined to execute the sentence which was pronounced. 
If it were not merited, I shall suspend it until I 
find out if this General is included in the suit filed 
in that city against the conspirators. Since I have 
already given an official account, I expect that in 
your reply, you will send me some documents, if they 
exist, that will serve as proof to add to the process.
You also tell me in your letter to expel all the 
representatives who took part in approving the Padilla 
insurrection in Cartagena. In an official letter you 
order me to expel only those who, because of their 
heated opinions in OcafEa, can be prejudicial to the 
country. I would not want any to remain, and by the 
faith I have promised you, none shall remain but the 
ones I am not aware of or those whom you want to be 
employed such as Gdmez, the Commandant of the Antioqui 
Battalion, and the always memorable Mr. Boguier.
May Providence watch over you. You are exceptional 
even in your luck, for to escape from a band of armed 
assassins searching for you in your own palace who had 
already defeated the forces guarding you, should prove 
that Heaven is your best custodian and that we still 
have not become unworthy of its benedictions. The 
assassins pretended to rob us of our greatest treasure, 
which is peace, and we have kept it in you. Such a 
fortunate escape is much to the admiration and con­
gratulation of all your friends and of all patriots.
The details of the event, contained in the Gazette, 
came to us the evening before Saint Simdn's feast.
This contributed to making us enjoy that day with 
greater jubilation and happiness— that day in which 
Valencia showed herself with a martial spirit while at 
the same time revealing enthusiasm for your life. In 
the morning the flags of the Fifth Battalion, which 
had twelve hundred well-uniformed squares, were blessed. 
With this function terminated, all the authorities and 
the people swore acknowledgment of your authority.
During the afternoon I received the oath from all the
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cavalry troops, of which there were more than a 
thousand scxuares. The entire city was out in the 
streetsi the jubilation and happiness of the people 
could be seen on all their faces. You would have been 
very happy to witness this scene and to consider that 
while there are some vile assassins who conspire 
against your life, there are entire towns interested 
in preserving it. The voices of "Long Live the 
Liberator” resounded everywhere. The imminent danger 
you escaped has only served to augment our joy.
My beloved Generali I embrace you from here and 
congratulate you fervently on the preservation of your 
life. Had it been lost, Santander would not have 
reaped the fruit of his infamous work, for I would 
have avenged it, or he would have multiplied the num­
ber of his victims.
I am always your sincere friend.
j o s £ a . p Ae z .
While the events I have referred to were occurring in 
Hew Granada, 1 continued struggling in Venezuela with the 
parties led by Ariz&balo and Cisneros. I also maintained a 
watch over the coast, which was threatened by a disembarka­
tion of Spanish troops destined to assist them. Furthermore, 
I contained the rebel factions that were little satisfied 
with the political state of the Republic. To maintain a 
vigil over the rebellious ones and prevent the Royalists who 
had remained in the territory after the retirement of the 
Spanish troops from disturbing the public order, I formed a 
police regiment and named the active General Arismendi as 
chief. Despite all these preoccupations, I did not fail to 
occupy myself with the needs of the towns and putting an end
to the evils which afflicted them.
Obeying the order that the Liberator sent me to try
to investigate the cause of the misery which afflicted
Venezuela and to propose the measures to remedy it, X 
assembled the landholders, farm employees, lawyers, and mer­
chants. The principal observations they made in the meeting 
were with respect to the currency which Bolivar had ordered 
out of circulation. The commissioned merchants found profit 
in it, and the landholders saw an increase in the value of 
their crops, even if it were momentary. When I saw that the 
discussion was getting heated in the meeting, I presented my 
ideas on the matter in a small memorandum written hastily 
and without sufficient time to project my calculations. 
However, this measure was opposed chiefly because of the 
difficulty of getting thirty thousand pesos monthly to put 
the plan I proposed into effect, even though some merchants 
told me they would get up that sum of money if the currency 
were put in circulation according to my ideas. It seemed 
fair to them for commerce to protect the government if govern 
ment protected commerce.
It was impossible to remedy in a moment the poverty 
of which the towns complained. It was the result of the lack 
of commerce and the low price of the crops, could the 
government increase these when they were in the same state 
of dejection in the European markets? The evil was univer­
sal! its remedy would be time and the consolidation of the 
government until confidence was reborn. Then there would be 
new agricultural and commercial undertakings. I worked on 
this point incessantly and believed it very convenient and 
powerful in public opinion to agree on an exemption of the
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duties on corn, rice, and other articles of primary neces­
sity to the subsistence of the needy, which were the product 
of the work of the greater part of our men in the fields. 
These unfortunate people, after the great expenses they sus­
tained to transport their crops to market, had to pay a duty 
making their condition even sadder. On the other hand, the 
income from the provisional taxes in this department was 
insignificant. By this means, I thought that cultivation 
would be stimulated, the stipend would be more acceptable, 
and these items of primary necessity would be cheaper.
Agriculture is going to suffer a great set back with 
the spreading of the cultivation of coffee. Its low price 
will not offer its harvesters any advantage. Since our 
country abounds in different branches of agriculture, as 
soon as the people become convinced that it is impossible to 
raise the price of coffee, they should dedicate themselves to 
other branches such as the cochineal which abound in Coro, 
Carora, Tocuyo and other places and which no one cultivates 
due to lack of stimulation. This is also the case with the 
wax which has given other countries immense riches. A 
foreigner had introduced some beehives which had progressed 
quite a bit; however, these would remain similarly abandoned 
if the government did not aid them. With this objective, X 
thought to grant some tax exemptions with the government1s 
approval. Indigo and cotton could not replace coffee because 
both are cultivated in many places where they are produced in 
infinitely greater quantities than in ours because of the
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ease and low cost, with which they are cultivated there.
Because of the remonstrances of the landholders and 
heads of families in the town of Ocumare on the coast, the 
Liberator ordered me to suppress the municipalities and sub­
stitute an authority similar to that of the old mayors or 
lord chief justices. This was to be in accordance with the 
opinion of respectable men. I was also to establish an 
ordinance which seemed most appropriate to me, and I was to 
send it on for his approval. I was trying to fulfill this 
order when 1 received another official communication in which 
Bolivar told me that he had asked the Intendants in Vene­
zuela, Maturin, and Orinoco to give information on the matter 
and also ask the superior court of justice for information 
and send this on to him so that he could make the suitable 
reforms.
1 hesitated for some moments to suspend the plan 1 
had started, satisfying myself by remitting the information 
I would have collected to the Liberator so that the reforms 
could come from there if they were to be put into practice.
If my objective had been solely to place obstacles in the 
path of these undertakings, I would have found enough motive 
in these two communications. Since my desire was to help 
Bolivar with all my efforts in everything possible, I called 
a meeting of the landholders and citizens in the different 
districts of the province under my command, and some from 
Carabobo who were in Caracas, who along with some lawyers, 
gave their opinion on the elimination of the municipalities.
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All were convinced that theae corporations were useless 
because they did not have the means with which to fulfill 
their duties, did not have public spirit, and did not know 
how to discharge their duties.
It was difficult to find men who wanted to give their 
opinion and sign their name. No one wanted to compromise 
himself in the slightest, for everyone feared everyone with­
out discernment. At times men feared to compromise them­
selves with the government and at others, with their friends 
or the town. Each one aspired to be an Egoist in approving 
or censuring everything that was done. To this effect, 
everyone found it convenient to hide his ideas in order to 
give favorable or unfavorable opinions in different circles 
and according to the persons in the group. Nevertheless, 
the act was signed, and I sent it to the Liberator.
The evils caused by the superior government treasury 
were what I wanted to be remedied by a quick and vigorous reso­
lution. The creditors of the State had increased prodigiously, 
animated by the power to complete supplementary proofs and to 
find witnesses disposed to declare and certify in accordance 
with their wishes. Meanwhile, the Attorney General because of 
corruption, according to some, or because of negligence, or 
because of lack of means, did not execute against the proofs 
nor oppose their pretensions. Thus the Superior Junta was 
writing great quantities weekly against the government, 
quantities so excessive that they scandalized everyone who 
knew about them. The State was assuming a debt which it
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could never pay, and if this continued, it would be useless 
to think of balancing the treasury. All that was economized 
on one hand would be drained off through this wide channel.
In the end, the multitude of new creditors, seeing the 
impossibility of payment, would confuse the public tran­
quillity to secure private convenience. I judged that tri­
bunal then as the font of future dissensions. Because of my 
desire for a stable peace, I wanted the Liberator to find 
the means to limit its authority or to delineate such type 
of checks, that the government could not be prejudiced nor 
obligated to satisfy anything but what it really owed.
At this time I also conceived a plan to divide the 
Republic into new departments. It was then that I manifested 
my ideas on this project and those which I believed most 
suitable. The plan consisted of dividing the Republic in six 
departments with equal forces to serve as a check for the 
other sections, and whose total force would belong to the 
government and thus help to temper the basis of the associa­
tion. I thought this plan to be very just, even though when 
it was put into effect some provinces might feel wronged by 
the terms assigned them and by being annexed to capitals to 
which they had not belonged previously.
It did not seem very natural to me that the Barinas 
province be added to the new department whose capital was to 
be the Rosario de Cdcuta Villa. Instead, I thought a part of 
it could be extended up to Guanare, which could run from 
Coro up to Tocuyo, and from this point to this city of
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Guanare or at least to that of Portuguese* Otherwise, Vene­
zuela would penetrate too far into the Tocuyo and its 
boundary would be stretched too much, running from that point 
beyond Aruare. Then, too, with the Cdcuta Department exer­
cising its jurisdiction as far as Guanare, the jealousies 
and discussions between Venezuelans and Granadines could be 
dissipated.
Finally, it would take too long to enumerate all the 
works and attentive acts which occupied me during the period 
we are discussing in this narration. This was a period, as 
the reader has seen, which was fertile in events of great 
transcendency. Above all it was a period of great danger 
for the Republic that was beginning to organize itself.
In view of all the disturbances that occurred in this 
epoch, and of the great risks which threatened the Republic's 
existence, who could find it strange that many eminent men 
desired the establishment of a firm and vigorous government? 
Many did not desire it under the Liberator's presidency as I 
did, but under the sceptre of a monarch, even if it were 
necessary to go to the old European dynasties to find this 
monarch.
CHAPTER XXIV
Projects for the Establishment of a Constitu­
tional Monarchy in Colombia— Unjust Charges 
Directed Against Me— My Opinions Concerning 
Forms of Government.
1829
Dating from the time we had won our independence and 
even before this, the anarchy existing in the Hispanic- 
American countries made the need for establishing a vigorous 
government apparent. Many of the wisest men in these 
countries had pronounced in favor of a constitutional 
monarchy. This trend was seen in the United Provinces of 
the Rio de la Plata in 1816 when the Congress of Tucumdn 
declared that "despite the ultra democratic ideas which have 
been manifested in the entire revolution, the Congress, as 
representative of the most seme and wise section of the 
people and truly of the community, is ready to favor a 
moderate constitutional monarchy, adapted to the condition 
and circumstances of the country."
In a conference the French Foreign Minister had with 
[jos6 Valentin] Gdanez, envoy from the United Provinces, he
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told himt1
. . . that reflecting on the true interests of those 
countries, he was convinced that their interests 
depended entirely on the establishment of a government 
under whose influence the advantages of peace could be 
enjoyed. He firmly believed that said form of govern­
ment could only be a constitutional monarchy with a 
European prince at the head, whose relations could 
inspire and augment respect for the State and facili­
tate the recognition of national independence.
The Duke of Luca, heir to the kingdom of Etruria and a Bour­
bon on his mother's side, was recommended for the post. It 
was added that the Austrian and Russian Emperors would pro­
tect him, and that England would not oppose his elevation to 
the throne. France would facilitate the naval and land 
forces necessary to enforce respect for this prince, and 
Luca would marry a Brazilian princess if the government of
^The author reveals later in this chapter that the 
French Foreign Minister he refers to here was in reality a 
special French Minister sent to investigate Spanish American 
affairs. His name was Charles Bresson. Lemly, Bolivar. 362.
Jos4 Valentin Gdmez was born in Buenos Aires on 
November 8, 1774. He studied at the San Carlos College and 
received his Doctorate in Theology from the University of 
Cdrdoba. He was pastor of Our Lady of Guadalupe Parish in 
the Banda Oriental, and it was here that he began his revo­
lutionary career. At the Battle of Piedras, he distin­
guished himself as a military chaplain. Following this, he 
was transferred to Buenos Aires, In 1813 and in 1821 he was 
Vicar General and Governor of this bishopric. He figures 
prominently as an educator, serving as rector of the univer­
sity from 1826 until 1830. Politically, his services were 
also eminent, for he served as a member of the famous 
Argentine National Assembly of 1813 and as Argentine repre­
sentative in the peace overtures in Montevideo in 1814.
From 1818 until 1821 he was envoy extraordinary to the Courts 
of France and England. GOmez was also a member of the Argen­
tine National Constituent Congress from 1825 to 1827. He 
died in 1833. Julio A. Muzzio, Diccionario Histdrico 
Biogr&fico de la Republica Argentina (Buenos Aires, 1920), 
204.
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this Empire would cede the territory situated East of the La 
Plata River to the United Provinces. This advice was very 
much in accord with what, by disposition of the Congress of 
TucumAn, the Argentine government had charged a commissioner 
it sent to Brazil to propose the coronation of one of the 
Brazilian infantas in those Provinces. under a constitution 
that the Congress would frame.
In the secret session on November 12, the Congress 
approved France's project, but under new conditions. The 
new conditions were chiefly that H. M. Cristianisima had to 
obtain the consent of the five great European powers to 
facilitate the marriage of the Duke of Luca with the 
Brazilian Princess; that the land session mentioned pre­
viously be effected; that France give the Duke all the 
support necessary to defend and consolidate the monarchy 
whose boundaries should include all the Eastern part, 
including Montevideo and Paraguay; and that France lend four 
million pesos to give the country a means of defense against 
Spain to assure its independence.2
In 1818, the Chilean Senate authorized the Supreme 
Director, [Bernardo] 0 'Higgins, to promote in Europe the
2Ricardo Levene (William Spence Robertson, tnans. and 
ed.), A History of Argentina (Chapel Hill, 1937), 331.
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establishment of a monarchy in Chile and PerO. Even Peril 
sent commissioners to London with this objective. In Mexico 
and in Guatemala independence from the metropolis was 
declared, and a moderate monarchy was established as a result 
of the emancipation. There were projects afloat sometimes 
to place a Spanish prince on the Mexican throne and at other 
times, to crown the Duke of Sussex, youngest son of George 
III of England. The latter asked if there would be sufficent 
means in this country [Mexico] to give a suitable luncheon 
for a European prince. There were also those who proposed 
bringing and crowning the Inca Don Dionisio Yupanqui, who 
resided in Madrid and had represented Peril in the Spanish 
cortes. In addition to him, there was the Count of Mocte- 
zuma to consider. The latter, a Spanish grandee of the 
first order and descendent on his maternal side of the last 
emperor of Mexico, presented himself in London and solicited 
to be declared Emperor of that country. Moctezuma addressed 
the Chilean government and asked for assistance to carry out 
this undertaking. That government answered him, addressing
^Bernardo O'Higgins became the Supreme Director of the 
Chilean Republic after the Battle of Chacabuco, which 
occurred on February 12, 1817. Primarily chosen for this 
office because of his military reputation, he demonstrated 
executive ability from the outset. Since he never affiliated 
with the aristocratic oligarchy that tried to rule Chile from 
Santiago, he was finally ousted from his post in 1823. The 
Chilean aristocracy had changed little since the winning of 
independence and “in early Chile, as in Rome, the word 
'republic* means little except the absence of a dynasty in 
the state." A. Curtis Wilgus, Argentina, Brazil. and Chile 
Since Independence (New York, 1963), 294.
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him as Imperial Majesty, and authorized its representatives 
in England and France to guarantee a small loan of a million 
pesos which the pretender Emperor stated he needed to effect 
his move to Mexico.
There were also many foreigners, even those holding
the most liberal ideas, that believed as did many South
Americans, that a constitutional monarchy was the system of
government most suitable to Spanish America. [Henry M.]
Breckenridge [sic, Brackenridge] who was secretary of the
United States mission sent in 1817 to collect information on
the state of the South American countries, manifested in
his account of the trip that he hadi^
. . . heard it expressed by persons of some preten­
sions, that nothing is necessary but the introduction 
into any country, of the forms of free government, and 
that the people will at once be free as a matter of 
course. This is a great mistake. A people must be 
educated and prepared for freedom. It is true that 
despotic forms will soon extinguish the flame of lib­
erty; but a different kind of government, such as we 
enjoy, would be useless and inoperative among a 
slavish ignorant people.
The following illustrious men thought in a similar
manner:
^Henry M. Brackenridge, Vovaae to South America 
Performed bv Order of the American Government in the Years 
1817 and 1818. 2 vols. (London, 1820), I, 47. It is
interesting to note that P&ez misquoted Brackenridge's last 
sentence in this instance, writing instead, "the under­
taking was quimerical, that a type of government as that of 
the United States was useless and embarrassing in the 
Spanish colonies."
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San Martin,^ Pueyrredon, Monteagudo, Rivadavia, Belgrano, 
the Balcarces, Sarratea, GOmez, Guido, Moreno, Vieites, 
Larrea, Posadas, Alvear, and many others in Buenos Aires;
0 'Higgins, P6rez, Vicufia, Lazo de la Vega, Salas Rosas, 
Lecaros, Canas, Lecavarrenes, ErrAzuris, Echeverrla, 
Cienfuegos, the priest Larrain, Rodriguez Aldea, Encalada, 
Tagle, Alcalde and many important men in Chile; Torre Tagle, 
Unanue, CarriOn, Pando, Pardo, Rivaguero, Rivadaurre, in 
Perd; General Juan Josd Flores, and the Great Marshal A. J. 
de Sucre in Ecuador; Pombo, Restrepo, Garcia del Rio and 
some others in New Granada; the Urdanetas, Archbishop Mdndez, 
the Montillas, the Ibarras, General Pedro Briceno MAndez and
^The author footnotes this as follows. "When General 
San Martin put Viceroy Laserna in Perd in a tight spot in 
1811, the latter proposed a friendly agreement at this time 
with. Don Manuel Abreu, commissioned by the constitutional 
government to negotiate an agreement with the patriot chiefs, 
when he arrived from Spain. Nothing was achieved by the 
leaders on either side in the conferences heldt so San 
Martin then invited Viceroy Laserna to an interview in 
Punchauca. San Martin believed at the time that the means 
of pacifying Perd lay in establishing a government that was 
independent from the Peninsula. But, states the record that 
was written then, the experience of an eleven-year revolu­
tion had revealed that the government most suited to the 
classes, customs, vices, preoccupations. character of the 
people, and education in Perd. was a constitutional monarchy 
that would guarantee its independence. liberty, security. 
and prosperity. In His Excellency's [San Martin'si concept. 
the most worthwhile work of those who held the public * s con­
fidence was to lav the foundations of this principle on a 
solid basis and assure peace with Spain. General San Martin 
offered to go to Spain to solicit a prince of the ruling 
dvnastv in Spain to come and head a constitutional monarchy. 
See Restrepo, Volume III, page 121."
This citation may be found as the author states in the 
Josd Jacquin edition of Restrepo, RevoluciOn de la Repdblica 
de Colombia.
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some of the mantuanos in Venezuela.®
It is not strange, then, that Bolivar could have con­
ceived the idea that the Spanish colonies could live in 
peace under a moderate monarchical government and progress 
as their political infancy allowed them. Bolivar, who 
repeatedly said that Spanish America presented a chaos which 
threatened a most complete anarchy constantly, was convinced 
that these people needed a firm, stable, and strong govern­
ment. The Liberator had manifested this in his message to 
the Congress of Guayana, and in his predilection for the 
Bolivian Constitution, which he always recommended and
®P4ez interjects this footnote. "When I went with 
the Liberator in the year XXVI from Valencia to Caracas, we 
stopped in the San Pedro Parish. Don Martin Tovar [Ponte] 
arrived there from the capital, and a little later, he re­
tired with Bolivar to a room. They remained there for over 
an hour in a seemingly-interesting conference. When we 
began our march anew, as we started to climb the hill, the 
Liberator told met 'Would you believe that in the conference
I have just had with Tovar, that man, known for his ultra- 
democratic ideas, has told me that I should take advantage 
of these moments to forge a crown for myself, for everything 
is propicious and favorable to this. It is delirium to 
think about monarchies when we ourselves have so ridiculed 
crowns. If it were necessary to adopt such a system, we 
should consider the Bolivian constitution, which is nothing 
more than a monarchy without a crown.'"
Martin Tovar Ponte was one of the leaders of the 
Caracas Junta in 1810 that removed Spanish Captain General 
Emparan from power. He belonged to the wealthy, white 
Spanish aristocracy at a time when this class was living in 
a "kind of twilight of loyalties." He was a brother of 
Manuel Felipe Tovar, who served as President of Venezuela 
from 1860 to 1861. (P&ez served as his Minister of War and 
Navy.) Madariaga, Bolivar. 18, 124, 126, 232. Mordn,
History of Venezuela. 169, 170.
The mantuanos were that half of the creole class com­
posed of city men who were the owners of large estates which 
they might visit on occasion. The lower classes referred to 
them as the grandes cacaos. Ibid., 59.
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called a monarchy without a crown.7
I can hear now the cry of excommunication that the 
ultra liberals will raise on reading the lines 1 have just 
written. 1 seem to see them collecting diatribes and invec­
tives against me in order to defend the memory of the 
Liberator, whom they will say is being slandered by one of 
his friends. Let those scandalized know that I do not pre­
tend in these Memoirs, which I am writing now when the length 
of time 1 have already lived serves to remind me of the 
little time I have left in which to account to God for the 
actions of my life; let them know, I repeat, that Z do not 
pretend to praise anyone, but to utter the truth as others 
have already done before the tribunal of history. I shall 
confess the errors which my inexperience made me incur; how­
ever, this will not stop me from believing that it is just 
for me to defend myself from the calumnies which have been 
propagated against me by bad faith and especially by those 
passions foreign to party spirit.
I venerate the memory of the Liberator of Colombia as
^P&ez footnotes this as follows. "Several of his 
friends had heard the Liberator say, according to Restrepo, 
IV, 207, 'that Colombia and all Spanish America had no remedy 
other than to establish constitutional monarchies, and that 
if the people of Columbia would decide in favor of this sys­
tem of government and would call a foreign prince to rule, 
he would be the first to submit to his authority and use his 
influence to support him.' He repeated this same thing 
later."
This quotation may be found as P&ez cites in the Jos6 
Jacquin edition of Restrepo, Revolucidn de la Reotiblica de 
Colombia.
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that of a benefactor of my country, and as that of a great 
rneui and a very favorite friend. I am convinced that 1 am 
not belittling the glory of his name in any way with what I 
have just written about his ideas. "The project of changing 
republican institutions for monarchical ones," says Restrepo, 
"might have been extemporaneous, unadaptable, and almost 
destructive for Colombia, but it was not criminal."®
Let those who call themselves liberals know that I 
believe in the good faith of men, even though they might 
preach what others recognize to be in error. Let them know 
also that it was possible to be a partisan of the monarchical 
form without ceasing to love the country and take an interest 
in its future. I was not a partisan of the establishment of 
a monarchy, and 1 am going to prove it despite the fact that 
it has already been proven. Nevertheless, I do not believe 
that those who advocated it were enemies of the country. I 
belong, and have always belonged, to the Republican school. 
However, I have never belonged to that school for which 
liberty is the goddess who is worshipped with a knife and 
incendiary torch, whose altars are purified with human blood, 
and whose worshippers must purge the land of those who do 
not think as they do concerning the country's interests. I 
do not belong to that sect who hold those horrible words of 
Voltaire as a motto*®
®It was not possible to locate this citation. Ibid.
®"The last king must hang
From the bowels of the last priest."
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Du Bovau du dernier pretre
II faut pendre le dernie roi.
I am, and always have been, on the side of those who believe 
that each individual has the right to manifest what he 
believes and what his reason dictates to him concerning the 
interests of the land on which he was born.
It would be an infamous calumny, and one which no one 
could support with any remnants of truth, to suppose that 
General Bolivar ever entertained the desire to exchange his 
imperishable laurels as Liberator for the ephemeral crown of 
an American E m p i r e . I  do not stop to give reasons for 
this, for he gave more than enough in all the occasions 
which were offered to him to speak on the matter. However, 
that he believed that a monarchical government or one similar 
to it would be suitable for the country, is something that 
cannot be denied by those who dealt with him closely and knew
^ T h e  author footnotes this as follows. "The his­
torian Cesar Cantu in his history One Hundred Years. says in 
speaking of Bollvan 'His adversaries pretended that this 
renunciation (of the presidency) was not real as the others, 
and made only so that his powers could be returned to him. 
Happy is the man who cannot be calumned except in his inten­
tions 1 The historians in their preoccupation recognize 
aspiration to a throne as the center of all ambition; however, 
illustrious men with superior nobility can have many others.
A sceptre could not have made Bolivar as great as his own 
sword, to which an entire continent owed its freedom.'"
For information on Cantu, please see footnote 19 in 
Chapter XVI of this manuscript.
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how disillusioned he was with democracy,1 -^ and what pain 
Colombia's sad situation caused him. The struggle he
11The author interjects the following footnote. "The 
following are the Liberator's words, which show how little 
faith he had in the future of the Spanish American countries. 
(This is copied from a bulletin which was published in Cuenca 
in 1828 under the title 'A Look Toward Spanish America.')
There is no faith in America, not among men, nor among 
nations. Treaties are papers; constitutions, books; 
elections, battles; liberty, anarchy; and life, a torment.
This is, Americans, our deplorable situation; if we 
do not change it, death is better; anything is better 
than indefinable struggles whose malignancy is increased 
by the violence of movement and the prolongation of time; 
let us not doubt it, the evil multiplies every moment 
and threatens us with complete destruction.
Colombians I You have suffered much, and sacrificed 
much without benefit, for you have not hit upon a 
healthy path. You fell in love with Liberty, dazzled by 
its attractive powers; but since Liberty is as dangerous 
as beauty in women, who seduce and claim everything in 
the name of love or vanity, you have not kept it pure 
and innocent as when it descended from the heavens.
Let us hear the cry of the country, of the magis­
trates and citizens, and of the provinces and armies, 
so that forming together a corps impenetrable to the 
violence of the parties, we can redeem the national 
representation with virtue, force, and the enlightenment 
of Colombia.
Predictions made by the Liberator himself on November 
9, 1830, thirty-eight days before his death, are as follows.
'America is ungovernable. Those who have served the 
revolution have plowed the seas. The only thing that can 
be done in America is to emigrate. These countries will 
most certainly fall into the hands of the frenzied 
multitude in order to pass on later into those of small, 
almost imperceptible, tyrants, of all colors and races, 
devoured by every crime, and extinguished by ferocity.
The Europeans, perhaps, will not deign to conquer them.
If it were possible for a part of the world to return to 
primitive chaos, this would be America's final period.'"
This last quotation is taken from a letter Bolivar 
wrote to General Juan Jos6 Flores, November 9, 1830. Simdn 
Bolivar, Obras Completas. 3 vols. (Habana, 1950), III, 501- 
502.
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maintained between his own convictions and the fear of 
opposing the multitude's wishes, which were nourished on 
modern ideas imported from France and the United States and 
did not agree with him with respect to Colombia's needs, 
must have been horrible. There is not one document of the 
Liberator's in which this struggle is not observed.
If Bolivar had not had the conscience of his glory, 
or if he had been an ambitious, common person, he could have 
unscrupulously crowned himself King of Colombia, seemingly 
with the best intentions. There were many people in the 
Republic that desired this. Even Lord Aberdeen, Her Britanic 
Majesty's Secretary of Foreign Affairs, when he was consulted 
about a European prince, gave assurances that the English 
government would not place any objections at all if the 
Colombian people proposed the Liberator as their monarch.
As in all the other American states, there was public 
talk in Colombia about changing the system of government and 
establishing a monarchy. There was a meeting in BogotA of 
persons known for their talents and virtues and who occupied 
high positions, to discuss the adoption of the monarchical 
system. As a result of what was resolved here, the ministers 
agreed on September 3, 1829 to open negotiations with the 
diplomatic agents from France and England. They wanted to 
know if Congress were to decree a constitutional monarchy, 
if their respective governments would look favorably on such
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a tremendous change.-*'2 They also wanted to know if they 
could rely on the cooperation of France and England in case 
the United States and other Republics became alarmed and 
opposed the project.
The counselors of state saidi^
The habits of our people are monarchical, for a 
monarchy is the system of government they have had 
for centuries. They decided in favor of indepen­
dence, and in the intoxication of the triumphs 
obtained in destroying Spanish power, they persuaded 
themselves that a boundless liberty was suitable for 
them; however, experience has made them recognize 
that it was harmful to them: so today a general
tendency toward monarchical institutions is noted.
Dr. Labastida [or La Bastida] writing to Marino in 
name of the Bishop of Tricala, Dr. Mariano Talavera, whom 
that General had asked for information concerning what was 
happening in Bogota, told him among other things that:1^
12The diplomatic agents from France and England were 
Charles Bresson and Patrick Campbell. Lemly, Bolivar. 362.
Although Gil Fortoul does not include this particular 
quotation, he does cite many direct quotations which reveal 
the pro-monarchy sentiments in Colombia at this time. His- 
toria Constitucional de Venezuela. I, 624-47.
l^Dr. La Bastida along with BriceAo, Delgado, and 
others helped to write the Merida Constitution which abounded 
in high ideals and ardent patriotism. Parra-Pdrez, Historia 
de la Primera Repflblica. II, 154.
Dr. Mariano Talavera, one of the most enlightened and 
enthusiastic members of the clergy in Venezuela, was in favor 
of the independence movement. He helped to eradicate the 
qualms of the clergy who had taken an oath to support the 
government of Ferdinand VII by stating that the oath had 
been invalidated by Ferdinand's renunciation. Ibid., 150,
151, 152.
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. . . he (the Bishop) informed me in detail concerning 
what occurred in a friendly meeting held in BogotA 
this past March [1829*1 at Dr. Castillo’s house in which 
the Minister Restrepo secretly proposed the establish­
ment of a monarchy in Colombia. This project, although 
ill-received by several of those attending, had no 
opposition other than that of the Bishop himself and 
two lawyers from the city. Although our party worked 
actively to diffuse opinions, it barely found any 
support, particularly among the learned youth of the 
country and among the women, who profess an implacable 
hatred of General Bolivar.
Mr. Charles Bresson, the French commissioner, sent the 
Duke of Montebello, who was traveling through our countries, 
to notify King Charles X that Colombia, wanting to free her­
self from demagoguery, was planning to adopt the monarchical 
system. Furthermore, he stated that she was ready to accept 
a prince of the House of Orleans as king. General Madrid and 
M. Palacios, Colombian ministers, received instructions to 
negotiate on this matter with the Tuileries and St. James 
cabinets.^ The council of ministers said that the Liberator 
had not issued his opinion on this matter, but that since his 
inviolable principle was to support what Congress did, they 
expected that he would approve the plan when a majority 
adopted it.
Many letters were written to Bolivar asking him to 
frankly state his opinion, but he answered none of them.
This proves that he was not entirely opposed to the ministers1
ISQeneral Madrid succeeded in establishing relations 
with Holland from his post in London. He negotiated a
treaty of peace, navigation, and commerce with Baron Falk
in 1829. Restrepo, Revolucidn de la Repdblica de Colombia, 
iV, 216-17.
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plans, for if he had been, surely he would not have left 
letters unanswered that dealt with such a vital affair for 
the Republic. The ministers, then, were not officially 
authorized to do anything but seek the protection, influence, 
mediation, or safeguard of a European nation other than 
Spain. This greatly displeased the admirers of the United 
States of North America whose minister in Colombia, Mr. 
[william] Harrison, counseled Bolivar on the establishment 
of a government similar to that of his country.16
In the month of August, Bolivar wrote to [Patrick] 
Campbell, who was in charge of Her Britannic Majesty's 
affairs. This is the letter that no Colombian historian has 
published. Since the Secretary of Foreign Affairs received 
a copy of it, the ministers supposed that Bolivar approved 
of their projects. The letter is as follows.17
TO COLONEL PATRICIO CAMPBELL, HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S
CHARGE D'AFFAIRS
Guayaquil, August 5, 1829.
My Esteemed Colonel and Friendi
16William Harrison had been appointed minister to 
Colombia by the John Quincy Adams administration and given 
specific instructions not to meddle in the internal affairs 
of the country. Judging by the United States' actions in 
Mexico under Poinsett, the Colombians seriously doubted that 
he would carry out these instructions. Harrison immediately 
plunged into the country's political affairs and declared 
himself to be the Liberator's enemy when the latter did not 
advocate a system of government similar to that of the United 
States for Colombia. When Harrison was replaced by colonel 
Thomas Moore in 1828 after Jackson's victory, Colombians 
sighed a sigh of relief. Ibid.. 203, 217-18.
17A copy of this letter may be found in Bolivar, 
Obras Completes. Ill, 278-79.
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I have the honor of informing you that I received 
your esteemed letter of May 31, dated in Bogota. I 
cannot but begin by thanking you for the multitude of 
kindnesses that you pour toward Colombia and me in 
your letter. How many claims do you have on our 
gratitude? I am humbled when I consider what you have 
thought and done since you have been among us in order 
to support the country and the glory of your chief.
The English minister residing in the United States 
honors me greatly when he says: that he has hopes for
Colombia only because there is a Bolivar here. But he 
does not know that his physical and political existence 
are very weakened and will fail soon.
What you tell me with respect to the new project of 
naming a European prince as my successor, does not 
surprise me. I had been broached on this topic some­
what, a little mysteriously and a little fearfully, 
for my way of thinking is known.
I do not know what to tell you about this idea 
which encompasses a thousand difficulties. You must 
know that there would be no obstacles presented by me, 
determined as I am to leave the command to this next 
congress; but, who can mitigate the ambition of our 
chiefs and the fear of inequality in the common people? 
Do you not think that England would feel jealousy at 
the election of a Bourbon? How much would the new 
American States oppose this? And the United States, 
which seem destined to plague the Americas with 
miseries in the name of liberty, how much would they 
oppose this also? It seems to me that I already see a 
general conspiracy against this poor Colombia (already 
envied too much by as many Republics as there are in 
America). All the press would launch a new crusade 
against the accomplices of treason to Liberty, against 
the proponents of the Bourbons, and against the vio­
lators of the American system. On the south, the 
Peruvians would light the flame of discord, while on the 
Isthmus the people of Guatemala and Mexico would follow 
suit. Throughout the Antilles, the Americans and lib­
erals from all parts would rebel. Santo Domingo would 
not remain inactive, but would call her brothers to 
wage a common cause against a prince of France. Every­
one would be converted into enemies, and Europe would 
do nothing to support us, for the Hew World does not 
merit the expenses of a Holy Alliance. At any rate, 
we have reason to think this is how Europe would react 
because of the indifference with which she saw us start 
to fight for the emancipation of half the world— a 
world which will very soon become the most productive 
fount of European prosperities.
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Finally, I am very far from opposing the reor­
ganization of Colombia according to the institu­
tions experimented with by a wise Europe. On the 
contrary, 1 would be infinitely happy and would 
enliven my forces to assist a task which might be 
called one of salvation and which would be achieved 
only with difficulty even when supported by England 
and by France. With the powerful aid of these two 
countries, we would be capable of anything; but with­
out it, we would not. Because of this, 1 hesitate to 
give my definite opinion until we know what the 
English and French governments think about the afore­
mentioned change of system and the election of a 
dynasty.
I assure you most sincerely, my worthy friend, 
that I have told you all my thoughts and held back 
nothing. You may use these thoughts as you find 
convenient to your duty and the well-being of Colom­
bia* this is the natural state of my thought.
Please receive the affectionate heart of your atten­
tive and obedient servant.— BOLlVAR.
This is a private copy.
The above letter is a copy of the one General Urdaneta 
included in his letter directed to General P&ez on September 
16, 1829, to whose care he entrusted it.— Caracas, October 1, 
1841.
JOSfi [Hilario] De Sistiaga.*®
The above letter is a copy of the one Urdaneta in­
cluded in his letter directed to General P&ez on September 
16, 1829, to whose care he entrusted this copy.— Caracas, 
November 2, 1841.
MANUEL CEREZO.
18Colonel Jos6 Hilario de Sistiaga, a native of Valen­
cia, was issued a Cavalry Colonel's commission in 1830 by 
General P&ez, which back-dated to 1826. This fact is offered 
as an indication of the services he rendered the independence 
cause. In 1828 P&ez had named him Governor of the Carabobo 
Province, and in 1834 he appointed him to serve as a Judge of 
the Central Court Martial Court. DAvila, Diccionario 
BioorAfico. II, 280.
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Whether it was because the Liberator feared to assume 
the responsibility for adopting a measure of uncertain success, 
or because he feared the youth who were enthusiastically sup­
porting the modern ideas and would involve the country in 
new dissensions, he disapproved all the plans in favor of a 
monarchy in an official letter dated November 22. Restrepo 
states that the ministers became indignant on reading this 
note and a d d s i ^
. . . the Liberator could have and should have made 
them avoid the risks and multitude of displeasures 
by speaking to them frankly from the beginning so 
that they would not have counted on his support in 
that difficult undertaking. No later than the month 
of May, they had told him about the plan they were 
entertaining concerning a monarchy. Four months went 
by before the celebrated agreement of September 3 was 
reached. There was more than enough time to have told 
them expressly that he could not support such a goal.
This was something that he should have done at least 
out of friendship. Nevertheless, he remained silent 
an additional three months, at the end of which he 
sent his gruff official disapproval. The language of 
events is eloquent.
On December 3 the ministers answered Bolivar’s note 
telling him that in order to carry out the orders he had 
given them to secure the protections of a European nation, 
they had felt it was necessary to show the latter that an 
attempt was being made to establish a lasting, stable, and 
permanent government. Furthermore, they stated that they 
had done even less than their instructions decreed, for 
these ordered them to solicit a protectorate for all of
l^This citation is not found in the Jos6 Jacquin edi­
tion of Restrepo, Revolucidn de la Republica de Colombia.
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America, and that they had only asked for Colombia's protec­
tion. Finally, since the counselors were hurt, they said 
that if they had to retract the propositions they had made, 
their ministry should be changed "so that those who enter 
negotiations will not have had any part in the project, and 
therefore will be able, without muffling or embarrassment, 
to manifest that we have changed our mind." Undoubtedly, 
much valor and a strong conviction was needed to take on 
such a tremendous responsibility as that which the ministers 
assumed in putting their projects into practice.
In Bolivar's opinion, the most efficacious means to 
prevent the annihilation of his efforts, was to elect a 
President for life and to have a hereditary senate. He had 
proposed this in Guayana in 1819. It can easily be seen 
that this system is very close to a constitutional monarchy, 
and that if Bolivar did not openly promote this type of 
government, it was due to an excess of prudence. He knew 
that he would have to reckon with violent parties, among 
which there would surely be those who would attribute ideas 
unworthy of his glory and of his genius to him. In an 
attempt to find out what the Liberator's opinion was on this 
matter of great interest being discussed in Colombia, I sent
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the following letter with Commandant Jos6 [de] Austria.20
HIS EXCELLENCY THE LIBERATOR PRESIDENT, GENERAL SIM6N
BOLlVAR
Mayquetia, July 22, 1829. 
My Beloved General and Friendt
Since my return from Apure, I have written you a 
letter in every outgoing mail about all the issues 
which I have considered worthy of your attention, 
and which could lend wisdom to your deliberations.
These considerations, which have always been an 
inviolable precept for me and the norm of my actions, 
lead me now with more reason than ever before to seek 
orders from you in order to bind myself to these as 
the only rule to guide the path of my political ship 
in the midst of the conflict presented by the opinion 
of some respectable and friendly people. I also want 
to delineate the observations I have made so far from 
your communications as well as from public opinion. 
Since the results will be of major transcendency and 
gravity, I shall not deviate one iota from your reso­
lution. In order to obtain the latter with the prompt­
ness and security I have felt necessary, I am sending 
Commandant Josfi Lde] Austria to bring this letter. He 
will be able to explain verbally all those things which 
are not easy to write, and I shall limit myself to 
making some general suggestions.
I have received a letter from General Urdaneta 
informing me of his opinion, as well as that of the 
most notable persons in the middle, concerning the
2°A copy of this letter may be found in Blanco and 
Azpurda (eds.), Documentos Para La Historia. XIII, 590-91.
General jos6 de Austria was born in Caracas in 1791.
He enlisted in the independence army in 1810 and served under 
Miranda in 1811 and 1812. In 1821 he served with General 
Bermudez in the Caracas campaign and by 1828 he was with 
Bolivar in Southern Colombia. He was promoted to the rank 
of General. He wrote the important Bosque1o de la Historia 
Militar de Venezuela en la Guerra de su Independencia.
Austria died in Caracas in 1863. D&vila, Diccionario 
Bioqr&fico, X, 24-25. Lecuna, Crdnica Razonada. I, 37, 137, 
163. Jos6 de Austria, Bosaueio de la Historia Militar de 
Venezuela en la Guerra de su Independencia (Caracas, 1855), 
v-xlvii.
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reforms on the governmental system. He has also 
demanded that I reveal my feelings to him. The 
sincerity of my character, the true friendship X 
profess for you, and the interest I take in your 
glory, have all made me think seriously about this 
arduous question which is vital for Colombia no 
matter how it is considered. This is because it is 
the heart of all the other branches of public admin­
istration and shall form either a monster that will 
destroy itself, or a moral being marching in harmony 
with its proper elements to create general happiness.
I have had recourse to your letters, especially the 
one in which you entrusted me to give the people an 
energetic manifesto to belie the calumnies with which 
your name was being maligned, and the one in which 
you told me to give the deputies the instructions 
that were in accord with the general will. In these 
I found that you stand for no other form of govern­
ment but a liberal one which is firm and vigorous, 
and which is capable of destroying anarchy forever 
and repelling federation and monarchy as foreign to 
public opinion. With these facts in mind, I frankly 
informed General Urdaneta about what you shall see in 
the copy I am including. Although in your reply you 
agree with me on everything, X understand from General 
Ibarra that you have written to him as well as to 
Urdaneta concurring with the opinions that they had 
manifested to you previously. Perplexity concerning 
your feelings has replaced certainty. You know, my 
dear General, that my desire is to do the correct 
thing, and I am certain that you cannot guide me 
except along the path that leads to Colombia's general 
well-being. This pleasant thought helps create the 
sincerity in me which essentially make me speak to you 
from my heart and never disguise the truth. Since not 
even a moment can be lost in these matters, I expect 
that you shall resolve this question which only you can 
conclude. Certain of my unchanging attachment to you, 
you may rest assured that I shall always be at your 
side as I have always told you.
Austria's efficacy and the speed with which he had 
discharged his previous commissions, afford me no 
anxiety regarding the promptness and other considera­
tions demanded by prudence.
Your most faithful friend and obedient servant who 
loves you with all his heart says goodbye.
JOS& A. PAEZ.
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In reply to this letter, the Liberator sent me the 
following instructions by Austria. These may be seen in 
Volume 30CII, page 15, of Documentos de la Vida Pftblica del 
Libert ador. ^
When His Excellency the Liberator sent me from 
Popay&n on this past December 15, after I had ful­
filled the commission which His Excellency the 
Superior Chief of Venezuela saw fit to confide in me, 
he reduced his instructions and special charges to 
two principal points.
First: to manifest to His Excellency the Superior
Chief and his other friends, the unsurmountable 
obstacles that existed opposing the establishment of 
a monarchy in Colombia. Consequently, those persons 
who desired a change in our political form as the 
only means to improve the critical situation the 
country demanded, were very much in error. Public 
opinion has said nothing about this transformation.
One had to be of the opinion that the people, whose 
will would serve as the only guide, would not change 
their republican forms for a monarchy— a word which 
would only serve to alarm them and to revive the 
patriotic enthusiasm which was b o m  with the first 
cry of liberty. Uttered on the first day of our 
revolution, this cry inspired immense sacrifices from 
the people and heroic efforts from the citizens.
That if at other times His Excellency had indicated 
that he was in favor of a more or less energetic and 
stable government, it should never have been deduced 
that this was in the sense of this violent a change. 
Judging from the customs, morals, and enlightenment 
of the country, he has been able to assign the 
criteria of his thoughts to his fellow citizens and 
use as his only guide at all times the protection of 
the public liberties and the granting of the greatest 
number of individual guarantees possible.
That the day has arrived in which the people in
21since Documentos Para la Historia contains only 
fourteen volumes, P&ez must refer here to the Coleccidn de 
Documentos. It contains only twenty-one volumes, however, 
and these instructions were not included in Volume XXI. A 
copy of these instructions are included in Bolivar, Obras 
Completes. Ill, 384, 385 ff.
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general, and men in particular, could freely and 
legally pronounce the forms of government which 
should be established, or the improvements that 
the country demanded. This was as a result of the 
October 16 Decree, which should serve as the norm 
for the deliberations by the constituent congress. 
Because of this. His Excellency had abstained from 
giving any opinion on the matter so that the 
deputies would recognize no other principles but 
those which emanated from the pure force of the 
nation.
That His Excellency has said previously that he 
would never exchange his title of Liberator for that 
of emperor or king, and that this has been, and still 
is, his heart's most sincere desire. Finally, even 
if all of Colombia, in a most determined and resolved 
manner, should want a king, His Excellency would not 
be the monarch.
Secondly* To persuade His Excellency the Superior 
Chief about the advantages which would accrue to 
Colombia from the Liberator's separation from the 
Republic's supreme command. His Excellency hesitated 
quite a bit at this point and demonstrated insurmount­
able reasons. He made the advantages which the country 
would report from this alienation very evident. These 
would be so much more useful and necessary when the 
august and formidable tribunal of opinions of the Old 
and Hew World had opened their judgments on His Excel­
lency's political conduct, and after Colombia and 
other sister towns had disturbed the peace and altered 
their institutions. They would be influenced apparently 
by the immense power that a conflagration of unheard 
of evils and fortuitous circumstances had forced the 
people to deposit in His Excellency's hands, and which 
he had been forced to accept and exercise despite a 
thousand conspiracies.
That the opinions that were evidently in favor of a 
political change to bring a monarchical form of govern­
ment to the country made his resolution to rush from 
the Presidency of the State and mingle with his fellow 
citizens, more irrevocable. It also made him want to 
fling himself first before the Constituent Congress 
that was going to assemble and swear his obedience 
before the new magistrate they would elect. He would 
offer him all his influence and all his resources in 
order to buttress his authority and to secure the 
triumph and stability of this regeneration which would 
be based exclusively on the people's most spontaneous 
free will.
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That this great moral act on His Excellency's 
behalf was necessary as the most splendid end to 
his public life after suppressing a thousand internal 
revolutions that had recognized different and contra­
dictory principles, after celebrating an honorable 
peace with Peril which satisfied the vindication of 
Colombia's honor, and after completely reuniting the 
national sovereignty. After this eloquent example, 
who could possible intend to usurp the rights of the 
people? Tyrants could never exist in Colombia.
Complying with the opinion generally held that he 
not leave the country, he would be satisfied for now 
to renounce his supreme command and lend his services 
as a general, if they were thought to be necessary.
He would redouble his zeal and his efforts until he 
saw that the Constitution and the laws ruled, and that 
the ferocious Hydra of anarchy had left forever. His 
Excellency repeated a thousand times to me that his 
resolution was irrevocable, that he wanted to raise 
his head up high one day without being aggravated by 
atrocious and incessant calumny.
That the good or the evil produced by his adminis­
tration in Colombia has fallen exclusively on him, 
when perhaps some of this had originated elsewhere 
since he had never been absolute in his country's 
administration. He had always been surrounded by a 
ministry. Listening to the voice of a council, he 
could never credit himself with being the exclusive 
author of either the good or the bad. Although his 
name presided over a thousand acts, he had neither 
had, nor wanted to have, a part in some of them.
Finally, he begged His Excellency General PAez, and 
all his fellow citizens to cooperate with him to save 
his glory, for this glory was not his exclusive prop­
erty. Rather, it belonged to Colombia, and being 
Colombia's, it should be preserved intact.
In order to alienate the will of the people and find 
some means to satisfy their wrath, my enemies have forged 
the calumny that I was an instrument in south America to 
prepare the fall of the Republican system and the establish-
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ment of a monarchy.22 Once again, as I have already done at 
other times, I challenge them before a tribunal of those who 
were contemporary to the events to present the testimony of 
a worthy Venezuelan out of those that still live and figured
in the period which we are now narrating, to prove that I
had any part in the projects for a monarchy in Colombia. Do 
not think that my efforts to prove the contrary arise out of 
a need to vindicate myself for a crime of which I am accused.
Noi I only propose to confuse a calumny that was forged by
dislike. If I had propagated for a monarchical government,
I would confess it today without blushing. This has already 
been done by many of Colombia's eminent men who ended their 
great services to the nation's independence cause at a time 
when others began to vociferate, in the plazas and by means 
of the press, their love for a land which the former had
22on October 1, 1825 P&ez wrote a letter to Bolivar in
PertS in which he compared the state of Colombia to that of
France when Napoleon was in Egypt. At the beginning of this 
letter, P&ez stated that he was sending this message by 
Briceno "who can tell you everything that is not expressed 
in this writing." Blanco and Azpurda <eds.), Documentos
Para la Historia. X, 119. On December 11, 1826 Bolivar wrote
PAez from San Josd de cdcutai "You know very well that 
Guzm&n did not come to Lima except to offer me your proposi­
tion that I destroy the Republic, imitating Bonaparte. . . . 
By Colonels Ibarra and Urbaneja you have proposed a crown for 
me which I have duly rejected." Lecuna (ed.), gartas del 
Libertador, VI, 116. Although P&ez cites Briceno as the 
bearer of his October 1 letter, Bolivar mentions QuzmAn 
repeatedly as the messenger who delivered this particular 
epistle. The reason for this deviation is that Briceno 
MAndez was forced to stay in Bogota as a deputy to Congress, 
and so he gave the correspondence to Quzm&n. Gil Fortoul, 
Historia Constitucional de Venezuela. I, 627.
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given them at the coat of many sacrifices. The only docu­
ment they have dared to present to prove their accusation is 
a letter concerning which I shall copy what can be seen in 
Numbers 6 and 7 of the Revisor. a newspaper edited in Curazao 
by SefEor D[on] A[ntonio] j[os4 de] Irisarri in the year 
1849.23
In the Republicano. number 214, may be found 
another article on Flores, P&ez, and irisarri, which 
contains only the most solemn document concerning 
the fraud with which General PAez's enemies try to 
deceive the Venezuelan people. The letter which is 
copied in the cited number of the Republicano, re­
portedly sent by General PAez to Bolivar by General 
Bricefio, is not the letter that General PAez sent, 
but one which was forged by the malevolence of this 
General's enemies. This has been proven most 
solemnly on the nineteenth of this month in the 
presence of forty-five persons assembled casually 
to witness the evil of those letter-forgers who 
today govern Venezuela.
The following men were assembled on this cited 
day in Senor TomA Naar's country house in the vicinity 
of Curazao for the purpose of celebrating the anni­
versary of April 19, 1810: the home owners; Seftores
TomA Naar, Jr., jacabo Naar, Jacobo Henriquez, josA 
Dacosta GOmez, and Pedro cranveld, a Dutchman;
Seflores Clemente Barclay, Samuel M. Jarvis, and 
Nathaniel Jarvis, North Americans; Seftores General 
PAez, Don Angel Quintero, Dr. Hilario Nada. Dr. Pedro 
JosA Estoquera, General Domingo HernAndez, Minister 
JosA Ayala, Colonel JosA F. castejon. Colonel Dolores 
HernAndez; and Sefiores Mariano Ustaris, J. A. Serrano,
J. A. Izquierdo, J. E. Gallegos, Jaime Harris, JosA de 
J. Villasmil, Antonio Tinoco Ayala, Juan R. Marcucci,
23Antonio JosA de Irisarri had served as Chilean 
ambassador in London in the 1820's and had been able to 
secure a loan for the purchase of ammunition and supplies. 
Lecuna, CrOnica Razonada. Ill, 267.
In 1849 PAez, who had broken with President JosA 
Tadeo Monagas, had been defeated by the Monaguistas and was 
in Saint Thomas, en route to his exile in the United States 
which began in 1850. Cunninghame Graham, PAez, 290. Mordn, 
History of Venezuela. 163.
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Jr., J. B. Marcucci, Jr., Luis Marcucci, Diego Sutil, 
Francisco Ustariz, Teofilo Celis, Eliodoro Montilla,
Jos6 Manuel Molero, Jaime Pocaterra, Licenciado R. 
Martinez, Juan C. Las Casas, Commandant Joaquin 
Chassin, Guillermo Leiva, J. A. Montobio, Inocente 
Lovera, Antonio Carmona, Antonio Maria Monsanto, and 
the editor of the Revisor.
Senor Pedro Cranveld, one of those attending, pre­
sented at this gathering Number 214 of the Republicano. 
which he had gotten in the mail, and began to read the 
letter found there from General P&ez to Bolivar. Gen­
eral P&ez immediately said that he remembered having 
written something similar to that, but that it was 
not the same. In order to convince everyone present 
of the truth, he ordered the box that contained the 
correspondence with Generals Bolivar and Urdaneta 
brought from his house. The box was brought in effect, 
and someone started to read Bruzual's printing and I, 
the editor of the Revisor, read the carbon of the letter 
in the presence of all those there. We found that 
entire sentences had been suppressed, that large sec­
tions had been added, and that passages had been altered 
to make the letter contain the opposite of what General 
P&ez wrote. All the world shall also see what we, the 
forty-five witnesses, have seen in General Urdaneta's 
letters. This is to say that if the project for a 
monarchy which the Duke of Montebello brought was not 
carried into effect, it was due to General P&ez's 
oppos ition.24
In later years a letter had been published which it is 
claimed Bolivar directed to me in answer to this one. In it 
there is talk that Colombia is not France, nor the Liberator,
24The author footnotes this as follows. "On different 
occasions malicious people have forged my signature to autho­
rize some document. In 1835 the Reformists falsified it to 
deceive and compromise General Manuel Vald6s, Commandant of 
Arms of the Cumana Province. By means of a false letter 
they led him to believe that I supported the reforms. Later 
in 1840, a Venezuelan colonel, also by means of a false 
letter of mine, defrauded General Santa Anna of ten thousand 
pesos. A little later SefEor Sayors, of La Guaira, was the 
victim of another deceit and paid three thousand pesos to a 
certain 'Lucas Gdmez1 in compliance with another forged 
letter of mine. The person the public pointed out as the 
thief is still living."
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Napoleon, et c e t e r a . 25 j not remember ever having re­
ceived this letter, which is not to be found in the Docu-
26mentos de la Vida Pdblica de Bolivar. it has more of the 
characteristic of a manifesto to the nation, than a reply to 
a private communication.
There are those who have written that Senor [Antonio] 
Leocadio GuzmAn was commissioned by me to take this letter in 
which I was supposed to have proposed the establishment of a 
monarchy in Columbia to the Liberator.27 Fortunately, SerSor
2^This is a letter the Liberator is supposed to have 
written PAez from Magdalena on March 6, 1826. In it Bolivar 
statest "I have received your very important letter of 
October 1 of this past year which you sent by Senor GuzmAn, 
whom I have seen and heard not without surprise, for his mis­
sion is extraordinary. You tell me that the situation in 
Colombia is very similar to that of France when Napoleon was 
in Egypt. . . . Nor is Colombia, France, nor I, Napoleon." 
Lecuna (ed.), Cartas del Libertador, V, 230-40.
2®in effect, PAez never received this letter, for 
Santander intercepted it in BogotA and kept it, claiming to 
Bolivar later that the letter had arrived at a time when 
PAez was being called before the Senate, and he feared 
Bolivar's letter might arouse PAez to further insubordina­
tion. Gil Fortoul, Historia Constitucional de Venezuela. I, 
629. Contrary to what the author states, however, this 
letter is included in Blanco and Azpurtla, Documentos Para la 
Historia. X, 211-12.
27£nt:onio Leocadio GuzmAn was a Paecista at one time. 
In 1840, when the names of Venezuela's two historic parties. 
Conservative and Liberal, came into use, he founded the 
Liberal Party. Since he had fallen out of favor with PAez 
because of a personal clash with a stronger Paecista, GuzmAn 
founded this party as the one in opposition to the reigning 
conservatives. In fact, GuzmAn followed a conservative 
philosophy. In 1846 he led a Liberal revolt which was 
quashed, and in 1847 GuzmAn was condemned to death, but later 
this sentence was commuted to exile. He left the country, 
but returned soon to collaborate with JosA Tadeo Monagas, 
the Conservative President-elect. Then in 1857 GuzmAn led
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GuzmAn still lives and still boasts about being my enemy. 
Nevertheless, I appeal to his testimony to state if I gave 
him the aforementioned letter, or if he ever received funds 
either out of mine or Venezuela's to go on this commission 
to Perd where the Liberator was. I also want him to state 
if his voyage had as its objective proposing any plan of 
monarchy to him.
The person who wrote in "The Order of Caracas" on 
"Monarchy in Colombia," should know that General Urdaneta 
was the chief instigator of the establishment of a monarchi­
cal form of government, and not I.28 No one should hold 
this against him, for he believed that his ideas would save 
the country from the anarchy which threatened to desolate it. 
No bastard project could animate that General when he pos­
sessed the idea that the realization of his plan could end 
all the difficulties with which the Liberator struggled. His 
illustrious name, acquired at the cost of great sacrifices
the Liberal opposition to Monagas which by 1859 had become 
Federalist under Zamora. In 1863 Falcdn became provi­
sional president of the Venezuelan federation, and GuzmAn 
Blanco, GuzmAn's son, became Vice-President. From this 
point on, GuzmAn Blanco assumed his father's leadership over 
the "Liberal" Party. Mordn, History of Venezuela. 158, 159, 
160, 161, 164, 165, 167, 168, 170-71, 175, 176, 179.
28Gil Fortoul, noted expert on the constitutional his­
tory of Venezuela, does not mention General Urdaneta once in 
connection with the proposed plans for the establishment of 
a monarchy. However, he does discuss at length PAez's 
"Caesaristic project of 1825." Historia Constitucional de 
Venezuela, I, 626-30.
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and great deeds, cannot suffer any detriment simply because 
the ultra-republicans of the day might choose to believe 
that the ideas he held are a sin against the Holy Spirit.
It is very painful for me today to have it appear that I 
want to obscure in the slightest the glory acquired by a 
comrade in arms, who was a worthy general and an illustrious 
patriot; however, these and other bitter tests have to be 
survived by those who have to defend themselves against the 
attacks of malevolence. in the name of honesty, I want to 
assert again that it is not my desire to attack the memory 
of Bolivar's illustrious friend. I am only forced to make 
this protest by the intolerant spirit of the pseudo-liberals 
who believe today that one can be a patriot only by being 
ultra-republican.
As a result of the letters I had written him pre­
viously, urdaneta wrote me on May 30, 1829 telling me he had 
desisted from his project in favor of an idea that had been 
generally accepted by many notable and very eminent men in 
Colombia. Despite his promise not to speak about the matter 
again, he sent me the Liberator's letter to Campbell in 
September. At this time he wrote me again about the plan, 
fearing that I had not understood it well. Finally, on 
November 23, he promised definitely not to think about the 
matter again. He stated this in a manner which is the best 
recommendation that can be made concerning his character, 
and the best proof of the good faith with which he had been 
working on this project.
643
Well now: if I had thought differently than what I 
had written Urdaneta in my letters, why does he not refer 
to this, throw my inconstancy in my face, and remind me of 
my previous commitments? The letter which cites the article 
that I am concerned with, does not exist in my archives, and 
I do not remember having received it. If it was written, I 
never received it. To prove all this, it is sufficient to 
compare that sole letter with all the others. If this is 
not adequate, I copy in continuation here fragments of other 
letters from Urdaneta, which I do not copy in their entirety 
because they also deal with other matters.
On April 23, 1829, urdaneta wrote me: "I am anxiously
awaiting a letter from you after Austria's arrival. It is 
necessary that we take charge of Colombia’s future. All my
measures are partial, as you say, until I hear from you."43
30On February 9, 1830 he wrote the following.
Do not find it strange that I speak to you again 
about the injustice with which the Liberator has been 
attacked.— Read my correspondence again and you shall 
see in all of it that the Liberator has been very far 
from having a part in the project. I always told you 
that many men, supposedly patriots, and very much the 
patriots, desired a change in the form of government.
I, too, have deemed it necessary. These ideas have 
been born out of the horrors with which the parties
29General Rafael Urdaneta wrote Memorias del General 
Rafael Urdaneta. (See footnote 3 in Chapter V of this 
manuscript for additional information on Urdaneta.) He 
included many important letters he wrote and received in this 
work. It is significant to note that he did not include 
this one to PAez.
^Urdaneta did not include this letter to PAez either
in his Memorias.
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have distinguished themselves, and out of the hope­
lessness for peace and order left to us after the 
events of the year XXVII until the conspiracy of 
September 25 and the later ones. Not being able to 
count on the Liberator's support for it, the project 
could not be achieved unless the nation forced him 
to admit it and sacrifice his glory for Colombia's 
stability.— You told me in one of your letters that 
you would do nothing until the Liberator commanded 
you because you did not want to do anything without 
his consent. I replied to you that the Liberator 
could not tell you anything concerning a matter of 
which he disapproved. If it were believed to be 
suitable for Colombia, it should be done by the 
nation, completely separate from the Liberator, who 
would never approve it, and because of this, could 
never advise you to do it. _I invited you to join 
in this project, for there was no opposition here.
If Venezuela adhered to it, it could all be done.
If, then, from all my correspondence it can be seen 
that the Liberator has been opposed to the project, 
why is he attacked? Why so much offense? If only 
they would write against me and against those of us 
who have held these opinions. It would never be 
just because I have done nothing more than to seek 
your support and that of a few friends from there in 
favor of am idea which in my eyes, could save us 
from the horrors we have witnessed in these later 
times and from the general anarchy which has condemned 
America up till today. However, I have not hurt any­
one .
To those who have written that the objective of the 
commission which I gave [Diego Bautista] Urbaneja when I sent 
him to the Liberator in Perti was to offer him a crown on his 
return to Colombia, I direct the following letter which I 
demanded from Urbaneja when this infamous calumny began to 
be propagated.
3^Diego Bautista Urbaneja was born in Barcelona, Vene­
zuela in 1785. By 1810 he was in Caracas, an ardent proponent 
of the revolution and liberty. He was forced to emigrate in 
1814 when Monteverde reestablished Spanish control in Vene­
zuela. In 1819 he was a member of the Congress that met in 
Angostura and signed the Constitution. He was immediately
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Senor General Josd Antonio PAez.
Caracas, September 9, 1841.
My esteemed friend and sir:
In your esteemed letter of the sixth, you demand 
my testimony concerning the purpose of the commission 
which you conferred on me in the year XXVI for His 
Excellency the Liberator. You tell me expressly not 
to omit any detail from it, even if it were confi­
dential .
Immediately following the political changes of the 
year XXVI, Dr. Cristobal Mendoza revealed your desire 
to me that I accompany Senor Diego Ibarra on the mis­
sion you were thinking about sending to the Liberator 
concerning the troubles we were experiencing in those 
times. He outlined its objectives somewhat, and I 
did not hesitate to take charge. It followed, then, 
that I should approach you to receive your orders and 
instructions. You told me briefly then that the 
objective of the mission was to instruct the Liberator 
about what had occurred and show him the urgent need 
for his return to Colombia to take charge of its 
government. You considered this the only means of 
avoiding the civil war which could engulf the Republic. 
Nevertheless, you added that it might be wise to 
listen to the opinions of some employees and notable 
persons on this matter: so a junta was celebrated in
effect. Its result was what you had indicated to me 
it would be. I limited the fulfillment of the confi­
dence you saw fit to deposit in me to this. The 
mission contained no other objective, public or private.
named Secretary of Internal and Foreign Affairs. Later he 
became a Supreme Court Justice. In 1831 he was elected 
Vice-President of Venezuela and served in this capacity 
until 1835. When Piez was reelected to the presidency in 
1839, Urbaneja was a member of his cabinet. In 1847, under 
JosA Tadeo Monagas' Presidency, he served as Vice-President 
of Venezuela again. Urbaneja died in Caracas in 1855. 
Scarpetta and Vergara, Diccionario Bioar&fico. 640-41. 
Mordn, History of Venezuela. 127, 141, 153, 154, 156, 158, 
162.
646
With the greatest consideration, I am your very 
attentive and obedient servant.
Q.B.S.M.32
D. B. URBANEJA.
If my profession of faith is desired, I shall make it 
anew here and in this manner relegate it to history. I am 
certain that it is not possible for me to change my opinion, 
for I have reached that period in life when error is wont to 
be tenacious and impenitent.
In keeping with my background, my character, the 
impressions of my youth, my love for the people, and if my 
enemies choose, my own ambition, I could not be a partisan 
of the monarchical system. The disorders that followed 
independence would have been sufficient to make me a mon­
archist if I had not been convinced that those evils arose, 
not out of the principles we had adopted, but out of stupid 
egotism and evil ambition— two mortal enemies of nations' 
well-being. The ravages these have caused includei falsi­
fying the most sacred beliefs,* placing the principles of 
political and private morals in difficult straits; and 
flattering the evil instincts of bad passions with fawning 
just as in other times Caesar's courtesans flattered the 
tyrant's bad instincts and passions in order to dominate him 
better after he was corrupted. These evils are certainly
32These initials stand for Quien Besa Su Mano. "who 
kisses your hand."
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not circumscribed only to the unfortunate South American 
Republics.
From time to time there will appear among all the 
people of the earth similar deluges in the political order. 
These will be more or less prolonged, in keeping with the 
degree of enlightenment and disposition of the people in­
volved. In the final analysis, we see these deluges in all 
countries, in all zones, under all systems of government, 
with more or less just diverse pretexts. These invoke 
exaggerated and flattering principles difficult to realize 
which announce themselves, appear, and eclipse themselves 
later. Then these principles leave behind them the stamp of 
destruction and the bitter memory of an experience dearly 
acquired. A century has not yet elapsed since illustrious 
Europe, both monarchical and republican, felt the most pro­
found shaking that any people on earth can experience. 
Liberty, morals, religion, and humanity fled for some time 
from that Old World— a world old with years and experience 
in the practice of social life, and always proud of its 
illustrious and powerful titles. Still that unfortunate 
period passed, and the European towns knotted the chain of 
progress and continued advancing in the path of civilization. 
At the cost of terrible tests, Europe has acquired a wealth 
of expensive experience for the future and the certainty 
that, despite every effort, the same scenes will repeat 
themselves later on. Meanwhile the people shall always be 
the spectators and the victims. Stupid egotism and evil
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ambition, the two untiring executioners, will be repaid in 
infamy and the opprobium of many years, and conceded only 
the hour of triumph by the ignorance of the mass of halluci­
nated people.
The simple enunciation of these historical truths and 
these contemporary events, which are repeated at certain 
times in all countries, regardless of the form of government 
and homogeneity of its population, authorize me to conclude 
with sane logic that America's misfortunes, and particularly 
those of Venezuela, do not stem from the institutions nor the 
political principles adopted, nor from the heterogeneity or 
diverse colors of the population, but from those endemic 
evils which I have mentioned. These sprouts exist in all 
hearts, and when their growth is stimulated by turbulent 
geniuses, they blossom out and necessarily cause misfortunes, 
many times irreparable. Universal phenomena should also 
recognize universal causesi man is susceptible to demoralize 
himself everywhere with more or less ease, in keeping with 
the degree of his learning, his disposition, his station in 
life, and even the climate and air that he breathes. If 
this is true, it is no less true that the American people who 
are more innocent, more simple, less learned, placed under 
climates propicious to the development of passions, spread 
out over an immense and almost deserted territory, and with 
difficult means of communication, would also lend themselves 
more readily to serve as an instrument for the ambitious 
demagogues in exchange for flattering promises which are
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never attainable. It is for these reasons that scenes of 
bloodshed and desolation which prevent progress and the 
consolidation of these young Republics [regardless of their 
governmental form, of the kindness of their political princi­
ples, or of the strict and sane intentions of their good 
sons] are repeated more frequently among us. This is why 
there have been and still are Republics in America that are 
happy with these elements and have progressed with astonish­
ing rapidity among their sisters who are victims of the most 
unchecked anarchy. In Chile essentially the same principles 
reign that have been adopted in all Spanish America, and its 
population is also heterogeneous. Yet Chile's progress is 
to be envied and worthy of being presented as a model to the 
other Republics sharing the same origin.
For a period of sixteen years Venezuela also enjoyed 
the same advantages. Her credit in the world market was 
superior to that of this very Chile. Her industry had been 
developed in a portentous manner. The habits of order, 
morality, work, and submission to the law had been dissemi­
nated among the people in such a manner, that I did not need 
bayonets to govern the Republic peacefully both times it fell 
my lot to guide her destinies. I barely maintained insig­
nificant garrisons to guard the chief prisons and the 
national parka. Everyone possessed confidence in public 
opinion and national security, and these were the object of 
admiration and praise from all learned foreigners who visited 
our country. All the citizens enjoyed the most ample and
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boundless right of voting, being elected, and revealing their 
thoughts in word and writing. There were always complete 
individual guarantees. Property and the Venezuelan right of 
asylum were held sacred. Free public instruction was avail­
able on all scales, and without any exceptions. Perhaps we 
dedicated to this important branch greater quantities of 
money than our finances permitted. Industrial freedom, with­
out any catches or privileges of any kind, was guaranteed to 
all persons who were interested. Never was any Venezuelan 
excluded from participation in these pleasures. Equality 
before the law was an effective principle in the Republic. 
Religious freedom was respected. From 1830 until 1846 the 
people were free to elect whom they wanted. Few Venezuelans 
of some merit have failed to fill some public post. Those 
who did not must remember that there was not sufficient 
positions in any country to satisfy the ambition of all those 
who can aspire to them. Then some of these men might have 
lacked the moral aptitude to guarantee the proper discharge 
of their duties, which is what creates happiness for the 
people.
I shall not deny that it is the people's fault if 
demagogues find in them a passion they can easily seduce, 
flatter, and convert into harm for society. Because of this, 
I shall always place among the friends of humanity those who 
use all their influence to destroy these vulgar preoccupa­
tions, leave behind all ideas of division, and make all 
interests homogeneous. For the man of talent, regardless of
651
his origin, color does not grant or take titles to merit.
Color shall always be an accident, as is the greatest or 
slightest perfection of the configuration of the human body. 
God has established a more noble inequality which is con­
venient to know because it is an individual justice and a 
social stimulus. Appreciate the man because of his soul, 
because of his capacity, because of his heart, and because 
of his virtues. The most capable and the most virtuous 
shall be the most distinguished citizens in a State, regard­
less of whether they are white, black, or mottled. These 
have been the principles I have held all my life, and I have 
professed them with sincerity, publicly as well as privately.
Finally, I must declare this* no anti-republican 
tendency in South America has ever merited my support or 
approval. I have stated this, and 1 have proven it repeatedly 
in the course of my long public career. Hy enemies in bad 
faith have proposed to attribute to me tendencies contrary 
to the Republican form. I have challenged them, and I 
challenge them again to present an authentic document or at 
least an event to justify their calumny. Vain declamations 
and free suppositions are not sufficient to stain the public 
life of a citizen. Proofs admissible to sane criticism are 
necessary.
Out of moderation and respect for memories which are 
sacred to me, 1 had not wanted to publish documents which 
the reader has seen; however, my enemies have made it neces­
sary for me to take this step. Meanwhile, they are the ones
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who should prove the imputation of what they have made them­
selves responsible for if they do not want to be labeled 
before the impartial tribunal of opinion with the deserved 
title of liars. 1 leave them in possession of this. I have 
always believed, and I have always maintained with profound 
conviction that the Spanish American States should not and 
cannot admit any form of government but the republican one. 
To think the opposite would be delirious in my opinion. Yes, 
an honest republic sooner or later will create the happiness 
of these nations. Before achieving this, however, they will 
have endured many painful tests as daughters of inexperience, 
which is inherent to all periods of infancy and to all 
systems which are being tried out. This is especially true 
when they have not been preceded by a preparatory period. 
However, true liberty shall finally triumph in America. All 
tyrannies, whether one or many, will be equally execrated. 
Columbus's world will attain the high destinies which nature 
has assigned to it with so much predilection.
These have been the beliefs 1 have held all of my 
life. Today these are my legitimate hopes, and as long as 
Providence keeps me alive, I shall dedicate myself unre­
servedly to the triumph of the same principles which I have 
maintained since 1810. Age and the ingratitude of men have 
not made the ardor and purity with which I have always lived 
lukewarm. The events of my life have well proven this.
General [Joaquin] Posada [or Posada Gutierrez] in the 
Memoirs which he has just published, and even others before
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this worthy soldier of independence, affirm that I was 
responsible for preventing the projects of monarchy in 
Colombia from being successfully carried out.33 It becomes 
difficult to conciliate the opinions of some with the calumnies 
of others. As for me, I am content.
33(5eneral Joaquin Posada Gutiferrez was born in Carta­
gena in 1797 and entered the Republican army as a Lieutenant 
in 1821. He fought in the Battles of Coro, Quiciro, and 
Barranquilla. He was forced to retreat to Maracaibo when the 
Royalist Army occupied the Coro Province. Wounded at both 
the Battles of Casiguano and Juritiva, he went on to fight 
at the Battles of Molino and Cienaga which kept Morales's 
forces from dominating this territory. Prom 1824 until 1826 
he was in Cartagena. By 1826 he had been promoted to the 
rank of Colonel, and then helped to draw up a boundary treaty 
with Ecuador. A member of the Granadine Congress at various 
times, he supported the established government in the revo­
lutions of 1840, 1854, and 1860. He wrote and published 
Memorias Histdrico-Poilticas del General Joaauln Posada 
Guti6 rrez. 4 vols. (Bogota, 1929). Scarpetta and Vergara, 
Diccionario Biogr&fico. 485. Madariaga, Bolivar. 532, 569, 
584, 613, 621, 622, 624, 640.
CHAPTER XXV
Internal Situation of Colombia— Manifesto to 
the Northern Colombians.
1829
The year we are now in our narration revealed how 
grave Colombia's situation was. Very complicated questions 
presented themselves. A study of them should serve the 
judicious historian as an explanation of the events which 
would verify themselves in later years. Among the evils 
which afflicted the Republic, the war with Perd was not one 
of the least important.1 Aside from the scandal presented 
the world by the fraticidal war among people that had yet to 
organize themselves, sending troops and ships to the terri­
tory and coasts of Perd cost more them the Colombian treasury
^This was a short struggle that started in 1828 and 
ended in 1829 over the ownership of part of the province of 
Mainas and the whole of Jadn. The former had come under the 
Viceroyalty of Perd in 1802, and the latter in 1821. This 
area which had once been under Peruvian political jurisdic­
tion, came under Colombian control in 1824. When the 
friction between Colombia and Perd reached a climax in 1828, 
Perd sent forces north with the aim of annexing Guayaquil.
The Colombian troops led by General Sucre decisively defeated 
the Peruvians; consequently, in February of 1829 Perd agreed 
to a withdrawal from the soil claimed by Colombia, the sur­
render of a war vessel, and the payment of $150,000 to 
Colombia. Mary Wilhelmine Williams, The People and Politics 
of Latin America (Boston, 1945), 605.
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could afford. Even then, our coasts and territory remained 
exposed to the threats of the Spaniards who did not desist 
from the projects of reconquest and who, according to public 
rumors, were preparing a new expeditionary army against 
Costa Firme.
The laurels gathered by some military men in the war 
with PertS and the luxury with which they returned from that 
country, excited the jealousies and animosities of the 
veterans who had stayed in Colombia and had not yet been paid 
for their services. However, the latter were too pretentious 
in their demands. The heroes of Pertl and the military men of 
Colombia formed the sane external contrast that the comrades 
of [SebastiAn de] Benalcazar and the soldiers of [NicolAs] 
Frederman [sic. Federmann] did when both conquistadores 
encountered [Gonzalo Jimenez de] Quesada on the plain of 
Bogota.2
2Henao and Arrubla statei "Quesada's men wore cotton 
clothes made by the Indians, Federmann1s were dressed in 
hides, while Benalcazar's wore fine scarlet and silk." 
History of Colombia. 53.
Sebastian de Benalcazar (or Belalcazar, depending on 
the writer) was born probably between 1478 and 1480 in the 
village of Belalcazar, Spain. His family name was Moyano, 
and his parents, of humble origin, worked their own small 
farm. When Columbus was getting ready in Seville in 1498 to 
make his third voyage to the New World, young Sebastian made 
his way to that city and obtained passage with the idea of 
settling in Santo Domingo. During the conquest of this 
island, he served in the ranks, distinguishing himself until 
he became an experienced captain. Santo Domingo proved too 
small for his ambitionsi so he went to Darien to serve under 
Balboa in the exploration of the Pacific Coast. Under 
Pedrarias orders, he accompanied Francisco de Cdrdoba in the 
expedition to Nicaragua and won the appointment as alcalde of 
the city of LeOn. He returned to Panami and joined his
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The Liberator's absence at a time when a sordid agita­
tion and conjectures of a nearing tempest were beginning to
former friends, the Pissarros, in the conquest of Perd. He 
even founded Quito, capital of the Republic of Ecuador. 
Benalcazar was not content, however, with being a subaltern, 
and he decided to push northward beyond PerQ's frontiers to 
discover new lands. While doing this he heard Luis de Daza 
speak about a tale an Indian had told him relating the 
peculiar ceremony in which the chief of one of the Indian 
villages would cover his body with gold dust and then bathe 
himself in a small lake into which the jewels offered the 
gods were thrown. From this came the name El. Dorado given 
to the region, in search of which the Spaniards suffered so 
many hardships. To find this "gilded mem," Benalcazar 
ordered explorations across the southern frontier of Colombia 
and was responsible for founding several cities. In 1541 
Benalcazar returned from Spain with the title of adelantado 
and an appointment as life-governor of Popay&n, which he had 
founded. In 1546 he had Jorge Robledo, one of his lieuten­
ants, killed because of insubordination. He then served 
under Pedro de la Gasca in the pacification of Perd. In 
1550, due mainly to the complaints of Robledo's widow, 
Benalcazar was tried, deposed, and sentenced to death. The 
sentence was commuted, however, and Benalcazar was sent to 
Spain. He died in Cartagena on April 30, 1551 of a fever he 
contracted on the voyage. Ibid., 35-41, 52-53, 68-69, 73-75, 
77, 80.
Nicol&s Federmann was the most celebrated of the 
Germans who explored for the Welsers. He was a native of 
the city of Ulm. In 1530 Federmann was in Venezuela at the 
head of an expedition and wrote Narracidn del Primer Viaie 
de Federmann a Venezuela (Caracas, 1916), to describe it.
Early in 1535, [jorge de] Spira (who had been appointed to 
succeed Federmann) and Federmann met in Coro and agreed to 
divide the men and each go his own way in search of gold. In 
1539 Federmann1s forces encountered those of Quesada in the 
Bosa fields. Quesada and Federmann pledged mutual friendship 
and support. Then Quesada sent his brother to the unknown 
force camped on the Magdalena, which consisted of Benalcazar’s 
men, to secure information on their objective. Benalcazar 
received the emissary courteously and told him he did not 
intend to contest Quesada's rights, but wished only unob­
structed passage to continue search for El. Dorado. However, 
when Benalcazar learned of Federmann's proximity, he tried 
to get him to align with him against Quesada and force the 
latter to surrender the territory, claiming it was under 
Pizarro's jurisdiction. Federmann refused to go along with 
this; consequently, the chaplains were able to get Benalcazar 
to yield on this point and submit the claim to Spain. Father
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be felt in Colombia placed me in great conflict, for it 
deprived me of his advice when 1 needed it most.
On February 7 I issued the following manifesto to the 
Northern Colombians.3
It is in this unexpected and satisfactory manner 
for you, that Colombia shall see assembled the 
august representation of its towns within a short 
period of eleven months. in this national assembly 
the principles of our happiness and the glory of 
the Republic will be fixed forever. You shall see
Las Casas returned to Spain with the three conquerors. Feder­
mann died in Madrid in February, 1542. Ibid.. 32-33, 51-52, 
84, 102.
Gonzalo Jim6nez de Quesada was born in Granada, Spain, 
about 1499. He came from a good family and, like his father, 
was a lawyer. He exercised his profession before the royal 
chancellery of Granada until he came to the New World with 
FernAndez de Lugo. In 1536 General Quesada left Santa Marta 
with his land forces. Part of his expedition was to go in 
seven boats to the mouth of the Magdalena River and then up 
the river to join Quesada. When his forces finally reunited, 
Quesada had to impose his authority to keep his men from 
turning back. His explorations and discoveries now led him 
to become the most noted among the conquerors of Colombia 
and finally to found the capital of the Republic. An 
unquenchable thirst for gold, however, led him to extreme 
cruelties which tarnished his image as it did that of the 
other Spanish explorers. After his meeting with Benalcazar 
and Federmann and his return from Spain, he obtained the 
title of marshall of the New Kingdom and the post of councilor 
for life of Santa Ffi. In 1569 he undertook a large and 
brilliant expedition which crossed the San Martin plains and 
finally reached the junction of the Guavire and Orinoco 
rivers. Instead of finding gold, however, Jimdnez de Quesada 
lost money. Then he wrote the history of his discoveries 
known as Compendio Historial or Historial Compendium. Unfor­
tunately, this priceless manuscript was lost. Quesada died 
a poor man on February 16, 1579, when he was over eighty 
years old. Ibid., 43-54, 89, 95, 101-102.
^The greater part of this manifesto has been deleted, 
for it is a flowery repetition of preceding events and proc­
lamations. The entire manifesto may also be seen in Blanco 
and Azpurda (eds.), Documentos Para la Historia. XIII,
376-86.
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the Liberator in this sovereign Areopagus present 
himself once more as a plain citizen to render his 
homage to the only Colombian monarch, which is the 
people assembled legitimately. Then cruel remorse, 
shame, and eternal opprobium shall cover his 
impious detractors with terror and horror. At the 
same time, just Colombians shall see the Father of 
the Republic with venerable respect mingle among us 
— more glorious and triumphant them in BoyacA, 
Carabobo, and junln.
Let us prepare ourselves, then, to enjoy now a 
delightful and ineffable period. Let even the 
slightest vestige of discord disappear from among us. 
Since the district under my command has been purged 
of those stray sons who attempted to alter its peace, 
let us all embrace with the ties of complete and 
sincere national reconciliation. Let the perturber 
of public order perish as a result of our love of 
country: let us submit ourselves with a pure
patriotism to the constituted authorities: and let
us banish from our homes the wicked ones who dare to 
disobey them. Recognizing the great man we owe our 
independence and liberty to, let us regard anyone who 
even imagines that the Liberator of Colombia could 
ever cease being that, as an enemy of the country.
It is time to conclude this exposition now. On 
ending it, I solemnly declare to you once more that 
my life, my blood, and all of me are the burnt sacra- 
fice with which I pay tribute to your happiness and 
your glories. Is it not sweet to perish, Colombians 
of the North, for such noble interests? I shall 
repeat to you, then, the same concepts that you 
heard on another occasion, and with which I shall 
seal my lips.
"The sword redemptoress of humanityI I In my hands 
it shall never be anything but Bolivar's swordi his 
will directs it, while my arm wields it. I shall 
perish a hundred times, and my blood shall be shed 
before I allow this sword to leave my hand or attempt 
to shed the blood that it has liberated until now. 
Fellow citizens 1 Bolivar's sword is in my hands: 
for you and for him, I shall go to eternity with it."
Caracas, February 7, 1829— XIX.
JOSE A. PAEZ.
CHAPTER XXVI
Difficulties of My Position in Venezuela—
General Cdrdova's Insurrection— Letter He Wrote 
Inviting Me to Take Part in It— General Santan­
der's Arrival in Venezuela as a Prisoner. My 
Correspondence with Him During These Circumstances 
— Judgment on General Santander— Difficulties With 
Which I Would Have to Struggle if the Liberator 
Abandoned Colombia— His October 14 Circular to the 
Colombian Departments— Its Results— Junta of 
Citizens in the San Francisco Convent in Caracas—  
My communication to the Minister of Interior— My 
Defense of the Liberator— Letter to the Liberator 
— I Convoke a Junta in the Caracas Theatre— Mani­
festo of the Town of Caracas to the Liberator—  
General Soublette's Letter to General Urdaneta—  
Reply to Some Charges that Restrepo Makes Against 
Me.
1829
All the events of these last years had made me under­
stand the great responsibility that accompanied command in 
Venezuela; consequently, my greatest desire was to retire to 
private life to tend to my affairs. Since I could tell from 
the Liberator's letters that he, too, was animated by the 
same desire, I offered him my fortune and invited him to come 
to his country to live and retire with me in my home, far 
from the turbulences and displeasures which embittered his 
existence.^
The author interjects this footnote here. “In his 
reply (September 13, Guayaquil) to my invitation, Bolivar 
told me* 'I am your appreciative friend, my beloved
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I had not learned the intrigues of court on the battle­
fields , nor did I know the power of ambition and of 
Machiavelism. I thought that courage and virtue were the 
only means to attain good fortune, and for six years 1 still 
considered them the poles on which the earth revolved. I 
thought the majority thought as I did. But even the govern­
ment which I was consecrated to obey and which I had as my 
only support, had mediated and concerted plans for my destruc­
tion since the beginning of my elevation to power. A 
thousand hurdles were stretched out before me. X was 
delivered from these either by my good faith or fortune. 
Nevertheless, the measure of perfidy had to be fulfilled: 
so the August 30 Decree was dispatched.^ I was then placed 
in a cruel alternative: to carry it out or not. Either way,
X would be judged. I did what my duty advised me, and I
general. I say appreciative, for this letter which I am 
answering is very noble and generous to m e . I have been 
moved by the idea you have given me, and I hope I may enjoy 
private life and intimate companionship with you. (Volume 
XXI, page 74, Documentos de la^  Vida Pdblica del Libertador. )" 
A copy of the entire letter may be found in Blanco and 
Azpurtka (eds.), Documentos Para la Historia. XXI, 74.
2paez must be referring to the August 31, 1829 Decree 
which the Liberator issued from Guayaquil. Bolivar, aware 
of his failing health and apparently sincerely wanting to 
relieve himself of all power and responsibility, dispatched 
his celebrated circular asking the people to "freely express 
their opinions on the type of government and constitution 
which the next constituent congress should adopt and about 
the chief of administration that was to be elected." Felipe 
Larraz&bal, La Vida de Bolivar, Libertador de Colombia y  del 
Perd. Padre y  Fundador de Bolivia. 2 vols. (New York,
1871), II, 484.
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executed it. As a result, I was accused, suspended, and 
called to Bogot&. It was well known that Venezuela would 
not consent to having me obey this order, and that I would 
not fail in my duty to her. This very data, however, influ­
enced my moral enemies to promote a revolution by means of a 
sheet of paper. Nevertheless, I was faithful, even despite 
the indignation of many and to the point of injuring my 
dearest interests, Venezuela's, and the Liberator's. The 
latter know how to save us, however.
It was then that I should have abandoned the field of 
politics. As a candid and faithful soldier, I had already 
passed my zenith. I should have retired. 1 wanted to 
retire, and I persistently asked the Liberator about this; 
however, he opposed my retirement tenaciously. Renewing my 
gratitude and duties even further, he entrusted Venezuela to 
my ine^qperience. I obeyed, as I always did, for I was 
certain that I had the Liberator in Bogota at the head of 
the Republic backing me with his authority and directing me 
with his advice. I relied on a reciprocal faith in the 
government, and I continued with difficulty, but with com­
plete confidence. At these very moments the Liberator was 
leaving, and I was being left without a guide, for the 
Council was not Bolivar* I was not certain of the govern­
ment's good faith, dexterity, or good accord.
Since April of this year. General Jos6 Maria Cdrdova 
had been tracing a conspiracy to oppose what he called 
Bolivar's ambitious desires. To achieve it, he proposed to
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excite the jealousies and animosities between the Venezue­
lans and the Granadines. When he believed that his plans 
were very advanced, he wrote me the letter which I copy 
below.^
MOST EXCELLENT SENOR GENERAL IN CHIEF JOSfi A. PAEZ .
Medellin
September 18, 1829.
Senori
I had been persuaded by the reiterated oaths with 
which General Bolivar promised so many times to sus­
tain and respect Colombia's liberty, by the liberal 
opinions he manifested in his writings, by the vene­
ration he seemed to hold for the rights of the people 
during other times, and by the fact that the glorious 
title of Liberator of his country is more worthy than 
all the crowns of the universe, and that no man would 
want to renounce it in order to dominate his brothers, 
that it was not possible for General Bolivar to 
depreciate honor and glory and aspire to dominate his 
country. I saw the alarm of free men who had pene­
trated his ambitious desires while examining his con­
duct, as the deliriums of an excessive zeal.
Furthermore, I thought I saw in the public writings 
that clearly outlined his criminal projects either an 
alleviation from envy, or an expression of fear or 
fearful temperaments that created phantoms to scare 
themselves. When I saw that his acts were contrary to 
the constitution and laws, I thought that he did this 
dragged by the force of circumstances, or that his 
reason had deviated momentarily without his heart taking 
any part in these deviations. I expected later acts to 
erase these stains which were eclipsing his reputation. 
Sensitive to honor, I thought he would retrace his 
stepss ashamed of having abandoned the path of his 
duty, he would correct his deviations. With his 
repentance, I knew he would again win the people's 
esteem and affection; however, I have waited a long 
time in vain. Finally, after meditating slowly on his 
proceedings and comparing his acts, I have come to 
penetrate his desires. My reason becomes indignant at 
the aspect of the scandalous attempts which form the 
series of his conduct in these last years. Seeing
^This letter is in Blanco and Azpurda (eds.), Docu­
mentor para la Historia. XIII, 638-39.
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clearly now, moat excellent Sefior, that far from 
seeking the road of correction, he removes his mask 
without shame to allow his base pretensions to be 
seen, my patriotism is inflamed against this General 
— this General who has deceived his country with vain 
oaths and who had the impudence of offering it an 
ignominious yoke as a reward for its sacrifices. . . .
1 am stimulated by the liberal sentiments which 
have never left my heart. 1 am tired of waiting for 
General Bolivar, moved by the unanimous clamor of the 
people, and sensitive to the glory of which he has 
been deprived by his ambition, to renounce his criminal 
projects and restore to Colombia the liberty which he 
has usurped from it. Finally, undeceived by his latest 
actions that he is thinking less about anything than 
restoring liberty, and that all his desires are on the 
path of cementing tyranny, I have yielded to the cries 
of my compatriots and the instigations of my heart.
I have raised the standard of liberty in this province, 
and all the people have enthusiastically declared for 
such a just cause. Free men run to join us from all 
parts. All of us proclaim to die a thousand times 
rather than suffer tyranny. Yes, most excellent 
Senor, this is our resolution, and there is nothing 
which can make us desist from it. The decision and 
ardor which is manifested everywhere for liberty, 
convince me that from one end of the Republic to the 
other, the people will take advantage of this occasion 
to allow their hatred for tyranny to be seen and to 
shake the yoke that oppresses them. . . .
It is not possible for Your Excellency to want the 
degrading title of vassal of a monarch as recompense 
for your heroism, sacrifices, and triumphs. We all 
rely on the fact that Your Excellency will no longer 
acknowledge General Bolivar's arbitrary government and 
will place yourself at the head of the free men in 
those departments. Then we expect you will establish 
relations with me, reach an agreement, and then to­
gether we shall destroy despotism forever. Let us 
unite and liberty will most certainly triumph. . . .
I end my letter by begging Your Excellency to hear 
the cry of the people who implore our protection, and 
that reaching an agreement with me, we lend our arms 
to shake the chaims of slavery. Please remove from 
your side all those men whom General Bolivar has brought 
to surround you always, for knowing Your Excellency's 
heart, he fears each instant that with you at the head 
of the republicans of Venezuela, his tyranny will end. 
Please search the heart of all honest citizens, and you
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will find that they all harbor the sentiments 
which I have manifested to you.
Please accept the sentiments of esteem and affec­
tion with which I have the honor of being Your 
Excellency's most attentive and obedient servant.
JOS6 m a r Ia  c6 r d o v a .
If I had had, as some malevolent writer has supposed, any 
preconcerted plan against Bolivar's authority and Colombia's 
integrity, I would not have allowed the occasion offered me 
by Cdrdova's insurrection to pass. This chief had attained 
quite a bit of fame in Perti, but was ruined by the speed 
with which he wanted to carry his plans into effect.
In August of this year, the frigate of war Cundina- 
marca entered Puerto Cabello carrying General Santander, whom 
the government had imprisoned in the Bocachica Fortress and 
was now sending to receive my orders. General Santander had 
written me from that fortress telling me about the misfor­
tune he suffered and of the hopes he had of finding good 
treatment with me which would be compatible with security.
He claimed this right as a man who had gone without sleep to 
second the worthy and magnificent projects of General Bolivar 
whose life he had saved at a time when his existence depended 
on his will. I answered this letter with the following one.4 
To Seftor General Francisco de P. Santander
Caracas
April 22, 1829.
Senor General:
4Ibid., 514-15.
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When your letter written in Bocachica on this 
past February 19th reached my hands, I already had 
news of your coming to Venezuela by disposition of 
the government. 1 also knew about the misfortunes 
prepared for you by a series of unfortunate happen­
ings and events. In opportune time also, X learned 
about the attempt of September 25 in Bogota, and 
later about everything published with respect to 
your accomplices.
It is not my place to analyze the government's 
reasons for suspending the Liberator's beneficious 
providence, who according to what you tell me, 
opposed your banishment from the country. However, 
it is very satisfactory for me to assure you that as 
soon as I learned of your confinement in Venezuela,
I prepared to correspond to the government's confi­
dence and your hopes.
Rest assured, Senor General, that I have the best 
intentions to favor you, always conciliating the 
duties of my position with my natural inclinations.
Come to Venezuela confident that you will find the 
best hospitality and consideration with which I am 
your obedient servant, General.
josfi a . pAez
Arriving in Puerto Cabello, Santander sent me a 
testimonial in which he tried to vindicate himself of the 
crimes of which he was accused, and he begged me to free him 
from privations and sufferings by granting him a passport to 
a foreign country. This document abounds in historical 
citations, and it is well known that he wrote it under the 
veil of a profound sadness. He terminated it with these 
wordsi5
If Your Excellency's sword has given life and 
fortune to many Colombians, a feeling of humanity 
and even of justice on your part, will give in this 
instance a less bitter existence to an old Colombian;
5Roberto Cortazar (ed.), Cartas y  Menaaqes de San­
tander . 8 vols. (Bogota, 1953-55), VIII, 29-30.
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health, to a sick man; and consolation, to a 
family inundated in tears.
In 1816 Your Excellency gave me protection 
against the oppressors of my native land; do the 
same in 1829 against the adversity and anger of my 
ignoble enemies.
Santander added the following letter to this testi­
monial . 6
To His Excellency, General in Chief JOs£ Antonio
P&ez.
Bay of Puerto Cabello 
August 19, 1829
Senor Generali
In Bocachica I opportunely received your very 
attentive letter in reply to the one I sent you from 
that fortress. This answer has corresponded 
entirely with my hopes and has filled me with con­
solation. As much for what it promises me for the 
future, as for having sent it, I thank you most 
expressively and sincerely.
My situation does not permit me to bestow any favor 
which would contribute to improving it. Since you 
have generously offered me all your services in my mis­
fortune, I have thought it suitable to present you the 
testimonial accompanying this letter, which the com­
mandant of this ship is delivering. I know that a 
magistrate always has to protect himself, sometimes 
before his superiors, and sometimes before sane public 
opinion. I have no doubt that I shall secure from you, 
or through your mediation, what I asked for in this 
paper. I know your heart and character well, and I 
also know well what influence you have in the govern­
ment. Since the public voice occupies itself today 
with nothing other than to praise and bless the kind­
nesses you have used with the banished and those 
confined to the territory under your command, how can 
I not expect relief, consolation, and my freedom from 
your powerful hand? Confident of this, I have reached 
this port. in the midst of the tribulations, of the 
penalties of sixty days of navigation, and of my cruel
^A copy of this letter may be found in Blanco and 
Azpurda (eds.), Documentos Para la Historia, XIII, 605-606.
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infirmities, I am consoled and vivified by the 
thought of being under your custody.
Overlook my impertinences. A sick man, who is 
absent from his family, pursued, and confined, has 
many necessities to consider, and a thousand reasons 
for being impertinent. Nevertheless, you can be sure 
that I will not demand anything which will compromise 
your honor or minex for this is the only jewel left 
me by my superiors. Out of my long public career in 
my country's service, I am determined to preserve it 
at all cost and in the midst of misfortunes and 
bitterness. The enclosed certificate which General 
Montilla has given me will show you that I have con­
ducted myself with honor in the prisons, as I shall 
always conduct myself in any circumstance. I beg you 
to please return said document to me and keep a copy, 
or if you keep the original, please send me an 
authentic copy.
1 remain, Senor General, a most acknowledged, 
obedient, humble servant.
Q.B.S.M.
F. de P. Santander.
When I received this letter, I answered with the following. 
To Sehor Francisco de Paula Santander
Puerto Cabello 
August 20, 1829
My Esteemed Senor:
I have read your letter dated yesterday aboard the 
frigate of war, Cundinamarca. in which you honor me with 
the hopes of relief from your present misfortune. You 
do justice to my sentiments, which are always inclined 
to make the lot of an unfortunate person leas bitter.
I thank you most sincerely for this belief. Even if I 
will flatter myself by considering myself worthy of it,
I shall always be honored by your conviction.
Fortunately you have arrived at Venezuelan shores at 
a time when I am competently authorized by the govern­
ment to make your situation more bearable. The desires 
which you manifested to me in your first letter from
7Ibid.. 606.
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the Bocachica fortress in Cartagena will be satis­
fied, and 1 shall have the pleasure of simultaneously 
fulfilling my duties to the government and to you.
By chance I arrived at this port three days ago.
If my proximity can be useful to you in anything con­
ducive to relieving your afflictions and making your 
stay and the trip on which you are going to embark less 
painful, please tell me, confident that I shall do 
everything possible.
I remain your obedient servant.
JOSfi A. pAe z .
Today, as I review the letters that General Santander 
wrote me at various times, I cannot understand how this mam 
has come to appear in Colombian history as one of my worst 
enemies. In all those letters and in the ones that I sent 
him in reply, there is not the slightest animosity. If in 
one or in another we manifest some resentment, it may be 
seen by the dates that we were satisfied very quickly by the 
explanations we gave each other. Santander continued to 
write me from New York and Hamburg. Those who read this 
correspondence cannot believe that this is the same Santander 
who wrote Bolivar the confidential letter which I have men­
tioned previously.
General Santander is a historic personage who has been 
judged in two diametrically opposed manners. Undoubtedly, it 
is still very difficult to justly place him in his proper 
niche. As a patriot in the early years of the revolution, 
he is unquestionably one of Colombia's heroesi as adminis­
trator of her interests, he cannot be denied great talent 
and ability if the grave obstacles with which he had to
669
struggle are taken into consideration. Sometimes moderate 
in his conduct while exaggerated in his principles at others, 
his administration hurt itself because of the lack of harmony 
between its deeds and its principles. Thus it is that while 
appearing to defend Colombia's integrity, Santander was per­
haps the most powerful instrument preparing for the necessary 
separation of the three sections. Much to the contrary of 
what has always happened to controversial men in republics, 
Santander returned to his country, directed its destinies 
again, and died in the land where he was born. When he 
declared himself Bolivar's enemy, posterity believed itself 
with the right to accuse him of ambitious desires and excessive 
presumption. It falls to the future historians of Colombia, 
when they are able to write without the impressions of the 
moment, to place this exalted personage of the American 
independence movement in the position pointed out by his 
civic virtues and his errors.
When the Liberator saw the war in Perd ended satis­
factorily and was preparing to return here, I manifested my 
desire to retire to private life to him once more— the 
private life which was my element and which promised me the 
inestimable joys of which I was deprived. If the Liberator 
left Colombia and left the reins of government, my obligation 
would be ended, for I thought it useless and perhaps dangerous 
for me to occupy such a precarious position. I feared that 
the government council, which frequently revealed itself most 
satisfied with me, would not have the same inclination in
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Bolivar's absence. 1 did not trust my forces if I were
lacking the support of a friend who knew the needs of his
native state, the character of its inhabitants, and the 
moral strength and prestige which it enjoyed. There would 
be many and repeated occasions when it would be imperative
to work in favor of the public good when the government
would not see the need. There would be other times when a 
measure selected by the government to provide for the needs 
at hand, would be funeral for Venezuela, so far from its 
sight. At still other times it would be indispensable to 
modify the resolutions whose extensive character would clash, 
either with the decrees issued by the Liberator in the 
departments, or with other statutes agreed upon and approved 
by the local government itself and which might not be con­
sidered. in any case, the responsibility of those who 
governed would be endangered at each step, either because 
they would detain execution of a decree to avoid harm, or 
because they would allow the latter to come without being 
able to prevent it. In a country where calumnies against 
the government and those who governed were fomented by cer­
tain disorganized men, who were enemies of Colombia, all
resolutions would be exposed to their detractions and even
*
their accusations. In a country subject to this calamity, 
it was indispensable to maintain the government, especially 
that of the Liberator.
There was no hope that the Constituent Congress could 
make provisions for these evils or that later the structure
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of the great political machine they created could resolve 
these difficulties. This was because without the Liberator's 
immediate instructions to the deputies, without his enlight­
enments given by time and experience, nothing could be done, 
or what was done would necessarily have omissions. The 
latter was something which a stable constitution, to which 
the future of Colombians would be entrusted forever, should 
not possess. It fell to the Liberator, then, to resolve the 
difficult political problems which would be considered by 
the national representation! the latter, although selected 
from the best that our countries could offer, would find 
itself consumed by a thousand perplexities unless the 
Liberator guided its course and aided its efforts.
Finally, I believed that Bolivar's presence in 
Colombia was vital to her organization. I also believed 
that my duration in the command of Venezuela was marked by 
that of the Liberator in the Presidency and his stay in that 
territory. I told him all this in my letters. Bolivar was 
Colombia's souli his genius gave it life: without him,
only a cadaver would remain.
On October 14 of this year, the Liberator directed a 
circular to the departments of Colombia authorizing them to 
express their views frankly on the type of political regime
Q
that would best suit them. . If I failed to publish the
®This circular was first issued on August 31, 1829.
See footnote 2 in this chapter.
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circular, 1 would be considered a tyrant who oppressed the 
liberty of the people when the Liberator had ordered them to 
express their desires openly. If I published it, I would be 
in open battle with the party that did not believe its 
publication opportune. Finally, I decided to face the con­
sequences, and I published the circular. Then the towns make 
their wishes known. These were so irreconcilable, that it 
was impossible to take any definite action. The citizens of 
Manavi and other points desired a moderate monarchy under 
Bolivar's sceptre. In Maracaibo, some of the people requested 
that this life-time leader be named the head of a republic 
with the authority to select a successor from among the three 
men that the citizens selected. In the village of Perija 
this program was varied somewhat. These citizens wanted the 
vice-president to succeed the supreme chief of the republic 
until the nation could name a successor. The city of 
Valencia, by the unanimous vote of its most notable men, 
pronounced against the monarchical form and favored the dis­
solution of the three states which formed Colombia. They 
requested that this petition be sent to Congress.
On November 26 a junta of Caracas's best citizens 
assembled in the San Francisco Convent. It resolvedi (1) 
to separate from the Bogota government and disallow General 
Bolivar's authority, but to maintain peace, friendship, and 
concordance with their brothers from the central and southern 
departments of Colombia; to draw up a treaty and establish 
what would suit their common interests, and this was
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applauded and greeted with extraordinary enthusiasm; (2) to 
send the act justifying the procedure, including the resolu­
tions, to the general superior chief, asking him to consult 
the will of the departments which comprised the old Venezuela, 
and convoke primary assemblies in all the territory under 
his command as quickly as possible so that, in accordance 
with the known regulations, electors could be nominated and 
successively representatives to compose a Venezuelan conven­
tion; taking this basis into consideration, it would proceed 
immediately to establish a republican government— representa­
tive, alternative, and responsible; (3) to extend the mani­
festo which was directed to their Colombian brothers and to 
the whole sphere, stating the reasons which imperiously 
demanded its resolution; {4) to maintain the worthy General 
Jose Antonio PAez as chief of these departments, and that 
holding the people's confidence as he did, he was to maintain 
public order and keep all the branches of the administration 
under the existing forms until the convention was installed; 
(5) to keep its commitments to foreign countries and private 
individuals who *had granted aids to consolidate her political 
existence, even though Venezuela had adopted measures rela­
tive to her security by separating from the government that 
had governed until then, it was expected that the convention 
would arrange these just obligations in the most suitable 
manner.9
9Blanco and Azpurda (eds.), Documentos Para la Historia. 
XIII, 719.
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When I received this junta's act in Valencia, I 
directed the following communication to the Minister of 
Interior.10
REPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA
JOSfi ANTONIO PAEZ, SUPERIOR CIVIL AND MILITARY CHIEF 
OF VENEZUELA, ET CETERA, ET CETERA.
General Headquarters, Valencia
December 8, 1829.-No. 98.
To the Minister of State in the Department of the 
Interior.
I received your official communique of this past 
October 16 containing the resolution of the government 
council e>q>edited in accordance with the decree of His 
Excellency, the Liberator President, to have the people 
freely express their wishes with regard to the form of 
their government, a decree which should be sanctioned, 
and to name the chief of the nation, which should be 
communicated directly to the departmental prefects.
I had this published by proclamation, and the 
citizens of each town have assembled and manifested 
their wishes, but not in a similar manner. In some 
cities, villages, and parishes, they have taken the 
form of a petition directed to the constituent con­
gress: in others, they have taken the form of resolu­
tions. All ask for or desire the separation of 
Venezuela from the rest of the Republic and to have 
her constituted as a sovereign state, leaving the 
relations which should be established with the other 
states which have been within Colombia1s territory 
to the consideration of its government. ■ The town which 
has most exceeded the terms of the decree has been 
Caracas. Here popular assemblies were held on the 
twenty-fifth and the twenty-sixth of this past month 
where it was resolved by act to separate Venezuela and 
disallow His Excellency the Liberator's authority, 
arranging beforehand to proceed immediately to form a 
constituent congress with representatives selected for 
this, and for me to take charge of the new order and 
direct the movement.
I had come from Caracas to this city in order to
10Ibid., XIV, 29-30.
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maintain peace and quiet in the surrounding areas of 
the valleys and towns in the West, for I was alarmed 
by the news that was spreading that the people were 
considering organizing the Republic under a monarchical 
system. 1 received the Caracas Act in this city. It 
was delivered to me by three secretaries and two addi­
tional citizens who were substituting for Doctor Andres 
Narvarte, another commissioned secretary who had become 
i l l . T h e  commissioners demanded that I march to 
Caracas immediately to take charge of the new adminis­
tration and issue the decrees needed for the execution 
of their projects. However, I let them know that the 
nature of my commitments and the obedience I had sworn 
to the provisional organization, did not permit me to 
do this in any way. Nevertheless, since I was pressed 
urgently, and since I considered on the other hand that 
the desperate state in which that town found itself 
might induce it to take other measures of action which 
might be capable of causing confusion and perhaps even 
leading us to anarchy, I promised them that they would 
not be molested because of their opinions. I have also 
promised them that their wishes shall have effect 
through the resolutions of the constituent congress—  
the legal font to which they should direct their act 
for a decision. Meanwhile, I ask to be permitted to 
govern, as is my duty, in the name and under the 
authority of His Excellency the Liberator President.
In this manner I have managed to maintain order, and 
quiet the people's agitation and alarm, for they have 
been and still are very restless.
Since on the first day of this month when the mail 
arrived in this capital, I was occupied all morning and 
part of the afternoon receiving the commissioners who 
brought the Caracas Act, I barely had time to inform 
His Excellency the Liberator President and the Most 
Excellent Minister of War by private letters about this 
event. I take advantage now of this first opportunity 
to inform you so that you can tell the government 
council, adding that if the separation of Venezuela is 
an evil, it now seems inevitable. Everyone seems to 
desire it vehemently, and I believe this occasion will 
not be allowed to pass except at the cost of bloody, 
horrible, .aid unfortunate sacrifices. This opinion is 
general and superior to the influence of any man* In 
reality, it is the public opinion. I have not wanted 
to participate in any of it because His Excellency
H-Dr. Andrfis Narvarte had been one of the three provis­
ional members of the triumvirate which composed the national 
executive in 1811. Morbn, History of Venezuela. 103.
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the Liberator forewarned me to allow the people to 
act and say what they wanted to with complete frank­
ness and freedom. They have done this. As for me,
I shall believe that I have fulfilled my duties if I 
can maintain order, tranquility, and the administra­
tion of the present regime to which I have sworn 
allegiance, until the constituent congress resolves 
this matter. These are the recommendations X have 
made to all the authorities that are under my command 
in these provinces, giving them orders at the same 
time to maintain respect, veneration, and obedience 
to His Excellency the Liberator President.
May God keep you.
JOS& ANTONIO PAEZ.
In those days lampoons appeared in Caracas which were 
injurious to the Liberator's person and which made violent 
allusions to his government. I sent orders then from Valen­
cia to the authorities so that they would punish these 
excesses. I said the following to the inhabitants.^2
. . . the liberty which the governmental decrees has 
given the people to request what would be most suit­
able for their future and prosperity does not auth­
orize them to write abuses and threats against the 
first magistrate, who was simultaneously the most 
notable hero of this part of the New World, and to 
whom immense services were owed. These excesses 
could only be the work of some violent persons who 
in a delirous moment had written what not even their 
own hearts, much less those of the rest of the 
Venezuelans, desired; that in any case such conduct 
was always painful and dishonorable for the country; 
and finally, that freedom of the press and the right 
of petition gave no cause to resort to such base 
means.
All the Venezuelan towns manifested the same desires 
as the capital city did to separate peacefully from Bogota
l2These are excerpts from a decree P&ez sent from his 
general headquarters in Valencia on November 30, 1829 to the 
Departmental Prefect. A complete copy of this decree may be
found in Blanco and Azpurda (eds.), Documentos Para la 
Historia, XIII, 727-28.
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and form an independent state. Mine was a most difficult
position, for I was struggling between my considerations for
the Liberator and the unanimous will of the people. On
December 1, I wrote the following letter to the Liberator
from Valencia.13
To His Excellency the Liberator SimOn Bolivar, Et Cetera. 
Et Cetera.
My Beloved General and Friend:
Today the commissioners from Caracas arrived to 
deliver the act they have recorded asking for 
Venezuela’s separation by act, and to be constituted 
under republican forms. If they had limited them­
selves to this, I would not have found it strange, 
for the opinions of these towns were known to me.
However, the part in which they address you person­
ally has caused me grief. The commissioners have come 
determined to demand that I go to Caracas to take 
charge of and direct this movement; however, I have 
excused myself because of my commitments. I have 
promised them wholeheartedly that this love which they 
have manifested for liberty shall have no painful con­
sequences for them. I have not seen anything in the 
act but the realization of the fears which I expressed 
to you in the letter I sent yesterday. I knew that 
the Venezuelans wholeheartedly opposed the union with 
Bogota and were determined to make any sacrifice to 
achieve this separation; but I believed that the 
reason for their doing this forces me to dissimulate it. 
The commissioners are satisfied with the offer I have 
made to them— an offer which I had to make to them 
because I could not leave that town in desperation and 
exposed to taking other disastrous and disorganizing 
measures. Thus I have continued to command on the same 
footing I had before and until such time as the reso­
lution of the constituent congress is known.
If the separation is an evil, it is already inevit­
able, and I hope that far from opposing it, you will 
recommend it to the congress. In this manner you will 
contribute greatly to the well-being and contentment of 
your countrymen and compatriots. On the other hand, if 
you or the government council attempt to suffocate it,
13Ibid.. XIV, 5-6.
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I cannot account for anything, for daily I see 
nothing but violence to contain. This is an opinion 
which is superior to the influence of any man. Fur­
thermore, I shall tell you that 1 am not certain that 
the moderation with which 1 am acting will be enough 
to maintain affairs in the order they still have. I 
say this because there is already talk, almost bare­
faced, of seeking another chief to guide Venezuela in 
this movement. 1 recommend this cause to your prudence. 
Reflect on it calmly, for those involved are your 
friends, and your brothers. If the lance is engaged, 
very precious blood shall be spilled. A war shall be 
started which we shall not see ended. Give the Vene­
zuelans their peace, and add this to the many benefits 
you have already given them.
I work to maintain your glory and reputation as my 
chief and my friend. This is the one task I perform 
with pleasure at this time, for I am very tired of 
commanding. I do not have a moment's peace. Dis­
pleasures have taken away my sleep and even my 
appetite.
It grieves me to tell you what I have to in this 
letter; however, it would grieve me even more if you 
did not know about it or if someone else told you 
before I did. I do not know what course these events 
shall take, but regardless of what they may be, and 
even if destiny carries me to misfortune, I shall 
always prove that I am your heart-felt friend.
JOSE A. PAEZ.
On December 21, I again wrote the Liberator from 
Caracas in the following terms.
Caracas
December 21, 1829
My Beloved General and Friendi
After I received the pronouncement from this city,
I remained in Valencia until I was forced to come by 
the agitation I observed in this town. I arrived here 
on the twelfth. Caracas was truly in a lamentable 
state, for there was no trusting anything or anyone.
Only thoughts about extreme revolution were comtem­
pi ated as protection from any attempt which might be
14Ibid., 54-55.
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made against the pronouncements. I tried to see 
everyone, and I have succeeded in inspiring confi­
dence; however, the people still are not quiet. The 
provisions I take with every precaution to calm 
resentments and passions disturb them in such a 
manner, that I am chagrined at each step because I 
fail to go crazy. I am suffocated, and 1 feel in­
capable of keeping the people quiet: prudence
appears to be timidity; any job appointment excites 
jealousies; and everything that is not inflamatory, 
is considered contrary to their movement.
I have not proposed any idea, but I have tried to 
moderate the existing ones without opposing the general 
will of the public. It would be impossible for me to 
do otherwise. Moreover, it would be harmful and con­
trary to my own ideas, for desiring Venezuela's for­
tune and prosperity as much as most, I am determined 
to maintain her wishes while trying by every means 
possible to prevent civil war, and internal dissen­
sions and persecutions from devouring her. I am 
determined to do this because I see very clearly that 
there is no other path left open to us: not you, nor
I, nor anyone can contain this movement. The person 
who attempts this will achieve nothing more than to 
ruin himself and destroy the country. A show of arms, 
or the first rifle shot, would be the sign for a 
general uprising. If the Venezuelan troops were 
defeated, the uprising would be even more devouring, 
for a chieftain would arise in each canton, in each 
town. Then the country would be divided at the very 
least into guerrilla factions which would be impossible 
to ever bring to any accord. We would die like savages, 
without the hope of ever seeing any social organization 
again. Perhaps this soil will get to be Spanish because 
those engaged in the conflict would fling themselves 
into the arms of anyone offering protection.15
15The author footnotes this as follows. "Senor 
Restrepo, who undoubtedly did not see this letter, states in 
Volume IV, page 269: 'He (P&ez) wrote a private letter to
Bolivar at the same time manifesting his resolution to him 
and urging him not to insist on going against the determined 
will of the Venezuelans; that if he attacked them, the entire 
country would be covered with guerrillas that would destroy 
him; and that in the final analysis they would rather deliver 
themselves to the Spanish. We do not believe that P&ez and 
his partisans would ever have thought of fulfilling this 
criminal threat.1 I beg the reader to compare these expres­
sions with the contents of my letter, and thus keep me from
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We have arrived at the worst imaginable state, for 
I have never seen myself in a more difficult and dan­
gerous situation. My future and my reputation are com­
promised, and I believe it not only necessary, but 
indispensable, to assemble a Venezuelan congress for 
the purpose of deliberating and organizing the country.
If this meeting is held without contradiction from you, 
without snares, and without any instigations on any­
one's part to introduce discord and foment lack of 
confidence, we can still expect days of peace and 
tranquility. Convince yourself of this, my dear Gen­
eral. Believe, believe me that I speak the truth, and 
the pure truth, without any other interest than the 
well-being of the country. I have no personal goal, 
and much less, any intention of contradicting you.
Believe me for the good of the country, and believe 
me for our friendship1s sake.
Goodbye, my dear General. I wish you the skill 
necessary to untie this knot, and I hope that you do 
not make any mistakes in your resolutions or in your 
actions. I also hope that you believe I am animated 
by the sentiments of consideration and friendship with 
which X am your affectionate servant and friend.
JOSfi A. PAEZ.
On December 24, with the object of determining the 
opinion of the citizens of Caracas for myself, I convoked a 
junta of its most select citizens at the public theatre in 
order that the inhabitants of the city in which the Liberator 
had been born could express their opinion anew. More than 
two thousand persons came to this junta, which was in session 
from 11:00 a.m. until 4:00 a.m. the following day. Among 
the orators, there were some who started to upbraid the 
Liberator's conduct. Among these was Sefior Juli&n Garcia 
who went to the extreme of calling him unjust and tyrannical.
commenting on the accusation of the Granadine historian."
This citation may be found where the author states in 
the Jos6 Jacquin edition of Restrepo, Revolucidn de la 
Repdblica de Colombia.
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Presiding over this assembly, I rose, interrupted the orator, 
and addressed him in the following manner.
Senor Garcia, you are out of order. We have not 
come here to discuss what the Liberator has been or 
is. The Liberator has sent an authorization to all 
the departments in Colombia so that they may express 
their wishes concerning the type of political regime 
they consider most suitable for the Republic. There­
fore, I declare that 1 shall not allow one sole word 
to be uttered against the Liberator.
A deep silence followed this short discourse, and the discus­
sion ended with the reading of the resolution adopted by the 
assembly and which follows below. It may also be found in 
Volume XXI, page 91, Documentos Relativos a .la Vida Ptiblica 
del Libertador.16
EXPOSITION OF THE TOWN OF CARACAS TO HIS EXCELLENCY
THE LIBERATOR PRESIDENT
Most Excellent Seflor:
We the priests, heads of families, and notable 
citizens of the city of Caracas to which we subscribe, 
while assembled in the presence of His Excellency the 
Superior Chief, accompanied by the wisdom and modera­
tion which the desire for peace and justice of our 
cause inspires, have determined to manifest to His 
Excellency that this town on this past November 25 and 
26, and the other towns on different days, have 
expressed their unanimous desire to separate the old 
Venezuela from the union with the rest of the territory 
forming the Republic of Colombia. In this manner 
Venezuela would regain her sovereignty and the power to 
create a republican, popular, representative, alterna­
tive, responsible and elective government, which is 
considered the most suitable to her customs, climate, 
and circumstances. These people want to proceed with 
this task involving their future repose and well-being 
motivated only by their own meditation and conscience. 
They fear that the shadow of the height that Your
^Blanco and Azpuarda (eds.) , Documentos Para la His- 
toria. The rest of the author's citation is correct.
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Excellency has attained might prevent free rein to your 
reflections, or that the execution of your ardent wishes 
might find obstacles in the councils of BogotA. It was 
not without agitation and pain that Venezuela tore her­
self from her sovereignty. Now she works for her future 
well-being without placing limits or price on the love 
of liberty.
We recommend most earnestly that you. Your Excellency, 
who has been so interested in the independence and glory 
of this soil where you were b o m ,  and where your rela­
tives, friends, and the respectable ashes of your 
parents are, exercise your powerful influence so that 
our separation and organization may be made peacefully, 
and so that no one will alter our union or pretend to 
oppose our precious and laudable undertaking. There 
is no justifiable motive before humanity that can arm 
Your Excellency nor the Bogota government to invade our 
rights so long as Your Excellency realizes that we are 
permitted to defend ourselves and resist. The world 
will investigate the cause of the misfortunes, deaths, 
and horrors which will come, and not the pretexts 
sought to wreak these upon u s . We shall leave the 
victim's sepulchres open so that their descendants may 
see the blood their fathers shed, and the sounds they 
received at the hands of those who uselessly wanted to 
suffocate their heroic patriotism.
Caracas, December 24, 1829— XIX.— Jose A. P&ez,
Rafael Ortega, priest Luis Acosta, priest Joaquin Rada, 
priest Ramdn Calzadilla, priest Dr. Juan Hilario Bocett, 
Diacono Ramdn Bermfldez, priest Dr. Francisco Javier 
Narvarte, priest Listo Freites, priest Josd Marla 
Hurtado, priest Juan Francisco Atencio, Diacono Pedro 
Osio, Dr. TomAs Francisco Vicente Parejo, Diego B.
Urbaneja, Carlos Soublette, Rafael Revenga, Mariano 
Herrera, Alejo Fortique, Angel Quintero, Ramdn Ayala,
Pedro Machado, Caludio Viana, josA F61ix Salas, TomAs 
Antero, Raimundo R. Sarmiento. An additional fifteen 
hundred signatures follow.
I shall not close this chapter without answering some 
of the unjust and malicious charges that have been directed 
against me and the Venezuelans as a result of the events of 
this year. I shall reply to those who accuse Venezuela of 
having been the center from which sprung the projects of 
monarchy, and those who believe that it was planned beforehand
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to divide the Republic in the territory which I commanded, 
by including the following letter from the worthy General 
Soublette to Urdaneta when the latter was trying to fulfill 
his monarchical schemes.^ No one will refuse to admit 
General Soublette's authorized word, for he was a veteran 
patriot and most republican in feeling. On April 19 of this 
year 1866, a Caracas newspaper has justly written the follow­
ing words about himt
Soublette, Miranda's, and Rivas's aide-de-camp, 
was a general of the sword and a brilliant person who 
inspired. More than once he was the leader in the 
famous retreat from Ocumare. He was also the defendor 
of Cartagena, Bolivar's loyal friend, author and 
witness of all our glories and administrator with 
Santander. Today he possesses the respect and 
sympathies of all parties in South America.
General Soublette*s Letter to General Urdaneta.
Caracas
October 13, 1819 [1829].
My dear General and friendi
Your letter of September 9 and the copy you 
enclosed for me of the one you wrote General P&ez on 
this same day, have sickened me and reduced me to a 
miserable state. From the very first time you had the 
kindness to speak to me about the great affair which 
occupies you, I manifested my opinion frankly to you.
You have mistrusted your ground-work, thought us to be 
seeing phantoms, have continued working along these 
lines, and insist that we co-operate in fulfilling the 
project. What hope remains for me then? None, and 
this is the thought that destroys my spirit.
Each day I have further reasons to realize that 
these departments will resist a monarchy, and that civil 
war shall result from the adoption of this form of
17it is interesting to note that this letter is not 
included in Urdaneta, Memoriae or in Blanco and Azpurda 
(eds.), Documentos Para la Historia.
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government— a civil war which shall return us to 
Spanish domination after a thousand horrors and dis­
asters. I do not seem to have the power to convince 
you of this, for my words reach you without efficacy.
You do not believe me, and attribute my opposition to 
varied fears. All of this causes me a mortal agony.
I am your friend and a friend to all who are in this 
undertaking. 1 know the purity of your intentions, 
and because of this my torments increase. I see that 
with the best intentions in the world, you all have 
adopted the only means that can ruin us without remedy. 
Forgive me this frankness, my friend; however, I con­
sider it a duty to tell you things as I see them.
After the letters of September 9 were received, the 
project has been publicized. Already everyone in this 
city knows about it, and very quickly all Venezuela 
will be aware of it. You have only surprised your 
friends and confirmed eternal doubts in others who 
already celebrate their triumph and relish Venezuela's 
sighed-for separation and the fall of the Liberator and 
all his friends. Those friends he has here are as sad 
as I am. We get together to sigh and deplore the fate 
that awaits us. We ask ourselves how can it be possible 
for you, Castillo, and the other important citizens 
involved, to have such little knowledge of Venezuela's 
true state and condition as to give this direction to 
things. No one can answer this. We go to see General 
P&ez, and we find him in bed— pale, sleepless, and 
unable to occupy himself with anything since the arrival 
of the September 9 mail. All this considered, can it 
be expected that any of these deputies will support the 
monarchy in Congress?
If, as I understand it, you all do not have any per­
sonal goals in this matter, but rather are animated by 
the desire to give the nation stability and order, why 
have you not modified the plan since you learned there 
was opposition in Venezuela? This is because you have 
not believed us and as a result you are going to cause 
a revolution in the country whose consequences neither 
of us can calculate. If until now it has been easy to 
prove that the Liberator opposed a monarchy, it may not 
be so easy to do later. If it is judged that Venezuela 
is not worth much and will be oppressed by the weight 
of the other parts of the Republic, allow me to tell 
you that this is an incorrect judgment. Venezuela has 
war materials, more so than any other people in Colombia, 
and her state of poverty prepares her for revolution. 
After the latter has broken out here, opposition will 
reveal itself throughout all that territory and in that 
army on which you rely so securely. Ah 1 If you all 
would abate just a little, I could still expect good
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fortune for the country.
Perhaps my friends are going to become angry with 
me as a result of my constant opposition to this pro­
ject, but it shall be one of the many misfortunes 1 
expect and which I shall endure in silence. You can be 
certain that I shall never be mutinuous.
I am.
C. Soublette.
Senor Restrepo states that the Venezuelans were dis­
content with my administration during this period.1® He for­
gets that it was exactly at this time that they gave me the 
greatest proof of confidence and the greatest sign of affec­
tion that a citizen can receive. By their free and spon­
taneous will, the Venezuelans kept me at the head of the 
national party. When they constituted a new state into its 
political existence, they entrusted me with the direction of 
their interests and gave me all the authority I needed to 
defend them.
With reference to the ordinances I decreed for policing 
the nation, the results they produced answer the accusations 
made by the Granadine historian. What he calls "intruding 
into even the worker's most hidden hovel to prescribe regula­
tions for him concerning the raising of his cattle and domes­
tic animals," represented nothing more than the proper pro­
visions for preserving some elements of the wealth of my
18See Restrepo, RevoluciOn de. 1& Reodblica de. Colom­
bia. IV, 200.
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1 Qcountry. I understood the value of this wealth since I 
had been a shepherd in my early youth and chief of military 
operations in those areas where possession of these elements 
was of great interest to the Republic.
Regarding the meat trade where he presents me with a 
personal interest in the sale of young bulls from my farms, 
Restrepo errs in supposing me the owner of a sufficient 
number of heads of cattle to establish a monopoly at the 
time to which he refers.^0 i remember that a merchant from 
Puerto Cabello committed the same error then, proposing 
deals to me which I could not accept because my pecuniary 
means could not satisfy his solicitations.
l^Ibid. 20Ibid.. 201.
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